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# CHINA'S ECONOMIC PENETRATION INTO POST-SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA AND EASTERN EUROPE

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## *Abstract*

This article examines China's recent economic penetration into Russia's post-Soviet strategic periphery. By focusing on the so-called strategic partnerships established throughout this huge area in the 21st century, the research analyses Beijing's patterns of trade, investment and economic aid in order to assess the rate and depth of its influence-projection efforts. The article shows that China's power and influence has grown particularly rapidly since the outbreak of the global financial crisis, and no longer confines itself to post-Soviet Central Asia.

## **Introduction**

In September 2013 the president of the People's Republic of China (China), Xi Jinping, swept through the post-Soviet Central Asian states signing multi-billion-dollar agreements in energy, infrastructure, agriculture and other areas. However, this was just the latest sign of China's growing influence in this vast, resource-rich and strategically placed region. Beijing has already become the main outside source of investment, trade and economic aid for these countries. Its overall trade volumes with Central Asia topped \$46 billion last year, a remarkable 100-fold increase since these states gained independence from the Soviet Union only two decades ago.<sup>1</sup>

Yet, China's growing presence in the huge post-Soviet area, which Russia still deems to be within its sphere of "privileged interests",<sup>2</sup> goes far beyond the

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<sup>1</sup> The Economist, "Rising China, sinking Russia", *The Economist*, <<http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21586304-vast-region-chinas-economic-clout-more-match-russias-rising-china-sinking>>, 22 09 2013.

<sup>2</sup> Trenin D., "Russia's Spheres of Interests, not Influence", *The Washington Quarterly* 4 (32), 2009, p. 3.

five Central Asian countries. The vast majority of academic studies desperately suffer from neglecting this fact, and are becoming rather outdated as Beijing's penetration deepens, quickens and becomes more delicate. On the other hand, China's foreign policy is notorious for lacking proper official definitions of its principles, goals and means to achieve these. The 2011 White Paper on China's Peaceful Development characteristically states that "China should develop itself through upholding world peace and contribute to world peace through its own development", preaches "a new thinking on security featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination" and upholds that it "does not seek regional hegemony or sphere of influence".<sup>3</sup> Needless to say, this kind of rhetoric has not much reassured the international community, in particular the neighbours of this would-be superpower.

Therefore, Beijing's foreign policy practice naturally becomes the almost only viable source of any adequate conclusions about the rise of its international influence and power. Fortunately, after the Cold War, China has been actively engaged in building so-called "strategic partnerships" all across the globe. According to Chinese commentators, this qualification connotes mutual acceptance of the partners' importance to each other and to the world at large, while at the same time acknowledging various difficulties, limits and a distinctive set of dynamics in these kinds of relationships.<sup>4</sup> Today Beijing has established eight strategic partnerships in the post-Soviet space. Because the first one, agreed upon with Moscow back in 1996, has already become a research topic for too many publications even to mention here, this analytical study intends to look at those secondary countries that lie in Russia's direct strategic periphery in Central Asia and Eastern Europe.

The purpose of this article is to examine China's recent economic penetration into seven remaining post-Soviet strategic partners in order to assess the rate and depth of Beijing's influence-projection efforts as well as indicate its most peculiar features. The analysis attempts to show that China has become an indispensable actor in the post-Soviet space, as its initially modest economic-penetration tools gradually created a substantial basis for political influence and strategic presence in this huge region. While mainly searching for new sources of energy and new markets for its products, Beijing is preparing to stay there for a long time. Due

<sup>3</sup> Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, "China's Peaceful Development", *China's National Online News Service*, <[http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node\\_7126562.htm](http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7126562.htm)>, 23 09 2013.

<sup>4</sup> Deng Y., *China's Struggle for Status: The Realignment of International Relations*, Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 128.

to the recentness of the relevant trends, some of the useful data for the trade, investment and economic aid patterns in every single strategic partner across the Russian “near abroad” in the 21st century could only be gathered from reports in the mass media, rather than primary sources or secondary academic literature. The article is structured according to widely accepted regional criteria, and follows a chronological order on a case-by-case basis. The analysis is preceded by a brief literature review of China’s economic penetration worldwide, and relevant conclusions are presented at the end.

## 1. Discussion: from capabilities to the tools of China’s economic penetration

It is widely agreed that economic influence has become the first and foremost feature of China’s emergence in any part of the present-day world. This trend not only echoes, but is largely driven by, Beijing’s decades-long obsession with its national wealth expansion. Ever since the era of economic reforms began in 1978, pragmatic Chinese leaders have seen the growth of gross domestic product (GDP) as an end in itself. Averaging almost 10 per cent annually, this astonishing expansion rate helped China attain the capabilities for its future outward projection of economic influence. Today this country has become the second largest economy in the world, with the fastest growth among those widely considered to be the great powers, as well as the world’s largest market, manufacturer, trader and saver, all at once. In contrast with most Western developed economies, present-day China continues to fill its coffers through increasing internal tax receipts and especially foreign currency earnings from its international trade. In mid-2013 Beijing held more than \$3.5 trillion of foreign exchange reserves, far surpassing all other states.<sup>5</sup>

These rapidly rising economic capabilities serve three crucial interdependent objectives: keeping the regime in power, promoting human welfare at home, and bringing China appropriate international status abroad.<sup>6</sup> Prominent Chinese

<sup>5</sup> State Administration of Foreign Exchange, “The Time-Series Data of International Investment Position of China”, *State Administration of Foreign Exchange*, <<http://www.safe.gov.cn/wps/wcm/connect/11ea20804f5a09699f879f219f90791c/The+time-series+data+of+International+Investment+Position+of+China%2C+Quarterly.xls?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=11ea20804f5a09699f879f219f90791c>>, 22 09 2013.

<sup>6</sup> Lampton D. M., *Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might, Money, and Minds*, Berkeley, Los Angeles & London: Berkeley University Press, 2008, p. 115.

scholars Zhang Yunling and Tang Shiping correctly point out that continuous and sustainable economic development is considered the only way to tackle all the pressing internal and external challenges that their country is facing and will face in the future. Thus, the central objective of Beijing's entire grand strategy can be summarised in just one phrase: "to secure and shape a security, economic, and political environment that is conducive to China concentrating on its economic, social, and political development".<sup>7</sup> Hence, economic power is the form of power that Beijing emphasises most in its overall strategy, compared to harder (military) as well as softer (ideational) ones.<sup>8</sup>

David M. Lampton, the author of one of the best works on China's influence-projection capabilities so far, singles out several ways in which economic power expresses itself: as the power of the buyer, the seller, the investor, the development-assistance source, and the innovator. While the money Beijing earns from the export of goods and services provides it with relevant capabilities, its roles as buyer and investor is what wins China more influence abroad. Economic allure allows Beijing to counter worldwide mistrust by giving outsiders an interest in its successful growth story.<sup>9</sup> On the other hand, this mistrust has been growing consistently in recent years due to China's increasingly active economic profile all over the planet. Joshua Kurlantzick, the author of another ground-breaking study on Beijing's growing influence abroad, adds the appeal of its particular development model itself to the economic toolkit of trade, investment and aid.<sup>10</sup>

During the reform era, China became enthusiastic about free trade. This tool is considered to provide the strongest basis for the development of its long-term political ties all over the planet.<sup>11</sup> In the 21st century Beijing has even turned to signing free trade deals and making trade concessions with other countries, both developing and developed. However, China's investment and foreign aid have attracted much more attention worldwide due to their comparatively sudden nature. After two decades of developing a policy of "inviting in" (*qingjin*) foreign capital, in the new millennium Beijing began to call upon its *nouveau-riche* companies

<sup>7</sup> Zhang Y., Tang S., "China's Regional Strategy" in Shambaugh D., ed., *Power Shift: China and Asia's New Dynamics*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005, p. 48.

<sup>8</sup> Lampton (note 6), p. 88.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 88-115.

<sup>10</sup> Kurlantzick J., *Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power Is Transforming the World*, New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2007, p. 84.

<sup>11</sup> Heginbotham E., "Evaluating China's Strategy toward the Developing World" in Eisenman J., Heginbotham E. & Mitchell D., eds., *China and the Developing World: Beijing's Strategy for the Twenty-First Century*, Armonk & London: M. E. Sharpe, 2007, p. 200.

to “go out” (*zouchuqu*) into international markets. Resource-deficient China put particular emphasis on strategic sectors, such as energy, and strategic nations, either within its immediate neighbourhood or containing vast hydrocarbon and other primary reserves.<sup>12</sup> In practice it becomes rather difficult to draw a clear line between Beijing’s outbound investment and foreign aid due to the state-capitalist character of its economic system.<sup>13</sup>

Finally, the most intangible and long-term tool of China’s economic penetration deserves to be briefly explained here. China’s specific development route was named the “Beijing Consensus” in 2004. The man who coined the term, Joshua Cooper Ramo, suggests that present-day China not only pioneers, but is also beginning to export its model based on three principal guidelines: pragmatic commitment to innovation and constant experimentation; sustainable and more equally distributed economic growth; and political as well as financial sovereignty from outside actors, both state and non-state.<sup>14</sup> In other words, this model presents an alternative to the “Washington Consensus” of market-friendly policies promoted by Western financial institutions and democratic governments. In 2010 Stefan Halper expanded this definition through a detailed assessment of China’s practical economic and political diplomacy around the world. According to his study, Beijing’s market authoritarianism, with its high growth, stability, improved living standards, and limits on expression, has become more popular than market democracy in the majority of non-Western states.<sup>15</sup> It is no coincidence that this model of capitalism without democratic governance attracts many post-Soviet political regimes as well.

## **2. Analysis: China’s economic penetration in practice**

The analytical part of this article deals with Beijing’s economic penetration in seven strategic partners in Russia’s immediate periphery. Focusing on the previously identified tools that China is increasingly applying in its influence-projection efforts, this section examines trade, investment and aid patterns in every relevant partner country during the 21st century. Due to its long-term and

<sup>12</sup> Kurlantzick (note 10), p. 90-95.

<sup>13</sup> Lampton (note 6), p. 101.

<sup>14</sup> Ramo J. C., *The Beijing Consensus*, London: The Foreign Policy Centre, 2004, p. 11-12.

<sup>15</sup> Halper S., *The Beijing Consensus: How China’s Authoritarian Model Will Dominate the Twenty-First Century*. New York: Basic Books, 2010, p. x.

ideational nature, the “Beijing Consensus” thesis regarding post-Soviet Central Asia and Eastern Europe is evaluated in conclusions. Table 1 provides data on China’s total trade with countries to be analysed for 2005 and 2011, suggesting important trends that are surveyed further based on additional up-to-date records. Similarly, Table 2 presents data on China’s total large-scale (i.e., exceeding \$100 million per single project) investment in these same countries, starting from 2005, the year of the first strategic partnership established with any of them. Finally, Table 3 at the end of the article gives additional specific details about those investments, many of which were also tied to economic aid provision.

**Table 1.** China’s total trade with selected countries<sup>16</sup>

| Country      | Total trade in billions<br>(US dollars) |      |
|--------------|---|------|
|              | 2005                                    | 2011 |
| Kazakhstan   | 6.8                                     | 25   |
| Uzbekistan   | 0.7                                     | 2.2  |
| Tajikistan   | 0.1                                     | 2.1  |
| Turkmenistan | 0.1                                     | 5.5  |
| Kyrgyzstan   | 1                                       | 5    |
| Ukraine      | 3.3                                     | 10.4 |
| Belarus      | 0.6                                     | 1.3  |

**Table 2.** China’s total large-scale investment in selected countries (2005-July 2013)<sup>17</sup>

| Country    | Total investment in billions<br>(US dollars) | Prevailing sector<br>(share of all investments) |
|------------|--|---|
| Kazakhstan | 14.1   | Energy (84.4%)                                  |
| Uzbekistan | 0.2  | Metals (100%)                                   |

<sup>16</sup> 2006 *China Trade and External Economic Statistical Yearbook*, Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2006, tables 3-18; 2012 *China Trade and External Economic Statistical Yearbook*, Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2012, pp. 571-574.

<sup>17</sup> The Heritage Foundation, “China Global Investment Tracker Interactive Map”, *The Heritage Foundation*, <<http://www.heritage.org/research/projects/china-global-investment-tracker-interactive-map>>, 04 10 2013.

|              |     |                                 |
|--------------|-----|---------------------------------|
| Tajikistan   | 0.6 | Energy & property<br>(50% each) |
| Turkmenistan | 3.1 | Energy (100%)                   |
| Kyrgyzstan   | –   | –                               |
| Ukraine      | 2.4 | Property (91.7%)                |
| Belarus      | 2.6 | Transportation (38.5%)          |

## 2.1. Central Asia as China's direct strategic neighbourhood

Post-Soviet Central Asia is the only region in the Russian strategic periphery that has a direct border and considerable historical relations with China. Both neighbouring giants were instrumental in establishing the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2001, mainly to deal with security issues that Beijing readily summarised as the “three evils” of terrorism, separatism and extremism. China's core interests in this region include: curbing Uyghur separatist activity from across the border dedicated to the establishment of their state in its westernmost Xinjiang province; increasing its national energy security by ensuring stable supplies of oil and natural gas; and countering the American presence on its western flank as a part of its alleged efforts to strategically encircle China. Naturally, all these tasks are directly related to China's increasing economic penetration into the region during the 21st century.

**Kazakhstan** is the ninth largest country in the world, occupying a strategically unique position in the middle of Eurasia. China shares with it a border stretching for more than 1,500 km, the longest out of all of the Central Asian countries. Today Kazakhstan is the second biggest oil producer in the post-Soviet space trailing only behind Russia, with well-founded expectations to soon emerge among the ten largest exporters in the oil and natural gas markets worldwide.<sup>18</sup> Moreover, it has considerable amounts of other natural resources, such as coal, iron, gold, uranium, chrome, lead, zinc, manganese, copper, etc. Finally, the most populous Uyghur diaspora (approx. 1.4 per cent of its almost 18 million people) outside China calls Kazakhstan home.<sup>19</sup> For all these reasons it was only natural that Beijing prioritised relations with Astana in its foreign policy relating to the Russian

<sup>18</sup> Zabortseva Y. N., “From the ‘Forgotten Region’ to the ‘Great Game’ Region: On the Development of Geopolitics in Central Asia”, *Journal of Eurasian Studies* 3, 2012, p. 170.

<sup>19</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, “Kazakhstan”, *CIA World Factbook*, <<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kz.html>>, 24 09 2013.

strategic periphery. Both countries signed a strategic partnership agreement in 2005; the earliest among post-Soviet states save Russia.<sup>20</sup>

Although Chinese energy companies had been actively investing in Kazakhstan since 1997, the real turning point came only with strategic partnership. In 2005 the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), China's largest oil and gas producer, paid almost \$4.2 billion for the Canadian enterprise PetroKazakhstan, with nearly a 12 per cent share in the country's total oil production. At that time it was the most important acquisition ever undertaken by a Chinese company on foreign soil.<sup>21</sup> The following year, the China International Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC Group) bought the Kazakh oil assets of Nations Energy Corporation, another Canadian company, for \$1.9 billion.<sup>22</sup> In 2009 CNPC participated in a joint purchase of the MangistauMunaiGas enterprise, made with Kazakh giant KazMunaiGas, for \$3.3 billion.<sup>23</sup> In 2010 Asia's largest refiner, the China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation (Sinopec), agreed to build a \$1.3 billion plastics facility in the country.<sup>24</sup> Finally, in September 2013 CNPC acquired an 8.33 per cent share in the exploration of the Kashagan oil field, one of the largest worldwide, in return for \$5 billion. In summary, during Xi's September 2013 visit both partners signed 22 contracts totalling \$30 billion. Beijing has provided Astana with loans worth a staggering \$17 billion since 2009.<sup>25</sup>

Today China has become the largest investor and trade partner for Kazakhstan. The flows of Kazakh exports to its huge neighbour have been facilitated by further Chinese investments in the Kazakh energy and transport infrastructure. The 2,228 km Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline, completed in 2009, can supply China

<sup>20</sup> China Internet Information Centre, "China, Kazakhstan upgrade strategic partnership", *China Internet Information Centre*, <[http://www.china.org.cn/world/2011-06/13/content\\_22775575.htm](http://www.china.org.cn/world/2011-06/13/content_22775575.htm)>, 24 09 2013.

<sup>21</sup> Peyrouse S., "Chinese Economic Presence in Kazakhstan: China's Resolve and Central Asia's Apprehension", *China Perspectives* 3, 2008, p. 44.

<sup>22</sup> The New York Times, "CITIC of China Buys Kazakhstan Oil Assets", *The New York Times*, <<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/01/business/worldbusiness/01china.html?adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1382024028-osNu2XkBrjE8PuEpLgpfTA>>, 24 09 2013.

<sup>23</sup> Xiao, W., "CNPC buys Kazakh oil company", *China Daily*, <[http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2009-04/28/content\\_7722725.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2009-04/28/content_7722725.htm)>, 25 09 2013.

<sup>24</sup> Reuters, "Sinopec to Build \$1.3 bln Kazakh Plastics Plant", *Reuters*, <<http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/03/25/sinopec-kazakhstan-idUSLDE62O06T20100325>>, 25 09 2013.

<sup>25</sup> Geostrategy, "Китай продовжує витіснити Росію з Середньої Азії", *Geostrategy*, <<http://geostrategy.ua/node/584>>, 25 09 2013.

with 20 million tonnes per year, roughly 5 per cent of its oil demand in 2009.<sup>26</sup> Moreover, Kazakhstan has become one of the three (along with Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) exporters of natural gas to the East through the joint 1,833 km Central Asia-China gas pipeline, also used for the first time in 2009. The parties concerned have already agreed to increase its annual capacity from 40 to 65 billion cubic metres (bcm) by 2014,<sup>27</sup> while China's president pledged to expand bilateral trade to \$40 billion by 2015.<sup>28</sup>

Although China does not share a common border with **Uzbekistan**, this country received attention from Beijing for several main reasons: it has the largest population (almost 29 million) in post-Soviet Central Asia, lies right in the middle of the region, has considerable natural resources, and pursues relatively bold foreign policy with local leadership claims. Moreover, Tashkent could truly be called a model potential ally of Beijing in the region, for it is the most affected by the so-called "three evils": the separatist threat in the Fergana valley, a pan-Islamic opposition represented by the local branch of Hizb-ut-Tahrir, and terrorist activities of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.<sup>29</sup> However, China had long been suspicious of Uzbekistan's close relations with the US that were forged soon after 9/11. Fortunately for Beijing, the chance to step in finally came when the brutal suppression of the 2005 Andijan protests undermined Tashkent's strategic partnership with Washington. Soon after the event, Uzbekistan's president, Islam Karimov, was warmly received in Beijing. His visit was followed by a joint declaration of the SCO, calling on the US to establish a date for full withdrawal of its military forces from Central Asia, including those stationed in Karshi-Khanabad Air Base in south-eastern Uzbekistan.<sup>30</sup>

Taking a similar approach to the one it employed in Kazakhstan, China has gradually emerged as the main player in the Uzbek energy market. In 2010 CNPC signed an agreement with Tashkent to buy 10 bcm of natural gas per year, provided through the Central Asia-China pipeline.<sup>31</sup> In June 2012 both countries

<sup>26</sup> Dannreuther R., "China and Global Oil: Vulnerability and Opportunity", *International Affairs* 6 (87), 2011, p. 1357.

<sup>27</sup> Куртов А., "Китай бросил вызов планам Москвы", *Республика*, <<http://www.respublika-kz.info/news/politics/32634/>>, 27 09 2013.

<sup>28</sup> Geostrategy (note 25).

<sup>29</sup> Kerr D., "Central Asian and Russian Perspectives on China's Strategic Emergence", *International Affairs* 1 (86), 2010, p. 144.

<sup>30</sup> Halper (note 15), pp. 78-79.

<sup>31</sup> Wan Z., "CNPC Inks Deal with Uzbekistan.", *China Daily*, <[http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2010-06/11/content\\_9963304.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2010-06/11/content_9963304.htm)>, 01 10 2013.

signed a strategic partnership agreement. Curiously, soon after that Uzbekistan formally notified the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a Russian-dominated multilateral military alliance, that it was suspending its membership.<sup>32</sup> Finally, during Xi's September 2013 Central Asian tour, both strategic partners signed 31 deals on oil, gas and gold totalling \$15 billion, with more than a half of these funds to be provided by Beijing. Tashkent plans to increase its annual gas exports to China to 30 bcm. From 2002 up until this point, China had already invested more than \$6 billion in Uzbekistan. Today both sides plan to expand their bilateral trade to \$3.4 billion in 2013 and \$5 billion in 2017.<sup>33</sup>

**Tajikistan** is the smallest among the Central Asian countries, whose Persian-speaking population is linguistically different from their Turkic regional neighbours. Almost completely covered with mountains, this country suffered a bloody civil war that lasted from 1992 to 1997, and it currently remains an impoverished and unstable place, separating Xinjiang from Afghanistan. Although heavily dependent on Russia's security provision, in the 21st century Tajikistan began to see Beijing as a welcome economic actor, especially considering Dushanbe's growing disagreements with Tashkent, Moscow and Western financial creditors.<sup>34</sup> Despite Tajikistan's extreme reliance on the migrant remittances coming from Russia, arguably reaching up to a half of the national GDP, China has already become its main trader, thanks largely to the high-altitude Kulma-Karasu border checkpoint, which opened in 2004. In 2011 their bilateral trade volume surpassed \$2 billion; 15 times that of a decade ago,<sup>35</sup> with the Chinese share accounting for an impressive 42 per cent of Tajik imports.<sup>36</sup>

Both countries finally signed a strategic partnership agreement in May 2013, which was followed by plans to accelerate bilateral economic cooperation in energy, infrastructure, mining, agriculture and other areas.<sup>37</sup> These will definitely

<sup>32</sup> Kim Y., Indeo F., "The New Great Game in Central Asia Post 2014: The US New 'Silk Road' Strategy and Sino-Russian Rivalry", *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 46, 2013, p. 283.

<sup>33</sup> ITAR-TASS, "China and Uzbekistan Sign Agreements Worth \$15 billion", *ITAR-TASS*, <<http://www.itar-tass.com/en/c154/871162.html>>, 01 10 2013.

<sup>34</sup> Российский институт стратегических исследований (РИСИ), "Страны СНГ и Балтии в глобальной политике Китая", *Проблемы национальной стратегии* 10 (1), 2012, p. 28.

<sup>35</sup> Pu Z., "China, Tajikistan Eye Free Trade Zone in Agriculture", *China Daily*, <[http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013xivisitcenterasia/2013-09/05/content\\_16945022.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013xivisitcenterasia/2013-09/05/content_16945022.htm)>, 04 10 2013.

<sup>36</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, "Tajikistan", *CIA World Factbook*, <<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ti.html>>, 04 10 2013.

<sup>37</sup> China Daily, "China, Tajikistan Establish Strategic Partnership", *China Daily*, <[http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-05/20/content\\_16513300.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-05/20/content_16513300.htm)>, 04 10 2013.

increase China's investments in Tajikistan, which exceeded \$600 million from 2005 to 2012.<sup>38</sup> During Xi's September 2013 Central Asian tour the partners were discussing the possibility of establishing a free trade zone on their mutual border.<sup>39</sup> Even more importantly, a new agreement to hasten the construction of Line D of the Central Asia-China gas pipeline has been reached. It is hoped that the 400 km Tajik section of this project would attract a desperately needed additional \$3 billion from Beijing.<sup>40</sup>

**Turkmenistan** is the southernmost Central Asian country, and a large proportion of it is covered by the harsh Karakum desert. Revenues from the fourth-largest natural gas reserves in the world have been instrumental in keeping Turkmenistan's bizarre political regime in power as well as maintaining neutrality in foreign affairs. Although Turkmenistan has no common border with China, and is the only Central Asian country that refrains from the SCO membership, its natural resources have long been tempting Beijing. In 2006 both countries signed a framework agreement on a pipeline construction and long-term gas deliveries. In 2008 China became a net importer of natural gas as the gap between supply and demand approached 5 bcm.<sup>41</sup> The following year, after a spat over deliveries with Moscow, Ashgabat agreed to increase its annual supply of natural gas to Beijing from 30 to 40 bcm through the Central Asia-China pipeline, while the CNPC was allowed to invest more than \$3 billion in the recently discovered Galkynysh gas field, reportedly the second largest in the world.<sup>42</sup>

A Sino-Turkmen strategic partnership agreement was finally signed during Xi's September 2013 regional tour. The two countries pledged to promote cooperation in infrastructure, telecommunications, agriculture and other areas.<sup>43</sup> Most importantly, China's president successfully sealed deals that potentially increase Chinese imports of Turkmen gas to 65 bcm by 2020. It is safe to conclude

<sup>38</sup> The Heritage Foundation (note 17).

<sup>39</sup> Pu (note 35).

<sup>40</sup> France 24, "China Confirms New Gas Pipeline through Tajikistan", *France 24*, <<http://www.france24.com/en/20130914-china-confirms-new-gas-pipeline-through-tajikistan>>, 04 10 2013.

<sup>41</sup> Rousseau, R., "Kazakhstan: Continuous Improvement or Stalemate in Its Relations with China?", *Strategic Analysis* 1 (37), 2013, p. 43.

<sup>42</sup> Blank S. J., "Challenges to Russia in Central Asia", *American Foreign Policy Interests* 5 (33), 2011, p. 214.

<sup>43</sup> China Daily, "China, Turkmenistan Lift Bilateral Ties to Strategic Partnership", *China Daily*, <[http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013xivisitcenterasia/2013-09/03/content\\_16941733.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013xivisitcenterasia/2013-09/03/content_16941733.htm)>, 05 10 2013.

that Beijing has already become a dominant economic power in this country, accounting for a fifth of its imports and a sensational two thirds of exports.<sup>44</sup> Remarkably, this happened to the country outside of the SCO framework.

Compared to Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, their Kyrgyz neighbour is a tiny and poor country. However, several factors make it very important for Beijing's foreign policy in the region. **Kyrgyzstan** has the second longest border with China of the Central Asian states, and the border lies in a particularly restless area that is difficult to access. Kyrgyzstan is the only country ever to have been directly ruled by both Beijing and Moscow,<sup>45</sup> and until at least July 2014 it will remain unique by hosting Russian as well as US military bases at the same time. Finally, even by Central Asian standards, Kyrgyzstan is a very politically unstable state, which suffered two revolutions in just five years: those of 2005 and 2010. The first of these was marked by anti-regime protesters looting Chinese businesses omnipresent throughout the country.<sup>46</sup> Despite these incidents, Beijing remained relatively calm and refrained from directly interfering in either of the revolutions, which ultimately proved to be a better choice.

Today the eastern neighbour has already established a primary presence in the Kyrgyz economy. While official figures suggest that China's share comprised almost 56 per cent of Kyrgyzstan's total imports in 2012,<sup>47</sup> it is widely believed that the "shuttle trade", where small traders cross the border as tourists to avoid customs, accounts for roughly a third of the country's GDP, and that almost every small business there relies on China in some way.<sup>48</sup> All these traits were obviously conducive to a strategic partnership agreement, which was signed during Xi's visit in September 2013. The whole package of seven deals nailed Beijing's pledge to invest almost \$3 billion in Kyrgyz energy and infrastructure projects, which include: \$1.4 billion for the construction of a gas pipeline spur from neighbouring Turkmenistan to China's westernmost city, Kashgar; \$400 million to retrofit a

<sup>44</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, "Turkmenistan", *CIA World Factbook*, <<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tx.html>>, 05 10 2013

<sup>45</sup> MacHaffie J., "China's Role in Central Asia: Security Implications for Russia and the United States", *Comparative Strategy* 29, 2010, p. 369.

<sup>46</sup> Oresman M., "Repaving the Silk Road: China's Emergence in Central Asia" in Eisenman J., Heginbotham E., Mitchell D., eds., *China and the Developing World: Beijing's Strategy for the Twenty-first Century*, Armonk & London: M. E. Sharpe, 2007, p. 69.

<sup>47</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, "Kyrgyzstan", *CIA World Factbook*, <<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kg.html>>, 08 10 2013.

<sup>48</sup> Li L., Pantucci R., "Decision Time for Central Asia: Russia or China?", *Open Democracy*, <<http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/li-lifan-raffaello-pantucci/decision-time-for-central-asia-russia-or-china>> 08 10 2013.

thermal power station in the capital, Bishkek, and to build a road linking the north and south of the country; as well as another \$400 million to invest in an oil refinery in the northern city of Kara-Balta.<sup>49</sup> Beijing will achieve another milestone in its penetration of Kyrgyzstan and whole of Central Asia with the completion of a railway linking China and Uzbekistan, which is currently under negotiation.<sup>50</sup>

## 2.2. Eastern Europe as a new gateway for China

Contrary to Central Asia, the westernmost flank of post-Soviet states on Russia's strategic periphery lies far away from China's borders. Neither has it a huge amount of energy reserves, which are so alluring for Beijing all over the planet. Nevertheless, China has recently signed strategic partnerships with two of the largest of these states: Ukraine and Belarus. A detailed analysis of China's economic penetration into both countries reveals the motives and goals behind these actions.

**Ukraine** is the most populous and the second largest state by area and economy in Russia's strategic periphery. Its geopolitical location and economic structure make Kiev an especially attractive target for Beijing's interests. Long suspicious of the pro-Western Orange Revolution, China decisively entered the country after Viktor Yanukovich's electoral triumph over Yulia Tymoshenko in 2010. The new Ukrainian president visited Beijing in September of the same year. Twelve cooperation agreements related to aviation, infrastructure, finance, customs, business, energy and other fields were signed by Yanukovich and his local counterpart Hu.<sup>51</sup> Another breakthrough came in June 2011 during the Chinese president's visit to Ukraine. Both parties signed an agreement establishing a strategic partnership, which was followed by secondary economic arrangements worth approximately \$3.5 billion.<sup>52</sup>

<sup>49</sup> RIA Novosti, "China to Allocate \$3Bln to Kyrgyzstan", *RIA Novosti*, <<http://en.ria.ru/world/20130911/183360316.html>>, 08 10 2013.

<sup>50</sup> China Daily, "Xi Tables Proposal on Cooperation with Uzbekistan", *China Daily*, <[http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013xivisitcenterasia/2013-09/09/content\\_16955851.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013xivisitcenterasia/2013-09/09/content_16955851.htm)>, 09 10 2013.

<sup>51</sup> Rousseau R., "China's Growing Economic Presence in Ukraine and Belarus", *Strategic Analysis* 1 (36), 2012, p. 20.

<sup>52</sup> Гулевич В., "Китайский локомотив украинской экономики", *Международная жизнь*, <<http://interaffairs.ru/print.php?item=7755>>, 11 10 2013.

Chinese economic penetration into Ukraine has rapidly achieved impressive proportions. Bilateral trade volume rose from \$3 billion in 2009 to \$10 billion in 2011. The figure has already reached \$7.3 billion for the first eight months of 2013, which means \$1 billion more than during the same period in 2012. Today China is Ukraine's second largest trade partner, lagging behind only Russia.<sup>53</sup> As in many other cases all over the world, the trade structure between Beijing and Kiev is favourable to the former. While Ukraine had long exported mainly iron ores to China, and imported predominantly processed goods,<sup>54</sup> a new significant development took shape in 2012. After a deal for the purchase of four huge Soviet-designed *Zubr*-class hovercrafts by the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) at a reported price of \$315 million,<sup>55</sup> Ukraine secured the fourth place among arms exporters worldwide for that year.<sup>56</sup> However, it was not the first time that both countries collaborated on similar matters. Back in 1998 Kiev, for only \$20 million, sold Beijing the stripped hulk of its *Varyag* ship, which was rebuilt and commissioned into the PLAN as its first aircraft carrier, *Liaoning*, in September 2012.<sup>57</sup> Ukrainian manufacturers participated in the carrier's reconstruction process by providing sophisticated turbine systems.<sup>58</sup>

Ukraine has become an important destination for Chinese investments, especially in infrastructure, energy, and most recently and controversially, agriculture. Beijing funded a 30 km railway project connecting Kiev with its international airport at Boryspil, and helped the partner to otherwise prepare for the 2012 UEFA European Football Championship jointly hosted with Poland.<sup>59</sup> Even more importantly, China readily assists Ukraine in its energy security efforts. While largely dependent on Russian oil and natural gas deliveries, the country has potentially significant, but undeveloped coal and gas fields of its own, and retains control of its pipeline system. Being among the states worst hit by the recent

<sup>53</sup> Geostrategy (note 25).

<sup>54</sup> Giusti S., "China: an Emergent Stakeholder in Eastern Europe", *ISPI-Analysis* 153, 2013, p. 4.

<sup>55</sup> China-Defense-Mashup, "Ukraine delivers world largest hovercraft to PLA Navy", *China-Defense-Mashup*, <<http://www.china-defense-mashup.com/ukraine-deliveries-world-largest-hovercraft-to-pla-navy.html>> 11 10 2013.

<sup>56</sup> Левый Берег, "Китай вывел Украину в топ-5 экспортеров оружия в мире", *LB.ua*, <[http://economics.lb.ua/state/2013/03/21/193626\\_kitay\\_vivel\\_ukrainu\\_lideri\\_mirovogo.html](http://economics.lb.ua/state/2013/03/21/193626_kitay_vivel_ukrainu_lideri_mirovogo.html)> 11 10 2013.

<sup>57</sup> BBC World News, "China's first aircraft enters service", BBC, <<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-19710040>>, 12 10 2013.

<sup>58</sup> РИСИ (note 34) p. 34.

<sup>59</sup> Rousseau (note 41) p. 20.

global financial crisis, Ukraine desperately needs substantial credits to develop its fossil-fuel deposits and increase alternative energy capabilities. Gladly for Kiev, in July 2012 it signed an agreement with the China Development Bank for a \$3 billion credit line to help the country switch its power plants from gas to coal. It is estimated that successful implementation of these projects will save Ukraine up to 3 bcm of natural gas and create 15,000 jobs for the local population.<sup>60</sup>

In the 21st century, Ukraine's fertile soil is destined to become one of the most important comparative advantages that this country has. Gradually losing its food self-sufficiency, the most populous state of the planet for quite some time has been trying to penetrate the Ukrainian agricultural sector. The turning-point seems to have come in September 2013 when China's official Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps signed an agreement with local firm KSG Agro. According to the agreement, Ukraine will provide 100,000 hectares to China, which will rise to 3 million hectares within 50 years. Thus, the deal encompasses 5 per cent of the country's total area, and makes it Beijing's largest overseas farming centre.<sup>61</sup> In conclusion, Chinese trade and investment in Ukraine will certainly grow even further, not least because of a three-year currency swap agreement for more than \$2 billion signed between their central banks in June 2012.<sup>62</sup>

**Belarus** is the second largest post-Soviet state on Russia's Western flank, politically characterised by Alexander Lukashenko's uninterrupted rule for almost two decades. The nature of its political regime largely explains the relative ease of China's penetration into the country. Long regarded as a pariah by the West, Minsk has made cooperation with Beijing a priority in its foreign policy ever since 2006. Overall, there have been more than a hundred visits and meetings at various levels, and dozens of agreements have been signed between the two in the last decade.<sup>63</sup> Nevertheless, similarly to that of Ukraine, the real breakthrough in bilateral relations came only in 2010 with Xi's (China's vice president at the time) and Lukashenko's exchange of visits. The results of those meetings were quite impressive. Beijing soon provided Minsk with a \$11 million grant and \$1 billion loan, both of which helped Belarus to raise its exports to China by 300 per cent for

<sup>60</sup> Костенко В., "Украина-Китай: в поисках третьего вектора", *Одна родина*, <<http://odnarodyna.com.ua/node/9676>>, 12 10 2013.

<sup>61</sup> Jourdan A., "China to Invest in 3 million Hectares of Ukrainian Farmland", *Reuters*, <<http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/22/china-ukraine-idUSL3N0HI04620130922>>, 12 10 2013.

<sup>62</sup> EurActiv, "China Penetrates Deeper into Ukrainian economy", *EurActiv.com*, <<http://www.euractiv.com/europes-east/china-penetrates-deeper-ukrainia-news-513944>>, 14 10 2013.

