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Centre for European Integration Studies
This Colloquium takes place at a right time. Progress Reports and Strategy Paper for Enlargement were released just a couple of days ago. We are in a year's time from the conclusion of accession negotiations and the beginning of ratification process. Exactly in a month the European Council in Laeken will set up the Convention to debate the future of the European Union. Thus we have to praise the initiative of the Centre for European Integration Studies in Bonn for bringing this group to address the issues that will be increasingly important in the run up to the IGC 2004. My intervention would consists of two major parts: firstly - I would like to make a few points on the enlargement process and then, secondly, - to give you some insights on how we in Lithuania see the evolving discussions on the finalities of the EU. Enlargement: first thing first My starting point is that enlargement is fundamentally linked to the question of the future of the Union. My logic here is simple - only successful enlargement can bring about the success of the future of the Union. Therefore the sub-title of the Commission's Strategy paper - "making success of enlargement" - does perfectly reflect the call of the day. I would point out just three elements: - completion of accession negotiations in time is imperative. Sticking to the so called road map should make it possible to conclude negotiations with the most advanced countries - including Lithuania - by the end of 2002 so that they can become members of the EU in 2004;- the EU financial framework agreed in Berlin in 1999 provides a sufficient basis for the accession of up to ten new Member States. Again - it is a strategic confirmation. We all understand sensitivities related to the financial issues; different assumptions will be scrutinized and different suggestions might be discussed but the point of departure is right; - next relative point - reforms of the EU policies or institutions should not hinder or slow down the EU enlargement. The processes of accession and reforms/reviews of policies should be kept distinct. This is very important as regards negotiations on Agriculture and Regional policy, which constitute the main part of the EU's budget. Clearly - the 'homework' of the candidate countries is conditio sine qua non. On the other hand, achievements of the transition process must be also recognised: over the past decade countries in central and Eastern Europe have made unprecedented effort on the road of peaceful and essential transformation. European integration has been a guiding principle to this. And the economic outlook of Lithuania is rather clear: privatization is nearly over; about 70 per cent of GDP is now generated by the private sector. The economic structure of Lithuania has become similar to that of the EU member states: the services account for 60 per cent of GDP, the industry - a quarter of GDP, the agriculture - 7.5 per cent. GDP is rising 4-5 percent annually - twice as much as the EU average. Exports to the EU have been rising thus testifying the ability to withstand the competitive pressures.There is another side - or shall we say, price - to these achievements. Unemployment has been rising and it is nearly twice higher than the average in the EU. Unemployment is acute in rural areas, which in the case of Lithuania accounts for a fifth of the total workforce. Tight budgetary policies have restricted spending for social needs. Not surprisingly, sectors of social protection, health care, education are the most sensitive in terms of reforms. Economic and social transformation is not free of political costs. Public opinion in the candidate countries relate these costs to the European integration often more than they are related in reality. We, in Lithuania, have been telling different interest groups and society at large that it is us who need reforms more than the Union or 'Brussels'. But many around this table can perhaps agree that this message is not that easy to get across to people's minds.Thus it is not surprising that in a country like Lithuania the enlargement debate and the debate about the future of Europe are not only closely interlinked but also the issues of enlargement are taking precedence. To put it the other way our domestic discussion concentrate more about the future in Europe rather than the future of Europe. Accession negotiations, discussions on the costs and benefits of the membership attract close public attention. It became increasingly obvious at the present stage of negotiations with sensitive issues being laid on the table. Up till now public support for the EU has been sustained in Lithuania. Opinion polls show that the support for the membership among our population is slowly but steadily increasing. It stands at around 50 %. Recently we tried another interesting approach: people were asked how they would describe the EU if it were a person. About 80 % of respondents gave a positive description saying that it is an honest, reliable, just and clever person. However, in addition to being described as a big and decent friend, it was also perceived as a selfish manager. So resentments about 'the long way' to the EU membership are present in the East. Fears about 'the cost of enlargement' are heard in the West (where else if not in Germany these feelings are known so well). Against this background, I find it extremely important that the enlargement issues would also be debated in the EU member countries. Needless to say - success of the enlargement depends on a public support and the current levels of public support among the EU 15 are not encouraging. The argument that enlargement is about investment, that short-term costs will be by far outweighed by long-term benefits will have to be repeated time and again both in the East and West, South and North of Europe. Political leadership is needed for this and not another dramatic reminder that we cannot take our security or prosperity for granted. Integration is the best response to internal or external challenges. More Europe - not less. And the final observation at this point - enlargement process must remain inclusive. There are important suggestions to that end in the Enlargement Strategy Paper. Whatever scenario becomes true in a year or two the countries that are not part of the first round of enlargement should be given their fair chance. Stabilization process in the South-East Europe will be evolving into pre-accession and then accession track. On the other hand "a new neighborhood policy" should also be expanded. There is a clear need to co-operate with future border regions of the enlarged EU - the regions, to which enlargement of the EU will open