A RESPONSE TO THE ARTICLE "AN ANALYSIS OF ROMANIA'S FOREIGN POLICY RELATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF UKRAINE'S EUROPEAN INTEGRATION"

Dan Bălănescu[*]

Please allow me to refer, in this letter, to the article "*An Analysis of Romania's Foreign Policy Relations in the Context of Ukraine's European Integration*", published in number 31/2014 of the Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review, under the signatures of Viktor Pavlenko, Deputy Director, Head of Defence Policy Division, Defence Policy and Strategic Planning Department, Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, Sergey Sveshnikov, PhD, Leading Research Fellow, National Defence University of Ukraine and Victor Bocharnikov, PhD, Chief Research Fellow, National Defence University of Ukraine.

I was unpleasantly surprised by the article, as it is full of false and defamatory allegations regarding Romania and based on speculations that portray an image of my country that is deeply contrary to reality.

According to the standards of the journal, published academic articles, including the one mentioned above, should include well founded arguments and have sound conclusions, while complying with the requirements of scholarly works.

Although it is stipulated that the views expressed in the articles are solely those of the authors, it is understood that no article can be published without observing the above-mentioned general rules. Accordingly, the article "*An Analysis of Romania's Foreign Policy Relations in the Context of Ukraine's European Integration*" should have fulfilled a set of clear conditions. I argue that the article does not fulfil the respective academic requirements and should not have been accepted for publishing in its current form.

I would like to start by quoting the final conclusion of the article: "From Ukraine's point of view, the most serious problem is the possibility of territorial claims from Romania". It is needless to argue on the absurdity of such a statement. The logical deduction is that, if the conclusion drawn by the authors of the article

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borders on the ridiculous, their analyses and arguments cannot be much more different.

I will also quote other allegations contained in the article, which blatantly conflict with objective reality. First and foremost the authors try to argue that Romania has territorial claims in relation with Ukraine, which Romania tried to satisfy by supporting Ukraine's division. The authors do not exclude the possibility of a Romanian military attack against Ukraine, a solution which, in their opinion, Bucharest would hesitate to resort to for fear of the military support Russia could extend to Ukraine and of a possible negative reaction of the European Union and the opposition of Ukraine itself. To affirm, now, that Romania could think of a military attack against Ukraine, whose territorial integrity would be defended by Russia in such a scenario, is absolutely inconceivable in the current regional context.

Romania was one of the first states that recognized Ukraine's independence after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, bilateral diplomatic relations being established on 1 February 1992. By the Treaty on good-neighbourly relations and cooperation between Ukraine and Romania (June 2, 1997) and the Treaty on the Ukrainian-Romanian state border, Romania expressly recognized Ukraine's current borders, which excludes any territorial claims. The situation of the Ukrainian minority in Romania and of the Romanian minority of Ukraine is mentioned in the Treaty on good-neighbourly relations and is monitored by the two states, without affecting in any way their territorial integrity and sovereignty.

Despite these facts, the authors of the article claim that the attention Bucharest gives to the protection of the rights of persons belonging to the Romanian minority in Ukraine is a proof of its territorial claims, although its behaviour is in line with European standards.

I must underline that, on the contrary, Romania is a promoter of the respect for rights of persons belonging to national minorities as a matter of principle, to be applied according to standards everywhere, including on its own territory.

The article contains even more false allegations which I quote below:

– "Because of disagreements with other members of the EU, Romania is not fully satisfied with its own membership of the EU." Apart from the fallacy, this deduction lacks any logic.

– "Romania showed no interest in Ukraine's accession to the EU". As it is well known, Romania is the first EU member state that ratified the Association Agreement with Ukraine, on July 3rd 2014.

– "Denial of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact makes it necessary to revise the borders that are established according to this Pact, which would lead to the transfer of North Bukovina and South Bessarabia to Romania". It is a speculation devoid of any grounds.