<sup>63</sup> Елисеев А., "Беларусь-Китай: слыть, но не быть", *BISS Research Paper*, 2013, pp. 1-3.

that year, and thus improve its dire economic situation.<sup>64</sup> Lukashenko achieved a long-awaited strategic partnership agreement in July 2013.<sup>65</sup>

Contrary to what has happened in Ukraine, Chinese economic penetration in Belarus has been rather imbalanced, with trade lagging far behind investment. Bilateral trade volume even decreased from 2011 to 2012, with China's share in overall Belarusian trade declining from 3.3 to 3.1 per cent. On the other hand, this decline was related to the slump of Belarus's exports to China from \$637 million to \$455 million, while China's imports to Belarus increased from \$2.19 billion to \$2.36 billion for the same period. China became Belarus's third import partner after Russia and Germany, with a 5.1 per cent share in 2012. The characteristic problem of trade imbalance favouring Beijing has been further aggravated for Minsk by its particular profile. During the period of 2010 to 2012 up to 87 per cent of Belarusian exports to China consisted of raw materials and products of low surplus value, mainly potash fertilizers. At the same time the Chinese were increasingly exporting sophisticated communication, manufacturing and other equipment, a substantial portion of which were bound to the credits given to Belarus.<sup>66</sup>

The vast majority of Chinese investments into the country come through financing various project schemes. Beijing opened credit lines worth \$16 billion for joint projects with Minsk, mainly in the energy, transport and housing sectors. China has been involved in the building and reconstruction of several thermal power stations, cement factories and roads. Among the most striking investments was the creation of two manufacturing joint ventures: one between Belarusian microwave producer Horizont Holding and Chinese electrical appliances giant Midea Group in 2007;<sup>67</sup> and another between car manufacturers from Belarus and China (BelAZ and Geely respectively) in 2013. The Chinese company owning the Volvo Car Corporation will invest up to \$245 million into building a new factory with an eventual annual production capacity of 120,000 cars. It is worth mentioning that China had the seventh largest share of the car market in Belarus in 2012, overtaking such countries as Italy, Spain and Sweden.<sup>68</sup> Nevertheless, potentially the most important direction of investments is the controversial China-Belarus Industrial Park. A special economic zone is currently being developed 25

<sup>64</sup> Giusti (note 54), p. 5.

<sup>65</sup> XinhuaNet, "China, Belarus Forge Comprehensive Strategic Partnership", *Xinhua*, <[http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-07/16/c\\_125018876.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-07/16/c_125018876.htm)>, 15 10 2013.

<sup>66</sup> Елисеєв (note 63), pp. 14-16.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 16-18.

<sup>68</sup> Лавнікевіч Д., "Все, что ни делается – делается в Китае...", *БДГ Деловая газета*, <<http://bdg.by/news/economics/21268.html>> 16 10 2013.

km from Minsk in a huge area comprising 8,048 hectares. Belarus hopes to attract investment in electronics, domestic appliances, biomedicine and other high-tech sectors there.<sup>69</sup> These hopes seem to be rather optimistic, given the popular opposition and corruption among governmental organisations.

## **Conclusions**

The analysis of China's recent economic penetration into Russia's post-Soviet strategic periphery reveals several important findings. Firstly, Beijing had long regarded Astana as the second most important actor in the ex-USSR countries, behind only Moscow itself. Ever since their strategic partnership agreement of 2005, China's economic presence in Kazakhstan has been dwarfing its penetration into other researched countries. Although today this largely remains the case, Beijing seems to be putting a lot of emphasis on catching up with other bilateral relations.

Secondly, China has been actively engaged in a wave of strategic partnership creation across the post-Soviet space since 2011. All of the remaining six agreements have been signed in the last three years. The timing logically suggests a link to the recent global financial crisis, which improved China's economic positions relative to the West as well as Russia and made its funds even more necessary for many struggling post-Soviet countries. Remarkably, today all Central Asian capitals are strategic partners with Beijing. Both parties in all of these arrangements have regarded them as positive political and economic developments, indicating well-established aspirations to win as much as possible from each other. Although it is difficult to speculate about the allure of the "Beijing Consensus" for China's seven new strategic partners, the nature of their political regimes, as well as timely and valuable help received during internal political crises in some of them, signifies its role is growing beyond that of pure economics.

Thirdly, Ukraine trails behind only Kazakhstan in Russia's post-Soviet periphery, indicating China's local priorities. Having the largest population among the seven countries analysed, Ukraine passed a symbolic \$10 billion bilateral trade threshold back in 2011. In Beijing both Kiev and Minsk are regarded as attractive markets, particularly considering their integration efforts towards Brussels and Moscow respectively. Moreover, these countries catch China's attention because

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<sup>69</sup> Лавникевич Д., "Китайский парк получил прописку в Беларуси", *BEL.BIZ*, <[http://economics.bel.biz/articles/kitajskij\\_park\\_poluchil\\_propisku\\_v\\_belarusi/](http://economics.bel.biz/articles/kitajskij_park_poluchil_propisku_v_belarusi/)> 16 10 2013.

of two additional comparative advantages: agriculture and technology, relatively corresponding to China's food and more traditional security needs. Minsk provides Beijing with a huge amount of fertilizer, while Kiev gives it an even more impressive quantity of land for agricultural development. Interestingly, Ukraine has rapidly become an important contributor to the PLA's military modernisation.

Fourthly, regardless of China's recent advances in post-Soviet Eastern Europe, Central Asia remains its foreign-policy focus. Arguably, nowhere else do Beijing's security, energy and economic interests intertwine as much. By gradually becoming the principal trader and investor in this vast area, China has emerged as the leading outside energy player as well. While turning out to be the main buyer of Kazakh, Uzbekistani and Turkmen oil and natural gas, Beijing no longer refrains from helping the other four strategic partners, including both Kiev and Minsk, in their efforts to increase energy independence from the traditional hegemon in Moscow. In other words, what seemed to be a natural expansion of China's economic influence toward the West has already achieved a new quality, with clear-cut political and strategic dimensions. Whether deliberately or not, Beijing has become an indispensable actor in the post-Soviet space.

As this article examined only economic penetration, both the harder and softer forms of China's influence-projection in the post-Soviet space should be dealt with when enough evidence and data emerge. Moscow's response to this process would present a constantly evolving topic, potentially capable of destabilizing its own strategic partnership with Beijing. The EU's further engagement with the region would certainly require a deeper contextual understanding of the foreign-policy motives, interests and actions of other countries, both external and post-Soviet. Finally, the given analysis of China's seven strategic partnerships in Russia's immediate neighbourhood suggests that this level of relationship will not go far beyond the current borders for some time. As all other post-Soviet countries simply do have not much to offer Beijing in exchange for this status, one should keep a close eye on energy-rich Azerbaijan only.

## Appendix

**Table 3.** China's prime investments in selected countries (2005 to July 2013)<sup>70</sup>

| Year | Investor   | Quantity (millions, USD) | Share Size (%) | Partner/ Target                   | Sector      | Country      |
|------|--|--------------------------|----------------|-----------------------------------|-------------|--------------|
| 2005 | CNPC   | 4,200                    | 67             | PetroKazakhstan                   | Energy      | Kazakhstan   |
| 2005 | China Nonferrous   | 300                      |                | Kazakhstan Aluminium              | Metals      | Kazakhstan   |
| 2006 | CITIC  | 1,910                    |                | Nations Energy Corporation        | Energy      | Kazakhstan   |
| 2007 | CITIC  | 620                      |                |                                   | Real estate | Belarus      |
| 2008 | Sinohydro  | 300                      |                |                                   | Energy      | Tajikistan   |
| 2008 | Sinoma   | 210                      |                | Lafarge                           | Real estate | Ukraine      |
| 2008 | Xinjiang Guanghui  | 250                      | 49             | Tarbagatay Munay                  | Energy      | Kazakhstan   |
| 2009 | CNPC   | 2,600                    | 50             | Central Asia Petroleum            | Energy      | Kazakhstan   |
| 2009 | CIC  | 940                      | 11             | JSC, KazMunaiGas, E&P             | Energy      | Kazakhstan   |
| 2009 | Baiyin Non-Ferrous, CITIC & Chang Xin                    | 190                      | 60             | Oxus                              | Metals      | Uzbekistan   |
| 2009 | CNPC   | 3,130                    |                |                                   | Energy      | Turkmenistan |
| 2010 | Gezhouba and Xinjiang International Economic Cooperation | 730                      |                | Kazakhstan Natural Gas Technology | Energy      | Kazakhstan   |
| 2010 | Sinopec  | 1,700                    |                | Kazakhstan Petrochemical          | Chemicals   | Kazakhstan   |
| 2010 | Jinchuan   | 120                      | 49             | Kazakhmys                         | Metals      | Kazakhstan   |
| 2010 | Sinomach   | 190                      |                |                                   | Energy      | Belarus      |
| 2011 | Sinomach   | 770                      |                |                                   | Agriculture | Belarus      |
| 2011 | Sinomach   | 2,010                    |                |                                   | Real estate | Ukraine      |
| 2011 | China National Precision Machinery                       | 600                      |                |                                   | Transport   | Belarus      |
| 2011 | CITIC  | 100                      |                | Kazakh State Energy               | Energy      | Kazakhstan   |
| 2011 | Sinopec  | 850                      |                | Marubeni                          | Energy      | Kazakhstan   |
| 2012 | China Communications Construction                        | 400                      |                |                                   | Transport   | Belarus      |
| 2012 | Three Gorges   | 360                      |                |                                   | Energy      | Kazakhstan   |
| 2012 | Hubei Changyang Hongxin                                  | 160                      |                |                                   | Metals      | Ukraine      |
| 2012 | China National Building Material                         | 300                      |                | Tajik Aluminium                   | Real estate | Tajikistan   |

<sup>70</sup> The Heritage Foundation (note 17).



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# TO WHAT EXTENT HAS RUSSIA'S FOREIGN POLICY SINCE 2000 BEEN INFLUENCED BY EURASIANISM?

**Marijuš Antonovič\***

*Abstract*

After Vladimir Putin's election as Russia's president, Russia started to act more assertively in world politics. Russia also witnessed a rise in nationalism, a strand of which is Eurasianism, with a very strong and aggressive foreign policy agenda. This provoked speculation about whether Russia's assertiveness is related to the prominence of Eurasianist ideas. This article aims to clarify this debate and investigates to what extent post-Soviet Russia's foreign policy has been influenced by the theories of Eurasianism. First, it outlines the main theories of Eurasianism, which are termed pragmatic Eurasianism, intercivilisational Eurasianism and neo-Eurasianism. Then it reviews Russia's foreign policy towards the USA, the EU, China, Japan, the CIS and Iran. After that it reviews how much Russia's foreign policy matched Eurasianist ideas and what relationship can be seen between Russia's foreign policy and the theories of Eurasianism. It comes to the conclusion that although Russia's foreign policy was not completely guided by any theory of Eurasianism, Russia was still strongly influenced by pragmatic Eurasianism and adopted many practical proposals from neo-Eurasianism. The article finishes with a conclusion where it interprets its findings and shows that Russia has not abandoned the West.

## **Introduction**

Vladimir Putin's election as Russia's president in 2000 marked a new era for Russia. After the chaos and hardship of the 1990s, the new president managed to stabilise the country and restore economic growth. This was later manifested in Russia's relative rise in world politics and a more assertive policy to defending Russia's interests abroad. Moreover, Russia started to undermine many Western interests. Consequently, this created a debate about how to interpret this new Russian assertiveness. What purpose did it serve? Was it revisionist? Was it just an

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end to itself? Or was it a means for achieving some higher goal? Some claimed that Russia was trying to restore its regional dominance with the help of the USSR's legacy.<sup>1</sup> Others thought that Russia was being pragmatic.<sup>2</sup> Many also argued<sup>3</sup> that Russia's policy was neo-imperialist.

Equally, certain scholars tried to relate Russia's assertiveness to the rise of Eurasianism,<sup>4</sup> and they had reasons for doing so. Firstly, Russia witnessed a rise in nationalism, and Eurasianism is a strand of Russian nationalism. Secondly, Russia's authorities claimed that Russia was a great power, which is exactly the same as what all Eurasianist theorists argue. Thirdly, many Eurasianist theories received recognition in Russia. During the 1990s, foreign-policy makers were considering adopting Eurasianist ideas, and since 2009 one of the most notorious Eurasianists, Aleksandr Dugin, has been teaching at Moscow's State University.<sup>5</sup> Fourthly, Russia employed some foreign-policy tools from Eurasianism, the most recent one being the establishment of the Eurasian Union.<sup>6</sup> Finally, Russia often used anti-Western rhetoric. This signalled that Russia might have adopted a new vision of its place in the world, which dictated a new foreign policy.

Consequently, many authors started to examine whether Russia's foreign policy was being influenced by Eurasianism, and this article will attempt to clarify that debate. It will analyse to what extent Russia's foreign policy from 2000 to 2012 was influenced by theories of Eurasianism. This question is important because it sheds light on Russia's relations with the West. The article will approach the question using the method of descriptive inference,<sup>7</sup> where it will outline the

<sup>1</sup> Spillius, A., "Vladimir Putin is trying to take Russia back in time", *The Telegraph*, <<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/8808712/Vladimir-Putin-is-trying-to-take-Russia-back-in-time.html>>, 05 10 2011.

<sup>2</sup> Donaldson, R. H. & Noguee, J. L., *The foreign policy of Russia: changing systems, enduring interests*, 4<sup>th</sup> ed., Armonk & London: M.E. Sharpe, 2009, p. 360.

<sup>3</sup> Lucas, E., *The new Cold War: how the Kremlin menaces both Russia and the West*, London: Bloomsbury, 2009; Bugajski, J., "Russia's pragmatic reimperialization", *Caucasian Review of International Affairs*, 4(1), 2010, pp. 3-19.

<sup>4</sup> See Clover, C., "Dreams of the Eurasian heartland: the re-emergence of geopolitics", *Foreign Affairs*, 78(2), 1999, pp. 9-13; Van der Oye, D. S., "Russia's Asian temptation", *International Journal*, 55(4), 2000, p. 623.

<sup>5</sup> Sotsiologicheskii Fakultet MGU, Kafedra Sotsiologii Miezhdunarodnih Otnoshenii, <<http://www.socio.msu.ru/?s=main&p=chair-gp>>.

<sup>6</sup> Socor, V., "Putin's Eurasian manifesto charts Russia's return to great power status", *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, 8(185), 2011.

<sup>7</sup> Goldstein, J. & Keohane, R. O., "Ideas and foreign policy: an analytical framework" in Goldstein, J. & Keohane, R. O., eds., *Ideas and foreign policy: beliefs, institutions, and political change*, Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 1993, p. 28.

systematic aspects of Russia's foreign policy and then assess the extent to which the observed behaviour matches Eurasianist theories. The latter will be done firstly by establishing covariation between Eurasianist theories and Russia's foreign policy, and secondly by examining whether a path can be identified between Eurasianist theories and Russia's policy.<sup>8</sup> In addition, there will also be a focus on Russia's normative positions on world politics, as this helps to identify Russia's worldview and the principles on which Russia built its foreign policy. The period studied is the interval between Putin's election as Russia's president in 2000 and his re-election in 2012. Though Russia had two presidents during that period, the Putin-Medvedev position swap showed that Putin was always the main decision-maker in the Kremlin.<sup>9</sup>

## **1. What is Eurasianism?**

Theories of Eurasianism were first developed in the 1920s by Russian intellectuals who were in exile. They sought to prove the existence of an entity called "Eurasia" using cultural, historical, political and geographical arguments.<sup>10</sup> Due to internal fractions, the movement concluded in the 1930s. During the Soviet period, Eurasianist ideas were developed by Lev Gumilev and in the years of perestroika in the USSR Eurasianist ideas re-emerged in Russia's public life.<sup>11</sup>

But the Eurasianism that has been developing since the last years of the USSR is not a coherent theory and has many diverse strands. Many authors, such as L. Gumilev, A. Panarin, F. Girenko, V. I. Paschenko, M. Titarenko, E. Bagramov, T. Pulatov and A. Dugin, contributed to the development of Eurasianism. Because of this diversity and because not all of the theories are strictly political, it is impossible to talk generally about Eurasianism in Russia's foreign policy. It can only be done by identifying which strands of Eurasianism could potentially influence Russia's foreign policy. Two criteria have been employed to differentiate among the theories of Eurasianism: their prominence in post-Soviet Russia, and

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<sup>8</sup> Goldstein, J. & Keohane, R. O., (note 7), p. 29.

<sup>9</sup> Barry, E., "Medvedev defends plans to trade places with Putin", *The New York Times*, <<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/01/world/europe/medvedev-defends-plan-to-trade-places-with-putin.html>>, 30 09 2011.

<sup>10</sup> Laruelle, M., *Russian Eurasianism: an ideology of empire*, Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2008, pp. 14-15.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 4.

their political focus (or lack thereof). Only by satisfying these criteria can a theory influence foreign policy. Without the first, the theory cannot come to the attention of the authorities; without the second, it is impossible to devise practical foreign policy strategies from the theory.

Whereas the first criterion allows us concentrate on Lev Gumilev, Aleksandr Panarin, Aleksandr Dugin, Mikhail Titarenko and Evgeny Primakov's pragmatic Eurasianism, the second discards Lev Gumilev's and Aleksandr Panarin's ideas, as their theories focus broadly on culture. Neither of them has a strong political agenda so as to form a basis for foreign policy. This means that Aleksandr Dugin's, Mikhail Titarenko's and Evgeny Primakov's theories had the most potential to influence Russia's foreign policy. This is not surprising, since all of these theories were created to provide Russia with a new strategy and identity in global politics after the collapse of the USSR. Nevertheless, they are not uniform in their prescriptions for Russia. Keeping this in mind, Eurasianist theories orientated towards foreign policy can be sorted into three categories – pragmatic Eurasianism, intercivilisational Eurasianism and neo-Eurasianism.

Pragmatic Eurasianism was first introduced and adopted for foreign policy by Evgeny Primakov in the last decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, when he served as Russia's minister of foreign affairs and later as Russia's prime minister. Pragmatic Eurasianism sees Russia as a Eurasian country and its vast territories allow it to play a big role in East Asia, Central Asia, the Caucasus and Europe. Thus, Russia has interests in the East, particularly Japan and China, and the West, making it necessary to have a balanced foreign policy between these two poles. This is not so much an ideology as a recognition of Russia's physical identity.<sup>12</sup> This foreign-policy approach is based on five principles.<sup>13</sup> Firstly, Russia must defend its position as a great power. Secondly, Russia should follow a multi-vector policy and promote its relations not only with other great powers like the USA, China, and the European Union (EU), but regional powers such as Iran and Turkey. Thirdly, Russia has important weapons at its disposal, such as its geopolitical position, nuclear arsenal, and its permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and Russia must use these assets. Fourthly, Russia should foster relations with countries that are wary of the USA's tendency towards unipolarity. Fifthly, Russia has no enemies, but only constant interests; thus, Russia should pursue pragmatism

<sup>12</sup> Rangsimaporn, P., *Russia as an aspiring great power in East Asia: perception and policies from Yeltsin to Putin*, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009, p. 43.

<sup>13</sup> Rubinstein, A. Z., "Russia adrift: strategic anchors for Russia's foreign policy", *Harvard International Review*, 22(1), 2000, p. 19.

and should aim to establish constructive partnerships with China, India, Japan, Iran, Libya, Iraq and others.<sup>14</sup> If this is impossible, then confrontation should be avoided.<sup>15</sup> Pragmatic Eurasianism allows use of Eurasianist rhetoric to justify the need for a balanced, less Western-biased policy that promotes Russia's status as a great power. But this does not mean a full rejection either of the Western vector or of a cultural affinity with Europe.<sup>16</sup> Rather, it involves stiff opposition to the hegemony of the USA and it even proposes to form a Russia-China-India axis to counterbalance the USA.<sup>17</sup> For similar reasons, it advocates a joint Russian-Japanese venture over the Kuril Islands<sup>18</sup> as a basis for Russia's alliance with Japan. Therefore, pragmatic Eurasianism is based on geopolitics, allows Russia to present itself as a great power and calls for the establishment of a multipolar world order.

Another interpretation of Eurasianism is intercivilisational Eurasianism, developed by Mikhail Titarenko. This emphasises Russia's intercivilisational role between Asia and Europe and advocates the pragmatic usage of Russia's unique geographical position as a land bridge between Asia and Europe.<sup>19</sup> China, here, is of particular importance. The theory sees China's and other East Asian countries' economic models as a viable alternative for Russia's economic development and reform, because these are based on stable and positive spiritual values. These economic models allow for other ways to build democracy and a market economy, without necessarily being based on Western values and models. Eurasianism is perceived as a "model for a relationship of equality between different civilisations, which recognises their right to exist, to develop, and to cooperate with other civilisations and cultures".<sup>20</sup> For Titarenko, this cultural agenda provides a framework for Russia's foreign policy, where Russia should oppose US unilateralism and hegemony and reject Western values, while at the same time forging strategic alliances with China, Japan and other Asian countries and moving closer to Asia on normative issues. Thus, it entails a multi-vector policy<sup>21</sup> with an "active

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<sup>14</sup> Erşen, E., "Neo-Eurasianism and Putin's 'Multipolarism' in Russian foreign policy", *Turkish Review of Eurasian Studies*, 4, p. 144.

<sup>15</sup> Primakov, E., *Minnoe pole politiki*, Moscow: Molodaya Gvardya, 2007, p. 158.

<sup>16</sup> Rangsimaporn, (note 13), p. 49.

<sup>17</sup> Kuhrt, N., *Russian policy towards China and Japan: The El'tsin and Putin periods*, London & New York: Routledge, 2007, p. 134.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 142.

<sup>19</sup> Rangsimaporn, (note 13), p. 43.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 54.

<sup>21</sup> Titarenko, M. L., *Geopolicheskoe znachenye dal'nevo vostoka: Rossya, Kitai i drugye strani Azii*, Moscow: Pamiatnikiki Istoricheskoi my'sli, 2008, p. 232.

development of good mutually beneficial relations with countries worldwide based on Russia's fundamental interests and respect for other countries' interests, principles of political and economic multipolarity and a dialogue of equals between civilisations".<sup>22</sup> However, intercivilisational Eurasianism warns that using the Eastern vector to replace Russia's Western policy would be a grave mistake.<sup>23</sup> Thus, a balanced approach is also necessary here.

The best-known strand of Eurasianism is Aleksandr Dugin's neo-Eurasianism. Dugin actually developed two theories of Eurasianism. One is based on regional empires, where Russia must form a Eurasian-Russian empire, and is mostly used in the literature on Russian Eurasianism. The other theory is a bit more moderate and is used in this article. The reason for this choice is that Dugin used this theory as a programme for his Eurasianist political party; thus, this theory, rather than the former, was targeted to influence Russian authorities.

In his more moderate theory Dugin claims that international affairs are characterised by a dualism of "land" and "sea" powers.<sup>24</sup> Usually the West embodied the sea with its characteristics – utilitarianism, optimisation, pragmatism, individualism, estrangement, moral flexibility, plutocracy, dynamism and economic flexibility. Consequently the East embodied land power with its values – contemplation, non-economic motivation for work, communality, a heroic set of values, spiritual broadness, idealism, sacrifice and faithfulness.<sup>25</sup> Currently, the USA and UK, with other Western countries, embody sea power; and Eurasia, with Russia, embodies land power. This opposition is usually termed as a competition between Atlanticist and Eurasianist powers and values. According to Dugin, after the Cold War the USA started to establish a unipolar world order and impose its Atlanticist sea values around the world. But each culture and nation has a right to follow its own historic path and, therefore, a multi-power world is necessary to secure these rights.<sup>26</sup> Only then can intercultural harmony and international peace flourish. To restore the political and cultural balance and geopolitical dualism, Russia must establish a Eurasian strategic block to challenge the USA<sup>27</sup> and its institutions, particularly NATO,<sup>28</sup> and the USA's version of globalisation. Russia

<sup>22</sup> Rangsimaporn, (note 13), p. 54.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 55.

<sup>24</sup> Dugin, A., *Osnovy Evraziistva*, Moscow: Arktogeya Centr, 2002, p. 557.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 562.

<sup>26</sup> Dugin, A., *Evraziiskii put' kak natsionalnaya ideya*, Moscow: Arktogeya Centr, 2002, p. 90.

<sup>27</sup> Dugin (note 25), p. 563.

<sup>28</sup> Kipp, J. W., "Aleksandr Dugin and the ideology of national revival: geopolitics, Eurasianism and the conservative revolution", *European Security*, 11(3), p. 101.

must, at all costs, try to prove to the USA the unsustainability of the unipolar world order and of the conflicting and irresponsible nature of USA-centric globalisation. Subsequently, Russia must support isolationist tendencies in the USA and the limitation of the USA's geopolitical interests around the American continent.<sup>29</sup>

Dugin argues that Eurasia must create a multipolar world that allows nations and cultures to follow their own historical paths in politics, economics, culture and religion.<sup>30</sup> Accordingly, Russia is the central state of Eurasia and must play a leading role to fulfil Eurasia's historic mission.

To achieve these aims, Dugin proposes a strategy for Russia's foreign policy. The first step is a strategic reunification of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries<sup>31</sup> into a common strategic formation, united by a consciousness of a common strategic and civilizational destiny.<sup>32</sup> This could possibly develop into a Eurasian Union.<sup>33</sup> Dugin also proposes to establish the Eurasian Customs Union, a regime of "selected openness" in economic relations with the West, severe control of customs, monopolisation of some key strategic industrial spheres, a differentiated approach towards economic relations with the developed world, i.e. preferring Europe and China over the USA and its sponsored institutions, and a re-orientation from the dollar to some newly established Eurasian currency.<sup>34</sup> The second step, which may take place in parallel with the first one, is the creation of a united strategic alliance with Eurasian countries that are interested in creating an alternative to the USA and countries of the Atlanticist West. Such countries are Iran, India, China, certain Arabian countries of the Middle East and North Africa, and Far Eastern countries in the Pacific region. The third step is the neutralisation of Europe and Japan, their exclusion from the USA's sphere of influence and inclusion into the Eurasian project.<sup>35</sup> To make this happen Dugin recommends reforming and upgrading the Russian army so that it reaches parity with NATO forces.<sup>36</sup> Russia must also divide NATO and oppose Atlantic hegemony.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> Dugin (note 25), p. 568.

<sup>30</sup> Dugin (note 27), p. 93.

<sup>31</sup> The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is an organisation that unites former-USSR states, apart from the Baltic States. Member States are: Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia (left the organisation in 2008), Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.

<sup>32</sup> Dugin (note 27), p. 94.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 569.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 577-578.

<sup>35</sup> Dugin (note 27), p. 95.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 98.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 99-100.

But Dugin does not rely only on military means, and outlines practical proposals: building east-west and north-south land transport networks; creating a Eurasian Economic Community and a Eurasian Energy Community; united systems of collective security; and representative structures.<sup>38</sup> More generally, he calls for a “program of subversion, destabilisation, disinformation spearheaded by the Russian special services, supported by a tough, hard-headed use of Russia’s gas, oil, and natural resource riches to pressure and bully other countries into bending to Russia’s will”<sup>39</sup> together with the usage of mass media.<sup>40</sup> In addition, the security services must be upgraded so that they can create Eurasianist geopolitical lobbies in Western and other countries, strengthen the Eurasianist trend among other countries’ elites and neutralise Atlanticist lobbies.<sup>41</sup> Economic relations, both on a national and an international level, should be based on state control of strategic assets; a free market in small and medium production, trade, and services; diverse forms of collective management; and autarchy.<sup>42</sup>

Thus, Eurasianist theories serve to justify Russia’s ambitions to be a global power.<sup>43</sup> Moreover, they help Moscow transform Europe into its bandwagon ally, weaken Europe’s ties with the USA<sup>44</sup> and reject Western economic and political models, because of their supposed inapplicability to Russia.<sup>45</sup> Its revisionism, its view of Russia as a great power and its concrete measures for how to achieve that status are attractive for Russians who cannot accept the collapse of the USSR and the decline of Russia’s power in world politics. The re-appearance of Eurasianism in academic circles after the Cold War could induce policy-makers to adopt these theories practically. This is especially true for Putin, whose main foreign policy goal is to regain Russia’s status as a global power. But Eurasianism is not the only way for Russia to regain its power. Therefore, it is necessary to review Russia’s foreign policy since 2000, what influenced it and what motivations were behind it, to be able to say whether any Eurasianist theory had an impact on Russia’s foreign policy.

<sup>38</sup> Ismailov, E. & Papava, V., *Rethinking Central Asia*, Washington: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, 2010, p. 33.

<sup>39</sup> Dunlop, J. B., “Aleksandr Dugin’s foundations of geopolitics”, *Demokratizatsiya*, **12**(1), 2004, p. 47.

<sup>40</sup> Kipp (note 29), p. 102.

<sup>41</sup> Dugin (note 27), p. 101.

<sup>42</sup> Kipp (note 29), p. 98.

<sup>43</sup> Ismailov & Papava (note 8), p. 21.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 41.

<sup>45</sup> Laruelle (note 11), p. 12.

## **2. Russia's foreign policy since 2000**

To determine whether Russia's foreign policy was based on Eurasianism it must be split into separate vectors, because Eurasianism prescribes different policies for different groups of states. Six vectors can be determined from Eurasianism that shall be reviewed hereafter: the USA, the EU, China, Japan, CIS and Iran. Though India is also important for Eurasianists, the mentioned vectors are sufficient to determine the influence of Eurasianist theories on Russia's foreign policy.

### **2.1 Russia's policy towards the USA**

When Vladimir Putin became Russia's president, Russia's relations with USA were the worst since the end of the Cold War. But due to its economic dependence on the West, Russia could not challenge many moves by the USA in world politics. Nevertheless, Putin declared his goal to make Russia an important regional and international actor.<sup>46</sup>

At first, Russia's policy was hardly Eurasianist. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Putin was the first to offer support to the USA. Disagreements were forgotten and countries started to cooperate. Russia supported the USA's war in Afghanistan and the war on terror. Russia allowed the US army to use Russian air space as a transit route, gave intelligence, supplied fighting forces and cooperated on protecting the Afghan border.<sup>47</sup> It allowed open US bases in Kyrgyzstan, later in Uzbekistan and in Tajikistan,<sup>48</sup> which was considered to lie in Russia's sphere of influence. Russia was happy to help the USA as this move coincided with Russia's interests in Chechnya<sup>49</sup> and Russia hoped to gain more respect for its interests from the USA.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> Kanet, R. E., "From the 'New World Order' to 'Resetting Relations': two decades of US-Russian relations" in Kanet, R. E., ed., *Russian foreign policy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, p. 208.

<sup>47</sup> Cohen, S. F., "US-Russian relations in an age of American triumphalism", *Journal of International Affairs*, **63**(2), 2010, p. 198.

<sup>48</sup> Lang, J., Matusiak, M., Strachota, K., "A new chapter in relations between NATO, the USA and Central Asia", *Eastweek*, **288**(12), <<http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/eastweek/2012-03-21/a-new-chapter-relations-between-nato-usa-and-central-asia>>, 2012.

<sup>49</sup> Mattox, G. A., "Resetting the US-Russian relationship: is 'cooperative engagement' possible?", *European Security*, **20**(1), p. 105.

<sup>50</sup> Mankoff, J., *Russian foreign policy: the return of great power politics*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2012, p. 99.

At the same time, Putin was successfully solving Russia's domestic problems and Russia rose economically due to the export of raw materials, which made Russia feel stronger in the international arena.<sup>51</sup> As the USA started to push for military intervention in Iraq, Russia vehemently opposed it because it feared US unilateralism would undermine the authority of the UNSC and subsequently of Russia.<sup>52</sup> But this was in vain, and the USA started the war in 2003. This, along with other factors, convinced Putin that Russia would never be accepted as a Western state and that Russia should rely on itself. After that, Russia emerged as a revisionist power that sought to reverse its geopolitical losses after the break-up of the USSR and promoted a multipolar world order with Russia as a one of the world's major powers.<sup>53</sup> From this point relations started to deteriorate, and Moscow became critical of many aspects of US foreign policy. But full confrontation did not emerge because Russia decided to endorse a policy of selective engagement and selective confrontation, where it challenged US interests in certain areas.

First was NATO's expansion eastward and US missile defence systems. As Russia saw NATO as an organisation that institutionalised the USA's zone of influence, Russia perceived its expansion as a deliberate attempt to undermine Russia's interests, expand Western dominance and diminish Russia's role in European security.<sup>54</sup> Moreover, Russia stated that NATO's placement of armed forces in new member states reduced mutual trust, as well as Russia's security. Moscow believed that both the USA and Russia should possess their own, unchallenged, spheres of influence. Therefore, Russia saw the recent developments in the post-Soviet space as Washington's bid to encircle Russia and create an anti-Russian axis within its sphere of interest.<sup>55</sup> This was one of the reasons why Moscow went to war with Georgia in 2008. It was targeted to dissuade NATO countries from granting Georgia NATO membership, show the limits of US influence and show that alliances with the USA were unreliable.<sup>56</sup>

Secondly, Russia opposed the USA's leadership in world politics and called for the establishment of a multipolar world order. The USA saw itself as an "exceptional" state that provided global leadership.<sup>57</sup> Because of this, and because

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<sup>51</sup> Kanet (note 47), p. 210.

<sup>52</sup> Mankoff (note 51), p. 108.

<sup>53</sup> Kanet (note 47), p. 212.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 213-214.

<sup>55</sup> Bugajski, J., *Dismantling the West: Russia's Atlantic agenda*, Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, 2009, p. 29.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 38-39.

<sup>57</sup> Kanet (note 47), pp. 212-213.

Russia perceived itself as an independent global power, Russia often criticised the USA for dividing Europe, making foreign policy too ideological and triumphalist with double-standards,<sup>58</sup> sabotaging arms treaties and disrespecting international law.<sup>59</sup> Russia also disagreed with the USA over the countries' relative standing in world politics, the USA's ignorance of Russia in key discussions about future security<sup>60</sup> and the USA's promotion of democracy. Moscow tried to portray itself as a protector of international legalism, state integrity, national sovereignty and UN decision-making. This policy of combining multilateralism and opposition to the USA was best seen in Kosovo. By insisting that the Kosovo case should be resolved through the UN, Russia showed that it was a defender of international law, multilateralism and state integrity. Russia also promoted its image as a constructive power that was mediating such conflicts as those in North Korea, Iran, Transdnistria and Nagorno-Karabach.<sup>61</sup> Furthermore, to promote itself as an alternative leader to the USA Russia supported various international and multilateral institutions. Examples could be the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)<sup>62</sup> or the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO).<sup>63</sup>

Russia's criticism of the USA aimed to justify Russia's position as an independent actor in world politics and to foster relations with countries that opposed the USA's dominance.<sup>64</sup> Russia was ready to support political regimes that challenged the USA, such as those in Venezuela, Cuba, Iran, Syria, Libya (under Gaddafi) and Muslim countries.<sup>65</sup> Consequently, Russia portrayed itself as one of the non-Western civilisations that opposed Western and Atlanticist globalisation and claimed to be speaking for all emerging countries. For instance, the 2008 Russian foreign policy concept argued that global competition was acquiring a civilisational aspect, which transformed into a battle between different values and state development models. For similar reasons Russia forged links with various

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<sup>58</sup> Cohen (note 48), pp. 197-199.

<sup>59</sup> Bugajski (note 56), pp. 30-31.

<sup>60</sup> Kanet (note 47), p. 212.

<sup>61</sup> Bugajski (note 56), p. 30.

<sup>62</sup> The SCO was founded in 2001 by China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Members cooperate on security, in the military, economic and cultural spheres. The CSTO was created in 2002 by Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and was joined by Uzbekistan in 2006. It is a collective security organisation which prohibits its members to join other military alliances and considers an attack on its member as an attack on the organisation.

<sup>63</sup> Mattox (note 50), p. 113.