new economic opportunities. Since Lithuania's Eastern border will become a part of the Union's external border we are particularly interested in regional co-operation (e.g. Northern Dimension). This topic is also a priority of the Lithuanian Chairmanship in the Council of Europe.Ideas and principles of the common futureBefore moving to some of the issues of the 'future of Europe' debate I would make the following remarks: - it is not the enlargement that has triggered this debate and further reforms of the Union. I counter the opinion that enlargement is the cause of all the changes - and nobody likes changes - that the Union has to undergo. The Union has been in the constant process of change since the very beginning. Enlargement is part of the change, but so is inherent logic of its development. The Union is under outside pressures of globalization and that - to my mind - is among the primary reasons for further European consolidation; - for the candidate countries participation in this debate is an important learning process. We have to recapitulate the post-war integrationist discourse. We have to become a part of it;- finally, we have the problem of the vocabulary. It is absolutely clear that the notions of 'federation' or 'constitution', 'solidarity' or 'division of competences' have quite a different meaning for different participants of the debate. Having said that, the questions that will have to be addressed in the course of the debate in a run up to the IGC 2004 and in the IGC itself are what objectives and common policies will be vested in the future European Union (what do we do together?). What institutional arrangements would serve those policies and overall objectives best? How it is all to be financed?Firstly, through the years of its existence, the European Union has proven that the objectives and policies of the founders of the EC set forth in fifties and sixties - the stability of the continent and the welfare of its citizens - are all alive. I would not put that to question. For me they continue to be fully relevant - and once again - the enlargement of the EU is the implementation of these objectives. If one looks at the preambles of the founding treaties or founding principles of the communities there is little to add to it. The dilemmas of 'communitarianism' and 'intergovernamentalism' will not be "resolved" in one or two IGCs or by making a great leap to a totally new constitutional design. This dualism is a unique characteristic of the whole project and what is impressive to those of us who have been observing it for the outside that it works. At least it has worked out so far. I think that the Union can register many more successes than failures over its relatively short history. It is always easier to focus on the latter as well as to be skeptical. For that you do not have to promote, to believe, to aspire. The principle of subsidiarity is as relevant as ever. At the turn of the centuries, it is still true that the most effective decisions are made at the level (regional, national or Union) which serves implementation and is closest to the citizens. Common EU areas and policies - single market, including free movement of goods, services, capital and persons or single currency have proven their worth. Their evolution should continue together with social protection and infrastructure of economics such as energy, transport or environment. The global role of the Union calls for new avenues for common policies such as common EU foreign and security policy, justice and home affairs. EU has been seeking to develop and will continue to develop a stronger identity in the global politics, while the third pillar should gradually evolve into a community policy. In the candidate countries - I suppose - we are somewhat more at ease with the dynamic evolution of these two pillars. Why? Because this decade [of exciting change of the EU agenda and consequently of these two policies] has coincided with our pre-accession efforts. In a way we were exposed to these developments right from the outset and we do not bear the memories of the European Political Cooperation or of the different sensitivities related to Schengen Agreement still at the time when it had a life of its own. Naturally, Lithuania has a special interest that EU builds a solid eastern as well as northern dimensions. Baltic Sea cooperation also has an immense potential. Lithuania will contribute to it with its knowledge of the region also making sure that borders although fully protected and controlled are not iron barriers to our neighbors. I think Lithuania's good cooperation with its neighbours is well recognized, including different projects with Kaliningrad region of Russian Federation. Among the important questions is how the founding principle of solidarity will be applied in the enlarged Union. Our reasoning here is the one of analogy. If cohesion and structural policies accelerated the growth of Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Greece then why this should not be repeated in the Baltic States or elsewhere? And solidarity should mean solidarity also from those who have been able to benefit from it over decades. In other words, credibility of the European integration rests on the degree in which its successes are given the means and conditions to be repeated in the expanded Union. The bigger or smaller the European Union will need a budget. Since the question about how the enlargement is financed is a fundamental issue and it will have to be addressed, it would also be sensible to look at the bigger picture and think whether it is a right moment to consider a gradual reform of the EU financing and budgeting. Perhaps time has come to take a closer look at the possibilities of guaranteeing the EU institutions more independent sources of income than the budgets of the member states.One requirement, however, here should be a clear linkage between the present and the future. People are allergic to futurology. Real people see real problems, which should, in their view, be necessarily addressed. Perhaps this is a very simplified but a "real" rephrase of what we call legitimacy. Democratic legitimacy of the Union is something that will be evolving over longer time and it will have to face not only all the 'traditional' components of representation, circulation of power and social acceptance, etc. but also the changing nature of democracy (one may wish to discuss the case of referendum in Ireland) and social organization.Secondly, European institutions - for me - are a derivation of the objectives. There is hardly a need for a "revolution" in the way the Council, Parliament, Commission, Court and other institutions interact. The institutions have to evolve gradually, the same way as the