By what is known from its positions adopted in the context of Crimea's illegal annexation by the Russian Federation and the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, Romania is one of the most vocal, firm and constant supporters of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. This reality contradicts completely the authors' conclusion that Bucharest would support Ukraine's division in order to annex parts of its territory. As a matter of fact, during his visit to Kiev on October 2nd, 2014, Romanian Prime Minister Victor Ponta expressed once again Romania's firm support for Ukraine's territorial integrity, as well as for its democratic and pro-European path. He announced the intention to be even more active in supporting projects developed for Ukraine, including visa liberalization. During that visit, Prime Minister Ponta signed with Mr. Arseniy Yatseniuk, the Prime-Minister of Ukraine the bilateral Agreement on Local Border Traffic Regime, which will have concrete benefits for around 2 million citizens on both sides of the border. As well, the two Prime-Ministers discussed the implementation and observance by both countries of the European standards on the protection of persons belonging to national minorities.

Hoping that the publication of the article was an unfortunate error and that your readers will take note of the arguments presented in this letter.

LITHUANIAN EASTERN POLICY 2004–2014: THE ROLE THEORY APPROACH

Linas Kojala, Vilius Ivanauskas*

Abstract

The article seeks to analyse Lithuanian Eastern policy in the period of 2004–2014. As role theory is used as a theoretical approach, the decade is divided into two parts in accordance to presidential terms: 2004–2009, the second term of Valdas Adamkus and 2009–2014, the first term of Dalia Grybauskaitė. This article aims to identify both the main characteristics of Adamkus and Grybauskaitė by analysing their personal national role conceptions on Lithuanian Eastern policy and by seeking the dynamic of change that depends on other role theory dimensions – structural factors and actual role performance.

Introduction

Conceptual analysis of Lithuanian foreign policy after the collapse of the Soviet Union is often divided into four periods 1990–1994, 1994(5)–2004, 2004–2009 and 2009–ongoing[1]. Different elements and priorities prevail in each of them.

The first period (1990–1994) and the second period (1994–2004) are mainly concerned with consolidation of the recently regained independence and the broadly agreed goal to get full membership in the European Union and NATO. After "anchoring itself firmly in the family of Western democracies" in 2004, Lithuania had to start "a new phase of statehood development"[2] or simply to fill a

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1 For example, a similar periodization might be noted in various works of Ramūnas Vilpišauskas, Ieva Karpavičiūtė, Dovilė Jakniūnaitė and others.

2 Gražina Miniotaitė, "Tapatybės paieškos Lietuvos užsienio politikoje: tarp Šiaurės ir Rytų dimensijų", (In search of identity in contemporary Lithuanian foreign policy: between East and North

"strategic vacuum"[3] in its foreign policy[4]. Due to its geopolitical situation, identity and economic interests, the new Lithuanian foreign policy agenda was shaped around Eastern policy and countries such as Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Belarus and others. Therefore, the third period (2004–2009) illustrates the euphoria of creation of the new identity[5] and is based on the idea of regional leadership in the Eastern policy.

A significant amount of analysis by foreign policy scholars[6] was devoted to the Eastern policy, especially when it was prioritized in the period of 2004–2008. For example, according to Laurynas Jonavičius, who applied theories of conventional constructivism and critical geopolitics, membership in the EU and NATO led to the change of the country's "geopolitical identity". The concept of "heading East" was driven by Lithuania's aim to create a democratic barrier along the country's eastern borders, material basis and changes at the structural level of the international system, which provided favourable conditions for a new Lithuanian identity. In other words, both material and ideational factors, such as construction of a new identity, were important in the process[7].