<sup>64</sup> Kanet (note 47), p. 220.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 204.

autocracies to tackle democratic transformations.<sup>66</sup> However, this was not directed against the USA *per se*, but to make the USA respect Russia's interests.<sup>67</sup>

These developments should have pleased neo-Eurasianists, but they were soon disappointed. After the 2007-2008 financial crisis, Russia realised it could not afford confrontation with the West due to economic difficulties.<sup>68</sup> Thus, after the 2009 reset initiative Russia increased cooperation with the USA in arms control, Afghanistan, Iran and in the economic sphere.<sup>69</sup> For instance, Russia did not confront the USA about the Kyrgyzstan crisis,<sup>70</sup> where they both cooperated in providing humanitarian aid,<sup>71</sup> and in 2010 Russia and the USA signed a new START treaty.<sup>72</sup> Other areas of cooperation were North Korea and Iran. Finally, Russia pursued integration into the US-created economic order, as shown by its entrance into the World Trade Organisation in 2011.

Overall, Russia had no strategy towards the USA. One reason for this could be the internal division in the Russian political elite in relation to policy towards the USA. Russia cooperated with and confronted the USA in a number of areas, but the latter was not aimed to overwhelm the USA; rather to achieve parity and reciprocity.<sup>73</sup>

## 2.2 Russia's policy towards the EU

Russia saw the EU as a weak, divided institution that was in decline<sup>74</sup> and could even collapse one day. Russia did not see the EU's institutional design as final and viewed the EU as being in a transitional period. Thus, any agreement with the EU need not be conclusive.<sup>75</sup> In addition, Russia saw compromise as

<sup>66</sup> Bugajski (note 56), pp. 46-48.

<sup>67</sup> Mankoff (note 51), p. 94.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 115.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 118-122.

<sup>70</sup> In April 2010 a political crisis broke out in Kyrgyzstan, where protesters clashed with the police demanding the resignation of President Kurmanbek Bakiyev. It was followed by ethnic clashes between Kyrgyz and Uzbek ethnic communities, and the interim government, which governed after the ousting of president Bakiyev, asked Russia to send its troops to calm down the violence.

<sup>71</sup> Mattox (note 50), p. 111.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 107.

<sup>73</sup> Mankoff (note 51), p. 94.

<sup>74</sup> Bugajski (note 56), pp. 107-108.

<sup>75</sup> Lukayanov, F., "Russia-EU: the partnership that went astray", *Europe-Asia Studies*, **60**(6), 2008, p. 1117.

being Europe's biggest weakness. All these factors encouraged Moscow to be more assertive,<sup>76</sup> and it became so in mid-2003. Though the oil price hike explains this shift, it would still have happened without the oil price rise because Russia had had high aspirations for a long time and the oil boom simply accelerated their realisation.<sup>77</sup> Russia wanted a strategic partnership with the EU to expand Russia's international interests, particularly its security and economic profile. The key Russian goal regarding the EU was to strengthen the Europe-Russia strategic pole, which would become a Russia-EU system of international security, where the EU would be Russia's junior partner, opposed to the USA's influence.<sup>78</sup>

Russia's strategy towards EU countries was based on four pillars. Firstly, Russia sought to take advantage of policy differences between the USA and major EU countries to create informal coalitions and opposition to the USA.<sup>79</sup> For example, in June 2008 Medvedev proposed a new comprehensive European Security Treaty<sup>80</sup> that would replace all existing security treaties, including NATO. It aimed to distract EU countries from the transatlantic alliance, offered them predictable, non-confrontational relations with Russia<sup>81</sup> and gave Russia a veto in European security.

Secondly, Russia created problematic issues to incite disagreements within the EU. Although its main rationale was to bypass Belarus and Ukraine as transit states for Russian energy exports, the Nord-Stream gas pipeline<sup>82</sup> can be viewed as an example of such policy. Moreover, Russia promoted bilateral ties with individual states, particularly larger EU members, as Moscow sees them as the most

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<sup>76</sup> Leonard, M. & Popescu, N., *A power audit of EU-Russia relations*, Policy Paper, London: European Council on Foreign Relations, 2007, p. 13.

<sup>77</sup> Lukyanov (note 76), p. 1108.

<sup>78</sup> Bugajski (note 56), p. 109.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 10.

<sup>80</sup> That treaty would aim to replace NATO and OSCE and position the UNSC as the main institution for guaranteeing peace. The main signatories ought to be the USA, Canada, Europe, Russia and its post-Soviet neighbours. The treaty would allow for signatories to consider an attack on another signatory as an attack on itself, but would not oblige them to come to the defence of the attacked country. For more information on the treaty, see: President of Russia. *European Security Treaty*, <<http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/docs/2009/11/223072.shtml>>, 29 11 2009; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, "Russia unveils proposal for European security treaty", <[http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia\\_Unveils\\_Proposal\\_For\\_European\\_Security\\_Treaty/1891161.html](http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia_Unveils_Proposal_For_European_Security_Treaty/1891161.html)>.

<sup>81</sup> Bugajski (note 56), p. 112.

<sup>82</sup> In 2005 Russia signed a deal with Germany to build a gas pipeline on the seabed of the Baltic Sea, which would transport gas directly from Russia into Germany and bypass many Eastern European transit states.

important. This policy also served to prevent the creation of a common EU policy, particularly foreign and security policy. At the same time Russia aimed to distance selected capitals from Washington and neutralise the effects of certain member states applying an assertive stance towards Russia.<sup>83</sup> For instance, Russia offered energy contracts to Hungary, Slovakia, Serbia, Bulgaria and Austria to undermine EU's attempts to diversify gas and oil supplies.<sup>84</sup> Russia used a charm offensive against strong EU states and put political-economic pressure on weaker states; the main tool here was energy.<sup>85</sup> Russia particularly focused on building strong relationships with core EU countries – Germany, France and Italy. It encouraged Germany to become more assertive and to be less dependent on the USA.<sup>86</sup> Russia also established closer ties (or attempted to do so) with Greece, Cyprus, Spain and Finland. At the same time Russia actively confronted other EU states, particularly the UK and the Baltic States. This policy aimed to exploit disagreements between EU member states, since the pro-Russian stance of some countries evoked harsh reactions from countries that had bad relations with Russia. Among Russia's other instruments were diplomatic pressure, trade embargoes, transport blockages and renegotiation of oil and gas contracts.<sup>87</sup> Russia also used its personal contacts with socialist and ex-communist politicians to ensure long-term energy supply contracts and build an infrastructure that would undermine the EU's attempts to diversify energy supplies.<sup>88</sup> Furthermore, Russia used its business links to create strong pro-Russian lobbies in EU member states<sup>89</sup> and supported pro-Russian parties, factions and politicians in EU institutions and countries.<sup>90</sup>

The third pillar of Russia's strategy towards the EU was to establish asymmetric interdependence, where the EU needed Russia more than Russia needed the EU.<sup>91</sup> This target was pursued through energy, and Russia aimed to control the entire European supply of gas and oil. Russian firms often got access to downstream markets in EU countries, while EU companies got upstream access to gas fields in Russia.<sup>92</sup> This allowed Russia to monopolise domestic gas pipelines in some

<sup>83</sup> Bugajski (note 56), p. 101.

<sup>84</sup> Leonard & Popescu (note 77), p. 16.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 14.

<sup>86</sup> Bugajski (note 56), p. 110.

<sup>87</sup> Leonard & Popescu (note 77), p. 15.

<sup>88</sup> Bugajski (note 56), p. 103.

<sup>89</sup> Leonard & Popescu (note 77), p. 14.

<sup>90</sup> Bugajski (note 56), p. 108.

<sup>91</sup> Leonard & Popescu (note 77), p. 1.

<sup>92</sup> This means that Russia sells and distributes gas and products of natural oil, while EU companies explore and produce gas and oil.

countries and let Russia decide when gas supplies reached Europe.<sup>93</sup> This dependence was used to pressurise EU governments into supporting Russia on such issues as separatism in Moldova and Georgia, Chechnya, NATO expansion, etc.<sup>94</sup>

The fourth pillar was Russian revisionism. Russia believed law to be an expression of the balance of power – when it changed, so should the law.<sup>95</sup> According to Russia, during the last two decades the West had rewritten the rules of their relationship, completely ignoring Russia's interests. Now, as Russia felt strong again, it started to challenge the economic, political and strategic agreements of the 1990s. In the political realm Russia repudiated the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and Helsinki norms, disregarded Council of Europe commitments, breached the Vienna Convention and tried to renegotiate the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe treaty.<sup>96</sup> In the economic sphere, Russia attempted to revise deals with Western companies.<sup>97</sup>

Though this four-pillar strategy resembled some Eurasianist ideas, Russia's normative positions did not. Russia emphasised its European essence, its historical decision to integrate into Europe and the need for reciprocity.<sup>98</sup> In 2007 Putin stressed this in a letter on the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the EU when he wrote: "I strongly believe the full unity of our continent can never be achieved until Russia, as the largest European state, becomes an integral part of the European process."<sup>99</sup> However, Russia often questioned various Western organisations and standards. For instance, it objected to the OSCE's role as a promoter of democracy. Russia wanted the European Council to focus on migration and culture instead of on human rights. Hence, Russia was seeking to be recognised as a European country and was frustrated by Europe's reluctance to do so,<sup>100</sup> but at the same time Russia

<sup>93</sup> Leonard & Popescu (note 77), p. 23.

<sup>94</sup> Kanet (note 47), p. 218.

<sup>95</sup> Leonard & Popescu (note 77), p. 1.

<sup>96</sup> Helsinki norms are the principles enshrined in the 1975 Helsinki Accords. Among them are refraining from the threat of use of force, respect for freedom and human rights, equal rights and self-determination of peoples. The Vienna Convention is an international treaty, signed in 1961, that sets the framework for international relations between sovereign countries and creates the basis of diplomatic legal immunity. In the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe treaty, signed in 1999, Russia promised to withdraw its armed forces from Moldova and Georgia. Due to Russia's reluctance to do so, NATO members have not yet ratified the treaty.

<sup>97</sup> Leonard & Popescu (note 77), pp. 20-21.

<sup>98</sup> Lukayanov (note 76), pp. 1110-1111.

<sup>99</sup> Wiegand, G., "EU-Russian relations at a crossroads", *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, 19, 2008, pp. 10-11.

<sup>100</sup> Lukayanov (note 76), p. 1118.

thought that European values were created in the EU and then imposed on Russia, without regard for its traditions.<sup>101</sup> This is why Russia aimed to rewrite some of the EU's normative stances.

### 2.3 Russia's policy towards China

Russia's policy towards China was mainly based on economic interests<sup>102</sup> and political considerations. Russia aimed to align with China to counterbalance the USA and promote its status as a great power. China was also essential for Russia's promotion of a multipolar world order, as Russia was too weak to do this alone.<sup>103</sup> At the same time Russia tried to balance China in the Asia-Pacific region, the Korean Peninsula<sup>104</sup> and Central Asia, and Russia's approach to China was often influenced by fears and reservations.<sup>105</sup>

After Putin became president, Russia was trying to construct strong political relations with China. In 2000 the Chinese and Russian presidents announced that their "countries were friends forever and would never be enemies". In 2001 Russia joined the China-initiated SCO, as this would allow Russia to share responsibility with China to ensure security and stability in Central Asia and at the same time constrain Chinese moves to increase its influence in the region.<sup>106</sup> Since then, the heads of Russia and China have held meetings at least three times a year.<sup>107</sup> Russia also used China to strengthen its claims against the US presence in Central Asia. For example, in 2005 both countries used the SCO summit in Astana to urge Central Asian countries to set timetables for the US army to withdraw from its bases.<sup>108</sup>

<sup>101</sup> Light, M., "Keynote article: Russia and the EU: strategic partners or strategic rivals?", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 46(issue supplement), 2008, p. 22.

<sup>102</sup> Salin, P., "How Russians perceive China" in Moshes, A. & Nojonen, M., eds., *Russia-China relations: current state, alternative futures, and implications for the West*, Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2011, p. 70.

<sup>103</sup> Mankoff (note 51), p. 178.

<sup>104</sup> Berryman, J., "Russia and China in Eurasia: the wary partnership" in Freire, M. R., Kanet, R. E., eds., *Key players and regional dynamics in Eurasia: the return of the 'Great Game'*, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010, p. 137.

<sup>105</sup> Belopolsky, H., *Russia and the challengers: Russian alignment with China, Iran and Iraq in the unipolar era*, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009, p. 65.

<sup>106</sup> Berryman (note 105), p. 133.

<sup>107</sup> Belopolsky (note 106), p. 68.

<sup>108</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 83.

Russia managed to reach agreement with China on many normative issues. Russia aligned with China to promote the concept of sovereignty and territorial integrity.<sup>109</sup> Both countries opposed the promotion of democracy in foreign policy and interference in other countries' domestic affairs. These issues were mentioned in almost all joint declarations by Russian and Chinese heads of state after their summits. As a result, this developed into Russia's cooperation and support for China's position on North Korea, Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang.<sup>110</sup> These stances were directed against USA hegemony and consequently both countries promoted a multipolar world order.<sup>111</sup> During Medvedev's presidency Moscow used its relations with China to advocate global political and economic reform to the benefit of rising powers.<sup>112</sup> But there were limits to the Chinese-Russian strategic partnership. To the disappointment of the Eurasianists, China refused to establish a military alliance with Russia and there were disagreements on many issues: for example, Japan's membership in the UNSC<sup>113</sup> and China's refusal to recognise the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.<sup>114</sup> Moreover, similarities of opinion were often a coincidence, as in the case of Iraq, rather than a result of coordination, and the identical positions of both countries often produced few practical results.<sup>115</sup>

Russia also had security concerns regarding China. For the first time in history Russia was in decline while China was on the rise, and this raised fears that China would dominate Russia's Far East and weaken the region's ties with Moscow. As a result, Russia wanted to complete the border demarcation process with China so that border issues would not preclude cooperation. Russia managed to do so in October 2004, when Russia and China declared the border demarcation process was over, and in July 2008 when Russia and China signed the final agreement.<sup>116</sup>

Consequently, Russia tried to transform the political relationship with China into economic benefits. More generally, economic cooperation was important to ensure markets for Russian goods and show independence from the USA. Though China was Russia's fourth largest partner,<sup>117</sup> Russia was dissatisfied with the structure of its trade with China. It wanted to export fewer raw materials and more

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<sup>109</sup> Belopolsky (note 107), p. 67.

<sup>110</sup> Kuhrt (note 18), pp. 135-136.

<sup>111</sup> Belopolsky (note 106), p. 95.

<sup>112</sup> Mankoff (note 51), p. 215.

<sup>113</sup> Kuhrt (note 18), p. 114.

<sup>114</sup> Berryman (note 105), p. 130.

<sup>115</sup> Kuhrt (note 18), p. 115.

<sup>116</sup> Berryman (note 105), p. 131.

<sup>117</sup> Belopolsky (note 106), pp. 70-72.

manufactured goods, but nevertheless the negative trend continued after 2000, though overall bilateral trade continued to rise. In addition, Russia's imports from China rose faster than exports<sup>118</sup> and Chinese investment in Russia was rising, while Russia's investment in China was low. Hence, the countries' economic cooperation never reached the levels envisaged by Russia.<sup>119</sup> The Russian political establishment was increasingly concerned that Russia's economic dependence on China was slowly transforming into political dependence.<sup>120</sup>

In addition, Russia was extremely active in promoting its military-industrial complex's interests in China, as it helped to keep Russia's military industry alive.<sup>121</sup> Given Western sanctions on arms trade with China, this was a very profitable enterprise.<sup>122</sup> By 2010 Russian cumulative arms sales to China had reached \$26 billion.<sup>123</sup> Russia was also helping China to build up its maritime forces.<sup>124</sup> Besides, Russia started joint research and development projects for armaments and equipment.<sup>125</sup> Moreover, arms sales gradually evolved into closer military cooperation. For example, Russia and China participated in joint or SCO military exercises in 2005, 2007 and 2009.<sup>126</sup> But there were fears that this pattern was detrimental to Russia's long-term interests,<sup>127</sup> as China might use those weapons against Russia. Furthermore, Russia's nuclear arsenal was constrained by various arms-control treaties, while China's nuclear arsenal was rising, which further exacerbated those fears.<sup>128</sup> To counterbalance this trend, Russia simultaneously sold weapons to India and substantially reduced military sales to China in 2007.<sup>129</sup> At the same time, China was developing its own military capabilities and technology and thus was reducing its reliance on Russia.

Energy was also essential in Russia's policy towards China. Though energy dominated Russian exports to China,<sup>130</sup> Russia was cautious here as well for fear

<sup>118</sup> Kuhrt (note 18), pp. 118-119.

<sup>119</sup> Belopolsky (note 106), p. 95.

<sup>120</sup> Salin, P. (note 103), p. 74.

<sup>121</sup> Belopolsky (note 106), p. 72.

<sup>122</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 69-70.

<sup>123</sup> Berryman (note 105), p. 129.

<sup>124</sup> Kuhrt (note 18), p. 136.

<sup>125</sup> Belopolsky (note 106), p. 74-75.

<sup>126</sup> Berryman (note 105), p. 134.

<sup>127</sup> Belopolsky (note 106), p. 83.

<sup>128</sup> Mankoff (note 51), p. 180.

<sup>129</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 201.

<sup>130</sup> Kuhrt (note 18), p. 125.

of becoming dependent on China in terms of energy. The nuclear sector was also present in energy trade. For example, Russia built the Tianwan nuclear power plant for China.<sup>131</sup> Russia used nuclear sales to China to sustain its nuclear industry, secure economic gains and show defiance against the USA's policy. Despite the fact that such energy cooperation was slowly making Russia dependent on China, Russia's continuation of such a policy, along with growing economic dependence, shows the heavier weight of economic interests compared to strategic ones.

Hence, Russia's policy towards China was based on economic interests and less important *realpolitik* considerations.<sup>132</sup> It was not based on a doctrine, but on pragmatic imperatives, especially to limit the interference of external powers in what Russia perceived as its zone of interest.<sup>133</sup> Russia worked with China to limit the USA's influence and unilateralism, but at the same time competed with China for influence in Central Asia and the Asia-Pacific.

## **2.4 Russia's policy towards Japan**

Russia was interested in forging closer relations with Japan as a counterbalance to the USA's hegemony, to attract Japanese capital to develop Russia's Far Eastern territories, and to sign energy deals with Japan. But Japan refused to develop any closer relationship with Russia until the Kuril Islands territorial dispute was resolved and the peace treaty between the two countries was signed.<sup>134</sup>

At first Russia tried to solve the territorial dispute. In 2000 Russia offered a compromise<sup>135</sup> based on the 1956 USSR-Japan agreement.<sup>136</sup> In 2004, after Putin's re-election, his foreign affairs minister, Sergei Lavrov, continued this line and acknowledged that Moscow would return only two islands.<sup>137</sup> But Japan expected

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<sup>131</sup> Titarenko (note 22), p. 248.

<sup>132</sup> Freire, M. R. & Mendes, C. A., "*Realpolitik* dynamics and image construction in the Russia-China relationship: forging a strategic partnership?", *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs*, **38**(2), p. 29.

<sup>133</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 31.

<sup>134</sup> At the end of World War II the USSR occupied the Kuril Islands. Four of these islands were claimed by Japan and as a result the countries still have not signed a peace treaty after World War II.

<sup>135</sup> Buszynski, L., "Oil and territory in Putin's relations with China and Japan", *The Pacific Review*, **19**(3), 2006, p. 295.

<sup>136</sup> In 1956 the USSR and Japan signed a Joint Declaration, where they restored diplomatic relations and ended the state of war. Though the countries did not sign a peace treaty, the declaration specified that the USSR would return two islands to Japan after the conclusion of a peace treaty between the two countries.

<sup>137</sup> Kuhrt (note 18), pp. 147-148.

to receive all the islands at some point in the future, a possibility which Russia opposed.<sup>138</sup> During 2008 and 2009 talks resumed, but without results, and Russia refused to give up all four islands.<sup>139</sup> Apart from defending its rights towards the territories, until 2009 Russia had ignored the islands.<sup>140</sup> But in 2010 everything changed when Medvedev visited the islands,<sup>141</sup> a symbolic gesture of Russia's uncompromising stance on the issue. Russia decided to upgrade the territories militarily and economically to boost its image in the Asia-Pacific. The fact that Russia ignored Japan's protests shows that Russia regarded Tokyo as a second-rank partner and would not now give up any part of the islands to Japan. After the 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan, Moscow tried to engage Japan again, but without any achievement.<sup>142</sup>

As a result of the unresolved territorial dispute, Russia was unable to engage Japan in other areas. For example, Russia failed to attract substantial Japanese investment in its Far East region. However, the bad investment climate was also responsible for this. Over time, Moscow was becoming more assertive. In 2004 Russia announced that the lack of a peace treaty should not hinder economic cooperation, and the countries began talks on the construction of an oil pipeline, but relations became bad again after Russian border guards shot at 4 Japanese fishermen,<sup>143</sup> killing one of them. In 2005 Russia was not very supportive of Japan's bid to gain a permanent seat at the UNSC.<sup>144</sup> The only sphere where Russia managed to cooperate with Japan was energy. Russia expected that energy would make Japan more prone to a compromise on the territorial dispute.<sup>145</sup> Russia persuaded Japan to participate in two big projects. The first was a \$2 billion deal in 2003 to construct the world's largest liquefied natural gas plant in Sakhalin. The second was Russia's decision in 2004 to build an oil pipeline from Angarsk to Nakhodka.<sup>146</sup> One aim of this project was to balance Russia's relations with China and open up new markets.<sup>147</sup>

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<sup>138</sup> Buszynski (note 136), p. 298.

<sup>139</sup> Blank, S., "Russia's failure in Asia", *UNISCI Discussion Papers*, No. 24, October 2010, p. 71.

<sup>140</sup> Kuhrt (note 18), p. 144.

<sup>141</sup> Pardo, E., "Northern territories and Japan-Russia relations: will the knot ever untie?", *UNISCI Discussion Papers*, No. 28, January 2012, p. 162.

<sup>142</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 165-166.

<sup>143</sup> Kuhrt (note 18), pp. 148-149.

<sup>144</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 153.

<sup>145</sup> Buszynski (note 136), p. 299.

<sup>146</sup> Kuhrt (note 18), pp. 149-151.

<sup>147</sup> Buszynski (note 163), p. 293.

Clearly, Russian-Japanese relations have been characterised by minor crises<sup>148</sup> and limited cooperation. Russia tried to create a strategic partnership with Japan, but failed to do so because of its uncompromising stance on the Kuril Islands, especially in later years. Unlike Eurasianist thinkers, Russia refused to see Japan as an equal partner and did not place much importance on relations with Japan.

## **2.5 Russia's policy towards the CIS states<sup>149</sup>**

For Putin, the CIS space was the most important. Russia claimed it to be its privileged zone of influence and was very sensitive to other countries' interference in the area,<sup>150</sup> which is similar to what the Eurasianists claim. The CIS space was so important that Russia went to war with Georgia in 2008 to show that Russia's interests in the CIS region cannot be ignored.<sup>151</sup> Subsequently, Russia used the CIS area to promote its ambitions to be a great power. In addition, Russia had economic interests in the area.<sup>152</sup>

Russia's policy towards the CIS countries was designed to secure Russian interests via integration processes, via Russia's involvement in regional-political and economic structures and through strengthening bilateral ties. This policy can be split into two periods. The first lasted for the length of Putin's first presidential term and was characterised by prioritising economic issues. This was shown by the main integration initiative. In 2000 the Eurasian Economic Community (EURASEC), which involved Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, was launched. Members pledged to adopt common policies on trade, migration, currency exchange and infrastructure development and coordinate employment, tax and investment policies.<sup>153</sup> Integration was based less on institutions and more on preparing legally for trade and economic liberalisation. Thus, Russia's policy was pragmatic. It attempted to integrate fewer countries, allowing for multi-speed and multi-level integration,<sup>154</sup> but securing economic gains. Nonetheless, Russia did not completely neglect strategic considerations and aimed to ensure its leading

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<sup>148</sup> Kuhrt (note 18), p. 155.

<sup>149</sup> Though Georgia left the CIS in 2008 it is still included into this section.

<sup>150</sup> Mankoff (note 51), p. 220.

<sup>151</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 242.

<sup>152</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 220-221.

<sup>153</sup> Vinokurov, E., "Russian approaches to integration in the post-Soviet space in the 2000s" in Malfliet, K., Verpoest, L., Vinokurov, E., eds., *The CIS, the EU and Russia: challenges of integration*, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007, pp. 30-31.

<sup>154</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 32.

role in all post-Soviet integration structures, as it was willing to participate in arrangements where Russia had most influence on decision-making.<sup>155</sup> In addition, economic initiatives aimed to limit China's role in the region.<sup>156</sup>

After Putin's re-election in 2004, Russia's policy towards the CIS states was based more on geopolitics at the expense of economics in order to secure Russia's zone of influence and diminish Western influence.<sup>157</sup> Russia used the main economic integration initiatives – EURASEC and the Customs Union between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan – to enhance its role in the CIS.<sup>158</sup> Russia also started to interfere more actively in CIS countries' internal affairs to protect its interests. For example, Russia actively supported Viktor Yanukovich in Ukraine's 2004 presidential elections. Russia acted similarly in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan. Furthermore, it interpreted the democratic movements and Euro-Atlantic aspirations in those countries as Western conspiracies directed against Russia, which showed that Russia perceived the CIS as its privileged zone of influence,<sup>159</sup> where nothing could change without Moscow's granting it. Moreover, Russia was ready to pay for its influence economically, particularly in forgoing economic gains to benefit its CIS neighbours.<sup>160</sup>

Russia's policy tools towards the CIS can be split into three areas. Firstly, in the geopolitical sphere Russia saw itself in competition with the USA, EU and NATO for influence in the CIS region, and Russia aimed for the conclusion of integration agreements to establish legal and institutional frameworks for Russia's dominance, while discouraging schemes without Russian participation.<sup>161</sup> The military-security dimension also played a role. Russia secured military bases in Armenia, Transdnistria and Tajikistan and used the CSTO to ensure its strategic-military dominance in Central Asia, Belarus and Armenia.<sup>162</sup> Furthermore, Russia tried to establish the organisation's contacts with NATO to get its acceptance of Russia's role in the region.<sup>163</sup> Failing to do so, in December 2011 CSTO adopted

<sup>155</sup> Vinokurov, E., (note 153), p. 34.

<sup>156</sup> Berryman (note 105), p. 135.

<sup>157</sup> Vinokurov (note 154), p. 35.

<sup>158</sup> Mankoff (note 51), p. 255.

<sup>159</sup> Skak, M., "Russia's new 'Monroe doctrine'" in Kanet, E., ed., *Russian foreign policy in the 21<sup>st</sup> century*, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010, p. 146.

<sup>160</sup> Vinokurov (note 154), p. 36.

<sup>161</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 39.

<sup>162</sup> Mankoff (note 51), p. 256.

<sup>163</sup> Trenin, D., "Russia's spheres of *interest*, not *influence*", *The Washington Quarterly*, 32(4), 2009, p. 14.

a resolution that required unanimous agreement from its members to station military from non-member states.<sup>164</sup> This gave Russia a veto over any future US base in Central Asia. Overall, Russia's main military goal was to prevent any CIS country from joining NATO<sup>165</sup> or establishing closer contacts with it, and military cooperation was used to secure Russia's dominance. In addition, Russia supported various separatist movements and interfered in conflicts to jeopardise CIS countries' Euro-Atlantic aspirations.

Secondly, in the geo-economic sphere Russia used energy to ensure its economic dominance and force countries to accept Russia's leadership in the region. Russia aimed to build asymmetric dependence and raised energy prices or cut energy supply for countries that were not following Russia's line. This strategy was applied to Moldova in 2003, Belarus and Georgia in 2004 and Ukraine in 2005.<sup>166</sup> In addition, trade sanctions, visa-free travel, business contracts and political support for local elites were used to defend Russia's interests.<sup>167</sup>

Thirdly, in the geo-cultural sphere Russia used its soft power, which involves pensions, economic opportunities, export of authoritarian capitalism and sovereign democracy,<sup>168</sup> and protection of authoritarian regimes in the international arena. The latter was relevant for Central Asian states, and in exchange Russia secured access to Uzbekistan's, Kazakhstan's and Turkmenistan's gas resources.<sup>169</sup> In addition, Russia was portraying itself as a defender of ethnic Russians and Russian citizens in the CIS and often evoked kinships built during the Soviet era, together with anti-Western rhetoric.<sup>170</sup> All this was used to encourage CIS countries' citizens and elites to prefer a partnership with Russia. On a global level, Russia used Western terminology to legitimise its actions in the CIS. For example, Lavrov made reference to the UN Responsibility to Protect principle to defend Russia's military actions against Georgia in 2008.<sup>171</sup>

<sup>164</sup> Sodiqov, A., "CSTO agreement on foreign bases frustrates Tajikistan's ambitions", *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, 9(10), 2012.

<sup>165</sup> Trenin (note 10), p. 14.

<sup>166</sup> Vinokurov (note 154), p. 39.

<sup>167</sup> Bugajski (note 56), pp. 80-81.

<sup>168</sup> Sovereign Democracy is a concept created by Vladislav Surkov to describe Russia's authoritarian political system, where one party dominates political life and tries to prevent foreign countries from interfering in Russia's domestic politics.

<sup>169</sup> Leonard & Popescu (note 77), p. 19.

<sup>170</sup> Nygren, B., "Russia and the CIS region: the Russian regional security complex" in Freire, M. R., Kanet, R. E., eds., *Key players and regional dynamics in Eurasia: the return of the 'Great Game'*, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010, pp. 26-27.

<sup>171</sup> Skak (note 167), p. 149.

Nevertheless, Russia's policy towards the CIS was not based on pure expansionism to boost Russia's power. It had many defensive elements. Russia perceived its presence in the CIS as essential to secure its defenceless borders and territorial integrity and to counter Islamic extremism. This was demonstrated by the fact that Russia accepted Western involvement in areas where it was unable to secure its interests alone, for instance, the threat of terrorism.<sup>172</sup> In fact, Moscow, contrary to Eurasianist theories' prescriptions, encouraged external involvement in the CIS when it coincided with Moscow's interests.<sup>173</sup> Furthermore, economic integration was often pursued to protect Russian business from outside competition in the region, and democratisation was opposed in order to preserve non-transparent business practices, which guaranteed wealth for many people in the Kremlin.<sup>174</sup> Moreover, Russia was often unwilling to take up the responsibilities of a hegemon in the region, as shown by its refusal to send troops to Kyrgyzstan in 2010 to calm the ethnic clashes. This inconsistency can be explained by the fact that Russia's assertive moves in the post-Soviet space often jeopardised its ambitions to integrate into the global political system.<sup>175</sup> This may also be driven by a lack of consensus among the Russian elite on policy towards the CIS space.

## 2.6 Russia's policy towards Iran

Russia's policy towards Iran was based on a mix of economic and political motives. Starting with the latter, Russia used Iran to challenge the USA and this motive was constantly in Russia's calculations in relation to Iran.<sup>176</sup> Russia always tried to prove within the context of international law its sovereign right to form partnerships with Iran and denounced the USA's intervention into Russian policy. Consequently, relations with Iran were often used as a bargaining chip in Russia's relations with the USA. For instance, during the reset initiative with the USA, Russia agreed to take a harsher stance on Iran in exchange for the USA's abandonment of the plan to construct missile defence facilities in Central Europe. As Russia's position on Iran was often similar to that of the EU countries, this was used to create disagreements in the transatlantic alliance and isolate the USA.<sup>177</sup>

<sup>172</sup> Skak (note 167), p. 150.

<sup>173</sup> Mankoff (note 51), p. 254.

<sup>174</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 260.

<sup>175</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 258-259.

<sup>176</sup> Belopolsky (note 106), p. 97.

<sup>177</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 128-131.

For similar reasons, Russia supported Ahmedinejad's re-election as Iran's president in 2009 and generally opposed regime change in Iran, particularly with military intervention, because Russia feared this would establish an anti-Russian regime.<sup>178</sup> Russia's policy towards Iran had a defensive element as well. Russia feared the spread of Islamic fundamentalism and asked Iran not to use its soft power among Russia's Muslim population<sup>179</sup> and not to interfere in Russia's dealings with separatist Chechnya.<sup>180</sup> Furthermore, Russia attempted to boost its image as a global power by trying to act as an intermediary between Iran and Western countries.<sup>181</sup> Russia also used Iran to promote its vision of a multipolar world. For instance, Russia supported many UN sanctions against Iran, but not separate USA or EU sanctions, as Russia thought this to be a step towards unilateralism.<sup>182</sup> Finally, Russia saw Iran as a rational country driven by interests, not ideology,<sup>183</sup> and defended Iran's actions when Russia thought they were not threatening. Consequently, Russia interacted with Iran in various areas.

The most important of these was the nuclear power field, where Russia gained economically, maintained high technology exports and showed its independence from the USA.<sup>184</sup> Civil nuclear cooperation was used to make Iran dependent on Russia and promote Russia's power in the Middle East.<sup>185</sup> Russia's nuclear cooperation with Iran was also part of Russia's drive to establish itself in the global nuclear energy market.<sup>186</sup> But Russia was also wary of Iran's nuclear ambitions, as evident from the case of the Bushehr nuclear reactor. In 2001 Russia began the construction of the second nuclear reactor at Bushehr, but Russia dragged the completion of works until 2010<sup>187</sup> due to Iran's alleged refusal to pay for it. This example shows that Russia lacked trust in Iran's nuclear programme and did not want Iran to possess nuclear weapons. For this reason, Russia tried to persuade

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<sup>178</sup> Katz, M. N., "Russian-Iranian relations in the Obama era", *Middle East Policy*, 17(2), 2010, p. 67.

<sup>179</sup> Belopolsky (note 106), p. 116.

<sup>180</sup> Mankoff (note 51), p. 124.

<sup>181</sup> Belopolsky (note 106), p. 99.

<sup>182</sup> Mankoff (note 51), p. 125.

<sup>183</sup> Shlapentokh, D., "Putin's Moscow approach to Iran: between pragmatism and fear", *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, 13(2), 2011, p. 194.

<sup>184</sup> Belopolsky (note 106), p. 103.

<sup>185</sup> Aras, B. & Ozbay, F., "Dances with Wolves: Russia, Iran and the nuclear issue", *Middle East Policy*, 13(4), 2006, p. 139.

<sup>186</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 144.

<sup>187</sup> Mankoff (note 51), p. 125.

Iran to allow Russia to enrich Iran's uranium<sup>188</sup> and always emphasised that it would cooperate with the West to prevent Iran from gaining nuclear weapons.<sup>189</sup> This was proven by Russia's actions. Russia agreed with other permanent UNSC members and Germany to offer Iran an action plan to suspend its nuclear enrichment activities and supported UNSC Resolutions 1696, 1737, 1747, and 1803.<sup>190</sup> Russia approved bans for Iran to import and export potential technology for uranium enrichment, reprocessing or heavy-water reactors and ballistic missile delivery systems.<sup>191</sup> Thus, Russia's nuclear cooperation with Iran had its checks.

Russia was also engaging Iran militarily. Russia was driven by significant economic benefits and the pressure of its military-industrial complex – in many cases Iran was one of the few customers for Russia's arms exports. But Russia's military cooperation also had its limits. For example, Russia promised to deliver S-300 Air-Defence Systems, but in 2010 it cancelled the delivery as part of the reset initiative with the USA. To the embarrassment of the Eurasianists, this shows Russia's preference to cooperate with the USA rather than Iran.<sup>192</sup> In addition, Russia always stressed the limited nature of its military assistance to Iran.<sup>193</sup>

Russia also cooperated with Iran on the Caspian Sea border demarcation dispute.<sup>194</sup> Both countries sought to prevent the USA from exploring natural resources in the sea and prevent the USA from entering the region through any littoral state.<sup>195</sup> Furthermore, both states were motivated to maintain their influence over the whole negotiation process and limit Turkey's influence in the region.<sup>196</sup>

But there were limits to Russia's rapprochement with Iran. Russia used Iran to show itself as a responsible and rational power. For instance, in 2007 Russia offered the USA use of its Gabala Radio Station in Azerbaijan to detect whether Iran had

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<sup>188</sup> Katz, M., "Russian-Iranian relations in the Ahmadinejad era", *Middle East Journal*, **62**(2), 2008, p. 212.

<sup>189</sup> Shlapentokh (note 184), p. 212.

<sup>190</sup> Katz (note 189), p. 214.