objectives of the EU are evolving - but that does not mean that there should be no change. Things can always be done better and ongoing reviews of the EU governance also on the Council functioning are good examples that there is a room for improving, for running the enterprise more efficiently. Lithuanian thinking rests on simple but tested experiences. Again - the communitarian method that has made the EU what it is today means for us that we are talking about a Union that accommodates the big and protects the small. Not the other union that we had a misfortune to test for fifty years. Strong institutions guarantee a fair game. That's what we learned from the textbooks. That's something that seems to work well in accession negotiations. Stronger institutions underlie the cohesion of the Union and have so far been the main "engine" of the European integration. Arguing for strengthening of the inter-governmentalism at the expense of communitarianism is, to a large extent, an attempt in a way to turn the integration clock backwards. Thus the community method must be preserved, strengthened and extended as the EU enlarges. Of course, in some cases the intergovernmental method might also be needed. Perhaps on the 'questions of war and peace' it may be the only way where supra-national method cannot be introduced for the time being or at all. The dilemma of these two methods can be further addressed by a clearer delimitation of competencies. The division of power should not, therefore, be limited to the principle of subsidiarity but must also say which issues and areas pertaining to the European competencies are bound to be dealt with in a communitarian way and which should be left for intergovernmental co-operation. Such a division should be accompanied by a common understanding that the European integration has not reached its limits and should thus be pursued further. In any case, different operating modes for the Union need to be considered on the basis of functional needs depending on the Union's objectives, areas and scope of action, rather than seen as an ideological shibboleth.Of course, the structure of 25 and more nations will be large and not easy to govern. But our union must be functioning. Alternatives to that are very, very bleak. Sovereignty is not in question here. From 15th to 18th century Lithuanian and Polish Commonwealth was governed by the principle of veto (liberum veto!): for that time it was democracy and sovereignty at its extremes. It was nice at the beginning but led to a catastrophe of the state later on. That was the end of sovereignty. Thus, from its own history Lithuania knows that too many vetoes are not for the good. We realize that more and more areas of European common policy can be exempted from the veto right in the future. On both sides of the enlargement we shall be moving towards the qualified majority voting (QMV). Representing your 'national' interests is one more thing which we have to discuss in the context of the policy reforms or application of the QMV in the enlarged Union. It is my conviction that interests of the new member states would fit into the general composition of interests of the present Union. Among the countries that are joining the Union there are countries that are more free traders (and free marketiers) and those that are more protectionist; there are protestant and catholic; there are southern and nearly 'northern' countries; there are also small and big ones. I say this because I believe that the national interests can be and will be integrated into the existing EU fabric and in a similar way that decisions in the EU were never taken on "big vs. small" basis we will not be seeing "old vs. new" voting whatever the voting procedures or weighting of votes may suggest. Look at the accession negotiations or the whole of the accession process starting with Europe Agreements. I have a difficulty in recalling a coordinated action - speaking one voice - from the side of acceding countries. I do not believe that membership in the Union would foster the Easter and Central European "newcomers club". Diversity of the European Union is bound to produce various initiatives of smaller groups of countries who later offer their experiences to the entire Union. Such initiatives are legitimised under the title of "enhanced co-operation" and have, throughout the modern history, served as motor of European integration. But, however good this arrangement is, we may need a safeguard for it not to break loose and fall out of our hands. Exclusive clubs or centres or cores should not threaten solidarity. They should not lead us into the European Union, which has two standards, two policies, two governments, two budgets - one for the selected, rich and lucky, and the other for the rest. We have to strive at a coherent European Union. We understand enhanced co-operation as an inclusive process in the spirit of Jean Monnet. The rules of enhanced co-operation as laid out in Amsterdam and Nice can be effectively used. The enhanced co-operation should be an instrument of integration, not exclusion.* * *Before concluding few remarks on the state of debate in Lithuania. Lithuanian Foreign Minister, members of Parliament have initiated discussions covering various aspects pertaining to future shape and policies of the Union with various interest groups, youth organisations, political parties and other segments of civil society. Minister of Foreign Affairs has a personal commitment to induce discussion inside the country. The President will be launching the civic society forum early next year. A group of scholars also charted their visions on the future of the European Union sector-wise and as a whole. Participation of candidate countries in the workings of Convention is also crucial for legitimasing the debate itself. It is also an important beginning of the bigger Union's functioning. I would not overestimate the formal part of the process; however, it is my strong believe that accession treaties will be signed well before the end of the Convention and Lithuanian participants will be endorsing the Final Document with a feeling of good accomplishment. We know the Union that was started by J.Monnet, R.Schuman, A. de Gaspery, W. Hallstein and others. We know the Union that was built further by the generation of F. Mitterand, H. Kohl and J. Delors. Now is the turn for G. Shroeder and P. Lipponen, T. Blair and L. Jospin, as well as A.Kwasniewski, V.Vike- Freiberga and V.Havel.At the end of the day it is all about responsibility. I would like to testify here that the closer countries of Central and Eastern Europe are coming to the day of EU membership the more we contemplate our responsibility. It is with this feeling that we have to continue the European adventure.