G. Miniotaitė explained this Lithuanian foreign policy dimension via the narrative of "Europe as a normative power". She concluded that the "regional leadership" approach was used as a narrative to develop and consolidate Lithuania's new international identity and it was merely a nationalist replica of the EU's narrative of "Normative Power Europe". Yet the goals to promote the European normative model and common values to the East were not clearly defined geographically[8]. Furthermore, while the aims to "bridge" East and West and at the same time be closely involved in the North and South dimension are ambitious, they lacked sufficient grounds[9]. Galina Vaščenkaitė's research, similarly to that of Miniotaitė,

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dimensions), Kn. Lopata R., Novagrockienė J., Vitkus G. (ed), *Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review*, 2004. Vilnius: Lietuvos karo akademija, p. 83

3 Laurynas Jonavičius, Geopolitical Projections of New Lithuanian Foreign Policy, *Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review*, 2006/1 (17), p. 15

4 Inaugural address to the nation by H. E. MR. Valdas Adamkus, President of the Republic of Lithuania <http://archyvas.lrp.lt/en/news.full/5116>

5 Ieva Karpavičiūtė, "Kaita ir nacionalinė tapatybė užsienio politikos studijose: Lietuvos atvejis" (National Identity and Change in Foreign Policy Studies: The Case of Lithuania), *Political science almanac* (13), Vytautas Magnus University, p. 126

6 The analysis include works of Gražina Miniotaitė, Dovilė Jakniūnaitė, Tomas Janeliūnas, Ramūnas Vilpišauskas, Nortautas Stankus, Kęstutis Paulauskas, Laurynas Jonavičius and others.

7 Jonavičius, p. 33–36

8 Gražina Miniotaitė, "ES normatyvinė galia ir Lietuvos užsienio politika", p. 13–16

9 Miniotaitė, "Tapatybės paieškos", p. 95

is also aimed at re-evaluating Lithuanian foreign policy in the context of the EU's normative power and notes that Lithuanian foreign policy is stuck in the search of a niche in Europe and in its efforts to become more visible and influential in the EU[10].

The fourth period, which started in 2009 and is (possibly) still ongoing, shows another shift of priorities and the search for greater pragmatism and specialization, together with the relatively new Nordic vector[11]. It is widely agreed that Lithuanian foreign policy underwent a transformation at the end of that period. For instance, Ramūnas Vilpišauskas used interdependence and economic arguments to present the basic trends and explain the shift of priorities. According to him, Lithuania started to reflect more closely the country's actual economic interdependences in terms of investment and trade, especially in 2009, when the emphasis has been placed (as in the early 1990s) on closer cooperation with the Baltic–Nordic countries, as well as with Belarus and Russia[12].

While most of these analyses sought to explain Lithuania's foreign policy as a whole or its relation to the EU's goals, the aim of this article is to observe the trends of the country's Eastern policy in 2004–2014 and explain its place in the broader context of foreign policy goals. Eastern policy is described as Lithuania's relationship with Eastern Partnership countries (Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Armenia), including other related countries, such as Poland and Russia. To observe dynamics and shifts, we apply the concept of role theory,[13] which is rarely used in the analysis of Lithuanian foreign policy. By integrating foreign policy analysis and International Relations (IR) theory, role theory enables looking at foreign policy as an interactive process; the subject not only forms the policies, but adapts them to the expectations of other participants and is also conditioned by various structural factors.

As role theory emphasizes both individual perceptions of political elites and structural elements, we divide the period of 2004–2014 into two parts, 2004–2009

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10 Galina Vaščenkaitė, "The Discrepancy of Lithuanian Foreign Policy: „Normative Deeds for the „Realpolitik" Needs"?", *Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review*, 2011, No. 25, p. 34–40

11 Ieva Karpavičiūtė, "Kaita ir nacionalinė tapatybė užsienio politikos studijose: Lietuvos atvejis" (National Identity and Change in Foreign Policy Studies: The Case of Lithuania), *Political science almanac* (13), Vytautas Magnus University, p. 120–126

12 Ramūnas Vilpišauskas, "Lithuanian Foreign Policy since EU Accession: Torn Between History and Interdependence" in Braun M., Marek D., eds., *The New Member States and the European Union. Foreign Policy and Europeanization*, London: Palgrave, 2013, p. 124