<sup>191</sup> Shlapentokh (note 184), p. 201.

<sup>192</sup> Mankoff (note 51), p. 126.

<sup>193</sup> Shlapentokh (note 184), p. 200.

<sup>194</sup> After the collapse of the Soviet Union, four new littoral states bordered the sea. Thus, a new agreement was necessary to mark the borders between the states in the sea. However, the countries cannot agree on the borders, mostly due to their inability to divide the resources lying in the Caspian Sea and on the right to build oil and gas pipelines in the sea.

<sup>195</sup> Belopolsky (note 106), p. 111.

<sup>196</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 135.

nuclear weapons,<sup>197</sup> to show that Russia cared about international security. Though this move angered Iran, Russia was more concerned about its great power status and its recognition from other powers. Similarly, Russia always advertised its non-military economic deals with Iran to prove that its interests were pragmatic.<sup>198</sup> This limited Russia's nuclear and military assistance to Iran. Moreover, Russia tried to make Iran dependent on Russia's support and refused to recognise Iran as equal to Russia. For this reason Russia declined Iran's offers to form an alliance and create a gas cartel in 2007.<sup>199</sup> Furthermore, there were disagreements between the countries. For instance, they could not agree on their shares of the Caspian Sea.<sup>200</sup> Finally, as Russia was using its policy towards Iran to boost its global power status, Russia, contrary to what Eurasianists argue, never allowed this vector to completely ruin Russia's relations with the West. For this reason, Russia sometimes hid its cooperation with Iran, for example, by transferring weapons to Iran through Syria.<sup>201</sup>

After reviewing Russia's foreign policy, one can explore the extent to which it was influenced by Eurasianism.

### **3. Was Russia's foreign policy based on Eurasianism?**

Russia's foreign policy used elements from all theories of Eurasianism, outlined above. But this match between theory and practice was not identical.

Starting with pragmatic Eurasianism, Russia's policy resembled the prescriptions of pragmatic Eurasianism in numerous cases. Russia was truly positioning itself as a great power and promoted a multipolar world order. Russia was trying to pursue a multi-vector foreign policy, but managed to create strong relations only with one regional power – Iran. Moreover, Russia was not only using its geopolitical assets, but also defended them, especially UNSC decision-making. Furthermore, Russia was building relations with countries opposed to US unipolarity. Russia even attempted to create an alliance with China to counterbalance the USA's dominance in world politics. Finally, Russia was truly avoiding confrontation with

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<sup>197</sup> Katz (note 189), p. 207.

<sup>198</sup> Shlapentokh (note 184), p. 199.

<sup>199</sup> Katz (note 189), pp. 207-208.

<sup>200</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 210.

<sup>201</sup> Shlapentokh (note 184), p. 192.

all countries, especially with the USA and China, and tried to establish constructive relations, though that was often hindered by Russia's ambitions.

But Russia's foreign policy sometimes contradicted pragmatic Eurasianism. Firstly, Russia clearly prioritised relations with the West and the CIS, rather than pursuing a pure multi-vector foreign policy. The case of Iran is a good example. Secondly, Russia used its relations with countries opposed to US unipolarity to have its interests heard rather than confront the USA's dominance as such. Finally, Russia was less interested in creating alliances opposed to the USA's hegemony and focused more on promoting its own power to achieve parity with the USA. In fact, Russia refused to accept Japan and Iran, pragmatic Eurasianism's listed potential allies, as equals and though Russia offered to establish a military alliance with China, Russia often tried to contain Chinese influence in other areas. This mismatch means that Russia's foreign policy was not guided by pragmatic Eurasianism, due to Russia's excessive prioritisation of relations with the USA and its focus on its own status rather than creating a truly multipolar world. Still, Russia's foreign policy was greatly influenced by pragmatic Eurasianism, particularly given the fact that Primakov was Putin's advisor in the beginning of his first presidential term, and Russia adopted many elements from pragmatic Eurasianism.

Moving on to intercivilisational Eurasianism, Russia's political establishment was truly looking towards China's model of modernising the economy while maintaining strong control of society.<sup>202</sup> Russia tried to create an alliance with China and opposed the USA's unilateralism. However, similarities finish here and are overwhelmed by mismatches. Firstly, Russia's opposition to the USA's hegemony was instrumental, aiming to get from the USA recognition of Russia's interests, rather than based on the perception of the USA as a cultural enemy. Secondly, though Russia often opposed some Western normative stances, it did not reject Western values completely and never promoted Asian values, but always emphasised its European identity. Finally, as mentioned above, even though Russia's policy was multi-vector, it prioritised relations with the West. Russia's inability to compromise on the Kuril Islands dispute shows the low importance of a potential alliance with Japan. Hence, Russia's foreign policy was influenced very little by intercivilisational Eurasianism because Russia prioritised relations with the West and never adopted the theory's normative positions, which comprise its foundations.

Finally, Russia's foreign policy adopted quite a lot of elements of Dugin's neo-Eurasianism. Firstly, Russia tried to establish itself as the hegemon in the CIS area

<sup>202</sup> Mankoff (note 51), p. 179.

and used many of Dugin's proposed integration initiatives, such as EURASEC, a customs union and the Eurasian Union. Secondly, Russia tried to form alliances and strong relationships with countries that were wary of the USA's dominance, particularly China. Thirdly, Russia tried to neutralise Europe by distracting it from the transatlantic alliance, opposed the USA's hegemony in world politics and advocated a multipolar world order. Finally, Russia used some of Dugin's proposed methods: intelligence service,<sup>203</sup> energy blackmail, mass media, support for pro-Russian lobbies and state control of strategic economic sectors.

But Russia's policy in many cases contradicted Dugin's neo-Eurasianism. Firstly, Russia never aimed to integrate the CIS space into a strategic union and its policy towards the CIS was more defensive than expansionist. Secondly, apart from China, Russia never attempted to create strategic or military alliances with Iran and other regional powers, because it refused to consider them as equals and instead used these countries as bargaining chips in relations with the West. This refusal to accept others as equals led to Russia's inability to neutralise Japan, a goal to which Russia did not pay much attention. In addition, despite good relations, Russia was often wary of China. Moreover, though Russia sometimes used the Eurasianist normative discourse in opposing US globalisation and criticising the West, it never claimed to be a Eurasianist country and never rejected its European identity. Furthermore, Russia often used Western legal jargon to defend its actions and tried to integrate itself into the US-created economic order. Finally, Russia did not consider the USA and the West as its main enemies. Russia aimed for the USA's recognition of Russia as a great power and respect for its interests, but not to defeat the USA in a strategic fight. Russia's opposition to the USA was not driven by any ideology,<sup>204</sup> but to maintain autonomy in foreign policy without interference from the USA.<sup>205</sup> This refusal to confront the USA and present Russia as a country that defends Eurasianist values is the main reason why Russia's foreign policy was not guided by neo-Eurasianism. Russia only used neo-Eurasianist prescriptions instrumentally to advance its other interests.

Nevertheless, there seems to be some confusion. Russia's foreign policy was not guided by any theory of Eurasianism, but sometimes employed Eurasianist foreign-policy prescriptions. Thus, how did these theories fit into Russia's foreign policy? The overview of Russia's foreign policy above showed that Russia's main

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<sup>203</sup> For an account of post-Soviet Russian espionage see Lucas, E., *Deception: spies, lies and how Russia dupes the West*, London: Bloomsbury, 2012.

<sup>204</sup> Mankoff (note 51), p. 131.

<sup>205</sup> Sakwa, R., *Putin: Russia's choice*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., Routledge: London & New York, 2008, p. 276.

foreign policy goal was to restore its status as a great power. Just like the current Russian political establishment, Eurasianism also sees Russia as a great power. But for Russian foreign-policy makers the status of a great power was an end in itself, rather than a starting position from which one can either seriously tackle US hegemony, adopt Asian values or defend Eurasianist values. Russia did not see itself as an Eurasianist country, but rather as a great power and Eurasianism was one of the many theories and schools of thought from which Vladimir Putin adopted practical foreign policy proposals for the realisation of his vision of “Russia as a great power”.<sup>206</sup> Thus, Russia used theories of Eurasianism instrumentally to promote its great power status and the theories’ relative influence on Russia’s foreign policy depended on their ability to fulfil this goal. Pragmatic Eurasianism was very influential on Russia’s foreign policy, because its goal is also to restore Russia’s status as a great power and the theory gives guidelines to increase Russia’s independence without antagonising other powers, which is exactly what the Russian political establishment wanted. Intercivilisational Eurasianism focused more on importing Asian values and political models into Russia than making Russia a great power, and as a result was marginal in Russia’s foreign policy. Neo-Eurasianism specified methods for how to make Russia a great power and a messianic vision of where to use Russia’s power. Consequently, Russia used the former in its foreign policy extensively, but not the latter, as Russia perceived itself to be European, not Eurasianist.

## **Conclusion**

All in all, it appears that Russia’s foreign policy was heavily influenced by pragmatic Eurasianism, that it was influenced very little by intercivilisational Eurasianism, and that neo-Eurasianism provided Russia with tools and methods to boost its power. Overall, Russia’s foreign policy was based on the idea of Russia as a great power. Just like other theoretical approaches to foreign policy, Eurasianism was used instrumentally to promote Russia’s status as a great power.

The fact that Russia did not fully endorse any theory of Eurasianism shows several things. Firstly, the West remains the main vector for Russia. In fact, Russia’s policy may be interpreted as an attempt to gain recognition from Western countries, and the USA in particular, that it is a rightful member of the international community that upholds international law and has legitimate interests. Hence,

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<sup>206</sup> Baliukonis, V., Lithuania’s Ambassador-at-large. Personal Interview. 27 February 2012.

there is potential for dialogue that could lead to cooperation on a range of issues between Western countries and Russia, something that Russia has always aimed for. More importantly, Western norms and values are not alien to Russia, so it is possible for Russia to adopt all Western norms, including democracy and human rights. However, Russia's relations with Europe are likely to be complicated. Though Russia perceives itself as European, Russia uses a lot of prescriptions from Eurasianism in its relations with the EU to make Europe Russia's inferior partner. Not all European countries want this, and as long as Russia continues this policy, it will damage relations with European countries.

Secondly, though Russia's relations with European countries will be bumpy in the short-term, in the long-run Russia's rapprochement with the West is inevitable. The fact that Russia did not base its foreign policy on Eurasianist theories shows its vulnerability and limited options. Even if Russia wanted to base its foreign policy on Eurasianism, an alliance with China would be dangerous for Russia, because Russia's relations with China are becoming asymmetric and Russia risks becoming dependent on China. Similarly, even if Russia surrendered all of the Kuril Islands to Japan, it would still face major difficulties in establishing an alliance with Japan due to Japan's commitments to the USA. Moreover, an alliance with Iran would be unreliable due to Iran's ambitions and its unpredictability. Furthermore, Russia's main foreign policy tool was energy, which alone cannot turn Russia into a great power, or into an Eurasianist country. This means that Russia's willingness to be accepted as an equal by Western powers is not so much an ambition, but a necessity, because this is the only way in which Russia can modernise its economy and achieve security. Thus, the political realities indicate that in the long-run Russia has no choice but to fully integrate into the Western political system. This means that Russia will have to drop its imperial ambitions in the post-Soviet space, normalise relations with its neighbours and completely endorse European values, which would finally bring Russia where it belongs – Europe.



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# SECURITIZATION OF THE ENERGY SECTORS IN ESTONIA, LITHUANIA, POLAND AND UKRAINE: MOTIVES AND EXTRAORDINARY MEASURES

**Tomas Janeliūnas, Agnija Tumkevič\***

## *Abstract*

The article provides a comparative analysis of how the securitization of an energy sector is related to the actual energy situation of a country, the intensity of the securitization proclamation, and the “practical outcomes” of the securitization process. The energy strategies and implementation processes of “untypical” energy projects in four Central and Eastern European countries have been explored. The analysis of the securitization of energy sectors in Estonia, Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine has served as a basis for introducing the concept of a “securitization intensity” in the energy-security sector. The article also contributes to the debate about the “explanatory role” of securitization theory by suggesting that the actual level of energy dependence (on an external supply) relates to the level of securitization intensity but not necessarily to the extraordinary measures or practical outcomes in the form of untypical projects in energy sectors.

## **Introduction**

The energy sector has become a highly securitized object of governmental policies. Although energy security is not a new issue in security studies, in recent decades it has received more political attention and in some cases has even been proclaimed as a priority for national security. The securitization process of energy issues has been formalised and has become part of the national security agenda. More and more governments are including energy security in their official national security documents, adopting energy security strategies and striving to “increase

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energy security”. The securitizing speech-act is transformed into written form and becomes a part of the official discourse on the security agenda.

However, this process of securitizing the energy sector often leaves open the questions: why has securitization of the energy sector happened? What motives lay behind attempts to securitize the energy sector? And was securitization needed at all? All these questions are essential in the context of securitization as an empirical theory.<sup>1</sup>

As Ole Wæver wrote, securitization theory could be used not only to explain “who does securitization and how” or “when it happens”, but also “what securitization does”.<sup>2</sup> In other words, an analysis of securitizing practices can reveal some causal mechanisms and provide hypotheses as to why specific issues were securitized and what changes that securitization brought. “The difference between securitized or not lies in the causal mechanisms”, states Wæver; “it is the effects that securitization has that make it attractive (or not) for various actors to pursue”.<sup>3</sup>

This article seeks to give new insights in exploring the causal mechanism of securitizing the energy sector. The comparative analysis of four countries – Estonia, Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine – provides a good background to answer questions such as:

- how securitization of the of energy sector happened in selected cases;
- what reasons led governments to increase awareness of energy-security issues;
- what changes in energy security brought about formal securitization; and
- whether securitization was needed to justify all extraordinary measures.

As the recent debates of the Copenhagen School show, there are a number of views about the purpose of securitizing selected issues. Securitisation is not identified with illocutionary speech act any more.<sup>4</sup> Rita Floyd, for instance, argues that original securitization theory cannot be used in normative analysis and provides a revised formulation of the theory that enables judgment about when it is “right” to employ securitization practice.<sup>5</sup> As Floyd states, the securitization of some issues can be positive, when it is morally justified. Meanwhile, references to

<sup>1</sup> Guzzini, S., “Securitization as a causal mechanism.” In *Security Dialogue* 42(4-5) 2011, pp. 329-341.

<sup>2</sup> Wæver, O., “Politics, Security, Theory.” In *Security Dialogue* 42(4-5), 2011, pp. 465–480.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 465–480.

<sup>4</sup> Buzan, B., Wæver, O. & De Wilde J., *Security: A new framework for analysis*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner., 1998.

<sup>5</sup> Floyd, R., “Can securitization theory be used in normative analysis? Towards a Just Securitization Theory”. In *Security Dialogue*, 42(4-5), 2011, p. 429.

justifiable securitization, to objective existential threat, a legitimate referent object and intentions to secure the referent object appropriately determine the legitimacy and success of securitization.<sup>6</sup>

This article holds that the full spectrum of the securitization process should include four elements of analysis: 1) the circumstances of securitization; 2) formal securitization; 3) security practice; and 4) the outcome of the securitization process.

This article employs the arguments of Floyd and Wæver and tries to extend them to a more specific issue – how the securitization of the energy sector was carried out and why the very core of the securitizing act is different among selected states (Estonia, Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine). It should be noted, though, that the article focuses mainly on Eastern European energy-importing countries facing common challenges in the energy sector, i.e., dependence on the dominant external energy supplier – Russia – which is treated as the main external threat to national security. This indicates that energy dependence in this article is an essential factor deciding the level of securitization of the energy sector.<sup>7</sup>

Although the securitization of energy is present in all four countries, the very essence of securitizing varies. In other words, the “intensity of securitization”, a new term introduced in this article, is different. Some countries give highest priority to the energy sector in terms of national security and treat energy issues as an autonomous security sector in their security strategies. According to the logic of securitization theory, such countries need to increase audience support for extraordinary measures (for example, unusual or “untypical” energy projects). These measures should be very specific in order to be termed “extraordinary”, and a significant number of unusual projects or radical changes in energy politics should be implemented. Other countries see energy as only “an ordinary security issue”, which is dealt with in a more incremental way.

A hypothesis is raised that different levels of “intensity of securitization” are related to the actual conditions of the energy sector in each country. More precisely, the level of energy dependence on an outside supply affects the level of intensity of securitization: the higher the energy dependence, the more extraordinary measures

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<sup>6</sup> Floyd, p. 429.

<sup>7</sup> It should be noted that energy dependence is not the only factor stimulating the securitization of the energy sector. Securitisation may be caused by a number of factors, such as concerns about the security of the energy infrastructure, environmental impact, diversification of energy export routes and markets, competition for energy sources, low energy prices, etc. However, it wouldn't be reasonable to compare the securitization process in different types of countries, for example, energy importers *versus* energy exporters, because of different perceptions of threats and energy security *per se*.

are needed to overcome it and the more intense the securitization to support such measures formalised in security documents and strategies.

To test this hypothesis, a comparative analysis has been conducted on the national security and energy strategies and previously proposed energy projects of Estonia, Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine.

## 1. Energy dependence and intensity of securitization

Energy dependence is an essential variable in testing the aforementioned hypothesis. However, before analysing selected countries' levels of energy dependence, some clarifications are needed. As noted previously, only energy-importing countries have been analysed. Countries with similarly structured energy sources and reliance on energy import usually identify the same energy security threats and form similar visions of energy security. Besides, the concept of energy dependence is usually analysed through the level of vulnerability of energy security.<sup>8</sup> In other words, the more energy resources are imported, the higher the dependence on the exporting country, and the less secure the importer feels. Following this logic, four countries – Lithuania, Estonia, Poland and Ukraine – have been selected. All four countries are more or less dependent on one dominant or single external energy supplier – Russia.

According to *Eurostat* data, energy dependence is expressed as an indicator showing the extent to which an economy relies upon imports in order to meet its energy needs. Taking into consideration Lithuania, Estonia and Poland's energy imports and gross inland consumption in 2010, Lithuania's energy dependence rate was 82%, Poland's was 32%, and Estonia's was 13%. Following this logic, Ukraine's energy dependence indicator has been calculated and, in 2010, was 69%.<sup>9</sup> These calculations represent the countries' dependence on total imports, but actually confirm the general tendency of the countries' dependence on Russian energy due to Russia's dominance in their energy market.

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<sup>8</sup> The main threats caused by energy dependence are supply cut-off, high prices of energy sources, etc. In the case of the EU, for instance, the main risk that energy dependence on Russia may pose is thought to be the threat of inflation that can cause a downward spiral of growth rates and lead to social unrest and potential state failure (for more detail see Ehn, pp. 3-25)

<sup>9</sup> The indicator of energy dependence is calculated as net imports divided by the sum of gross inland energy consumption, plus bunkers. Eurostat: <<http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/graph.do?tab=graph&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tsdcc310&toolbox=type>>

Lithuania and Estonia are typical energy consumers, with no or irrelevant energy export flows. Poland and Ukraine are not only consumers of imported materials, but also key transit countries for energy resources being transported from Russia to the EU. Although the share of Russian energy sources imported by Poland and Ukraine is almost the same, their levels of dependence on the dominant supplier differs. In 2011 Poland consumed 15,134 billion cubic metres of natural gas, of which almost 30% came from domestic sources. Its domestic production of natural gas was supplemented by 10,325 billion cubic metres of imported resource. However, only 27.53 million cubic metres (0.19%) of natural gas was exported to Western Europe. This is similar to the situation regarding the Russian oil that is transported to Europe though the Polish pipelines. In other words, the transit of energy resources imported from Russia constitutes a pretty small proportion of overall Polish energy exports and is not a main revenue source for Poland's national budget. Meanwhile Ukraine's energy statistics mark it out as not only an export but also a transit denominator. Being the largest European transit country, Ukraine transported 104.2 billion cubic metres of natural gas and 17.8 million tonnes of oil to Western Europe in 2011. In other words, Ukraine sold 67% of Russian natural gas and 24% of oil imported from Russia.

An economy's reliance on energy imports should not be considered as a threat *per se*. Many countries cannot fulfil their energy needs using domestic resources only. However, there is a big difference in relation to whether the diversification of energy import is assured. As Daniel Yergin states, "since Churchill's day, the key to energy security has been diversification".<sup>10</sup> Reliance on a single or dominant external energy supplier increases the risk of various negative effects on energy security: starting from natural disruptions to supply flow and ending with politically motivated cut-offs or radical increases in the prices of energy resources. In Yergin's words, the diversification of the energy supply was the first, and still is, a major principle for ensuring energy security.<sup>11</sup>

All four selected countries face the challenge of energy diversification, but the extent of dependency on the dominant supplier varies among the countries. Does the actual level of dependency on a single supplier affect the different methods of securitization in the selected countries?

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<sup>10</sup> Yergin D., "Ensuring energy security". In *Foreign Affairs* 85(2), 2006, pp. 69-82.

<sup>11</sup> Yergin provides further principles as well: resilience; recognising the reality of integration; and the importance of information (for more detail see Yergin, pp. 69-82). In this article there is no intention to analyse the "objective" situation of energy security in selected states; the focus is on the motives for securitization. However, some "objective" facts, as reasons for raising concerns about energy security, could play a very important role in the process of securitization.

The existence of one dominant energy supplier in the structure of energy import has a substantial role in the process of securitization of the energy sector. An external actor, dominant in the energy market, might be more easily associated with some “other” who poses an external threat for ‘us’. Being a dominant energy supplier, Russia becomes a “perfect target” as the “other” in securitizing energy threats.

## 2. The concept of securitization intensity: How is energy securitized?

Although the securitization of energy is more or less characteristic of all four countries, the intensity of securitization differs in each state. Criteria to evaluate the intensity of securitization are related to specific questions: *how*, *why* and *do* countries securitize energy in their strategic documents? All these criteria provide characteristics not only of the act of securitization (i.e., the particular proclamation of “a threat”) but of the entire securitization process as well, including reasons, sources and eventual consequences as the main rationale of securitization. The more criteria for securitization that are found, the more elaborate and intense securitization is.

**1. The inclusion of energy security (as a point of concern) in national security strategies.** The formal designation of energy issues as an object of concern for national security is the most general result of a securitization act. If energy security is mentioned in the national security strategy, it expresses the national consensus to call energy issues “a threat” and could be evaluated as a securitization act.

**2. The status of the energy sector in security strategies.** The relationship between energy security issues with other fields of security concern should be evaluated: a) is the energy sector described in strategic documents as an independent security sector with specific objects, risks and objectives, or b) does energy security refer only to energy supply at reasonable prices in order to promote economic growth (this notion would determine energy security mainly as part of the economic sector, but not as an independent security sector)? The status of energy issues as an “independent sector” would demonstrate intentions to provide specific means of solving energy issues.

**3. The significance of energy threats.** Are energy threats prioritised among other security risks or threats? If the answer is positive, it would mean that energy issues prevail over other security issues and require the most attention.

**4. The timing of energy concerns.** The timing of energy issues may be related to the means and urgency when referring to an energy threat to be solved. Specific energy issues that already exist and should be resolved straight away would have higher priority than potential energy risks and problems that may become *de facto* problems in the future. A presumption is that current energy problems seem to be more threatening than eventual ones.

**5. Sources of energy threats.** A presumption is made that the dominance of external energy threats (in comparison to domestic sources of threats) is more prone to energy securitization. This is because the concept of the “other” is used, which usually indicates a certain country or actors who are identified with the main source of the threat. Moreover, the distinction between “us” versus the “other” helps to legitimise the securitization act.

**6. Extraordinary measures.** Does securitization of the energy sector create preconditions for using extraordinary measures in order to solve securitized problems? Specific measures to solve energy issues that could be called ‘extraordinary’ would indicate that the securitization process has a clear purpose – to result in specific changes that would be unachievable within a certain time without securitization attempts.

The distinguishing feature of securitization is that it justifies the breaking of established rules in order to respond to an existential threat. Although for Wæver, desecuritization might be more effective than securitizing problems; in particular cases emergency measures that are extraordinary in nature may be legitimised. But what does “extraordinary” measures actually mean? According to Roe, extraordinary politics is what normal politics is not in liberal democratic states. As Roe puts it, the concern here lies in the context within which issues are handled.<sup>12</sup> In other words, “normal politics” refers to routine, quite slow and deliberate procedures; whereas “securitized politics” is about exceptional and speedy security responses. Considering the concept of securitization as “silence and speed” rather than deliberation and debate, its “extraordinariness” may be recognised as negative and harmful to democratic problem-solving mechanisms.

However, democracies, where conflicts of interests are a distinguishing characteristic, are even more prone to securitize their energy problems in order to

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<sup>12</sup> Roe P., “Is securitization a “negative” concept? Revisiting the normative debate over normal versus extraordinary politics”. In *Security Dialogue* 43(3), 2011, pp. 249-266.

solve them. Paradoxically, due to the complexity of energy issues, constant debates about energy projects related to strengthening energy security only delay the real solution. How should specific energy projects as “extraordinary measures” be separated from “business as usual” activities?

While recognising the specific difficulties, the Copenhagen School addresses, in describing the concept of “extraordinary measures”, certain criteria that could help to determine how “untypical” an energy project is.

**1. The novelty of a certain energy project:** New energy initiatives in comparison to those that are continued and already characteristic to specific political and economic conditions may be treated as exceptional and extraordinary.

**2. The cost of an energy project:** The more investment required by a certain energy project, the more untypical as an energy security measure it should be.

**3. The scale of an energy project:** The more actors that are involved in a project, the more difficult it is to reach agreed solutions. In this sense, regional (transnational) and national energy projects should be separated. Regional initiatives with partners from several states or other international actors require more time and funds for implementation, and are treated as untypical in comparison to national, usually small-scale projects.

**4. The implementation term:** The following general rule should be applied – the more time it takes to implement a project, the more difficult and untypical it is. There should be a greater need to maintain public and political support for time-intensive projects. A simple classification into short-term projects (up to 3 years), mid-term projects (3–5 years) and long-term projects (from 5 years) could be proposed.

Next, specific cases of energy securitization in Estonia, Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine are analysed, and the previously mentioned characteristics of “intensity of securitization” and “extraordinary measures” are applied.

### **3. Securitisation of energy in Estonian strategic documents**

The Estonian balance of primary energy resources is based on domestic oil shale, which constitutes 78% of total energy production. The share of other domestic fuels is modest – the production of wood constitutes 19%, production of peat 2%, and wind and hydro-energy 1%. Although 65% of primary energy is produced from local energy resources, Estonia cannot meet its total demand for energy and is forced to import liquid fuels. Together with natural gas, these consist

of more than 90% of Estonian imports.<sup>13</sup> Almost all liquid fuel and natural gas is imported from Russia. However, the overall dependency on imports from Russia is quite small because of the large proportion of domestic production. Due to the small proportion of natural gas in the energy balance, Estonia's dependence on Russia is not significant.<sup>14</sup>

### **3.1. National security concept of Estonia**

According to the Estonian National Development Plan of the Energy Sector 2020, energy independence is defined as the largest portion of imported energy resources in the overall energy balance. In accordance with this definition, Estonia is characterised as one of the most independent European states. However, the question of Estonia's energy dependence has still been raised in its National Security Concept.

The energy sector is not prioritised over other security sectors such as cyber security, transport infrastructure, security of the financial system and the environment. Energy security is quite an "ordinary" sector, with specific objectives, and only one crucial threat is mentioned – the dependence on local oil shale resources.<sup>15</sup> In order to secure its energy needs and diversify energy sources, the strategy stresses the importance of Estonia's interconnection with the EU electricity and gas system and the implementation of EU energy policy objectives such as efficient energy consumption. That means the rational use of oil shale and the extensive introduction of renewable energy technologies. Besides, additional connections with the Baltic states, Nordic countries and Poland will diversify the country's sources of energy and reduce its dependence on Russia as the dominant energy supplier.

To conclude:

1. The energy sector is defined as one of the national security sectors. However, being relatively independent regarding energy imports due to significant local energy sources, Estonia has not prioritised the energy sector over others.

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<sup>13</sup> Naaber, M., Overview of Estonian Energy Policy. Research Paper. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2011. Available at <[http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas\\_29589-1522-2-30.pdf?11120117265](http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_29589-1522-2-30.pdf?11120117265)> [3 12 2012].

<sup>14</sup> National Development Plan of the Energy Sector until 2020 (2009) of Estonia, adopted by *Riigikogu* on 9 March 2009.

<sup>15</sup> National Security Concept of Estonia, adopted by *Riigikogu* on 12 May 2012. Available at <[http://www.kmin.ee/files/kmin/img/files/National\\_Security\\_Concept\\_of\\_Estonia.pdf](http://www.kmin.ee/files/kmin/img/files/National_Security_Concept_of_Estonia.pdf)> [3 12 2010]

2. Energy threats have not been prioritised either. The crucial one is Estonia's dependence on oil shale – the dominant local energy source. In order to diversify energy consumption, Estonia could increase its share of imported energy sources, strengthening its energy dependence on external suppliers. However, the risk of growing energy dependence is scarcely probable in the short term; thus, Estonia securitizes the potential internal energy problem, which may threaten its energy sector in the future.
3. Estonia's measures to strengthen energy security are supported by implementing EU energy policies and integrating with the EU energy market.

### **3.2. The development plan for Estonia's energy sector up to 2020**

Estonia's energy strategy, adopted by *Riigikogu* in 2009, is a complex document that is implemented through the development plans of different sub-sectors, such as the Development Plan of Estonian Electricity Sector up to 2018, the National Development Plan for the Use of Oil Shale for 2008-2015, the Development Plan for Enhancing the Use of Biomass and Bioenergy for 2007-2013 and the Energy Conservation Programme for Estonia for 2007-2013. Hence, concerning Estonian energy security measures, the whole legislative basis of energy politics shall be taken into account.

According to Estonian energy strategy, the objectives of the energy sector are as follows:

1. Continuous energy supply. Measures and activities planned for the achievement of this objective are described below.
  - a) Diversification of energy supply through the distribution of energy sources in the energy balance. In 2010, oil shale formed 80% of Estonia's internal energy balance. As stated in the energy strategy, such a large share of one fossil fuel in the total energy production is not practical due to energy security and climate considerations.<sup>16</sup> Therefore, diversification of the energy portfolio is needed. In order to reach a target of 30% of oil shale in the energy balance by 2020, the implementation of long-term national energy projects related to the development of renewable energy sources and wind farms is planned. Additionally, a new power-plant project has recently been begun by the Estonian government. The power plant, located in Narva, will be fuelled by local oil shale and supplied with

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<sup>16</sup> National Development Plan of the Energy Sector until 2020 (2009) of Estonia.

two 300 MW units for a fossil-fuel power plant based on Circulating Fluidised Bed (CFB) boiler technology. Although it won't be a new project, it will be based on fairly new efficiency-oriented technology. Besides, when the project is implemented, it will be definitely one of the most expensive.<sup>17</sup>

- b) Development of new electricity and natural gas connections. This measure refers to new and previously implemented regional and long-term projects such as an electricity connection between Estonia and Finland, 'Estlink 2', as well as the implementation of the Baltic Interconnection Plan (BEMIP) in cooperation with other EU member states, particularly the Baltic states.

2. Sustainable supply and energy consumption is the second priority. In order to meet this objective, the efficiency of the use of oil shale is to be improved. As stated in the strategy, the use of oil shale for electricity production will be continued in the interests of Estonia's energy security, but this should be carried out in a more environmentally friendly way. This objective shall be met by investing in new technologies and the infrastructure of power plants such as Narva and Kiisa.

Three out of four energy projects that Estonia has recently implemented are not new, national and short- or medium-term (Table 1). These are Estlink 2, the prototype of the first undersea electricity cable, completed in 2006; the modernisation of existing power plants such as Kiisa and Narva; and development of wind farms. Taking into account the price of these projects, they may be described as ordinary measures. Although the total cost of 'Estlink 2' is 320 million euros, it is not the largest investment for the Estonian energy sector.<sup>18</sup> The cost of modernising the existing energy infrastructure (power plants) is just 17.3 million euros. Finally, the development of two new wind farms will cost 92 million euros.

To sum up, as a country with low dependency on energy from outside sources, Estonia is not keen on securitizing its energy sector. The securitization intensity is rather low and extraordinary measures do not prevail in the implementation of energy policy. This indicates that Estonia implements a rather comprehensive and rational energy policy – non-securitization of the energy sector leads to quite "ordinary" political measures to strengthen Estonia's energy security. This example shows that energy problems may be solved successfully without their securitization.

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<sup>17</sup> According to Eesti Energia, the contract for the new power plant reaches 950 million euros. Available at <<http://www.alstom.com/press-centre/2011/1/press-releases-power-plant-estonia/>>

<sup>18</sup> European Commission endorses Estlink 2 investment. Estonia.eu 2 July, 2012. Available at <<http://estonia.eu/news/150-european-commission-endorses-estlink-2-investment.html>>.

**Table 1.** Estonia's energy projects

| PROJECT                                   | CRITERIA FOR EXTRAORDINARY MEASURES |                                     |          |                      | <i>Extraordinary /typical</i> |
|---|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|----------|----------------------|-------------------------------|
|   | New                                 | Cost of project                     | Regional | Long-term            |                               |
| Estlink 2                                 | -                                   | +                                   | +        | -                    | Typical                       |
| New power plant in Narva                  | +                                   | -/+<br>(new power plant technology) | -        | -/+<br>(medium-term) | (extra)ordinary               |
| Modernisation of Narva/Kiisa power plants | -                                   | -                                   | -        | -                    | Typical                       |
| Wind farms                                | -                                   | +                                   | -        | -                    | Typical                       |

#### 4. Securitisation of energy in Lithuanian strategic documents

After the shutdown of the Ignalina nuclear power plant, Lithuania's energy system became highly dependent on imports of electricity and fossil fuels. Lithuania does not have sufficient fossil fuel in-ground resources to fully satisfy its energy needs and is forced to import more than 80% of its energy from Russia. The level of energy dependence has been growing for several years. There was a high increase in the level of Lithuanian dependence on imported liquid fuels, from 48.8% in 2009 to 79.4% in 2010.<sup>19</sup> Consumption of renewable energy sources has also been growing; in 2010 this constituted 15.2% of the total energy balance. However, this is still not sufficient to decrease Lithuania's dependence on imported fossil fuels. Another feature of Lithuania's energy sector is its isolation from the EU energy system. There are no electricity connections with continental Europe. As part of the Eastern BRELL (Belarus, Russia, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia) interconnection ring, Lithuania feels more vulnerable to interruptions to its energy supply or large price fluctuations than countries with diversified and self-sufficient energy systems.

<sup>19</sup> Department of Lithuanian Statistics (Vilnius), Energy statistics of 2010. Report of Department of Lithuania's statistics, 15 June, 2011.

#### 4.1. Lithuania's national security strategy

The importance of energy security is strengthened in the latest National Security Strategy of Lithuania (henceforth, “the strategy”), adopted in 2012. Firstly, energy security is identified as one of the country's vital interests. Ensuring a stable and reliable energy supply from diversified sources, and Lithuania's integration into the EU energy system, are targets of the national security policy. Secondly, the significance of energy problems is underlined in the description of risks and threats to national security. Economic and energy dependence is the first security risk mentioned in the strategy. In this sense, the challenges within Lithuania's energy sector are prioritised, among other risks and threats to national security. Unlike Estonia, Lithuania mostly securitizes actual problems and challenges to the energy sector. These are: the dominance of a single external energy supplier; and the isolation of Lithuania from the EU energy system, making it an ‘energy island’ without internal energy resources, etc.<sup>20</sup> To sum up:

1. The vulnerability of Lithuania's national security depends on the reliability of the energy sector. The more challenges Lithuania faces in the energy sector, the more vulnerable its national security is. The importance of energy determines that the energy sector is thought to be an independent and vital sector of national security.
2. Risks and threats to the energy sector are the most important.
3. Energy problems are securitized because of Lithuania's complicated energy situation – the scarcity of internal energy resources and, as a result, the dependence on a single external supplier. Thus, *de facto* existing and external problems of the energy sector, particularly energy dependence on Russia, have been securitized in the strategy.

#### 4.2. National Energy (Energy Independence) Strategy

In order to ensure energy independence before 2020, the most ambitious measures are to be implemented. These are initiatives in the electricity, heating, gas and oil sectors, as well as renewable resources and energy efficiency.