13 A notable exception is a work by N. Statkus and K. Paulauskas, who briefly mentioned Role theory and its applicability to Lithuania, in Nortautas Statkus, Kęstutis Paulauskas, "Foreign Policy of Lithuania: Linking Theory to Practice", *Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review*, 2006, No. 17, p. 56–57.

and 2009–2014, which coincide with the terms of two different presidents, Valdas Adamkus and Dalia Grybauskaitė. To analyse the dynamics of Lithuanian Eastern policy, we seek to answer these questions: 1) What was the essence of Adamkus' and Grybauskaitė's foreign policies, by emphasizing the Eastern dimension?; and 2) what where the causes of change in their policies (analysis of factors, which contributed/determined policy change)?

1. Role theory

Even though it has been left out of mainstream discussions for long periods, role theory is now considered as an established conceptual tool of foreign policy analysis. The concept of "role", which was initially developed in sociology and social psychology, started to gain ground in political science in the 1970s with Kalevi Holsti's seminal article *National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy*. Holsti criticised "unnecessarily crude" portrayals of national roles and "too strong preoccupation with national role types germane to the structural conditions, such as bloc, satellites, allies, and non-aligned". Instead, the new concept followed the path of sociological and social-psychological theories about the role of the individual in society and argued that, "by providing the sense of purpose of the state in the international community, national role conceptions endow the state with a sense of selfhood and identity"[14].

According to Lisbeth Aggestam, the theory adopted an inductive approach to explore what role conceptions policy-makers themselves perceived and defined[15]. It was indicated that the practitioners of foreign policy expressed different and more roles than the ones stipulated by academics; hence the roles may have multiple sources and may not be exclusively generated by the international distribution of power – an argument which is the backbone of the realist school of international relations.

Role theory has three core elements:

- The key is *national role conception*. In Holsti's words, "a national role conception includes the policymakers' own definitions of the general

[14] Vit Benes, "Role Theory: A Conceptual Framework for the Constructivist Foreign Policy Analysis?" Third Global International Studies Conference, August 17 –20, 2011. University of Porto, Portugal <http://www.wiscnetwork.org/porto2011/papers/WISC_2011–768.pdf>

[15] Lisabeth Aggestam, "Role Conceptions and the Politics of Identity in Foreign Policy". Arena Working Papers, WP 99/8, 1999 <http://www.sv.uio.no/arena/english/research/publications/arena–publications/workingpapers/working–papers1999/wp99_8.htm>

kinds of decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable to their state, and the functions, if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system or in subordinate regional systems. It is their "image" of the appropriate orientations or functions of their state towards, or in, the external environment"[16]. Therefore, the key are actors, the policy-makers, who use simplified roles as "a core of a grand causal map through which [they] make sense of the world and their personal existence therein"[17]. As this paper will analyse a specific area of Lithuanian foreign policy, namely the Eastern policy, the single-role assumption will be used, which puts aside divisions in the political elite's foreign policy priorities.

- Role theory also includes *role expectation*. It can be defined as "the roles that other actors of groups prescribe and expect the role-beholder to enact". It is also important how foreign policy-makers themselves perceive role expectations arising from the others. For instance, Germany was encouraged by other countries to take a more active role in foreign and security policy after reunification[18].
- The last term is *national role performance*, which encompasses the actual foreign policy behaviour in terms of decisions and actions undertaken, as well as the outcome[19]. Hence, it is attitudes, decisions and actions governments take vis–à–vis other actors in order to implement the role[20].

Holsti's multiple case analysis provided evidence of seventeen role conceptions, "arranged along a continuum reflecting the degree of passivity or activity in foreign policy that the role conceptions seem to imply"[21]. They are the following: bastion of revolution–liberator, regional leader, regional protector, active independent, liberation supporter, defender of the faith, mediator–integrator, regional–subsystem collaborator, developer, bridge, faithful ally, independent, example, internal development, isolate, protectee, as well as other roles. While a state may have multiple national role conceptions[22], the analysis of this paper is confined to Lithuania's role in Eastern policy.