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<sup>20</sup> National Security Strategy of the Republic of Lithuania (2012), adopted by Seimas on 26 June 2012. Available at <[http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter3/dokpaieska.showdoc\\_l?p\\_id=428241&p\\_query=&cp\\_tr2=2](http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter3/dokpaieska.showdoc_l?p_id=428241&p_query=&cp_tr2=2)> [3 07 2012].

1. Electricity is one of the most important sectors for energy security. The focus is on strategic projects, which have a crucial impact on ensuring the country's energy independence.

- a) In order to reach full integration into the European energy system by synchronising with the European Continental Network, power links with Poland (LitPol Link) and Sweden (NordBalt) are to be completed. These are brand new projects that will be crucial for the whole Baltic region, connecting it with the EU energy system. According to the Lithuanian electricity transmission system operator, Litgrid, the cost of the LitPol Link may reach 371 million euros, more than 174 million of which will be invested by Lithuania.<sup>21</sup> Meanwhile, the total price of the NordBalt project is planned to be 550 million euros, with 232 million euros of Lithuania's investment.<sup>22</sup> Two electricity lines will be built before 2020, so these are long-term projects. Taking into consideration the price and the project term of the two links, these measures should be described as having features of 'extraordinariness'.
- b) A new nuclear power plant (Visaginas NPP) is Lithuania's main strategic project. However, it is not a new strategy, as the Ignalina nuclear power plant was commissioned in 1983. Although Ignalina NPP was shut down in 2010, Lithuania has never given up its ambitious to remain a nuclear state. In this regard, the Visaginas NPP project does not satisfy the first criterion of extraordinary energy measures. Despite this, the project is definitely untypical for Lithuania. Firstly, the preliminary cost of the plant will fluctuate from 3.5 to 5 billion euros, an unprecedented level of investment for Lithuania. Secondly, this is a regional project, ensuring additional – but vital – electricity capacities for Lithuanian co-partners Latvia and Estonia. Finally, the new nuclear power plant is scheduled to be commissioned in 2020, so this is a long-term project. In this regard, Visaginas NPP meets three out of four criteria and may be described as an extraordinary measure<sup>23</sup>.

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<sup>21</sup> Poderys, V., "Jungtis su Lenkija ir Švedija ir Lietuvos perdavimo tinklo naujos struktūros vieta Europos vieningame tinkle (supertinkle)" ["Electricity links with Poland and Sweden and the place of Lithuania's new-structured powergrid in the single (super) powergrid of the EU"]. Report. Available at <[http://www.lsta.lt/files/seminarai/2011\\_0926\\_LM\\_konferencija/19\\_Litgrid%20Virgilijus%20Poderys.pdf](http://www.lsta.lt/files/seminarai/2011_0926_LM_konferencija/19_Litgrid%20Virgilijus%20Poderys.pdf)> [11 05 2011].

<sup>22</sup> National Energy (Energy Independence) Strategy (2012), adopted by Seimas on 26 June 2012. Available at <<http://www.lrv.lt/EP/strategija-EN.pdf>> [1 08 2012].

<sup>23</sup> On 14 October 2012 an advisory referendum on the construction of a new nuclear power station was

2. The most progressive initiative in the gas sector is a liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal, which should diversify the supply of natural gas. This is another completely new energy project recently implemented by Lithuania. Taking into consideration the costs, the LNG terminal is one of the most expensive projects of recent years,<sup>24</sup> and is planned to be built and launched by 2014. Although the LNG terminal is a national and short-term project, it is thought to be an untypical one.

3. The Lithuania–Poland gas pipeline is a prospective future project which would be untypical for Lithuania. According to preliminary project assessment, investment may reach 47 million euros. Besides, its regional significance is stressed in Lithuania’s energy strategy. It is stated that the gas pipeline between Lithuania and Poland is strategically important on a regional level, allowing the connection of the Baltic states’ and Polish and Western European gas networks.<sup>25</sup> The project is planned to be finished by 2016, so it may be identified as untypical.

**Table 2.** Lithuania’s energy projects

| PROJECT                              | CRITERIA FOR EXTRAORDINARY MEASURES |                 |          |                      | <i>Extraordinary /typical</i> |
|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------|----------|----------------------|-------------------------------|
|                                      | New                                 | Cost of project | Regional | Long-term            |                               |
| Visaginas NPP                        | +                                   | +               | +        | +                    | Extraordinary                 |
| LitPol Link<br>NordBalt              | +                                   | +               | +        | -/+<br>(medium-term) | Extraordinary                 |
| LNG Terminal                         | +                                   | +               | -        | +                    | Extraordinary                 |
| Lithuania–<br>Poland gas<br>pipeline | +                                   | +               | +        | +                    | Extraordinary                 |

Most of Lithuania’s energy projects described above can be evaluated as extraordinary measures, determined to assure energy independence (Table 2).

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held in Lithuania and the proposal was rejected. However, the new government of Lithuania is still undecided as to whether to continue with this project.

<sup>24</sup> According to Klaipėdos nafta, which is implementing the LNG terminal project and will pay for Norway’s Høegh LNG company, that covers a 10-year lease of a maritime platform for importing liquefied gas, along with regasification devices, at 520 million euros. The ship, which functions as a Floating Storage and Regasification Unit, will cost 250 million euros.

<sup>25</sup> National Energy (Energy Independence) Strategy (2012).

Although none of the projects have been implemented yet, there is a strong political will to implement them, despite the controversy they have already caused. As the most dependent on external energy supply, Lithuania is the country that securitizes her energy sector in the most intensive way, and most of the measures which Lithuania has recently implemented are extraordinary, i.e., they are new, expensive, regional and medium- to long-term. If these projects were implemented, the securitization of Lithuania's energy sector could be treated as reasonable political tool in order to legitimise energy projects and ensure energy security.

## **5. Securitisation of energy in Polish strategic documents**

Poland is challenged by the same problem as Lithuania – energy dependence on a dominant external energy supplier. The country imports nearly 90% of its crude oil and 66% of its natural gas. What is more, 95% of imported crude oil and 80% of gas comes from Russia. However, as the largest producer of hard coal in the EU, Poland has balanced its energy consumption with local coal resources. Hence, coal constitutes 58% of the overall structure of energy sources, and imported oil and natural gas constitute 28% and 13% respectively. Although Poland's hard coal reserves are key strategic fuel for power generation, making energy by burning coal produces twice as much CO<sub>2</sub> emissions as burning natural gas, and Poland will have to change its energy balance in order to meet EU environmental standards. According to Poland's national energy strategy, the country's energy mix is going to change over the next two decades due to a rise in the use of renewables, natural gas and nuclear energy.<sup>26</sup> Poland's energy profile is therefore shaped both by vast domestic coal reserves and a heavy reliance on imported fuels, of which gas is of particular political and economic importance.

### **5.1. Poland's national security strategy**

In contrast to Lithuania and Estonia, Poland does not specify the energy sector as independent in its national security strategy. Energy is an integrated sector of the economy, and is one of the most significant. Measures of energy security are identified in the section on economic policy. As stated in the strategy,

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<sup>26</sup> Sprawozdanie z wyników monitorowania bezpieczeństwa dostaw energii elektrycznej (2011) [Report of Poland's Ministry of Economy] Ministerstwo Gospodarki. Warszawa 2011.

the main targets of economic policy are the development of energy infrastructure, the modernisation of the national electricity system, and implementation of new electricity grids, etc.<sup>27</sup>

The main energy challenge is stated to be Poland's dependence on external energy suppliers. In this context, one more risk is mentioned – the use of energy resources for political ends by some countries, particularly Russia. Thus, the main source of threats is thought to be other states that Poland is dependent on and which may use this dependence in order to reduce Poland's energy (and economic) security. On the other hand, in securitizing its energy dependence on Russia as the dominant energy supplier, Poland ignores its internal energy problems, such as the ineffectiveness of the energy sector because of coal overuse. Such selective securitization of energy problems is thought to be unreasonable.

To sum up:

1. The energy sector is one of the prioritised sectors of the economy but is not an independent sector of national security.
2. Energy threats are important, but are not vital. The main source of threats is external in nature, coming from other states, particularly Russia.
3. Poland does not identify its energy sector problems with national threats. Internal energy problems are not mentioned in the strategy and are not securitized.

## **5.2. Poland's energy policy to 2030**

Poland's energy strategy has been systematically reviewed and amended every four years since the late 1990s. The latest version of the document was prepared in 2009 by the Polish government and provides a comprehensive vision of the energy sector, its drawbacks and perspectives. The strategy provides a coherent list of urgent problems in the national energy sector, which – in contrast to those in the National Security Strategy of Poland – are much more relevant. The improvement of energy efficiency is the first basic target mentioned in the strategy. Of course, energy efficiency is only one step toward the overall goal of energy security; this also refers to other priorities in Polish energy policy, such as improvements in overall energy security, the wider use of renewables, the development of competitive energy and electricity markets, and so on. However, after comparison of the contents

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<sup>27</sup> National Security Strategy of Poland, adopted by the Council of Ministers. Available at <[http://www.bbn.gov.pl/portal/pl/475/1144/Strategia\\_Bezpieczenstwa\\_Narodowego\\_RP.html](http://www.bbn.gov.pl/portal/pl/475/1144/Strategia_Bezpieczenstwa_Narodowego_RP.html)> [3 04 2012].

of the two above-mentioned strategic documents, the change in the problems of energy sector that have been securitized has been noted. In the national security strategy, priority is given to Polish reliance on external supplies of energy resources; meanwhile, in the energy strategy, the main object of securitization is the energy sector's internal problems, mainly energy efficiency. Actions that influence all of the targets set in the energy strategy can be distinguished by the following concrete actions: power diversification through the construction of nuclear power plants; development of an LNG terminal; and increased investment in energy-efficiency measures at a residential level.

1. Development of nuclear energy: although the debate on building a nuclear power plant in Poland had continued for more than four decades, the concept of adding nuclear power to the Polish energy mix was revived in 2005 and was subsequently included in the nation's overall energy policy strategy. More recently, in the newest energy strategy, the development of nuclear energy was stated to be a vital direction for energy policy. A project for two planned nuclear plants, which has already satisfied all of the regulatory procedures (environmental impact assessment, investment, nuclear waste management and a public communication/outreach programme), marked the beginning of the nuclear era of Polish history. In this context, the project should be treated as an extraordinary measure. The cost of the project confirms the uniqueness of this measure. According to Poland's state-owned, largest power group, PGE, the preliminary cost will fluctuate from 15 to 18 billion euros between 2012 and 2035. The project is planned to be implemented by 2030. Although it is not a regional but a national project, it satisfies three out of four criteria and may be described as an extraordinary measure.

2. Construction of the LNG terminal in Świnoujście is the Polish answer to the question of its heavy reliance on Russia as a single supplier of natural gas. As in Lithuania, Polish LNG is also a completely new project, the implementation of which was accelerated after 2008 when the Polish government declared it a project of strategic significance. The terminal should start operating by 2014. Like the nuclear power plant project, the LNG terminal is untypical due to its costs, which may reach 600 million euros. The terminal has also garnered the interest of the European Union (EU), which perceives it not only as an important tool for increasing Polish energy security but also as representing a possibility for the Baltic states to diversify their gas supply through the Polish terminal. As a result, the EU decided to co-finance this investment by granting roughly 8 million euros from the European Energy Plan for Recovery Fund.<sup>28</sup> Although Poland has already stressed

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<sup>28</sup> Nyga-Łukaszewska H., Poland's Energy Security Strategy, 2011. Report.

the regional significance of the project, other Baltic states haven't shared this view. To sum up, the Polish LNG terminal, with some reservations, may be described as an extraordinary measure.

3. Renewables and alternative energy sources play a part in the diversification of the energy mix.

- a) In order to support energy generation from renewable energy sources, a particular support system has been introduced. This system is based on the possibility of obtaining certificates of origin, known as 'green certificates'.<sup>29</sup> This initiative is quite new; it was introduced in 2005, but started operating in 2010. In order to create a market for the certificates, in which generating electricity from renewables would be supported, investments reaching 180 million euros for the 10-year period between 2010 and 2020 have been provided. Although this is a new kind of measure for Poland, which has just started promoting its 'green policy', no other criteria for extraordinariness would apply.
- b) One more alternative in order to meet EU targets on reducing greenhouse gas emissions is shale gas. It is also believed that tapping Poland's own gas deposits could assure strategic energy independence from Russia. Although Poland is thought to have the largest deposits of shale gas in Europe, drilling the shale gas is still an alternative, but not a real energy security measure. Besides, this new policy direction would be extremely expensive for Poland, but would have regional significance in spreading the shale gas revolution in Central and Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, shale gas should be treated as a future direction for Polish energy policy.

In conclusion, Poland is keen on securitizing its dependence on external energy suppliers, but its energy policy is a coherent plan for addressing multiple challenges – external energy threats together with the internal problems of the Polish energy sector, which are not securitized with the same intensity. Poland's plans to build nuclear facilities and an LNG terminal, as well as exploring shale gas, are types of extraordinary measures. Meanwhile, some of the energy projects have been successfully started in an "ordinary" way, without them being proclaimed as a response to security issues. For example, in order to meet EU renewables and emission standards, Poland has taken RES and nuclear development initiatives.

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<sup>29</sup> Energy generated from renewable sources supported by the project includes electricity generated in particular by: a) hydro-plants and wind farms, b) biomass and biogas-based sources, c) solar photovoltaic cells and thermal collectors, d) geothermal sources, and e) energy recovered from the incineration of municipal waste.

Although these measures could be described as extraordinary, they have been implemented without any securitization. Poland's energy policy is reasonable and comprehensive – only sensitive issues such as energy dependence on Russia are securitized and solved with extraordinary measures; other challenges are tackled without official securitization. This would support the hypothesis that securitization is not always necessary to tackle energy issues.

**Table 3.** Poland's energy projects

| PROJECT          | CRITERIA FOR<br>EXTRAORDINARY MEASURES |                    |          |                      | <i>Extraordinary<br/>/typical</i> |
|------------------|--|--------------------|----------|----------------------|-----------------------------------|
|                  | New                                    | Cost of<br>project | Regional | Long-term            |                                   |
| LNG terminal     | +                                      | +                  | -        | -/+<br>(medium-term) | Extraordinary                     |
| NPP              | +                                      | +                  | -        | +                    | Extraordinary                     |
| RES              | +                                      | +                  | -        | +                    | Extraordinary                     |
| <i>Shale gas</i> | +                                      | +                  | -        | +                    | Possibly<br>Extraordinary         |

## 6. Securitisation of energy in Ukrainian strategic documents

Owing to its Soviet-inherited energy infrastructure, Ukraine's primary advantage in the energy field is the transit of oil and gas to Europe. Possessing the largest system of gas and oil pipelines in Europe, spread over 37,500 km, Ukraine is capable of delivering around 56 million tonnes of oil and 180 million cubic metres of natural gas per year.<sup>30</sup> What is more, Ukraine has large reserves of oil, natural gas and coal. These advantages of Ukraine's energy sector, however, are not enough to ensure Ukraine's energy security, and the country faces some significant risks. First, partly due to the lack of modernisation of its Soviet-era energy infrastructure,

<sup>30</sup> Kapitonenko M., "Ukrainian energy security: Between mortgage and profit. On wider Europe". In *Foreign Policy and Civil Society Program*, 2012. Sirijos Gira V., Ukrainos gamtinių dujų transportavimo sistemos modernizacija: Ukrainos kaip „energetinio įkaito“ sindromas. [The modernization of Ukraine's natural gas transportation system: an "energy hostage" syndrome of Ukraine.] In *Rytų pulsas* 5(33), pp. 1-10, 2010.

Ukraine's economy consumes too much energy. It requires about two times more energy per GDP unit than the world average. Ukraine's own production covers only about 25% of its consumption, while the remaining 75% is imported, mainly from Russia and Turkmenistan. Not only the gas transportation system, but the whole Ukrainian energy sector, needs appropriate investment for modernisation.

### **6.1. Ukraine's national security strategy**

The latest version of the strategy was approved in 2012. Energy security is given top priority in an overview of security threats and risk assessment. As stated in the strategy, exhaustion of traditional energy resources and increased competition for access to them and control over their transportation routes are the main global trends that are extremely important to Ukraine.<sup>31</sup> Some internal energy problems are mentioned in the strategy, too: Ukraine's heavy reliance on imported energy sources; its ineffective use of national energy potential and local energy sources; and a too-slow integration process with the EU Energy Community. The risk assessment shows that energy is thought to be an independent and significant sector of national security, and the target of ensuring energy security is a vital national interest. It should be mentioned that in a previous version of the strategy, from 2007, such a formal separation of the energy sector did not exist and energy was claimed to be a branch of the economic sector.

The main targets of the energy sector are diversification of energy supply sources; increased use of new energy sources and the protection of existing ones; modernisation of the energy transportation system to ensure uninterrupted energy supplies for the internal and external markets, etc.<sup>32</sup> Meanwhile, the main tool for solving these problems is expected to be Ukraine's cooperation with the EU, based on financial support from the EU to modernise the Ukrainian energy system.

Energy plays a pivotal role in Ukraine's national security strategy and Ukraine realises the seriousness of the energy challenges the country has recently addressed. Being a matter of great concern, energy is securitized in the strategy:

1. The energy sector is placed as equal to other sectors and is even one of the most significant.
2. Energy threats are treated as seriously as other threats.

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<sup>31</sup> National Security Strategy of Ukraine (Ukraine in the Changing World), 2010. Available at <[http://www.dsaua.org/images/docs/2011.02.08%20nss\\_ukraine\\_project.pdf](http://www.dsaua.org/images/docs/2011.02.08%20nss_ukraine_project.pdf)> [23 05 2012]

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*

3. Problems of the energy sector that are securitized in the strategy are not only external, but also internal in their nature – from Ukraine’s reliance on imported energy sources and its dependence on Russia in particular, to inefficiency in its own energy sector and large energy consumption.

## **6.2. Ukraine’s energy strategy for the period up to 2030**

The energy strategy was approved in 2006 as a manifest of legal instruments that shape the energy sector’s regulatory environment and other instruments more international in character. The main objectives of the strategy are: increased Ukrainian GDP through efficient development of the fuel and energy infrastructure; creation of the necessary environment to ensure that the demand for energy products can always be met; improvement of Ukrainian energy security; improvement in energy efficiency, etc.<sup>33</sup> Energy (inter)dependence on Russia and other previously mentioned problems in the energy sector have been considered in most of the newest strategic draft documents, which have not been adopted yet. However, Ukraine has no reliable legislative basis regulating the process of decreasing its energy dependence on Russia. Without a strong legal basis, the energy strategy cannot become an efficient document in fighting the challenges Ukraine has recently faced. Despite some of the drawbacks of this document, tools and measures to reach the targets of the energy policy are as follows:

1. Problems referring to the oil supply could be solved by the extension of the Ukrainian–Polish Odessa–Brody pipeline to Poland’s port of Gdansk and refinery in Plock. The pipeline is designed to pump oil from the Caspian Sea to Europe, bypassing Russia. The project is the first and only initiative in the oil sector directed at decreasing Ukraine’s energy dependence on Russia. Its costs may reach 3.6 to 14.4 billion euros and that would be the main argument for calling this project an extraordinary one. Despite the potential of the project, it hasn’t progressed for several years and may not be brought back to life. Ukraine is not the only partner showing little interest in continuing the initiative, but there are some internal factors forcing Ukraine to delay the expansion of the pipeline, such

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<sup>33</sup> Energy strategy of Ukraine for the period up to 2030, 2006. Available at <[http://www.google.com/#hl=en&tbo=d&q=energy+strategy+of+ukraine+till+2030&revid=850947698&sa=X&psj=1&ei=5ve8UKmWD8SLswbjloHYBw&ved=0CGUQ1QIoAA&bav=on.2,or.r\\_gc.r\\_pw.r\\_qf.&fp=a97ff67a64e84980&cbpcl=39314241&biw=1366&bih=615](http://www.google.com/#hl=en&tbo=d&q=energy+strategy+of+ukraine+till+2030&revid=850947698&sa=X&psj=1&ei=5ve8UKmWD8SLswbjloHYBw&ved=0CGUQ1QIoAA&bav=on.2,or.r_gc.r_pw.r_qf.&fp=a97ff67a64e84980&cbpcl=39314241&biw=1366&bih=615)> [12 03 2012].

as its old and unreliable energy infrastructure as well as Ukraine's vulnerability to Russian lobbying and pressure to delay the project.

2. The development of nuclear energy is not a new direction for Ukraine's energy policy, because the country is heavily dependent on nuclear energy – it has 15 reactors generating about half of its electricity. In mid-2011 the Ukrainian energy strategy to 2030 was updated, and the role of nuclear power in the electricity sector was emphasised. In mid-2012 the policy was again updated, and 5000 to 7000 MWe of new nuclear capacity was proposed by 2030, costing some 18 billion euros. It should be mentioned that those extra capacities would be achieved by completing and modernising existing nuclear plants. Although Ukraine's projects for developing nuclear energy are not new and cannot be treated as extraordinary measures, according to the cost criterion they may be described as untypical, with some reservations. Thus, the preliminary costs of the modernisation process may reach between 1.4 and 3.7 billion euros. In June 2010 an intergovernmental agreement was signed, under which Russia will largely finance the project. Some 85% is to be financed through a Russian loan, with 15% of the funding coming from Ukraine. It seems that part of Ukraine's investments will not be as high as may have been expected. In this regard, the modernisation of previously commissioned nuclear plants is not treated as an extraordinary measure ensuring Ukraine's energy security.

3. One of the most innovative energy projects could be the LNG terminal. Plans for the construction of an LNG terminal to weaken dependence on Russian gas were first announced on the state level by the Ministry for Fuel and Energy in 2005. However, in contrast with Poland and Lithuania, Ukraine has taken no practical steps to implement the project. Ukraine's LNG terminal could be an untypical measure due to the 'novelty' criterion. There are some difficulties in evaluating the costs of the LNG terminal. According to preliminary estimates, construction of an LNG terminal may require 816 to 1443 million euros of investment.<sup>34</sup> On the other hand, the scope of investments may be clarified after the feasibility study and development of the project's business plan. However, the implementation process has already stalled several times and the date when it should be finished is unknown.

Ukraine is a very specific case when comparing its proclamations on energy security and measures (especially the implementation process) to deal with energy

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<sup>34</sup> Razumkov Centre, "Diversification of Sources of Natural Gas Supply in Eurasia (2009)", In National Security and Defense. Available at [http://www.razumkov.org.ua/eng/files/category\\_journal/NSD110\\_eng.pdf](http://www.razumkov.org.ua/eng/files/category_journal/NSD110_eng.pdf) [12 04 2012].

threats. Ukraine securitizes its energy dependence on Russia in quite an intense form, but takes no rational steps to solve these problems. Furthermore, it should be admitted that some actors on both the Russian and Ukrainian sides have an interest in maintaining the *status quo* between the states. In this context, securitization has not been used as a problem-solving technique, or as the basis for the legitimisation of extraordinary measures. This could lead to an assumption that Ukraine considers securitization only as a political trend or proclamation, without any rational usage in practical measures dealing with security issues.

**Table 4.** Ukraine's energy projects

| PROJECT                          | CRITERIA FOR<br>EXTRAORDINARY MEASURES |                    |   |     | Cost of project               |
|----------------------------------|--|--------------------|---|-----|-------------------------------|
|                                  | New                                    | Cost of<br>project |   | New |                               |
| Odessa–Brody pipeline            | -                                      | +/-                | + | +   | Typical                       |
| Development of nuclear<br>energy | -                                      | -                  | - | +   | Typical                       |
| <i>LNG terminal</i>              | +                                      | +                  | - | -   | <i>Possibly Extraordinary</i> |

## Conclusions

All the countries analysed – Estonia, Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine – are securitizing energy issues; moreover, the securitization act is formalised comprehensively in strategic documents and the energy security sector has become, in most cases, a methodologically separate sector of national security, treated equally with “traditional” security sectors, like military, economic, political, social, etc. The formal inclusion of energy issues in national security agendas and more elaborate sector-level strategies (i.e., energy security strategies) could be named as cases of “successful securitization” processes.

The research extends Floyd's argument about the need to have a source of moral legitimacy for securitization and a positive outcome of security practices. In this study, the premise was that the dependence ratio on an external source of energy supply could serve as a legitimate reason to securitize energy issues. Moreover, this actual dependence on an external supply could be related to the

extent of securitization efforts (securitization intensity) and the selected security practice, i.e., what extraordinary measures are taken.

In the cases of Estonia, Lithuania and Poland, this rationale for securitization processes is confirmed: a higher energy-dependence ratio leads to more intense formal securitization and to more extraordinary measures (or energy projects that are untypical for certain countries). However, the Ukrainian case provides some interesting reservations. Although Ukraine is very dependent on supplies from Russia, and this situation serves as the main reason for the high securitization intensity of its energy sector, it does not lead to the sort of security practices considered likely. As the analysis of Ukrainian strategic documents exposes, Ukraine still tries to solve its energy problems in fairly typical ways; that is to say, with “business as usual” methods. Such a situation begs the question: why does Ukraine securitize the energy sector in a very intense manner when it does not need to attract support for extraordinary measures?

**Table 5.** The relationship of reasons, security intensity and extraordinary measures

|           | <b>Energy dependence ratio (share of imported energy sources, %)</b> | <b>Securitisation intensity (based on six criteria)</b> | <b>Number of extraordinary measures/projects</b> |
|-----------|--|---|--|
| Estonia   | 13   | Low   | 1  |
| Lithuania | 82   | High  | 3–4  |
| Poland    | 32   | Medium  | 2–3  |
| Ukraine   | 69   | High  | 1–2  |

The Ukrainian case should lead to the conclusion that a securitizing actor (the Ukrainian government) reacts inertly to the persistent problem of energy dependence and follows a general trend in the region to securitize the energy sector, but does not seek consistently to solve issues. Of course, there could be a lot of other obstacles to completing the securitization process successfully, but the investigation of such obstacles would be out of the sphere of securitization studies. The complete securitization process should involve not only the legitimisation for extraordinary measures but also the implementation of such measures in order to solve issues that would otherwise persist. An unfinished securitization process could mean that a securitizing actor does not always understand the rational purpose of securitization.

The Polish case is very helpful to explain whether securitization efforts are always needed to solve energy issues. This case shows that the securitization of some energy issues is likely, but not necessarily when implementing unusual energy projects or extraordinary measures. Poland is securitizing the issue of dependence on external supply to some extent, but only some extraordinary measures are included in this securitized agenda of energy policy. Some energy projects, which could be described as untypical for Poland, are not securitized and fall away from the security agenda. This could support the argument that implementation of untypical projects or extraordinary measures does not always provoke securitization efforts. In other words, the choice to securitize or not securitize some specific issues and measures still remains a freely selected instrument by the government (or other securitizing actor).

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## EU FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS BELARUS – MIXING CHESS WITH CHECKERS

Vytis Jurkonis\*

The European Union was criticized for a lack of coherent strategy towards Belarus. The EU foreign-policy makers have been blamed for inaction as much as for ineffective decisions. However, active versus reactive policies has mostly been discussed.

A number of articles argue that the formula for Belarus's foreign affairs is to create a balance between Moscow and Brussels.<sup>1</sup> Such modus operandi of official Minsk has misled international foreign-policy makers, who reacted either with attempts for dialogue and engagement, or pressure and sanctions.<sup>2</sup> The policy of applying either engagement or sanctions has never been fully implemented and has usually ended up as a short-term endeavour as a reaction to the shifting policies of Minsk, rather than a consistent and coherent EU strategy towards Belarus.

This opinion notes that the misperception of EU foreign policy lies not within the dilemma of using the wrong sticks or carrots,<sup>3</sup> but within the general misunderstanding of what the game offers, who the players are and what rules of the game frame the decisions made by the other side.

There are a number of explanations for disconnect in the EU – Belarus's relations and the assumed inefficiency of EU eastern neighbourhood policy towards Belarus; however, a lot of arguments refer to geopolitical implications. On the one hand, the so-called geopolitical chessboard provides an uncomplicated explanation

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<sup>1</sup> Wilson, A., *A New Paradigm or the Same Old Balancing Act?*, <[http://ecfr.eu/content/entry/commentary\\_wilson\\_on\\_belarus](http://ecfr.eu/content/entry/commentary_wilson_on_belarus)>; Fischer, S. (ed.), *Back from the Cold? The EU and Belarus in 2009*, <<http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp119.pdf>>; Vytis, J. & Narkeviciute, J., *The EU-Belarus Dialogue: Opportunity or Simulacrum?*, <<http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2009-04-17-narkeviciute-en.html>>.

<sup>2</sup> *Belarus Reality Check 2012*, <[http://www.eesc.lt/uploads/news/id515/Belarus\\_Reality\\_Check\\_December\\_2012.pdf](http://www.eesc.lt/uploads/news/id515/Belarus_Reality_Check_December_2012.pdf)>.

<sup>3</sup> Lucas, E., *Wrong Carrot, Wrong Stick*, <<http://www.cepa.org/content/wrong-carrot-wrong-stick>>.

for the shortcomings and failures of EU policy, downgrading it to the influence of the third actor; on the other hand, it oversimplifies the complexity of issues and ends up in a deadlock of how to outplay Russia. The geopolitical chessboard evokes a parallel of disconnect between the players, where one side tries to play chess while the other enjoys checkers.

The Council of the European Union describes its policy towards Belarus as “the policy of critical engagement [...] and recalls that the development of bilateral relations under the Eastern Partnership is conditional on progress towards respect by Belarus for the principles of democracy, the rule of law and human rights”.<sup>4</sup> This document, among many others, and notably the “critical engagement”, reveals the confusion of in the EU policy.

First of all, there’s a question of the agency. Namely, who are the players of the game? Some authors claim that Belarus is trading off its sovereignty;<sup>5</sup> therefore, the supporters of geopolitical thinking would exclude Belarus as an independent player. Consequently, they claim that, if the EU wants to solve the deadlock with Belarus, it should address the big elephant in the room – Russia. Finally, one might consider asking if Belarus is playing, or is even present at the table at all, as official Minsk has been ignorant to communicate with Brussels.

The other issue of paramount importance addressing the question of agency is what the pieces on the chessboard are. In contrast to the critics of the international democracy promotion work, the EU is addressing a variety of target groups: – civil society, human rights defenders and, local authorities, as well as the national government. This “multifaceted assortment of endeavours, engaged in by a diverse plurality of actors of different sorts”<sup>6</sup> definitely looks like a chessboard game. Meanwhile the other side of the game (if it’s not an imaginary friend) is using checkers – white and black pieces – either you are in line with the regime or you are considered to be in opposition.

Secondly, there’s a question of process and operational capacity to be able to react quickly to the move made by the other player. Obviously, playing chess encompasses a complexity of moves of different pieces, which often results in the inaccuracy brilliantly pin-pointed by Edward Lucas of “using a hammer when you

<sup>4</sup> *Council Conclusions on Belarus*, <[http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/132836.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/132836.pdf)>.

<sup>5</sup> Marin, A., *Trading off sovereignty. The outcome of Belarus’s integration with Russia in the security and defence field*, <<http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2013-04-29/trading-sovereignty-outcome-belaruss-integration-russia>>.

<sup>6</sup> Burnell, P., *Does International Democracy Promotion Work?*, 2007, Bonn.

need a spanner”.<sup>7</sup> Similarly, in the EU the decision-making process is complicated due to the range of bureaucratic mechanisms in Brussels and the national capitals. Playing checkers is much easier – there are standard moves, obvious targets and everything is either black or white. Therefore, the policy of Minsk is always one step ahead, leaving Brussels only in reactive mode.

And, most importantly, there’s the fundamental question of the objective of the game. In other words, what is the overall goal of the game, and what motivates the players? Kristi Raik, for instance, stated that the Eastern Partnership is talking democracy and thinking geopolitics.<sup>8</sup> The supporters of conspiracy theories would usually accuse any efforts at promoting democracy to be an attempt at regime change and would argue that this is the reason for the absence of the other player.

Such an approach would argue that external actors should not and cannot promote democracy justifying this by terms of non-intervention or state sovereignty. These are valid arguments, but whatever the EU’s policies are, they usually address the local actors. As Michael Walzer rightly noted that “struggles for democratization, whatever help they receive from outsiders, are always local struggles”.<sup>9</sup> Even so, you would hear that none of the pieces – be it they in political opposition (A. Lebedko, A. Milinkevich, V. Neklyayev, A. Sannikov) or civic actors – do not represent the society. Obviously, none of them can do that in an oppressive and non-democratic environment. Moreover, history has a number of examples of when dissidents have become presidents (Vaclav Havel or Nelson Mandela, to name two).

The European Dialogue on Modernisation with Belarus, which is the latest initiative from Brussels, indicates the objective. Though a process is not very comprehensible yet, it seems that the agent of this game is to be considered civil society. Nobody is swiping the chess board, but the message is clear – Brussels needs a diversity of interactions to play chess, and that’s what official Minsk cannot deliver.

This surely means that the above-mentioned critical engagement will be a long-term project, streamlining the dual-track approach. Therefore, critics of sanctions

<sup>7</sup> Lucas, E., *Screwed Hammers, Nails and Eastern Partnership*, <<http://www.cepolicy.org/publications/screwed-hammers-nails-and-eastern-partnership>>.

<sup>8</sup> Raik, K., “Talking Democracy, Thinking Geopolitics: The EU’s Eastern Partnership Policy Faces Difficult Choices”, *FIIA Comment*, November 2011.

<sup>9</sup> Walzer, M., “On Promoting Democracy”, *Ethic & International Affairs*, 22(4), 2008, <[http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/journal/22\\_4/essays/001.html](http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/journal/22_4/essays/001.html)>.

should be silenced: despite the so-called restrictive measures, the trade with the EU countries has recently been substantially increasing<sup>10</sup>.

Therefore, a complicated and long-term strategy, similar to the game of chess, avoids the trap of black-and-white accusations promoting either sanctions or engagement. “Responsible engagement support enhanced economic integration while at the same time seeking to mitigate some of the negative human rights impacts of this integration, in the worst cases, prescribes a series of ‘smart sanctions’ directed at recalcitrant, human rights abusing elites”,<sup>11</sup> which would be the formula for escaping the current pat in Belarus.

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<sup>10</sup> European Union, *Trade in Goods With Belarus*, <[http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc\\_113351.pdf](http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113351.pdf)>.

<sup>11</sup> Forcese, C., *Engagement in an Era of Economic Integration*, <[http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/LawJournals/Craig\\_Forcese\\_YHRDLJ.pdf](http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/LawJournals/Craig_Forcese_YHRDLJ.pdf)>.

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## EU POLICY TOWARDS RUSSIA: WILL WE FILL THE STRATEGIC VACUUM?

Laurynas Kasčiūnas, Linas Kojala\*

Since the end of the Cold War, the European Union (EU) has not been able to offer any solution for its relations with Russia that would encourage Russia to adapt to European rules. This has often led to false assumptions and political puzzles in relations with Russia. For instance, in 2008 after the exchange of official office involving Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev, the majority of EU member states hoped that the latter would be capable and motivated to transform Russia into a modern state governed by Western rules.

In order to strengthen Medvedev's position in the Russian political system, the EU even initiated the Partnership for Modernisation programme and started more intensive discussions about the idea of a visa-free regime between the EU and Russia, which was unofficially referred to as an incentive to Medvedev in return for his political and economic reforms. However, this was a fallacy, because it soon became obvious that Medvedev was only acting as a Russian "business card" for the West, while remaining Putin's protégé, and could not take any independent action or vision.

The strengths of Russia's political system are personalised power and a business-politics nexus, which act specifically as the cement for the current system. "Putin's Russia" stands for the model of "fusion" between politics and business, where groups of the political elite have taken over control of the main business structures and, therefore, strengthened the centralisation of the political system. In other words, the *silovarchy* organisational model, where the function of public corporations and energy companies is to "feed" groups of the Russian political elite, has replaced the oligarchy that was rampant in Russia during the time of Boris Yeltsin. This supports the internal stability: the so-called vertical politics.

The energy sector is Russia's most important platform for the business-politics nexus. Back in 2006–2007, with rising energy prices, certain analysts of Russian politics associated with the Kremlin declared that the economic formula

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(a centralised energy sector) discovered by Moscow would allow the Russian rouble to become a global currency, and that Moscow would become one of the financial centres of the world. Revenue in dollars from oil and gas also led to the emergence of the phenomenon of “Putin consensus” between those in power and society,<sup>1</sup> whereby the stability of the vertical political system was ensured in exchange for relative economic well-being.

At the same time, Russia’s political elite increasingly nurtured the vision of “Russia as an energy superpower”, the most important pillars of which were: the control of the country’s energy sector by the Russian government; restrictions on foreign direct investment in strategic sectors of the economy (in particular, the energy sector); and the establishment of large public corporations that would control strategic industries. This economic recipe was reinforced by the ideological pillar of a sovereign democracy<sup>2</sup> based on the assumption that each cultural community has its own understanding of freedom. This was an attempt to challenge the concept of Western liberal democracy.

However, in 2008, like all of Europe, Russia was in for an economic shock. The rhetoric about the “energy superpower” was replaced by the need to diversify the economy and attract foreign investment and technology. It is obvious that the only source of this is the EU, which also means that the EU will gain more leverage in respect of Russia’s internal economic and political processes. Furthermore, Russia needs a new energy and transport infrastructure, because petroleum product sales, which were booming over the past decade, will begin to stagnate over the next ten years.<sup>3</sup> Therefore, when discussing the future model of EU-Russia relations, it is important to identify the factors that support the stability of Russia’s political system and to evaluate the opportunities for an external factor (in particular, the EU) to make an impact on the Russian political and economic system.

## **1. Recent trends in domestic policy: rearrangement of the political elite?**

Recent opinion polls show that the majority of Russians approve of Putin’s work as president. Although his ratings are no longer as high as they were during his first

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<sup>1</sup> Juidah, B., Kobzova, J. & Popescu, N., “Dealing with a Post-BRIC Russia”, *European Council on Foreign Relations*, November, 2011, p. 16, <[http://www.academia.edu/1266423/Dealing\\_with\\_a\\_post-BRIC\\_Russia](http://www.academia.edu/1266423/Dealing_with_a_post-BRIC_Russia)>, 28 05 2013.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p.17.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 20.

two terms in office, around 30% of Russians would vote for him again. He is well ahead of his closest competitors, the Communist Party leader, Gennady Ziuganov (7%) and the leader of the Liberal Democratic Party, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy (3%).<sup>4</sup>

Nevertheless, analysts note increasing signs of rearrangement in the vertical political structure created by Putin. Possible changes are indicated by the changing attitude of the Russian president towards the United Russia Party and the recently initiated massive anti-corruption campaign, which will not bypass Putin's associates in high positions.

### 1.1 The fight against corruption – a government consolidation tool?

The Corruption Perceptions Index 2012, published by Transparency International, ranks Russia in 133rd place only, which is an even poorer indicator than that of countries such as Mozambique or Togo.<sup>5</sup> The extent of corruption in Russia, which is most rampant in the sectors of administration of state property, natural resources and law enforcement, amounts to about 300 billion dollars each year. Nevertheless, the Kremlin has not considered this problem as a priority. On the contrary, after Putin's rise to power the scope of corruption steadily increased as this indicator was sacrificed in order to appoint loyal staff, "repay" political comrades and create a vertical political structure. Anecdotally, Putin once even referred to corruption as a "natural phenomenon"; "the Russian tradition".<sup>6</sup>

However, the situation is changing and this could be felt during Medvedev's presidency, when laws were first adopted obliging state officials to make public information about their income. Yet it seems that this campaign will not become a systemic reform, but rather a tool to fight political opponents. It serves two purposes: it helps to solve internal puzzles of the political elite and also to improve the public image of government in society.

The anti-corruption campaign coincides with the transformation of the elite, and this transformation, according to analysts, is becoming more visible in Russia.

<sup>4</sup> Левада-Центр, Возможные результаты президентских и парламентских выборов [Possible results for the Parliamentary and Presidential elections], <<http://www.levada.ru/03-10-2013/vozmozhnye-rezultaty-prezidentskikh-i-parlamentskikh-vyborov>>, 04 10 2013

<sup>5</sup> Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2012, <<http://www.transparency.org/cpi2012/results>>, 21 05 2013.

<sup>6</sup> Whitmore, B., "Russia Is Keeping its Elites on a Shorter Leash", *The Atlantic*, 12 March 2013, <<http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/03/russia-is-keeping-its-elites-on-a-shorter-leash/273965/>>, 23 05 2013.

In the words of experts from the Institute of Modern Russia, “if anyone is thrown in prison, it will not be because they violated the law, but because they disobeyed Putin.”<sup>7</sup> Igor Bunin, Director of the Centre for Political Technologies, adds that the previous logic whereby opponents of United Russia had no rights, while those who were loyal were untouchable, is becoming less and less true.<sup>8</sup>

The transformation process was given an added impetus by the law adopted by the State Duma at the beginning of 2013, by which the country’s top officials are prohibited from holding bank accounts abroad and investing in foreign bonds. In addition, they are required to declare any foreign property holdings. As a result, Vladimir Pehktin, one of the founders of United Russia, was forced to resign after it transpired that he had a 1.3 million dollar luxury home abroad, which he had not officially declared. Soon afterward, two other MPs followed in his footsteps: Anatoly Lomakin, who is ranked 79th in the Forbes list of richest Russians, and Vasily Topstopiatov. Over a period of a few months, nine MPs and three members of the Federation Council have withdrawn their mandates.<sup>9</sup>

Indeed, Putin has two tasks: not only is he trying to “bind” groups of the political elite closer to him, but he is also trying to reduce the vulnerability of the regime in case of potential international sanctions against it. Gleb Pavlovsky, the former advisor to Putin, commented that “for this reason, officials at all levels perceive the president’s behaviour as a signal: remain silent, don’t act, and don’t stand out. Remain sitting, do not move, and be afraid. Stagnation is setting in.” In other words, the elite have ended up with a stick, but without the carrot.<sup>10</sup>

## **1.2 Creating an alternative to United Russia?**

The reputation of United Russia, formally led by Medvedev, has been seriously damaged lately by corruption scandals and internal divisions. This was particularly evident when the Governance and Problem Analysis Centre associated with the

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<sup>7</sup> Stanovaya, T., “Putin’s Corruption Trap”, Institute of Modern Russia, <<http://imrussia.org/en/politics/435-putins-corruption-trap>>, 21 05 2013.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>9</sup> Alexandrova, L., “Russia’s new elite must consist of people indifferent to material values”, Itar-Tass News Agency, 27 March 2013, <<http://www.itar-tass.com/en/c39/688810.html>>, 21 05 2013.

<sup>10</sup> Whitmore, B., “Russia Is Keeping its Elites on a Shorter Leash”, *The Atlantic*, 12 March 2013, <<http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/03/russia-is-keeping-its-elites-on-a-shorter-leash/273965/>>, 23 05 2013.

Kremlin (primarily with Vladimir Jakunin, Head of Russian Railways) exposed that the December 2011 parliamentary elections could actually have been won by the Communist Party and the formal victory of the United Russia Party was due to ballot-rigging. The United Russia Party remains the most popular in non-governmental opinion polls, but the approval ratings has fallen to 29%, while the rating of the Communist Party stands at 12%.<sup>11</sup> The president, it seems, has taken advantage of these circumstances to distance himself from the party.<sup>12</sup>

Jadwiga Rogoza of the Polish Centre for Eastern Studies maintained that in order to solve the internal problems of the elite and retain popularity in society, Putin might have to change his political platform. In other words, United Russia is becoming more like ballast in danger of being sunk politically, together with the scandal-ridden former comrades who are so annoying to the electorate and politicians with unrestrained ambitions. It is predicted that the All-Russia People's Front, a social movement established by Putin – then Prime Minister – with traditional rhetoric and patriotic ideas, could become this new political platform.<sup>13</sup>

### 1.3 Putin seeks to prevent the emergence of nationalist opposition

With the weakening “Putin consensus”, the political elite has started a new strategy to mobilise society, based on strengthening the conservative identity. Stronger union of the Russian authorities with the Orthodox Church and orientation toward the concept of Russia as a “distinctive civilisation” can be interpreted as an attempt to prevent the rise of the nationalist opposition. For the current Russian political elite, only the Communists or pro-American liberals can be at the forefront of opposition in Russia.<sup>14</sup> By deduction, this restricts the impact of the opposition on Russian society, while the nationalist movement may dislodge the ideological foundation of the regime. If, in this decade, the apparent

<sup>11</sup> Левада-Центр, Возможные результаты президентских и парламентских выборов [Possible results for the Prliamentary and Presidential elections], <<http://www.levada.ru/03-10-2013/voz-mozhnyye-rezultaty-prezidentskikh-i-parlamentskikh-vyborov>>, 04 10 2013

<sup>12</sup> Всероссийский центр изучения общественного мнения, Опрос 25-26 мая 2013. [Public Polls 25-26 May 2013], <<http://wciom.ru/>>, 21 06 2013.

<sup>13</sup> Rogoza, J., “The Kremlin’s New Political Project”, *OSW Eastweek* (20), 2013, <<http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/eastweek/2013-03-20/kremlin-s-new-political-project>>, 23 05 2013.

<sup>14</sup> Trenin, D., “Responding to the Russian Awakening”, Carnegie Moscow Centre, 31 March 2013, <<http://www.carnegie.ru/2013/03/31/responding-to-russian-awakening/fzyu>>, 23 05 2013

integration of Russia with the West were observed, Russia now wants to build an alternative to the Western value system.

Recently, anti-Western value rhetoric has increased in Russia; it is manifested not only in prohibiting Americans from adopting Russian children, but also in discussing the application of the same measures in relations with countries that have legalised same-sex marriage and adoption. In parallel, emphasis on the moral decline of the West and the Russian Orthodox Church as a cultural and civilisation counterbalance is made.<sup>15</sup>

#### **1.4. Rearrangements in the Russian energy sector**

Recently, changes have also been observed in the internal Russian energy pyramid. If the position of gas giant Gazprom, which controls 75% of the Russian domestic market and holds a monopoly on raw material expertise, seemed unshaken, the latest trends in the market cast doubt on this. Over the past five years, the market value of Gazprom stock has shrunk by almost four times. The main causes of this include the financial crisis; the development of a common EU energy policy; the development of a network of liquefied-gas terminals; and the shale-gas “boom”. In addition, fewer large customers, such as Statoil, are agreeing to sign long-term gas-supply contracts pegged to the price of oil.

Furthermore, the growing influence of Rosneft, Novatek and other companies, and their share of the domestic market (from 15% in 2007 to 25% in 2011) make one wonder how strong the pressure on Gazprom will be. All these trends are related to the question of whether the Russian government has deliberately decided to replace the locomotive (Rosneft in place of Gazprom) that guarantees the stability of the vertical political structure, or whether these rearrangements are the result of the beginning of disintegration of the Russian political elite.

## **2. The EU’s relations with Russia: the search for leverage**

As shown, current developments undermined Gazprom’s position in Europe. Even the governments and companies of Italy, Germany and the Netherlands,

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<sup>15</sup> Rogoza, J., “The Kremlin’s New Political Project”, *OSW Eastweek* (20), 2013, <<http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/eastweek/2013-03-20/kremlin-s-new-political-project>>, 23 05 2013.

bound by long-term contracts with Gazprom, have exerted pressure on the Russian energy giant to cut prices or they would choose another alternative – international arbitration. Furthermore, the EU-initiated third liberalisation package for the gas and electricity sector had a significant impact on Gazprom's interests in the European markets, as it weakened Gazprom's position as a monopolist in the EU domestic market. All this significantly curtailed the lopsidedness in EU-Russia relations in the gas sector, as it introduced safeguards for access to the EU domestic market. Russia became the "successor to the policy" and was forced to negotiate regarding application of the provisions introduced by the EU. The EU also gained new leverage with respect to Russia and perhaps even caused turmoil within the Russian political elite.

Nevertheless, analysts point out that the EU lacks ideas to force Russia to behave according to the European rules of the game. The EU still tends to identify Russia as a strategic partner, but the content of the partnership has been completely washed out. Therefore, according to Kobzova, the EU should seriously consider the possibility of a strategic pause in relations with Russia.<sup>16</sup> During this pause, the EU should do its homework. For example, a highly efficient tool would be the implementation of the European anti-corruption legislation. This could be based on the British model, where, since 2010, it is possible to apply sanctions against companies operating in Great Britain that get involved in corrupt relations in other countries. This would prevent EU companies from forming corrupt relations in Russia. At the same time, it would be appropriate to promote coordination between EU business and diplomatic structures, so that business and political interests would not be mutually exclusive, but rather would complement one another.

Energy will remain the most important components in relations with Russia. In recent years, there have been an increasing number of arbitration cases where Gazprom's customers have disputed the price formulas for energy. One priority of the EU should be to ensure the most favourable prices, which would be dependent on competitive conditions (liquefied-gas terminals, shale gas and other alternative sources) rather than on volatile oil prices.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>16</sup> Kobzova, J., Time for a Strategic Pause in EU-Russia Relations? European Council on Foreign Relations, 2013, <[http://ecfr.eu/content/entry/commentary\\_eu\\_russia\\_relations\\_time\\_for\\_a\\_strategic\\_pause130](http://ecfr.eu/content/entry/commentary_eu_russia_relations_time_for_a_strategic_pause130)>, 23 05 2013.

<sup>17</sup> More about these and other tools mentioned in the text: Juidah, B., Kobzova, J. & Popescu, N., "Dealing with a Post-BRIC Russia", *European Council on Foreign Relations*, November, 2011, p. 16, <[http://www.academia.edu/1266423/Dealing\\_with\\_a\\_post-BRIC\\_Russia](http://www.academia.edu/1266423/Dealing_with_a_post-BRIC_Russia)>, 28 05 2013.

Another leverage, which the EU exerts very little, is the issue of a visa-free regime between the EU and Russia. Russia needs visa-free travel much more than the EU does, and the EU must take advantage of this. The EU must look for opportunities to link this issue with the factors that promote Russia's political and economic transformation.

A possibility to adopt the "European" version of the Magnistky Act should also be considered.<sup>18</sup> Coordinated actions of the USA and the EU would put more pressure on the Russian political elite. Targeted sanctions may undermine the authority of the leaders who control the rules of the game within the elite and, eventually, would lead to the inner turmoil. This could be one of the few EU attempts to apply the principle of conditionality with respect to Russia, under which the opportunities for the Russian political elite to create a zone of personal security in the West would be linked to their behaviour in Russia.

In addition, the EU can and must wait for a favourable situation. With the receding concept of the "energy superpower", the need for Russia's modernisation, whereby it will inevitably have to diversify its economy, will become more prominent. This process is essentially impossible without direct foreign investment and access to advanced technology and management practices. This means that the modernisation of Russia without the EU would be practically impossible. However, thus far Russia is not going to change its economic system. Any such change would affect the functioning of the Russian political system – the system of patronage and clientelism within the elite. As long as Russia's export structure is dominated by energy resources, Russia has no interest in developing a free trade area with the EU because tariff restrictions do not affect energy resources.

### **3. Is it possible to "reset" Lithuania's relations with Russia? Lessons from history**

The development of Lithuanian-Russian relations over the past two decades has shown certain trends. On the level of rhetoric and at the same time the practical political level, we can distinguish two models in the approach of Lithuanian politicians to Russia: rigorous, based on values; and softer, based on "resetting" the

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<sup>18</sup> Dempsey, J., "Judy Asks: Is There a Way for Europe to Deal With Russia?" Carnegie Moscow Center, 2013, <<http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/?fa=51537>>, 28 05 2013.

past hurts and, in the context of *realpolitik*, seeking more friendly relations. These approaches first manifested in 1992, when the new ruling majority compared the continuity of the rhetoric in the period of the re-establishment of independence to a “witch-hunt” that prevented the implementation of practical economic interests. Such public attitude was strengthened by the fact that Lithuania remained completely economically dependent on Russia, particularly in the sectors of raw materials, energy sources and trade.

According to political scientist Gediminas Vitkus, expectations that Lithuanian pragmatism and a softer approach would warm relations with Russia were not realised. This was evident when the issue of military transit via the territory of Lithuania was discussed: after Vilnius prepared the rules for the transportation of hazardous goods, Moscow declared that these rules were unacceptable; therefore, they would not comply with them. Since the negotiations were bilateral, Lithuania essentially had no leverage (except for unilateral concessions) to force Russia to comply with the rules. The lesson has been twofold: on the one hand, successful negotiations with Russia are practically impossible if they are not attended by a significant international actor, such as EU; and on the other hand, the illusion that abandoning the “anti-Russian” rhetoric and attempting to establish a friendly relationship would directly and positively affect the most important political decisions has been dispelled.

Today, the “warming-up” trend in bilateral relations is primarily related to the desire to reduce energy prices, but the negotiations between the government and Gazprom have revealed the political price of this energy “candy”: in exchange for a discount on gas, Gazprom is asking Lithuania to freeze arbitration proceedings against Gazprom and to sign a long-term gas-supply agreement to ensure an undisturbed supply of gas to Kaliningrad (although this would be a counter-flow to the gas coming from the future Klaipėda LNG terminal) and, possibly, put off the implementation of the EU’s Third Energy Package.

In other words, softer rhetoric due to the lopsidedness of power is not conducive to real concessions on the Russian side: concessions are based on pressure exerted on Lithuania to abandon its strategic interests. A typical example is the 1997 suggestion from Moscow to guarantee security for Vilnius in exchange for Vilnius abandoning its transatlantic security strategy. It is true that, as Vitkus notes, it would be easier to solve practical and technical issues by dissociating from the implementation of strategic objectives and, therefore, working in a less stressful atmosphere of cross-border relations, but there is also a risk that this would lead towards a move to strategic geopolitical exchange governed by a completely different logic.

So, the essential lesson from history as far as relations with Russia are concerned is the involvement of an international factor (in this case, the EU) in order to strengthen Lithuania's negotiating power. And this formula should be extended to as many areas of Lithuanian-Russian bilateral relationships as possible.

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# THE FORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN IDENTITY OF UKRAINE: KEY FACTORS AND PRINCIPLES

Iuliia Tsyrfa\*

## *Abstract*

This article analyses the main determinants of the formation of the European identity of Ukraine. Using the historical background of the Ukrainian statehood the author focuses on European cultural and political components inherent to the mentality of Ukrainians. It is proved that Ukrainian regionalism does not separate the population into groups with different mentalities but contributes to the realisation of their specific features. The long absence of statehood caused the detraction of importance of some Ukrainian mental traits, which is why it is only nowadays that the Ukrainian population can be considered to be a conscious nation. This article focuses on the main features that unite Ukrainian people with Europeans: individualism, constitutionalism, democratism, etc. It also analyses the geographical component of Ukraine's identity, and the current trends in the formation of the latter. The author concludes that the formation of the European identity of Ukraine is possible only through the perception of Ukraine as a part of Europe by the European nations.

## **Introduction**

Throughout the history of the European continent, and therefore Europe as a separate region where different social groups and, consequently, states co-existed, the issue of the identity of Ukraine has been on the agenda. The nature of this concept was always determined by the problem of the uncertainty of the geographical territory of Ukraine, its civilisation and cultural belonging, and therefore the lack of an ascertained Ukrainian mentality, which would allow the construction of a unified, politically conscious community that forms an entire Ukrainian nation. Located in Europe, Ukraine remains a kind of *tabula rasa* if one determines its identity, and receives epithets such as “buffer zone” (from the

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political perspective), “torn civilisation” (in the cultural and ideological context), or simply a “black hole” (in the state and social dimension). However, taking into consideration the geopolitical factors affecting the development of the Ukrainian state and its foreign policy priorities, further ignoring the identification of the state leaves Ukraine at a crossroads of the existing vectors to create an international political space. In fact, it is not enough to determine the exclusive priorities that could define the preemptive Ukrainian foreign policy interests and give preference to one of the poles of the “East-West” axis: it is necessary to detect the fundamental factors that form the Ukrainian identity, and, thus, the essence of the latter.

Historically Europe has always played a crucial role in the formation and maintenance of the state identity of Ukraine. Considering the meaning of the concept of identity in the most general terms, one should conclude that any identity is based on three interrelated coordinate systems – spatial, temporal and mental. That’s why it is no accident that the concept of Europe is so important for the Ukrainian self-identity: it includes all three dimensions. Europe combines the spatial and geographical meaning, and the distinct temporal component associated not only with the historical past, but also with a projection into the future. At the same time, Europe designates the mental unity which appears as a set of common values, e.g., democratic rights and freedom of people and of citizens, the rule of law, respect for the cultural, ethnic and linguistic diversity of European countries (the principle of “unity in diversity”), and others.<sup>1</sup>

It is equally important that in the Ukrainian context the issues relating to its European identity are currently connected with the problems of the state’s integration into the European Union. These problems, which Ukraine faces during the development, formation and maintenance of its modern political, cultural and civilisation identity, are not only a result of the specifics of its history and its geographical location. The same importance can also be attributed to the overall global context and the particulars of the international environment in which, during the last two decades, there have been cardinal changes caused by globalisation and the end of the Cold War. Ukraine took the chance to establish its independence in that new context. To some extent, the emergence of Ukraine in the international political arena is one of the consequences of the formation of a new world order. Therefore, the sensitivity to global changes and the willingness to take new opportunities and meet new challenges, particularly through the participation

<sup>1</sup> Яворська Г., “До проблеми формування європейської ідентичності в Україні” [“To the problem of formation of the European identity in Ukraine”], *Наукові записки Інституту політологічних і етніонаціональних досліджень ім. І.Ф. Кураса НАН України*, No 42, 2008, pp. 269-270.

in integration associations, are a prerequisite for the further development of the Ukrainian statehood<sup>2</sup>.

## **1. Ethnic regionalism as a display of European features in the Ukrainian mentality**

### **1.1. Ethnic diversity as a feature of Ukrainian and European peoples**

During the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, one of the most productive periods of the formation of the idea of a Ukrainian national identity, Ukraine obtained two models of social identification that still retain their influence today. The first model, in terms suggested by H. Hrabovych, is the “focus on itself” (i.e., the dominant Russian mental, cultural and political background), and the second is the “orientation to the world”, or, rather, toward the West and Europe.<sup>3</sup>

However, theoretically understanding the necessity of the pro-Western orientation of the further political development of Ukraine, its ideologues were in a condition that made the implementation of their plans impossible in reality. Indeed, the peculiarities of the social and cultural situation that emerged historically in Ukraine had always been determined by the fact that for many centuries the space that is now the territory of Ukraine had been segmented by variable internal borders: among the different languages and ethnic groups, states, religions, political and cultural systems, and areas with different economic structures. This transformed it into a strongly pronounced contact zone including a diverse spectrum of cultural phenomena.<sup>4</sup>

The Ukrainian political scientist M. Riabchuk even states the existence of “two Ukraines”, where there are “different worlds, different civilisations” that differ in the ways of speaking and thinking among the locals, who “are guided by the diverse cultural models, civilisation and geographical centres; profess fundamentally

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<sup>2</sup> Яворська Г., (note 1), p. 270.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 272.

<sup>4</sup> Яковенко Н., *Паралельний світ. Дослідження з історії уявлень та ідей в Україні XVI-XVII ст.* [‘The parallel world. Research of the history of notions and ideas in Ukraine of the 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> centuries’], Київ: Критика, 2002, p. 333.

irreconcilable and incompatible historical myths and narratives; see not only the past, but also the future of the land quite differently”.<sup>5</sup>

However, the internal social differentiation of the Ukrainian nation cannot be considered as an exception in the context of the development of European states. For example, F. Braudel notes that “the very nature of France is diversity”, and agrees with the conclusions of H. Le Bras and E. Todd, made on the basis of studying regional differences, that, according to all indications, France as one nation should not exist: that’s why it had to be “invented”. He scrupulously examines the depth of division into the French south and French north, and notes that France can be understood as a tapestry of different, divergent regions. But such a tapestry can be found everywhere in Europe. Therefore, F. Braudel logically concludes that each nation is divided, but it exists and develops on the basis of these divisions.<sup>6</sup>

Consequently, the European nations as well as the Ukrainian meta-ethnos are not homogeneous, unified entities; each of them includes various ethnic communities that have their own specific forms of displaying their mentality. At the same time, different regional ethnic communities in Ukraine share significant mental traits, which are distinctively modified through their forms of expression. The same commonality of determinative ethnic and psychological features also characterises the Europeans.<sup>7</sup>

## **1.2. Absence of statehood as the main cause for the ungrouping of Ukrainian society**

The absence of its own statehood during previous centuries had a decisive influence on the display of the mentality of the Ukrainian ethnos. This is caused by the fact that statehood is the basic platform for an ethnos to find its political and legal structure and to produce the forms of social and cultural life that mostly correspond to its profound mindset.<sup>8</sup>

A nation that has been under foreign oppression and that has experienced a total denial of its social and cultural life for a long time begins to acquire new

<sup>5</sup> Рябчук М., *Дві України* [‘Two Ukraines’], part 10, Київ: Критика, 2001, p. 10.

<sup>6</sup> Braudel F., *The identity of France: History and environment*, vol. 1, New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1990, p. 107.

<sup>7</sup> Старовойт І., *Західноєвропейська і українська ментальність. Компаративний аналіз* [‘West European and Ukrainian mentality. Comparative analysis’], Тернопіль: Тернопільська академія народного господарства, 1995, p. 16.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 13.

forms of expression of its mental characteristics that are, in fact, the deformation of its own mentality. It invents peculiar ways to adapt to the way of life of 'alien' cultures, the formal perception and even endorsement of the social system, norms and behaviour stereotypes of the dominant ethnic group. Consequently, its own mental traits continue to function at a deep psychological level but they begin to be stratified by the rules of the perception of the world, and the behavior within it, that the ethnos had obtained during the time of its subjugation. In due course, these acquired alien values and guidelines have increasingly blocked, deformed and pushed to the background the components of the Ukrainian mentality.<sup>9</sup> Accordingly, people from different regions developed diverse attitudes towards the problems of usage of the Ukrainian language, the independence of Ukraine, its further development and other fundamental national issues.<sup>10</sup>

The basic components of social and political unity of society were also partially destroyed, causing the establishment of different cultural groups. The foundation of the separation and continuity of the national group is its culture, which is common in form and nature and has its own creations, language, customs and traditions, historical fate and values: economic, technical, aesthetic, theoretical (philosophical), social and political, and religious ones.<sup>11</sup> This culture becomes the basis of the group's awareness of its separateness from other groups and, despite the globalisation of the modern world, still continues to be dominant.<sup>12</sup> The development of this group community itself and the formation of its consciousness require a certain degree of attraction and duration as a form of unity. The existence of such a group promotes the construction of its collective identity, which helps to build a separate 'We' feeling between the individual members of the community and to represent it as a unitary entity for the external Others. However, the structuring of this type of identity and its comparison with the other identity types become possible, firstly, due to its multidimensional relationships with the state as one of the institutions that construct the nation (despite its absolute influence in the past); specific focus

<sup>9</sup> Старовойт І., (note 7), p. 15.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 16.

<sup>11</sup> Піскун В., "Спільна дія як засіб подолання *Vita minima* українців (теоретичне бачення історичної практики спільнотного згуртування)" ["Common action as a means to overcome Ukrainians' *vita minima* (theoretical view of the historical practice of the community's unification)"], *Український досвід спільнотного згуртування. Матеріали міжнародної наукової конференції. 26 жовтня 2006 р.*, Київ: Українська Видавнича Спілка, 2006, pp. 57-58.

<sup>12</sup> Ольшанский Д., "Психология больших групп в политике. Большие национально-этнические группы" ["Psychology of big groups in politics. Large national and ethnic groups"] in Тарас А., ed., *Современная этнопсихология. Хрестоматия*, Минск: Харвест, 2003, p. 267-268.

of the state ideology (liberal and illiberal democracy); and, as a consequence, the possibility of the existence of other social non-governmental institutions and their influence on the procedural development of the consensus principles. The overall impact of these factors creates different configurations of developing social relations. Another fundamental aspect influencing the construction of the social collective identity is the establishment of ties between state institutions, NGOs and individuals at the levels of “object – object” and “object – subject” interaction.<sup>13</sup>

The feedback relationships (between the individual and the state, and the individual and the movements to be created or non-governmental social institutions) are also important for consolidating public relations and increasing the level of individualisation. Accordingly, despite having enough mental resources to consolidate society, for a long time Ukrainians haven't had the necessary mechanisms to organise the process that would unify different regional groups into a single consolidated society through the use of appropriate instruments. But the existence of such groups cannot deny the European characteristics of Ukrainian society because the ability to express their “sub-mentalities” is a direct analogy to European ethnic diversity.

## 2. Individualistic world view in the context of Ukrainian and European ethnic development

It can be stated that at the level of existing communities the Ukrainian and European ethnics have a common key mental trait of individualism and, therefore, Ukraine's entry into Europe will be quite natural and a psychologically painless phenomenon. According to the Ukrainian historian M. Hrushevsky, the Ukrainian people belong to the western European or, in short, to the European area, not only because of the power of the historical ties that have connected Ukrainian life with the West for centuries, but also because of how the national character is moulded.<sup>14</sup>

Individualism in the European context, first of all, means the form and method of the individual's establishment in society. Roman law and the elements of democratic governance, which were asserted in Europe both legally and culturally

<sup>13</sup> Побєса Н., “Моделі української ідентичності” [‘Models of Ukrainian identity’], *Україна – проблема ідентичності: людина, економіка, суспільство. Матеріали конференції українських випускників програм наукового стажування у США. Львів, 18-21 вересня 2003 р.*, Київ: СтилоС, 2003, pp. 205-206.

<sup>14</sup> Грушевський М., *Хто такі українці і чого вони хочуть* [‘Who the Ukrainians are and what they want’], Київ: Т-во “Знання України”, 1991, p. 147.

during the Renaissance, determine the social status of the individual. They codify the boundaries of individuals' freedom, guarantee their rights, and protect them from the pressure of more powerful forces, such as society and the state. The vector of the European individual is directed to their environment: each person acts to assert their Self in the world and, if the world of society does not correspond to their ideals, they try to transform it. The individual may fail in this struggle (and it happens very often) but he or she does not passively submit to society. All the European discourse of the Renaissance and the New Age concerns the glorification of a person, their public role, and the personal moral responsibility of an individual for their actions.<sup>15</sup>

European individualism is a form of assertion of the personality in the natural and social environment. A *socium* is an open society where every individual, regardless of their origin and social status, can achieve a high social position in accordance with the accepted and approved norms but due to their own efforts, energy and abilities.<sup>16</sup>

In a theoretical respect, the individualistic world view is primarily based on common sense that ultimately leads to ignoring or even denying the metaphysical knowledge and problems that mainly concern the world as a whole and are important for the evolution of communities.<sup>17</sup> Groups based on a rational component derive from the need of a person in total freedom, which is bound with equality. Existing within such groups, the individual focuses on a conscious choice; the achievement of their particular goals by means of public and political methods. The specialities of individualisation in social relations and of the conscious approach to resolving various issues allow the community to be considered not only in the light of spontaneous will, but also in the context of the combined precise positions of its individual members.<sup>18</sup>

Having initially considered individualism as an integral feature of the Ukrainian character, after the split between Rome and Constantinople the Kievan Rus took the side of the Byzantine Empire and acquired such values of the Byzantine world as the subordination of the individual to the collective. This fact significantly

<sup>15</sup> Старовойт, (note 7) p. 117.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 12.

<sup>18</sup> Бойко Т., "Взасмодоповнення спільнотного та суспільного як шлях творення української нації" ['Mutual supplement of communities' and social features as the way of Ukrainian nation formation'], *Український досвід спільнотного згуртування. Матеріали міжнародної наукової конференції. 26 жовтня 2006 р.*, Київ: Українська Видавнича Спілка, 2006, p. 359.

impacted the whole subsequent history of the relationships between the individual and society.<sup>19</sup>

At the end of the 16<sup>th</sup> century the status quo was broken once again, by the religious and faith factor (after the signing of the Union of Brześć in 1596), which urged the socium to engage in social confrontations and oriented it to the dominance of separate small groups. Thus, Ukrainian individualism did not go beyond the boundaries of the group, nor beyond the borders of ordinariness. Even group “conductors” did not impose their fantastic impromptus on their subordinates.<sup>20</sup> However, at the same time, the unification of groups within the Ukrainian people always took place voluntarily, in accordance with agreement and democratic declaration of will.

This trend was drawing Ukrainian society toward European values, making feasible the assertion of the cult of personality, even within small groups. However, for a long time the Ukrainians’ existence within various states (Russia and Poland) made the formation of the all-group consciousness impossible, while the other European nations formed it on the basis of a joint territorial matrix and general ideas about their native countries, power, ownership, and responsibility.<sup>21</sup>

In this sense, individualism is a prerequisite for the emergence of a personality as the subject, which, internalising the social and communicative framework, is capable of the deliberate building of civil society in the traditions of European development. Furthermore, the fact of the obvious appreciation of the individual that certainly becomes a positive consequence of the existential individualism of the Ukrainian mentality gives the researchers every reason to express some optimism about the prospects for the democratic evolution of Ukrainians. Ukrainian individualism mostly closes the state to individualistic Europe while distancing it from Moscow, which has always had an autocrat; it is no matter whether that was the king or dictator: Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great, Stalin.... So, in the independent Ukraine, the distinctive Ukrainian individualism can be considered as an important component of the development of branched civil society functioning according to the principles of liberal freedoms.

<sup>19</sup> Старовойт (note 7), p. 119.

<sup>20</sup> Антонюк Т., “Особливості українського досвіду спільнотного згуртування в дослідженнях Юрія Липи” [‘Peculiarities of the Ukrainian experience of communities’ unification in the works of Yuri Lipa’], *Український досвід спільнотного згуртування. Матеріали міжнародної наукової конференції. 26 жовтня 2006 р.*, Київ: Українська Видавнича Спілка, 2006, p. 124.

<sup>21</sup> Піскун (note 11), p. 56.

### **3. The main features of the Ukrainian mentality: pro-European component**

Due to the territorial and mental fragmentation of the Ukrainian regions, for a long time the entire ethnic territory of Ukraine has been under the influence of various cultural factors. At different times the “generators” of their influence appeared in Lviv, Galicia and Volyn (Ukrainian western lands); in the Kiev and the Dnieper region (the central part of the state); the Zaporozhian Host; or Poltava, Kharkiv and the Sloboda Ukraine (the eastern regions of the country). So, the national and cultural revival of the 15<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> centuries was marked with the establishment of national and religious handicraft brotherhoods initially in Lviv, Lutsk, Ostrog and other cities in western Ukraine, and later in Kiev. In time the latter strengthened its role as the biggest cultural centre, presented with the glorious Kiev-Mohyla Academy. The seats of the national and cultural renaissance and Romantic movement of the early 19<sup>th</sup> century were Poltava and Kharkiv. The development of modern Ukrainian literature in the Left Bank area and the Dnieper region was a powerful catalyst to similar processes in Galicia and Bukovyna.

That is, the continuous development of the cultural component in the entire ethnic territory of Ukraine contributed to the formation of a single cultural area of Ukrainian society, even within the political framework of various states. This sense of symbolic cultural unity was supplemented with a sense of political unity, which had its peaks during the national liberation struggle led by the hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky (1648-1654), during the flourishing of the nationalist and civic movement in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, and, most intensively, during the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917-1920.