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16 Holsti, "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 14, No. 3 , September, 1970, p. 245–246

17 Chih–yu Shih, "National Role Conception as Foreign Policy Motivation: The Psycho-cultural Bases of Chinese Diplomacy", *Political Psychology*, Vol. 9, No. 4, 1988, p. 599

18 Ibid.

19 Aggestam

20 Benes

21 Holsti, p. 260

22 Ibid., p. 260–273

Furthermore, other factors, such as the size of a state may play a role in determining the type of national role, yet they are not exclusively determined. For example, "operationalization of state size may differ (geography, population, economy, etc.) and even a small state can play a significant role in international relations"[23]. Therefore, in theory, any role type is applicable to Lithuania.

According to Benes, the strength of this theory lies in the fact that it "occupies a middle position on the ontological spectrum between individualism and structuralism (holism)" or between foreign policy analysis (FPA), which traditionally prefers an actor's perspective and individual ontology, and theory of international relations (IR), which tends to adopt structuralism ontology[24]. In other words, foreign policy analysis considers the individual to be the "ground" of IR theory, while international relations are more apt to proceed from systematic orientation[25]. Role theory tries to build "an empirical bridge between agent and structure in international relations" as it has the wherewithal to reconcile different levels of analysis and provides a means of assessing the interplay between internal and external variables[26]. As the efforts to integrate, and, possibly, synthesize conceptual, theoretic, methodological differences of FPA and IR under the umbrella of role theory are being pursued[27], it is important to move this debate to a field of Lithuanian foreign policy research.

The paper analyses Lithuanian foreign policy via three dimensions of role theory: First, it explores the national role conception of the political elite, namely two Presidents of Lithuania, and its influence on policies towards Eastern countries in the period 2004–2014. The President is a determining factor in foreign policy, as according to Article 84 in the Lithuanian Constitution, "The President of the Republic shall decide the basic issues of foreign policy and, together with the Government, conduct foreign policy"[28]. While there are various inter–institutional frictions and competition because of the rather significant role of the Parliament and Government in foreign policy, it is agreed that President has a right and duty to project his influence and take his own foreign policy initiatives. It is done

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[23] Marijke Breuning, "Role theory research in international relations: state of the art and blind spots" in Sebastian Harnisch (ed) et al, *Role Theory in International Relations. Approaches and analyses*, New York: Routledge, 2012, p. 18

[24] Ibid.

[25] Cameron G. Thies, Marijke Breuning, "Integrating Foreign Policy Analysis and International Relations through Role Theory", *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Volume 8, Issue 1, 2012, p. 2

[26] Ebere Richard Adigbuo, "National Role Conceptions: A New Trend in Foreign Policy Analysis" <http://www.wiscnetwork.org/porto2011/papers/WISC_2011–647.pdf>

[27] G. Thies, Breuning, p. 3

[28] Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania <http://www3.lrs.lt/home/Konstitucija/Constitution.htm>

mostly by focusing on macro–level initiatives with high–level meetings, visits and various international forums[29]. In order to define the national role conception of two Presidents Valdas Adamkus and Dalia Grybauskaitė, interviews, as well as an analysis of the core foreign policy speeches and memoirs are used. Speeches and official statements are of essential importance, as "what statesmen and diplomats say is often as vital as what they do. It would not be far-fetched to go further and declare that speech is an incisive form of action"[30].

Second, the role of expectations are analysed via Lithuania's relationship with key partners – the United States of America, the most influential member of NATO, and the European Union. Due to its "Lilliputian size", Lithuania has a limited capacity to influence even the regional environment by itself; hence, membership in the Euro-Atlantic community provides opportunities for joint action[31]. Therefore, policies of the EU and United States towards the region are essential, as they, in the minds of the political elite, open up or restrict opportunities for Lithuania to take an active role in the region. Therefore, policies of the EU and United States will be analysed in light of the possibilities they open up for Lithuania. Third, key events and circumstances (crisis, conflicts, new policies), which shaped Lithuanian foreign policy in two different periods, are taken into consideration, as they are closely related to the second dimension.

2. Valdas Adamkus – 2004–2009: the idea of a Regional Centre

Artūras Paulauskas, acting President of Lithuania after Rolandas Paksas' impeachment, announced his foreign policy doctrine in 2004: "I have a vision of Lithuania as a centre of the region, with Vilnius as a regional capital"[32]. President Valdas Adamkus, who was elected in 2004, followed the path of this foreign policy as it complied with his national role conception.

Lithuania fulfilled its ambition to become member of the EU and NATO, but had to continue strengthening its security by surrounding itself from all sides

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29 David J. Galbreath, Ainius Lašas, Jeremy W. Lamoreaux, *Continuity and Change in the Baltic Sea Region: Comparing Foreign Policies*, New York: Rodopi, 2008, p. 95

30 Philippe G. Le Prestre (ed), *Role Quests in the Post–Cold War Era: Foreign Policies in Transition*, Montreal: McGill–Queens University Press, p. 14

31 Ibid., p. 97

32 Paulauskas, A. (2004) "Lithuania´s new foreign policy", Speech by the acting president of the Republic of Lithuania, Vilnius University, 24 May 2004. < http://paulauskas.president.lt/one.phtml?id=4996>

with free and democratic states and transferring the function of the eastern "forepost" to other states, for instance, Ukraine[33]. In his inaugural address, Adamkus expressed the idea to "bridge the West and the East"[34]. It was elaborated during a meeting with the heads of foreign diplomatic missions in Lithuania: "Lithuania can and must be a centre of regional gravity. That should be our strategic orientation. It is ambitious, but we have historic, geographic and political preconditions to succeed. <...> I see Vilnius as a natural centre of the region, where political initiatives are being born and implemented"[35]. This direction was closely related with the President's personality and experience of five decades spent living and working in the United States, which shaped his liberal, value and freedom based ideology. Adamkus sought to spread democracy and freedom to the countries in the East as it was a "civilizational mission" with historic roots in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania[36]. These ideas became a practically applicable foreign policy doctrine[37].

Moreover, Adamkus sought to break Lithuania's international isolation after the impeachment and unprecedented in Europe removal of President R. Paksas[38]. Partly because of recurring political crises in the region, it was soon understood that Lithuania will only be interesting to Western partners by taking an active stance towards what is now known as Eastern Partnership countries[39]. In Adamkus' words, "The task was to find ways to be more noticeable in European policy and strengthen our international standing. We could do it only by being active in regional policy and becoming advocates of post-Soviet countries<…>"[40].

The key event, which helped to shape Adamkus' perception of the region, was the Ukrainian Orange Revolution in 2004. During the political crisis, the

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33 Jonavičiūs, p. 21

34 Inaugural address to the nation by H. E. MR. Valdas Adamkus, President of the Republic of Lithuania, July 12, 2004 <http://archyvas.lrp.lt/en/news.full/5116>

35 Respublikos Prezidento Valdo Adamkaus kalba Lietuvos diplomatinių misijų vadovams, July 13, 2004 <Address by H. E. Mr. Valdas Adamkus, President of the Republic of Lithuania, during the meeting the heads of foreign diplomatic missions in Lithuania><http://archyvas.lrp.lt/lt/news.full/5121>

36 Alvydas Jokubaitis, Raimondas Lopata, Lietuva kaip problema <Lithuania as a problem>. Vilnius: Tyto Alba, 2014, p. 284

37 Česlovas Laurinavičius, Raimondas Lopata, Vladas Sirutavičius, "Kritinis požiūris į Lietuvos užsienio politiką: kas pasikeitė nuo Augustino Voldemaro laikų?" (Critical Approach to Lithuanian Foreign Policy: What has Changed since Augustinas Voldemaras's Times?). Vilnius: *Politologija* 2009/2 (54), p. 111