These short periods when the Ukrainian people established their statehood allowed the identification of several key features of the Ukrainians’ political mentality, which are largely still inherent to them today. Democracy, constitutionalism, egalitarianism and regionalism should primarily be mentioned as the basic features of Ukrainian political mentality. The democratic component of the Ukrainian mentality is dominant in the Ukrainians’ *étatisme*. Thus, it is observed to be the invariable presence of certain institutions with popular representation in all Ukrainian states (the organ of direct democracy in the Kievan Rus was the viche (the popular assembly); the Cossack Republic had its military council; in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century the representative democracy was embodied by the Central Council of the Ukrainian People’s Republic and by the Ukrainian National Council of the West Ukrainian People’s Republic). The constitutional guidelines had been in

special agreements in the forms of relationships between the prince and the viche in the Kievan Rus; then, those guidelines were represented in the agreements of the Cossack state, and particularly in the documents of the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>22</sup>

In accordance with the draft constitution of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UPR), the main principles of development of the modern Ukrainian state were traditional democratism (which showed that popular representation was dominant in the political mentality of Ukrainians), the separation of powers, all-round guaranteeing of minorities' rights (which indicated the unconditional Ukrainian tolerance in relations with the citizens of other nationalities), and others. The draft constitution of the UPR provided for the establishment of the parliamentary republic because the National Council (the parliament) had to become the main source of state policy formation, e.g., it was authorised to pass a vote of no confidence in the government as a whole and its individual ministers.<sup>23</sup> That is, despite the significant legal drawbacks, at that time the contents of the draft constitution of the UPR pointed to the quite European nature of political thought of the Ukrainian leaders who, even in the absence of the statehood, were able to put forward the idea of the independence of Ukraine and developed a specific programme for its realisation in a short space of time. The foreign-policy priorities of Ukraine were not directed to the East (to Bolshevik Russia) but focused on relations with the European states: during the national liberation struggle the political leaders of Ukraine established diplomatic relations with the Czech and Slovak Republic, Germany, Bulgaria, Latvia, Hungary, Finland, Switzerland, Sweden, Poland, Austria, etc.

## **4. The territorial principle of the unification of the Ukrainian nation**

### **4.1. Historical legitimisation of Ukraine's current borders**

In principle, the contents of the Constitution of Independent Ukraine (of 28 June 1996), as well as the further development of the state, underline its adherence to the fundamental principles of European democracy, political development and

<sup>22</sup> Чигринов В., Поліщук І., *Політична ментальність українського суспільства: історія і модерн* [Political mentality of the Ukrainian society: Historical and modern], Харків: ХІБМ, 2001, pp. 87-88.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 81.

social relations. However, the existing mental separation of the Ukrainian ethnos, which is now strengthened by the economic component (and the myth of the West-East dichotomy) raises issues on the legitimacy of the territorial location of Ukraine and, therefore, its geopolitical role in the continent. That is, whether Ukraine corresponds with the historically formed model of the European “nation-state” still remains uncertain. Even if the Ukrainian population can be considered as a kind of multi-layer ethnic community according to its mental features, the legitimacy of the territorial boundaries of the state often causes a number of issues, primarily related to the historical division of its territory.

In fact, from the very outset of the development of its civilization the community has had to replace the tribal system with ethnic integrity. This required some uniting events, including the foundation and development of the ancient empires (such as the Kievan Rus and the Frankish state), the adoption of written culture and synthesis of the first written texts (legal and religious annals; historical chronicles), as well as the military campaigns and other military activities of the most effective social groups.<sup>24</sup> Accordingly, considering the ancient Slavic tribes to be their ancestors the Ukrainians associate their past with the glorious Kievan princes whose state was retained within certain boundaries through the spillover of power from Kiev to Halych and from Kyiv to Wilno. Thus, the past of the five largest princely capitals (Kiev, Halych, Holm, Lviv and Vladimir) and reigns became the main means to mobilise the historical memory of Ukrainian society, and thus legitimised the idea of its political succession in its territory.

Another object to link the Ukrainians to the princely Rus, which was the Cossacks, appeared in the Ukrainian historical and political doctrines in the early 1620s. The sacralization of the Cossacks, associated with the glory and sacred things of the Kievan Rus, their popularisation in poetry, and the determination of their place within society became the components of the early national myth, and the means to expand the social content of the Ukrainian (“Ruthenian”) people and form their national identity.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>24</sup> Мостяев О., “Соціальна мобілізація як спосіб згуртування спільнот” [‘Social mobilisation as a means of communities’ unification’], *Український досвід спільнотного згуртування. Матеріали міжнародної наукової конференції. 26 жовтня 2006 р.*, Київ: Українська Видавнича Спілка, 2006, р. 297.

<sup>25</sup> Дячук Л., “Проблема національної ідентичності українців у міфосторичних концепціях XVII та початку XIX століть” [‘Problem of the Ukrainians’ national identity in the myth and historical conceptions of the 17<sup>th</sup> and the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> centuries’], *Етнічна історія народів Європи: Збірник наук. праць: Секція 1. Теоретичні проблеми етнології*, Київ: Видавничий центр «Київський університет», 1999, р. 21.

The main objective of the Cossack chronicles of the end of the 17<sup>th</sup> and the beginning of the 18<sup>th</sup> centuries was to justify the legitimacy of “Cossack” Ukraine, which caused some psychological tensions in the people’s consciousness because the Cossacks had come to power “using the sword”, i.e., breaking the rules of the divinely instituted system. Such justification caused the development of the myth and historical concept of the “Cossack and Ruthenian Motherland”.<sup>26</sup> Indeed, the activity of the Cossacks, who struggled for the right of their nation to exist, pushed into the background the military dimension of their policy and gave hope to the Ukrainian ethnos for the establishment of its own statehood, which the common people thought to be a “divine affair”.

Accordingly, during the national liberation war led by Bohdan Khmelnytsky the Ukrainians had the opportunity to act as one, and almost completely transformed into a single Cossack and peasant nation that held all the historical ethnic lands. At that time, the integral image of Cossack and Ruthenian Ukraine was born. The ethnic territory was firstly identified with the terrain where the Cossack system had spread (i.e., the state) and the people obtained the features of the political community, which absorbed all groups of different social levels and even the different types of individuals inherent in those groups.

The consolidation of the modern Ukrainian nation, then, was based on the territorial and civic principle, and the national idea, in particular the main ethnic and cultural values of the Ukrainian people, spread within the historically determined area of its existence, which had been inherited from the Kievan Rus.

#### **4.2. The main factors of the formation of the Ukrainian image in Europe**

Geographical images (maps or imagined borders of the states) usually change much more slowly than the “objective” world, but they also exist for much longer than the geographical actuals they are based on.<sup>27</sup> The European foreign-policy

<sup>26</sup> Дячук Л., “Проблема національної ідентичності українців у міфологічних концепціях XVII та початку XIX століть” [‘Problem of the Ukrainians’ national identity in the myth and historical conceptions of the 17<sup>th</sup> and the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> centuries’], *Етнічна історія народів Європи: Збірник наук. праць: Секція I. Теоретичні проблеми етнології*, Київ: Видавничий центр «Київський університет», 1999, p. 22.

<sup>27</sup> Колосов В., ed., *Мир глазами россиян: мифы и внешняя политика* [‘The world through the eyes of Russians: Myths and foreign policy’], Москва: Институт Фонда «Общественное мнение», 2003, p. 30.

orientation of the Kievan Rus and, accordingly, the consideration of that state as a truly European sovereign, contributed to the peculiar “overflow” of the Slavs’ territorial legacy to the Ukrainian people, which continued positioning its own state formations as a part of Europe. The same trend was retraced during the existence of Cossack Ukraine, which, moreover, helped the Ukrainian nation to elaborate on its own political ideology in order to prove its right to the historically defined territory.

In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, when Ukraine was considered as a geographical space to represent the separate provinces of the Russian and Austria-Hungarian empires, the historical memory of its population was not eradicated because the people supported the existing territorial image that had been created much earlier. Due to geopolitical and cultural factors, that geographical image acquired the traits of a multi-layer formation because, like any other geographic object, it was seen at different spatial levels. At that time, its versatility was also reinforced by the fact that various aspects of that image were directed towards different addressees, and the components of its representation were shared by different social groups.<sup>28</sup>

As geographical images are usually built on antitheses, they clearly show the willingness of a person or social group to divide countries and regions into “their own” and “alien”, friendly and hostile, mentally mastered and mentally distant. The “territoriality” of the geographical images is an integral element of identity. As a result, the image almost always includes the notion of territorial borders. The borders are characterised by the possibility not only to provide contact between neighbouring regions, but also to separate them. This makes the images sharp and deprives them of halftones and shades.<sup>29</sup>

The identity of any country (constructed within a given territory) must include ideas of foreign countries that help people realise the characteristics that distinguish them (as group united with belonging to their country, a common language, history, culture, contemporary problems, etc.) from Others as the residents of other countries. The extremely important ideas on national (state) territory and its boundaries, which do not necessarily correspond to those recognised by the international community, are formed in conformity with the “We–They” opposition. Accordingly, in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century the existence of Ukrainians’ notions of their own (even potentially independent) state allowed the ideologists of the Ukrainian political movement to build the concept of an independent Ukrainian state delimited with clear borders.

<sup>28</sup> КОЛОСОБ В., (note 27), pp. 30-31.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 33.

In principle, the image of the outer world as a criterion for self-discovery shows deep existential, religious and mythological grounds of the relationship between culture and the world. But the existential world view is not static; it is constantly changing. The geographical images are in constant motion; they are born, dividing, becoming out of date, and renewing. They can also endure conditional death, but during new rounds of historical development the half-forgotten and erased images are often required and revived.

The evolution of countries' images depends on changes in the society in which they are created (endogenous notions), as well as on changes taking place in the country itself, so that country can be perceived in a certain way abroad (exogenous components)<sup>30</sup>.

The exogenous notions were always formed outside Ukraine, mostly in European countries. Occupying the "border position" between the majority of European countries and Russia (and it has been considered as a part of the latter for a long time), in the external dimension Ukraine could rely on the probability of being recognised by European sovereigns as an existing state. Their recognition is still a kind of legitimization of the existence of Ukraine within its borders as a part of the European continent.

If one carefully analyses the genesis of geographical images, it would be easy to identify several sources of their formation. Deep beliefs come from transcendental, cultural and symbolic ideas, and superficial knowledge is based on opportunistic political information, which today is mostly presented in reports by the media.<sup>31</sup>

The transcendental, or religious and mythological, component of the image, in contrast to the historical and political ones, is the most universal and generic. The transformation of the environment into the sign system (in which the roles of the signs are played by geographical objects, and the roles of the designata belong to the archetypes, transcendental concepts and categories) creates a religious and mythological, or sacral, geography. As a result, the world map turns into a specific panel that reflects the traditional world view expressing the "vertical", spiritual layers of the universe on the plane. The image of such a world was dominant in the Middle Ages. At that time, the Ukrainian state, as its integral geographical component, had the image of an area where Christian values were spread and supported at the state level.

However, in this sense the cultural and symbolic component was key, as it allowed the geographical image of the concrete state and its social contents to

<sup>30</sup> КОЛОСОВ В., (note 28), p. 183.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 185-186.

be passed on more accurately. But the greater the cultural distance that existed between nations, the less concrete the image of a country appeared to be. That's why cultural associations often changed after a change to the symbolic guidelines. For example, at the time when Anna Yaroslavna moved from the Kievan Rus to France, the latter was considered by her compatriots as a barbaric country (in comparison with the civilised East), but in the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries the attitude of the Ukrainian population to France, in contrast, was formed according to the perception of the Ukrainian territories as a kind of cultural "satellite". It was caused not so much by the actual correlation of cultural worlds but with the internal fluctuations of the Ukrainian culture and its lack of legitimacy.

The opportunistic political component of the world image based on the continuous and increasing flow of information is the brightest and most transient one. However, the lack of information, as history shows, generates no less striking mythological notions (e.g., medieval images of countries inhabited by people with dogs' heads and other monsters). In the modern era, one can give numerous examples of evidence of the decisive influence of the media, primarily the television, on the formation of geographical concepts and images of the countries. So, the large amount of coverage in the Western press about the spread of racism and xenophobia in Ukraine that appeared before the European Football Championship "Euro 2012" almost instantly obscured all the images of the Ukrainian state that had been constructed via numerous promotions and advertising campaigns before.

As a result, the countries' images are emerging and evolving both in the minds of society as a whole and in the minds of individuals throughout their lives. Different factors connected with the collection and interpretation of information play a role in both cases. Sometimes these factors overlap, but often do not match. So, historical and political events influence the formation of the country's image in the social and individual consciousness: the historical events act directly, and the political ones are mediated by personal experience. That's why the so-called Iron Curtain, which separated Ukraine (and other former Soviet republics) from the other European states, historically moved Ukraine aside from other European countries because for almost 70 years the Europeans had not considered Ukraine as an independent state. That, respectively, contributed to the loss of its geographical image. Nowadays its geographical image is only just being renewed, but its political component, represented by quite diverse news coverage about the activities of the Ukrainian authorities, often undermines the importance of the European component of the Ukrainian identity, attributing only post-Soviet (and often pro-Russian) features to its nature.

## 5. Current trends of the Ukrainian formation of identity

At the present stage, the problem of determining the geopolitical and civilisation identities of Ukraine is really quite pressing because the intention of our state to join the family of European nations (or to remain in the area of post-Soviet interactions) has once again put on the agenda its priorities and orientations, and, as a result, the significance of the determination of its foreign-policy course. In addition, a key geostrategic decision, which should now be taken by the Ukrainian authorities, should, in fact, determine the nature of identity beliefs supported by all of the Ukrainian society.

In recent years, the issue of determining the identity of Ukraine has become highly influential, taking into account the strategic priorities set forth in the Law of Ukraine “On Foundations of Domestic and Foreign Policy” of 1 July 2010,<sup>32</sup> and social and cultural ties with most of the former Soviet republics supported by the Ukrainian population. The reasons why the Ukrainian authorities were forcing the conclusion of the Association Agreement with the EU were not always clear to the average citizen of the Ukrainian state. Supporting the idea of the “European Ukraine” and, at the same time, understanding its historical implications, Ukrainian citizens were often not aware of the difference between Europe as a geographical reality and the European Union as a certain political and economic entity. For a long time, the banal lack of accurate information on that subject has not allowed the Ukrainian people to comprehend the existence of the large number of EU requirements to be followed in order to approach this organisation, in contrast with the complete absence of such requirements on the part of the Customs Union headed by the Russian Federation.

The Russian promotion of the idea of the so-called “Russian world”<sup>33</sup> really created the impression of the existence of a unified “Slavic civilisation” through which different peoples could be united on the basis of a common history, culture, and similar mentality founded on their single historical fate, as well as through which existing economic and commercial ties could be strengthened. However, the principles of the economic integration, which initially formed the basis of the

<sup>32</sup> Закон України “Про засади внутрішньої і зовнішньої політики” від 1 липня 2010 р. [“The law of Ukraine “On foundations of domestic and foreign policy”, 1 July 2010’], <<http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2411-17>>, 05 10 2013.

<sup>33</sup> Концепция внешней политики Российской Федерации, утверждена Указом Президента РФ от 12 июля 2008 г. [“The concept of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation, adopted with the Decree of the President of the RF, 12 July 2008’], <<http://kremlin.ru/acts/785>>, 05 10 2013

Customs Union, have absolutely nothing in common with the above-mentioned factors. Moreover, the latter factors are primarily used to establish the image of Russia as a separate, self-sufficient civilisation that is capable, on the one hand, of resisting the influences of other cultures – both Eastern (including the Islamic culture) and Western (mainly, the European secular culture) – and, on the other hand, to restore the desired imperial project that could help Russia to revive its status as a great power. This is why the economic factor is only a tool to return the spiritual centre of the Slavs (who are considered to be the direct ancestors of modern Russians by Moscow officials) to the area of the Russian Federation's influence because, being located in the neighbouring state, this spiritual centre deprives Russia of the opportunity to promote the idea of the leading Russian civilisation, even if only within the post-Soviet area. Existing as a country with “casual boundaries”, the Russian Federation is not integral without the consolidation of its neighbouring countries inhabited by “fraternal Slavic peoples”. In this sense, the Slavic identity is proposed to Ukrainians as a substitute for their national identity.

Considering the issue of Ukraine's European identity one can argue that the latter, by contrast, sooner complements the national identity of the state than enters into competition with it. The Europeanness is an identifier based on values that do not affect traditional foundations or national feelings. Accordingly, the idea of rapprochement with the EU is determined not only by the common historical heritage of its Member States and Ukraine, but also by the values and standards now to be applied in Europe to social security, business, public administration, elections, and the legal system.

As a result, the most important advantages of the EU to be picked out by the citizens of Ukraine are the high level of social security, the rule of law, the advanced democracy, the availability of financial resources, the quality of health-care, the scientific and technological development, and the low level of corruption. Due to these factors 49% of Ukrainian citizens support the idea of concluding the Association Agreement with the EU.<sup>34</sup> Thirty-one per cent of Ukrainians, who continue to be inclined towards the idea of Ukraine's joining the Customs Union,<sup>35</sup> are guided, in fact, solely by social, cultural and economic factors, taking into account Russia's natural and energy resources as well as the existence of strong ties between the key national industrial sectors and the same spheres in the countries of the former USSR.

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<sup>34</sup> Европейский выбор Украины в контексте украинско-российских отношений [“The European choice of Ukraine in the context of Ukrainian–Russian relations”], *Report of the Research & Branding Group*, 4 September 2013, <<http://rb.com.ua/rus/projects/omnibus/8813/>>, 05 10 2013

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*

However, the nature of integration projects with unequal actors (and in the case of the Customs Union the dominance, of course, would belong to the Russian Federation) is, in fact, characterised by the economic and political absorption of the “satellite states” and therefore does not mean “mutually beneficial economic cooperation”. Today the newly-created Free Trade Area of the Community of Independent States (CIS FTA), established according to the treaty of 18 October 2011,<sup>36</sup> may serve as a striking example of such relations because, despite the promised benefits, Ukraine did not experience the declared advantages after the document was concluded, and the implementation of the treaty contributed to:

- the asymmetry (in the first place, in Russia’s favour) of processes, establishing export duties on a large amount of goods; and
- the discriminatory situation in relation to important Ukrainian interests, such as “transit freedom”, because the provisions of the above-mentioned treaty on similar freedoms “do not apply to pipelines”.<sup>37</sup>

Moreover, the economic drawbacks of deepening cooperation with the Russian Federation were clearly displayed during the so-called “chocolate war” between states, which flared up in August 2013 and continued in the form of a complete blockade of Ukrainian exports: due to the Russia’s position, even the representatives of the industrially-oriented eastern regions of Ukraine (who are the most desperate, while supporting Ukraine’s accession to the Customs Union (CU) understood that in trying to increase its political pressure on neighbouring countries, Russia would not even stop at depriving its citizens of quality and cheap products, not to mention the accordance of preferences to the importers.

Accordingly, currently the majority of business-people, even those who have close ties with entrepreneurs from the CU countries, are interested in the market of the 500 million people in the European Union, which, in addition, provides access to international exchanges, investment and credit resources; the possibility to use new technologies and production processes; as well as the opportunity for cooperation on the basis of liberal market principles based on the property rights, fair legal proceedings and regulatory mechanisms that protect independent businessmen and citizens.

In this vein, it is clear that focusing on Russia as an imperial centre of the development of civilisation puts Ukraine in a peripheral position and gives the

<sup>36</sup> Договір про зону вільної торгівлі від 18 жовтня 2011 р. [“The Treaty on the Free Trade Area, October 18, 2011”], <[http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/997\\_n25](http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/997_n25)>, 05 10 2013

<sup>37</sup> Юрчишин В., “Окремі ризики залучення України до сфери економічних інтересів Росії” [“Some risks of Ukraine’s inclusion into the sphere of the economic interests of Russia”], *Національна безпека і оборона*, No 4-5, 2012, p. 89.

Ukrainian community a provincial status. This forms a system of psychological complexities in the public consciousness of this social community, eliminating its true identity. It would start to feel its inferiority, collaterality, and deficiency in comparison with the “great imperial Russian nation”.<sup>38</sup> As a result, today the issue of Ukrainian “usefulness” could be resolved only while defending the truly European Ukraine in which citizens are historically closer to Europe (but not to Eurasia or the idea of Pan-Slavism), and politically – to the EU.

The Ukrainians, of course, are direct descendants of the ancient Slavs but, at the same time, only Kiev has always been the centre of Slavic development – both as the “mother of the Russian cities” and as the cradle of Orthodoxy. That is why only Ukrainians have the right to choose their path, and do not follow the path selected for them by others. Although the choice between the European and Slavic identities of the Ukrainian population is still on the agenda, the final decision is now in the hands of the Ukrainian authorities. In fact, they are the ones to prove that Ukraine does not want to occupy a middle position supporting the idea of the “duality” of its foreign-policy aspirations. The Slavic identity promoted by Russia focuses solely on the ethnic and cultural affinity and relies only on the traditional elements of ways of life, while the European identity is rather a world view and is based on the results of conscious, rational choice of a certain value system.

However, the majority of European nations strengthened their identities during the 18<sup>th</sup> or 19<sup>th</sup> centuries or before, and now may limit themselves to certain changes of their identities’ categories. Ukraine has to form a new identity: perhaps not from scratch but in the much more difficult conditions of global integration and the infinite space of global challenges and imperatives. The national self-understanding should act as a compass on this journey because it is assured by political and cultural identities. The erasure of boundaries should be the key measure to constructing an identity since they still exist between different groups within the state but, in principle, are completely artificial. National self-determination, as a basic condition for national self-realisation at all, is to be complemented with outside support. That is, today, the formation of Ukraine’s separate Self should rely on its perception by the European powers and proper relations at the level of society and the state, which has to play the primary role in the formation of a common collective identity of the Ukrainian socium.

<sup>38</sup> Перепелиця Г., “Курс на стрімке зближення з Росією: чи можлива подвійна асиметрична інтеграція?” [“The policy for speedy rapprochement with Russia: Is double asymmetric integration possible?”] in Перепелиця Г., ed., *Зовнішня політика України – 2009/2010: стратегічні оцінки, прогнози та пріоритети*. ПДорічник, Київ: Видавничий дім “Стилос”, 2011, p. 179.

## Conclusions

Accordingly, the European identity of Ukraine can be seamlessly combined with the concept of the identity of the whole of Europe, and becomes its integral element. The nature of modern European identity can be examined in the light of three models developed as a result of research into the problem of collective identity.<sup>39</sup>

The first of these is the “cultural heritage” model, which is based on two pillars.

The first pillar is common social values and philosophical and legal heritage. The common values of European culture are democracy, human rights, social justice, Christian faith, humanism, personalism, etc. An important feature of this list of values is the specific European nature spreading widely around the world, particularly in North America. The identity built on these values and heritage often lays claim even to global status. Accordingly, supporting these values historically Ukraine can continue on its European path while developing and augmenting them in its territory.

The second pillar of the cultural heritage model is common traditions and history consisting of the actions of outstanding personalities, cultural artifacts, symbols, myths, and so on. Cultural identity is the criterion to define the limits of Europe. It exists as the spiritual community of its people despite the fact that social actors may belong to different national cultures. In this vein, the Ukrainian cultural heritage is also the part of Europe because its historical development is closely connected with European cultural heritage. In addition, the Ukrainian and many European peoples have much in common, not only spiritually but also culturally since they have even mutually contributed to the creation of cultures and left some cultural imprints on each other's lands.<sup>40</sup>

The second model can be named the “universal supranationality” model.

This model presupposes that European identity is achieved through identification with European institutions, with generally accepted political and legal norms, particular political and territorial structures and a new cosmopolitan culture. For the most part, the basis of the identity and its generator is the institutionalised social and legal order presented in the regulations, codes, and documents of some EU institutions. In this respect, Ukraine is trying to find its

<sup>39</sup> Голошнич І., “Основні моделі сучасної європейської ідентичності” [‘Main models of modern European identity’], *Наукові записки. Серія «Філософія»*, Острого: Видавництво Національного університету «Острозька академія», No 5, 2009, pp. 80-81.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 80.

European path while aspiring to fulfil all the prerequisites of the signature of the Association Agreement with the EU. It is important that the work done shows that its efforts are recognised to be in line with European requirements and, therefore, are consistent with this model of European identity.<sup>41</sup>

The third model is “collective pragmatism”.

According to this model, European collective identity emerges and operates due to the European way of living, which is represented by, for example, free movement of people and goods, the common currency and European institutions, and a free market. The basis of this model, in contrast to the previous ones, has no reference to moral or legal norms. It is only descriptive in nature. However, considering themselves to be Europeans, the Ukrainians are quite closely approaching the requirements of this identification model. This is because, in fact, mentally they are really closer to the “European spirit” of development based on a pragmatic awareness of their belonging to the European community, which is united by common traditions and modern moral standards.<sup>42</sup>

As a result, trying to overcome a series of political defeats in the past, to fight the feeling of historical tragedy associated with the lack of statehood, and to overstep the limits of the former Soviet Union, Ukraine is currently proving the existence of its European identity. Under present conditions, a new community is being formed in its territory. The formula of the community’s identity fully reflects the traditional cultural and ideological trend of the Europeanness that has always existed at the level of social and political communication. However, only the result of competition for power and cultural priorities, which entered the rigid phase due to the transition to real nation-building and many attempts to overcome the post-Soviet inertia, would determine the role of the new community within the global political space and, accordingly, the validity of its European identity abroad. That is, whether it could be closer to the realisation of the idea of its European identity not only in civilisation, but also in social, cultural, political and legal fields.

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<sup>41</sup> Голошнич І., (note 39), p. 81.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*



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# ATTEMPTS TO CHANGE THE NATIONAL AFFILIATION OF LVIV AND VILNIUS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE 1944 MOSCOW CONFERENCE

**Andrew Wawryniuk\***

## *Abstract*

As a result of the outbreak of the Second World War, Poland's territory was divided between the German Reich and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Lithuania lost its own independence as well by becoming one of the republics of the USSR. During the war the Polish government-in-exile solicited to determine the post-war borders of Poland as they had been established in 1920 by the Treaty of Riga. However, the most significant issue in the problem of the inclusion of Lviv and Vilnius in Polish territory was the consent of Joseph Stalin. The final shape of the borders was determined by Three Great Powers at conferences in Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam.

## **Introduction**

The issue of Polish-Soviet relations, in particular after the outbreak of the Second World War and after its ending, has always aroused great interest, not only among scientists who research this matter, but also among numerous societies other than in Poland – in particular, those nations which suffered the horrors of the war.

It is no wonder that discovering issues that were unknown and not necessarily based on the contemporary facts, or studied only in a general way, is confusing for those historians who have different opinions on this matter. I feel authorised to make such a hypothesis because of the fact that in archived records of collections concerning the topic I discuss, there are not many entries of scholars dealing with the above-mentioned period. I do not exclude that with the change of political

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system in Poland, surely in the coming months new studies based on reference documents will appear. These will show that the drama of the war period and several years after the war concerns not only Poland and the Poles. A favourable political climate supports this, including the declassification of files as well as the possibility of accessing foreign archives.

The subject matter of the article is an attempt to reveal probably still unknown or not very widespread facts that deserve to be studied separately and that concern the attempts of Polish politicians to keep Lviv and Vilnius within the boundaries of the Republic of Poland.

I was very fortunate because, as one of the few people working for the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, I studied fonds (archived documents) concerning the cooperation of the Soviet Union and Poland including delimitation of the eastern border. Files more than five metres deep, unavailable until recently, now allow us to reveal the truth of what happened at that time. I have also broadened my knowledge thanks to the fonds available in the Central Archives of Modern Records in Warsaw, commonly known as the Archives of Bolesław Bierut. What is more, a wide access to Polish archives abroad, mainly in London and New York, allowed me to learn about facts that can now raise some doubts.

Comparing archived documents that have been made available, including stenographic reports of talks between the most important people in the Polish government-in-exile (in London) and Winston Churchill, Joseph Stalin and Vyacheslav Molotov, allow generalizations to be made that will be presented later in the article. At the same time, I only emphasise the fact that cited references were customarily prepared in three identical copies: the first written by hand during the talks, and the next two as typescripts, for example, in London.

This article is the outcome of archival research conducted as part of my quest for materials for my thesis on habilitation. Its subject matter, generally speaking, concerns the process of shaping of the eastern borders of Poland after the Second World War.

## **1. The Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact and the issue of the eastern borders of Poland**

1939 went down in the history of Europe as the beginning of what would be the most devastating war for many countries. Before its outbreak, many diplomatic steps were taken to prevent the impending global conflict, or at least postpone it for a while.

### **1.1. Attempts to preserve peace in Europe**

Poland made specific efforts to keep the peace, including soliciting the support of Great Britain and France. As early as 19 February 1921, Poland and the French Republic signed a treaty of alliance.<sup>1</sup> The treaty guaranteed the obligation of mutual consultations on international issues for both parties and stipulated economic cooperation and assistance in the event of unprovoked aggression.<sup>2</sup> France confirmed its validity in August 1939.

What is more, Poland signed non-aggression agreements with Germany and the Soviet Union, and on 25 August 1939 formalized the Polish-British military alliance in the Agreement of Mutual Assistance between the Republic of Poland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Article 1 of the latter agreement guarantees: “Should one of the Contracting Parties become engaged in hostilities with a European Power in consequence of aggression by the latter against that Contracting Party, the other Contracting Party will at once give the Contracting Party engaged in hostilities all the support and assistance in its power.”<sup>3</sup>

It should be emphasised that in the cited document, Great Britain did not postulate for any territorial restrictions of Poland concerning the guarantees that are mentioned in article 1. That is why the Polish government-in-exile could have believed, and, incidentally, it did believe, that it was synonymous to providing guarantees concerning the whole territory.

We can also attempt a different, common argumentation of the standpoints of France and Great Britain on the eastern boundaries of Poland, taking into consideration, for example, the fact that when Germany attacked Poland, both countries declared war on it but after 17 September 1939 they did not make such a decision in relation to the Soviet Union, which annexed territories given to Poland as a result of signing the Treaty of Riga.

Officially, Stalin did not retreat from occupied eastern territories of Poland, but “Churchill did not want to force anything on this matter as the British government reckoned that the Polish Eastern boundary should run along the Curzon Line which more or less corresponded with new divisions determined by

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<sup>1</sup> Polish-French treaty signed in Paris on 19 February 1921, *Journal of Laws*, no 63, item 563. Polish version of the document contained two words referring to the treaty.

<sup>2</sup> Strękowski, *French-Polish Relations in the Interwar Period, sine nomine, sine loco*, p. 2.

<sup>3</sup> The Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum (PISM), Documents – PCM.Z. Files of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers. Special Office of the Prime Minister the so-called J. Żarąński Archives, sig. PCM.Z.10, p. 91, 93.

Stalin. Eventually, British views on the issue of boundaries were closer to those of Russians than Polish.”<sup>4</sup>

Władysław Stadnicki, a pro-German publicist and above all a consultant of several ministries, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as lecturer at the Institute of Business and Economic Sciences in Vilnius, issued a short article, “Facing the oncoming Second World War” (June 1939). In the article Stadnicki commented negatively on the alliance with the United Kingdom and correctly assessed and anticipated that the German Reich would begin with the invasion and annexing of Poland. The greatest danger he saw in the alliance with the British was that the British were making diplomatic efforts to create an alliance between Great Britain and the USSR. According to Stadnicki, the price for such an alliance would be the eastern regions of Poland, which would be given to the Soviets.<sup>5</sup>

It is worth adding that the government of the Republic of Poland did not allow the article to be published and confiscated it.

## 1.2. German-Soviet preparation for a “new Europe”

The new political division of Europe in 1939 was made on the basis of the pact of 23 August between Germany and the Soviet Union. This document was signed by the representatives of the states: Joachim von Ribbentrop, Foreign Minister of the Third Reich and Vyacheslav Molotov, the Soviet foreign minister. At that time, the line determined by the demarcation ran along the Pisa-Narew-Vistula-San.<sup>6</sup> According to Professor Waldemar Kozyra, Ribbentrop was awarded with the Order of Lenin during one of the banquets held to celebrate the signing of the pact.<sup>7</sup>

In signing the treaty, there was a German concept which concerned leaving “independent remains of Poland”.<sup>8</sup> Joseph Stalin did not agree with the proposal of the Reich and he suggested that Germany include the territory situated

<sup>4</sup> Walker J., *Poland Alone. Why Did Great Britain Betray its Most Devoted Ally?*, Cracow, 2010, p. 42.

<sup>5</sup> Stadnicki W., *Facing the Oncoming Second World War*, Wydawnictwo Antyk–Marcin Dybkowski, Warsaw 1939, p. 62.

<sup>6</sup> *Blank Pages – the USSR-Germany 1939-1941*, “Mokslas” Vilnius, 1990, p. 100.

<sup>7</sup> Kozyra W., “Ribbentrop-Molotov Treaty and Eastern Lands of the II Republic of Poland” in *The Soviet Aggression of 17 September 1939 on Kresy Wschodnie and Lubelszczyzna*, Lublin: Towarzystwo Przyjaźni Grodna i Wilna, 2011, p. 24.

<sup>8</sup> *Blank Pages – the USSR-Germany 1939-1941*, “Mokslas” Vilnius, 1990, p. 100. The issue is brought up in the telegram from the German ambassador in Moscow addressed to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is dated 25 September 1939.

eastwards from the demarcation line; i.e., the whole Lubelskie voivodeship and a considerable part of Warszawskie voivodeship, in “our portion”.<sup>9</sup> It is also known that if this could be agreed upon, Stalin was willing to drop his claims concerning Lithuania.<sup>10</sup> The above-mentioned note, which includes inter alia some information on Lithuania, is the first reference presented in German-Soviet official documents for 1939. It is also known that in October 1939, Richard Butler, the undersecretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the United Kingdom, during a conversation with Ivan Mayski<sup>11</sup>, the Soviet ambassador in London, suggested that his government was inclined to accept that after the war Poland would be reduced to ethnic territories and its independence would be guaranteed by Great Britain, France, Germany and the Soviet Union.<sup>12</sup> One may be tempted to conclude that at the same time,<sup>13</sup> Great Britain was trying to reach a political agreement with the Soviet Union that would prevent the possibility of armed conflict arising. This was difficult because Stalin, conducting doubles, wanted the war to break out, which was the main reason for his political cooperation with the Germans. One of the main aims of the Soviet leader was to quickly occupy the territories of eastern Poland and the Baltic States, including mainly Lithuania with Vilnius and Vilnius oblast.<sup>14</sup>

Another author states that “taking advantage of general ferment in Europe, Soviets would like to take maximum advantage for political expansion and in a given case to solidify its hegemony over the Baltic Sea”.<sup>15</sup>

It was Winston Churchill who used to say “that he is ready to enter into agreement with a devil if it was beneficial for Great Britain”.<sup>16</sup> Professor Marek Kazimierz Kamiński, PhD, an expert in the history of Poland and international relationships, thinks that Poland could have submitted to German demands and

<sup>9</sup> The term is quoted literally.

<sup>10</sup> *Blank Pages – the USSR-Germany 1939-1941*, “Mokslas” Vilnius, 1990, p. 100.

<sup>11</sup> This surname is written Majski in two copies of this document.

<sup>12</sup> Drabik S., *British Diplomacy Towards Polish Matters in 1939–1941s*, <http://historiaswiata.com.pl/wpis/12/>, 11 10 2013.

<sup>13</sup> It is not possible to determine the date of the talks.

<sup>14</sup> “Defeated in the Winners’ Camp” – Władysław Bułhak and Barbara Polak Talk with Marek Kazimierz Kamiński and Tadeusz Kisielewski on the Polish Issue within the Years of War World II”, *The Bulletin of National Remembrance*, 2005, 5–6, p. 23.

<sup>15</sup> Mazak T., “Józef Mackiewicz Towards Communism in 1939-1945” in *Wschodni Rocznik Humanistyczny*, t. II, 2005, p. 302.

<sup>16</sup> “Defeated in the Winners’ Camp” – Władysław Bułhak and Barbara Polak Talk with Marek Kazimierz Kamiński and Tadeusz Kisielewski on the Polish Issue within the Years of War World II”, *The Bulletin of National Remembrance*, 2005, 5–6, p. 24.

not let the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact be signed, at the same time maintaining the status quo regarding the territory of the Republic of Poland.<sup>17</sup> However, there were also other opinions. It was claimed that one should not have any illusions about any benefits for the Republic of Poland resulting from cooperation with the Third Reich. Some arguments are given that Germany, after the fulfilment of its initial demands relating mainly to the passage connecting Germany with the free city of Gdańsk, would come up with others, the last of them being total Polish submission to the government in Berlin.<sup>18</sup>

It is worth quoting some of the prophetic visions of Władysław Stadnicki here concerning the essence of cooperation between Poland and Great Britain as well as the military alliance. Despite the fact that on 3 September 1939 Great Britain and France declared war on Germany, a meeting of both parties took place in Abbeville during which the decision was made that “these states will not come to Poland with the promised help”.<sup>19</sup> On 17 September the USSR attacked Poland; this is considered by military analysts to show that the USSR waited for the reactions of France and Great Britain to the Third Reich’s previous act of aggression on 1 September 1939.

In line with Stalin’s concept, in a secret additional document signed on 23 September 1939 the territory of Lithuania was considered as within the zone of Soviet influence, while the territory that the Germans had intended to be a small Polish state was passed to the Third Reich. Many Polish historians and political scientists claim that the secret services, involved in the war later, knew the contents of this document. It is believed that it was familiar to the Americans, the French and the Italians. Whether the British were familiar with it remains unknown.<sup>20</sup>

Meanwhile, the last sign of friendly German-Soviet relations was the treaty on friendship and borders of 28 September 1939 that was concluded between those states. As early as 10 October 1939, a thirty-thousand-strong Soviet army invaded the territory of Lithuania and at the same time Vilnius and Vilnius oblast were included in Lithuania.<sup>21</sup> As follows from the German documentation of 2 August

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 25.

<sup>18</sup> Konrad M., “The way of Germany to Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact and Polish Matters (Events and Interpretations)”, *Remembrance and Justice*, 2008, 1, p. 46.

<sup>19</sup> “‘Defeated in the Winners’ Camp’” – Władysław Bułhak and Barbara Polak Talk with Marek Kazimierz Kamiński and Tadeusz Kisielewski on the Polish Issue within the Years of War World II”, *The Bulletin of National Remembrance*, 2005, 5–6, p. 30.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 23.

<sup>21</sup> Kozyra W., “Ribbentrop-Molotov Treaty and Eastern Lands of the II Republic of Poland” in *The Soviet Aggression of 17 September 1939 on Kresy Wschodnie and Lubelszczyzna*, Lublin: Towarzystwo Przyjaźni Grodna i Wilna, 2011, p. 29.

1940, the USSR was expecting Germany to transfer the part of Lithuania granted on the basis of the Moscow agreements of 1939. Ribbentrop advised Ambassador Schulenburg to take note of Russian expectations and to wait to find out what the Soviet government would propose in exchange.<sup>22</sup> In reply, Molotov suggested paying 3.86 million US dollars in gold for the territory remaining so far under German administration. This amount was so high that it was presented as half of the sum paid to Russia by the USA for giving up the rights to Alaska.<sup>23</sup>

In a telegram to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs in September, Schulenburg informed that “Molotov was very interested in the fact that the government of the Reich was generally willing to renounce the specific compensation for the zone of Lithuanian territory previously granted on the basis of the Moscow agreement”.<sup>24</sup>

In Nikita S. Khrushchev’s diaries from that time, there is a note that after signing a treaty with Germany (the Ribbentrop-Molotov Treaty, as the author recalls) Stalin “was beside himself with joy, shouting: ‘I managed to cheat Hitler’”.<sup>25</sup>

### **1.3. Lithuania loses its independence**

In 1940 Lithuania lost its independence and became a republic of the Soviet Union, which was done with the consent of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union.<sup>26</sup> The full name of Lithuania was changed to the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic. With the creation of a new republic, its inhabitants received Soviet citizenship.<sup>27</sup> This was possible thanks to the silent consent of the Germans, who were probably leading discussions about a new plan for the conquest of Europe.

Nevertheless, the fact that Lithuania was a part of the Soviet Union in the following years gave Stalin the right to represent the interests of the Soviet Union at its sole discretion. This was particularly noticeable during his numerous talks

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<sup>22</sup> *Blank Pages – the USSR-Germany 1939–1941*, “Mokslas” Vilnius, 1990, p. 197.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 200.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 202. Document no 59 dated 17 September 1940.

<sup>25</sup> “‘Defeated in the Winners’ Camp’” – Władysław Bulhak and Barbara Polak Talk with Marek Kazimierz Kamiński and Tadeusz Kisielewski on the Polish Issue within the Years of War World II”, *The Bulletin of National Remembrance*, 2005, 5–6, p. 28.

<sup>26</sup> The Consulate of the Republic of Lithuania in Szczecin, *The History of Lithuania*, <http://www.konsulat-litwa.pl/historia-informacje-o-litwie-8.html>, 25 05 2013.

<sup>27</sup> Głowacki A., “General Assumptions of the Soviet Occupying Politics in Poland”, *Remembrance and Justice*, 2008, 1, p. 64.

in Moscow with representatives of the Polish government-in-exile (the so-called London government) in which the Lithuanians had never participated.

## 2. New Polish-Soviet relations

The arrangement of forces was changed by the Reich's invasion of the USSR on 22 June 1941. This changed the relations to the Soviets of the British, the Americans, and the majority of Polish politicians forming the cabinet of the Polish government-in-exile. Especially active were the Polish generals, such as Kazimierz Sosnkowski and Władysław Sikorski, who exchanged among themselves remarks and observations, as well as their own plans for the future of Poland.

### 2.1. The Sikorski-Mayski Treaty as the hope of the Republic of Poland's prime minister

It is worth quoting a fragment of a letter from General Kazimierz Sosnkowski, who was a minister without portfolio, to General Władysław Sikorski, the prime minister of Poland at that time. The letter is dated at 22 June 1941. Sosnkowski, giving his opinion on the German invasion of the USSR, wrote, *inter alia*:

“1) The German-Soviet war is very beneficial to Poland and its interests on condition that Russia will not be quickly and totally defeated by the German army. Quick and total German victory besides purely military results for the Western Front may have political consequences in the form of the reconstruction of pro-German Lithuania and including northern portions of Poland in its territory again, creating an independent Ukraine including Lviv, Eastern Malopolska and Volyn as well as reconstructing a reactive, pro-German Russia and passing Poland under its administration up to the borders of the territories attached to the Reich.”<sup>28</sup>

On 16 July 1941 General Sosnkowski, in connection with previous correspondence, proposed an alternative version of the postulate on the matter of Poland's future boundaries, suggesting that a relevant notation in the future Polish-Soviet document would be the following: “The Soviet government states that it considers that the treaties with Germany in 1939 which concerned Poland did not

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<sup>28</sup> Józef Piłsudski Institute of America (JPIA), the Polish Government-in-exile file 701/9/3, p. 3. Translation is based on the document prepared by the Polish side.

happen and as far as the matter of Polish-Russian boundaries are concerned, the legal status before September 1939 is recognised.”<sup>29</sup> In the cited document there is also a shorter version of the notation proposed by the general: “As for the matter of boundaries between Poland and the Soviet Union, the Soviet government recognises the legal status as of July 1939.”<sup>30</sup>

Also at that time, the Polish government presented its standpoint concerning the eastern boundaries of Poland, which was that those boundaries should be compatible with provisions of the Treaty of Riga.

A comment made by above-mentioned politician and military man, who was afraid of a quick defeat of Soviet Russia and predicted some negative effects of such a state for post-war Poland, attracts the attention. Sosnkowski indicated at the same time that his fears also related to the reconstruction of pro-German Lithuania, as it was described by him, to which the north-western territories of Poland from the period before 1 September 1939 would be granted.

In retrospect, the general’s argument is difficult to understand. On the one hand, he wanted a quick victory for the Reich over the Russians, but on the other hand, he opposed the alliance between Poland and the USSR.

Meanwhile, the eastern borders of Poland and the USSR were officially mentioned for the first time after the Sikorski-Mayski Treaty was signed on 30 August 1941. The former, Władysław Sikorski, was the prime minister of the Polish government-in-exile; the latter, Ivan Mayski, was at that time the USSR’s ambassador in London.

At the beginning of the document the following was written: “Article 1. The government of the USSR acknowledges that the German-Soviet treaties from 1939, concerning territorial changes, are no longer in force. The government of Poland declares that Poland is not bound towards any other state with any treaty intended against the USSR.”<sup>31</sup>

Consequently, my own interpretation is that when accepting the above-mentioned notation, the Soviet Union acknowledged that decisions made with Germany concerning the division of Polish territory before the war are not applicable. Thereby, the annexation of Lithuania and its effects could have been

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<sup>29</sup> IJPUSA, the Polish Government-in-exile, file 701/9/3, p. 4.

<sup>30</sup> JPIA, the Polish Government-in-exile, file 701/9/3, p. 4.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 3. The text contains some stylistic mistakes which do not occur in the original version. Because the Treaty stirred up great controversies among Polish politicians and military men as well as among many communities of the Polish immigrants, the text in the JPIA was deliberately quoted.

treated as non-existent, as well as the matter that recognised Lithuania's right to independency and self-determination.

It should also be added that the treaty was signed because of strong pressure from the prime minister of Great Britain, Winston Churchill. The main opponents of the treaty were the Władysław Raczkiewicz, President of the Republic of Poland; Kazimierz Sosnkowski, General and Minister without Portfolio; and August Zaleski, Minister of Foreign Affairs. They found the contents of the treaty too general – in particular the lack of definite provisions on the specific acknowledgement of the eastern borders of Poland from the period prior to 1 September 1939. It was also maintained that such agreement with the USSR was signed too early.

In one of the documents kept in the Józef Piłsudski Institute of America in New York and concerning the aftermath of the treaty, it was written that “there is no question of reconstructing the old Poland, no matter what the term means. Therefore, the continuation of the present war under the banner of reconstruction of the previous Polish state is nonsensical.”<sup>32</sup>

From a further part of the quoted study it follows that both France and Great Britain realised that the reconstruction of the territory of Poland along the borders from the period prior to 1 September 1939 would not be possible, inter alia because the main player, as it was then predicted, would be Joseph Stalin. *Ipsa facto*, Poland remained alone in its political desires concerning fixing the eastern borders in accordance with the Treaty of Riga of 1921,<sup>33</sup> even though the document the Treaty of Riga had been signed by the Soviet Union. The eastern borders of the Republic of Poland were fixed by the Soviet Union's authorities, who were also acting on behalf of the governments of the Belarussian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

## 2.2. Historical determinants of the Polish border before 1939

To understand what the Polish government-in-exile fought for I will quote part of article 2 of the Treaty of Riga concerning the Lithuanian border and part of the Belarussian one:

“Both negotiating parties, according to the rule of self-determination of nations, recognise the independence of Ukraine and Belarus and they agree and

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<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 14.

<sup>33</sup> Treaty of Peace between Poland and Russia and Ukraine, signed in Riga on 18 March 1921, *Journal of Laws*, 1921, 49, item 300.

decide that the eastern border of Poland, which is a border between Poland and Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, is marked: along the Dźwina river (Zap. Dwina) from the border of Russia and Latvia to the point in which the border of former Vilnius province meets the border of former Vitebsk province; then the border of former Vilnius and Vitebsk provinces to the road that joins the village of Drozdy with the town of Orzechowo (Oriechowno), leaving the road and Orzechowo on the side of Poland; then, crossing the railway near Orzechowo and turning south west, it goes along the railway leaving Zahacie (Zagaje) station on the side of Poland, the town of Zahacie on the side of Russia and the village of Stelmachowi (Stolmachowo) on the side of Poland (village not marked on the map); next, along the eastern border of former Vilnius province to the point at which the Dziśnieński, Lepelski and Borysowski districts meet; then, along the border of former Vilnius province on the area of about one verst to its turn towards the west near Sosnowiec (not marked on the map); then with the line from sources of the Czernica river (Czernica) on the east of Hornowo (Gornowo), then, along the Czernica river to the village of Wielka Czernica (B. Czernica)”<sup>34</sup>

It should also be said that an agreement between the Republic of Poland and the Republic of Lithuania was signed on 7 October 1920 in Suwałki in order to arrange a temporary *modus vivendi* until the final regulation of relations between both states was ready.<sup>35</sup> The following note was found in the document:

“a/ the following fixed demarcation line between the Polish and Lithuanian army which does not predetermine any territorial rights of any of the contracting parties: from the border of East Prussia up to the mouth of the Czarna Hańcza River to the Neman – the line established by the regulation of the Supreme Council on 8 December 1919. Then along the Neman River up to the mouth of the Grawa River; then from the Grawa River to the point of the crossroads with the Marecz-Rotnica road; then in a straight line up to the mouth of the Skroblis River to the Mareczanka River; then the Mareczanka River, up to tributary of the Dereźnica stream, leaving the country of Solorowce on the Lithuanian side whereas Małe-Dubno is on the Polish side; then the Dereźnica stream to the crossroads of the Wilno-Orany railways, approximately 2 km north-west of the Orany station; then along the road crossing Bartele, Kucie, Nowy-Dwór, Ejszyszki, Podziewa and

<sup>34</sup> Treaty of Peace between Poland and Russia and Ukraine, signed in Riga on 18 March 1921, *Journal of Laws*, 1921, 49, item 300, pp. 815-819.

<sup>35</sup> The National Archives in Suwałki (NAS), the minutes from the Polish-Lithuanian conference from 1920, fonds 583, sig. 13, no page numbering.

Horodecka to Bastuny station, leaving the whole road and Bastuny station under the jurisdiction of the Polish authorities.”<sup>36</sup>

The Conference of Ambassadors in Paris on 16 March 1923 acknowledged *de jure* the borders of Poland with Russia and Lithuania. The representatives of Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan participated in the conference; thus, making use of the law that was reserved by the Main Allied Powers in Article 87 of the Treaty of Versailles concerning the decisions on Polish borders. America joined the group of ambassadors with a separate note of 5 April 1923<sup>37</sup>.

The government of Poland, with General Władysław Raczkiewicz at the spearhead, waited after the war for the creation of the Polish state with the preservation of territories situated westward or southward from the above-mentioned border arranged in 1920, considering the decision of the Conference of Ambassadors and the United States of 1923 as an additional argument.

Acknowledging the arguments listed above, the reaction of President Raczkiewicz should not be a surprise. In his letter to the prime minister he wrote: “The general signed the treaty at his own responsibility not foreseen in the constitutional act, depriving it of any legal grounds.”<sup>38</sup>

### 2.3. Churchill and Eden and the Polish matter

It is worth stressing that, while discussing the matter of the signed treaty in the House of Commons on 30 July 1941, Great Britain’s minister of foreign affairs also answered questions from the MPs. One of them, Mr Mender, asked, “In the matter of guarantee of the borders, obviously the existing borders of Poland remain valid?” Eden answered: “No, as I said, there is no guarantee of any borders.”<sup>39</sup>

Once again the representatives of the British government publicly presented their negative standpoint towards the Polish government’s expectations about the eastern boundaries of post-war Poland.

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<sup>36</sup> NAS, The minutes from the Polish-Lithuanian conference from 1920, comp.583, sig.13, no page numbering.

<sup>37</sup> PISM, Documents – PCM.Z. Files of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers. Special Office of the Prime Minister the so-called J. Zarański Archives, sig. PCM.Z.10, p. 113.

<sup>38</sup> Wyrwa T., “Sikorski-Majski Treaty”, *Historical Books*, Paris, 1992, p. 200.

<sup>39</sup> Ślusarczyk J., *Government’s Politics of General W. Sikorski towards the USSR*, Warsaw: Instytut Krajów Socjalistycznych Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 1985, p. 50.

Meanwhile, Prime Minister Sikorski, in his radio address of 31 July 1941, claimed that “this treaty does not allow any suggestion to call the borders of Poland from the period prior to September 1939 into question and [...] it does not take into consideration the possibility that Poland will resign”.<sup>40</sup>

Signing the treaty led to a governmental crisis. The following people resigned from their positions: August Zaleski, Minister of Foreign Affairs; General Kazimierz Sosnkowski, Minister without Portfolio and Chairman of the Committee of Ministers on State Affairs; and Marian Seyda, Minister of Justice. Just after his resignation, Zaleski issued a circular to each of the Polish diplomatic outposts “ordering to disavow the concluded agreement and informing the governments at which they were accredited that general Sikorski signed the agreement having no authorisation of the president of the Republic of Poland”.<sup>41</sup>

In the situation where Great Britain stood in favour of Poland but without the guarantee of its borders and with the acceptance of such an attitude by America, the coalition known as the Big Three was formed, which aimed to defeat Germany and its alliances after the conclusion of military alliances between its particular members.

Meanwhile, the Polish government-in-exile still had expectations concerning the eastern border of Poland. Prime Minister Mikołajczyk, discussing the shape of the borders of Poland wrote, in the letter to Marian Seyda<sup>42</sup> no 83<sup>43</sup> on 4 July 1943: “In the north, Lithuania must be considered as a territory in which Poland has a special interest, for example, in the form of federation.”<sup>44</sup>

In such a politically tangled situation for Poland, the first conference of the Big Three in Tehran took place (28 November – 1 December 1943), where the solution proposed by Churchill concerning Poland was accepted. It said that “the seat of the state and Polish nation should be placed between the so-called Curzon Line and the line of the Odra River with inclusion of Eastern Prussia and Opole province”.<sup>45</sup> In addition, it pointed out that the final arrangement of the border,

<sup>40</sup> Żaroń P., *Eastern Direction in the Military-Political Strategy of General W. Sikorski 1940-1943*, Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwa Naukowe, 1988, p. 37.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 46.

<sup>42</sup> Marian Seyda was the minister of justice from 1940; then he became president of the Ministry of Congressional Affairs in the Polish government-in-exile

<sup>43</sup> The content of the telegram is unknown.

<sup>44</sup> PISM, Documents – PCM.Z. Files of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers. Special Office of the Prime Minister the so-called J. Zarański Archives, sig. PCM.Z.1, p. 19.

<sup>45</sup> Majerski, W., *Teheran, Yalta, San Francisco, Potsdam*, Wydawnictwa Szkolne i Pedagogiczne, Warsaw 1987, p. 93.

which was consistent with the expectations of Stalin, requires a “precise study and possible resettlement of people in some places”.<sup>46</sup>

However, it should be emphasised that from 1943 to 1945 British politicians excluded the possibility of creating a Soviet zone in liberated territories of the future Polish state.

Knowing the standpoint of three big coalition members from Tehran, which gave rise to opportunities for more beneficial solutions in the matter of the eastern border other than the Curzon Line, Stanisław Mikołajczyk, Prime Minister of the Polish government and his cabinet, developed tactics of dialogue with representatives of the Soviet government concerning the future of Poland and first of all its eastern borders. It was also decided that direct dialogue with Joseph Stalin and Vyacheslav Molotov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, would be necessary.

One of the documents prepared for the above-mentioned conversations, in the study that included eight points, assumed the possibility of a peaceful revision of the Treaty of Riga inter alia on the principle that the territory of post-war Poland would not be reduced and the most important centres of Polish culture in the East; i.e., Lviv and Vilnius, would remain the territory of Poland.<sup>47</sup>

The first of the conversations took place on 31 July 1944 upon request of Churchill. The Polish side was represented by Prime Minister Mikołajczyk; Tadeusz Romer, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Stanisław Grabski, Chairman of the National Council; and an interpreter, Aleksander Mniszek. The opponents of the Polish delegation from the side of the USSR were Vyacheslav Molotov, Minister of Foreign Affairs as well as an interpreter whose name is not mentioned. During the conversation, Mikołajczyk stated: “I came to Moscow in order to discuss all contentious issues with the Soviet government”.<sup>48</sup> Molotov answered: “It seems that it would be better if you had reached an agreement with the Polish Committee of National Liberation first.”<sup>49</sup> Nothing was achieved during this conversation besides the assurance that Stalin would talk to representatives of the Polish Committee of National Liberation of the Polish government-in-exile.

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<sup>46</sup> Majerski, W., (note 45), p. 93.

<sup>47</sup> PISM, Documents – PCM.Z. Files of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers. Special Office of the Prime Minister, the so-called J. Zarański Archives, sig. PCM.Z.4, p. 160.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*

### **3. The strategy of Prime Minister Mikołajczyk**

Mikołajczyk developed a strategy of conversation before the meeting with Stalin. A typescript consisting of five pages may be summarized in four main propositions: “1) military cooperation in the war with Germany; 2) the matter of future borders of Poland; 3) reorganisation of the Polish government and its return to Poland; 4) normalization of permanent and friendly relations between Poland and the Soviet Union.”<sup>50</sup>

#### **3.1. First negotiations with the Soviets**

An interesting plot concerning the eastern border was preceded by a long monologue on the subject and the importance of the decisions in the peace treaty signed in Riga, including problems connected with the subject matter of the article. The following paragraph was found in Mikołajczyk’s notes:

“Mr Marshal, would you be willing to leave the great centres of national and cultural life and tradition such as Lviv and Vilnius within the new eastern borders of Poland taking into consideration these arguments? Such a decision in accordance with nationalistic criteria and with the heated feeling of the entire Polish nation could greatly facilitate solving any other Polish-Soviet difficulties and at the same time it would win you, Sir, the gratitude and acclaim of the wide masses in Poland.”<sup>51</sup>

In this statement Mikołajczyk is inconsistent, to say the least. On the one hand, he talks about the so-called Riga borders of 1921, but at the same time he had a precise question concerning the inclusion of Lviv and Vilnius in the territory of Poland. It is obvious that in case of a positive decision from Stalin relating to the first demand, the second motion would simply be obsolete. Bringing it up during the discussions with Stalin clearly suggested particular concessions from the Polish delegation in relation to its territory.

The discussion with Marshal Joseph Stalin took place on 3 August 1944. The generalissimo reminded Mikołajczyk of the existence of the Polish Committee of National Liberation (PCNL) with which the USSR came into agreement. When the Polish prime minister expressed his doubt and asked “will they govern?” Stalin answered: “No, no, it should not be understood in such a way; however, it is

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<sup>50</sup> *Supra* note 47, p. 18.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 19.

necessary to end the situation where two governments exist at the same time; e.g., the London government and the PCNL. A temporary government is necessary.”<sup>52</sup>

Mikołajczyk, in accordance with the predictions, asked Stalin directly how he imagined the future borders of Poland and the marshal answered: “on the east the Curzon Line, on the west the border will be the Odra and the Nysa Rivers, and Poles get Szczecin. Königsberg [he is thinking for a while] and its region will be given to the Russians. Yes, the Russians.”<sup>53</sup>

From the transcript of Mnizek, the Polish interpreter, it follows that it was “a lengthy monologue defending Lviv and Vilnius on the subject of harm”.<sup>54</sup> However, one of Stalin’s comments was written down:

“If it has to be harmful for the Poles, it will also be harmful for Lithuanians; for Ukrainians. However, all nations are equal. I do not want to wrong Poles, Ukrainians or Belarusians. Let Slavs agree with each other. It is not about the fact that friends should not take land from each other. It’s what I think and believe. Also, that is what the Soviet citizens think.”<sup>55</sup>

Elsewhere, Stalin added: “The border, which I’m proposing at the moment, is neither a Russian invention nor a Polish one, but it is a compromising border, studied by the umpire. Hardly anyone in Russia would agree to give Białystok back ... but we give it back.”<sup>56</sup> There is also the following sentence: “I am too old; I cannot harm people any more. I cannot act against conscience. Anyway, please remember that Ukrainians demand Chełm”,<sup>57</sup> and then: “please remember that if you insist, there will be no friendship. But Wrocław is better than Lviv”.<sup>58</sup> He also adds: “We, giving Lviv back to Poland, cannot offend Kiev; anyway, Poles have their own centre of culture in Krakow, Warsaw.”<sup>59</sup>

The presented fragments of discussions concerning the borders show that Stalin, having already arranged their shape with the British and the Americans, did not agree to any concessions and did not accept any arguments. On the other hand, it should be emphasised that the generalissimo was well prepared to this negotiation.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 22. In the cited fragments I have used only the archival materials of the Polish government-in-exile (London government) which, in my opinion, are sufficiently reliable and do not require comparative studies.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 25.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 26.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 26.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 26, 27.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 19.

In accordance with Molotov's suggestion of 31 July 1944, there was a meeting of delegations of the Polish government-in-exile (the London government) and representatives of the PCNL, who were described as "present from that side" on 6 August 1944. Attending were Edward Osóbka-Morawski, Chairman of the PCNL; Wincenty Witos, Vice-President of the PCNL; Wanda Wasilewska, Vice-President of the PCNL; and General Michał Rola-Żymierski, Minister of National Defence.

In the first paragraph of the transcript, "Prime Minister Mikołajczyk, referring to his discussion with Stalin, begins with border matters. Lviv and Vilnius. Our programme: Poland should not come out of this war smaller."<sup>60</sup> Also, Wanda Wasilewska made an important comment: "None of us negates sentimental factors. Warm bonds of Poles with Vilnius and Lviv. But we cannot give in to sentiments on one side only. The policy of not letting Ukrainians or Belarusians touch these cities, but I do not negate that Lviv and Vilnius are Polish cities. But these are islands in the sea of other nations."<sup>61</sup>

Edward Osóbka-Morawski, among others, expressed his point of view on the eastern border in the second part of the conversation. In his opinion, "in the cause of the good of Poland it is high time to regulate this matter, on this assumption that everywhere where there is a majority of Poles, the land should belong to Poland".<sup>62</sup> In response to this, Professor Stanisław Grabski, President of the National Council, asked: "Is there a majority of Poles in Vilnius voivodeship or not?" The president of the PCNL, "Osóbka-Morawski, admitted that there are some Polish islands in the east. This problem is hard to solve."<sup>63</sup> Professor Grabski stated: "We, on our part, came up with the demarcation line going eastwards from Lviv and Vilnius."<sup>64</sup>

General Żymierski commented: "How can you expect that the Soviet armies have not had some impact on this war in the form of the liberation of Ukrainians and Belarusians? How is Stalin to explain to Ukrainians that he leaves a part of them behind the Bug River (in Chełmszczyzna)? These are realities, not sentiments, which are crucial in politics."<sup>65</sup>

There was a second meeting of the PCNL delegation with the Polish government-in-exile on 7 August. This time Bolesław Bierut also participated in

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<sup>60</sup> *Supra* note 47, p. 26, 27.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 66.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 76.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 80.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 81.

the negotiations. The matter of the eastern border was brought up many times. I quote two comments from the archival document that I consider the most crucial. The first one was made by Wanda Wasilewska:

“One should view this matter-of-factly. The Soviet position has been strict from the beginning, and consistent. The UPP (the Union of Polish Patriots) has brought up the matter of Vilnius and Lviv many times. We do not have any real support from England and America. Is it worth putting pressure on Russia from England and America? If Russia sees that the whole of Poland wants to be in friendly relationships with it, then maybe we will bargain something.”<sup>66</sup>

Wincenty Witos took the floor after Wasilewska. He explained that:

“the matter of eastern borders is not ultimately finished. Both Stalin and Molotov declared that some changes are possible but roughly the borders should be determined during the war. ... Today, we do not have any choice. The matter of Vilnius and Lviv caused crisis in the UPP and particularly in the case of Osóbka-Morawski. Can we afford to bargain more?”<sup>67</sup>

Bolesław Bierut said: “There are no differences between us in the matter of Vilnius and Lviv as far as our personal attitude is concerned. But what conditions are we in? (...) We should subordinate these difficult border issues to a more important matter – the future development of Poland.”<sup>68</sup>

Up until now the quoted fragment of the comment by Bolesław Bierut, who was the next president of Poland, was unknown and unpublished in Polish historiography. The comment is even more crucial if the transcripts are correct, as they show two-sided actions both of the UPP and the London environment concerning the most beneficial shape of the eastern borders of the state.

On 8 August 1944 tripartite negotiations took place on the invitation of Vyacheslav Molotov, during which the issue of the affiliation of Vilnius and Lviv to Poland was not brought up.<sup>69</sup> A day later, another meeting of the delegation of the Polish government-in-exile took place. This was the meeting with Joseph Stalin,<sup>70</sup> during which the issue of the eastern borders was again not raised.

Taking into consideration the results of the first visitation of Mikołajczyk and other members of the London delegation to Moscow, one should acknowledge that, with the exception of propagandist effects, it did not result in any decisions

<sup>66</sup> *Supra* note 47, p. 95.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 96

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 126–132.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 143–148.

concerning the eastern borders of Poland. The government of the USSR maintained that the Curzon Line should be a starting point for other possible decisions.

### **3.2. Negotiations of the last chance**

In that situation the Polish government-in-exile strove for further negotiations with Joseph Stalin. The meeting with the representatives of the USSR took place on 13 October 1944. The Soviet side was represented by Joseph Stalin; Vyacheslav Molotov; Fiodor Gusiew, the ambassador of the USSR in Great Britain; as well as an interpreter and secretary – Pawłow. The British delegation, which arrived for the negotiations, was composed of Prime Minister Winston Churchill; Anthony Eden, Minister of Foreign Affairs; as well as Archibald Clark-Kerr, Great Britain's ambassador to the USSR.

The following constituted the Polish delegation: Prime Minister Stanisław Mikołajczyk; Adam Romer, Minister without Portfolio and Director of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers; prof. Stanisław Grabski, Chairman of the Supervisory Board of the Republic of Poland; and the interpreter Aleksander Mniszek.

William Averell Harriman, a secretary of the embassy of the United States of America in the USSR, observed the negotiations.<sup>71</sup>

Joseph Stalin continued to claim that the eastern borders of Poland should be marked with the Curzon Line, and he called Prime Minister Mikołajczyk an imperialist because he refused to let this happen.<sup>72</sup> Mikołajczyk took the floor and stated: "I suggested a demarcation line some time ago but I did not think that we were talking about a new partition of Poland." Stalin answered: "I am against the partition of Poland but you want us to make the partition of Ukraine and Belarus."<sup>73</sup> Also, Molotov said, quoting the words of President Roosevelt from the conference in Tehran, that he completely agreed for the Curzon Line to be used and that he thought it would be a proper border between Poland and the Soviet Union.<sup>74</sup>

The final part of the discussion is the most important from a political point of view relating to the eastern border of Poland. This was when Stalin made

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<sup>71</sup> *Supra* note 47, p. 39.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 46, 50.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 53.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 54.

himself perfectly clear: “the Curzon Line is the basis for the border. It is a definite delimitation to which I agree with some corrections caused by local problems which may change the border by 6 - 7 kilometres to one side or the other.” Then, the Polish prime minister asked: “May I know what is considered as the Curzon Line? Is the Curzon Line identical to the demarcation line of 1939?” And Stalin answered: “No, it is not the same. The Curzon Line gives to you Białystok, Łomża and Przemysł.”<sup>75</sup>

Winston Churchill and Stanisław Mikołajczyk met in Moscow on 14 October 1944. The conversation was started by the British prime minister, who delivered quite a long introduction in which he claimed that the future of Poland was in danger and that a crisis threatened the situation in the state. He said that if there was no consensus in Moscow, such an opportunity may never appear again. Everything depended on one issue: the eastern border of Poland. Churchill added that an agreement could be concluded very quickly. He also added that an agreement and a solution to the problem had been very close at the beginning of the year. If agreement had been reached, there would not have been other people (referring to the representatives of the PCNL) involved who may do terrible harm. They will create a competitive government and will gradually take over the rule in Poland.<sup>76</sup>

Churchill told also Prime Minister Mikołajczyk that Mikołajczyk must go to Poland in order to create a united government. The British prime minister added that British relations with Russia had never been better and he said that he had talked to General Anders, who deluded himself that after the fall of Germany, Russia would be defeated. “It is madness. You cannot defeat the Russians”, claimed the head of the British government. Turning directly to Mikołajczyk, Churchill said: “I beg you to fix and settle the matter of the border. If we reach the agreement, I will visit Stalin today. (...) If you agree for the borders, the Russians will withdraw their support for the Committee (the PCNL). If you do not agree now, use your *liberum veto*, it will shatter the independence of Poland. (...) If you lose the moment, everything will be lost.”<sup>77</sup>

In reply, Mikołajczyk declared that he “was thinking all night about the matter discussed during yesterday’s conference. It follows that the decisions referring to Poland had been taken at the conference in Tehran whereas now what is expected is that Poland confirms them.”<sup>78</sup> The prime minister of the government-in-exile said that there was still the issue of the independence of the rest of Poland. He added

<sup>75</sup> *Supra* note 47, sig. PCZ.Z.5, p. 58.

<sup>76</sup> See JPIA, Polish-Soviet Treaty, file 701/9/16, p. 151.

<sup>77</sup> JPIA, Polish-Soviet Treaty, file 701/9/16, p. 151.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*

elsewhere: “Should I sign my own death verdict?”<sup>79</sup> Minister Eden, who joined the discussion, answered: “If the formula concerning the Curzon Line is agreed, then it will be possible to obtain from Stalin full guarantees of the independence of Poland.”<sup>80</sup>

The interchange of ideas between Mikołajczyk, Churchill and Eden contains quite dramatic and, at the same time, realistic political options for the world of that time. In response to Mikołajczyk’s statement “that Stalin declared that the Curzon Line must be a border between Poland and Russia”, Churchill said, “we will not lose peace in Europe because of the dispute between Poles. You do not see this because of your stubbornness. This is not friendship in which we will participate. We should tell the world how unreasonable you are. You will start another war in which 25 million human beings will lose their lives but you do not care about this.” Mikołajczyk, defending himself against the accusation, said, “I know that our destiny was decided in Tehran.” He received the following reaction from the British prime minister: “It was saved in Tehran.”

The remaining part of the conversation was as follows. Mikołajczyk: “I am not a person who is totally deprived of patriotic feelings to give back a half of Poland.” Churchill: “You do not have any patriotic feelings. We reconstructed Poland 25 years ago, even though more Poles were fighting against us than with us in the previous war. Now again we are trying to deliver you from destruction but you do not want to participate in it. You are totally mad. (...) Until you accept the border, you will be out of this business forever. Russians will grind through your country and your people will be terminated.” [...] Mikołajczyk: “Can we announce that the Three Powers decided about the fate of Poland without us?” Churchill: “You must be ill and tired if you insist on this argumentation.”<sup>81</sup>

The statements of Minister Romer and Professor Grabski were also noted in the quoted document. The president of the National Council of the Republic of Poland, turning to Churchill for the first time during the conversation, “explains the meaning of Lviv and the oil basin and finishes expressing the idea that public opinion in Poland could not understand and submit to this paradox consisting in the fact that Poland, which was the first to oppose the German armed aggression, should leave the war a smaller country”.<sup>82</sup>

The conclusion of the meeting, which is recorded in the minutes, reads: “as a result it was negotiated that the Polish side cannot agree to accept the Curzon Line as

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<sup>79</sup> JPIA, Polish-Soviet Treaty, file 701/9/16, p. 152.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 153.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 155.

the border between Poland and Russia and that this decision will be communicated orally to Prime Minister Churchill by Prime Minister Mikołajczyk”.<sup>83</sup>

It was the last discussion conducted in Moscow by Stanisław Mikołajczyk as the prime minister of the Polish government-in-exile. His attempts relating to the borders of Poland from the period prior to 1 September 1939 were unsuccessful and, in fact, yielding to both Stalin and Churchill, he handed in his resignation on 24 November 1944.

The borders of Poland were confirmed during the conference in Yalta (4–11 February 1945) and in Potsdam (17 July – 2 August 1945).

## Conclusions

1. As a result of the assault of Nazi Germany on Poland, the country lost large areas east of the German-Soviet demarcation line, at the same time losing its independence for almost five years.

2. In order to improve Polish-Soviet relations, under pressure from the British government, the Polish government-in-exile signed with Soviet Russia the so-called Sikorski-Mayski Treaty, as a result of which the Soviets acknowledged that the agreements concluded with the Third Reich were not valid. Tens of thousands of Polish citizens put under arrest, staying in Gulag camps or prisons, were released. What is more, the Poles obtained permission for the formation of their own armed forces.

3. After the Soviet army crossed the pre-war border of Poland, the Polish government-in-exile. London government started diplomatic measures relating to the acknowledgement of its right to establish Polish administration on liberated territories.

4. Stanisław Mikołajczyk travelled to Moscow twice in 1944. The main aim of his visits was to fix the eastern borders of the Republic of Poland, taking into consideration the inclusion of Lviv and Vilnius into the post-war territory of Poland.

5. Finally, the post-war border of the Republic of Poland was fixed with some diversions along the Curzon Line. Vilnius stayed with Lithuania, whereas Lviv became a part of the Soviet Ukraine.

6. Decisions concerning the borders were made during the conferences of the Big Three in Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam.

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<sup>83</sup> *Supra* note 79, p. 156.