38 A close aide to the Presidents Staff, interview with the author, Vilnius, 12 September, 2014

39 Ibid.

40 Adamkus, p. 527

Lithuanian President was invited by his Ukrainian counterpart to Kiev to act as a mediator between political groups and protesters after the rigged presidential elections. Adamkus shared this role together with the Polish President Kwasniewski: "this mission was only the beginning of efforts to draw Ukraine and the Western world closer together. It was also the start of Lithuanian diplomatic activity in Eastern Europe. <…> Lithuania's role in this region excelled its size; we erupted from provincial foreign policy. Lithuania never had such important tasks before"[41].

Adamkus foreign policy vision could also be observed while analysing the destinations of his foreign visits. Ukraine, Georgia, Poland and other countries are among the most visited during his term.

Table 1. Foreign visits of the President Valdas Adamkus (2004–2009)[42]

Belgium[42]	18
Poland	16
Ukraine	**13**
United States	7
Germany	6
Estonia	6
Georgia	**6**
Latvia	6
France	4
...	
Azerbaijan	**3**
Moldova	**2**
Armenia	**1**
	158

The structural conditions and role expectations to pursue active policies in the East were partly favourable in 2004–2009.

A key factor was the excellent relationship between Poland and Lithuania – symbolically, Adamkus chose Warsaw for his first foreign visit after his election[43]. Both Polish Presidents Alexander Kwasniewski (1995–2005) and Lech Kaczynski (2005 – until his tragic death in 2010), who worked during Adamkus' term,

41 Adamkus, p. 127

42 Belgium is the most popular destination due to regular meetings among EU leaders in the European Council.

43 Prezidentas su darbo vizitu lankysis Lenkijoje [President will visit Poland] <http://archyvas.lrp.lt/lt/news.full/5178>

expressed the goal to become a centre of the region and spread democracy to the East[44]. As they maintained excellent relationships with Adamkus, Lithuania became an essential partner with similar aims[45].

Adamkus' vision was also influenced by the Giedroyc–Mieroszewski political doctrine, which was developed in the Polish emigration literary–political journal "Kultura". It proposed a concept of Polish Eastern policy based on the close cooperation of Poland, Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine (ULB region)[46]. The President had a direct link to this approach: for example, the intellectual discourse of "Kultura" shaped the foreign policy of Polish President Alexander Kwasniewski[47], who in turn described the Polish – Lithuanian relationship in the times of Adamkus as "a strategic partnership" with a similar vision[48]. It also created room for Poland and Lithuania to take care of other "problematic" neighbour countries (Belarus, Ukraine), ensuring their democratic development and advocating their integration into Europe[49]. To this day Adamkus remains an unofficial patron of the intellectual platform, the Jerzy Giedroyc Forum for Dialogue and Cooperation[50].

Kaczyński's policies had rather similar implications for regional cooperation. He sought a strategy described as *Prometheism*, which has historic roots in the 1920s and 1930s; it aims at creating a fortress of common defence against Russia that would include independent states in the basins of the Baltic, Black and Caspian Seas. Therefore, Kaczynski sought to "develop the closest possible relations with the countries southeast to Poland" by pooling together Western–

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44 Jonavičius, p. 25

45 Later V. Adamkus himself admitted that without closer cooperation with Lithuania Poland will not be able to strengthen its position as a leader of region (V. Adamkus: Lenkijai bus sunku būti regionine lydere be gerų santykių su Lietuva (V.Adamkus: Poland will struggle to be leader of region without good relationship with Lithuania <http://www.lrt.lt/naujienos/lietuvoje/2/16091/v._adamkus_lenkijai_bus_sunku_buti_regione_lydere_be_geru_santykiu_su_lietuva>)

46 Marcin Celinski, The Giedroyc era ended in foreign policy. March 8, 2011 <http://liberteworld.com/2011/03/08/the–giedroyc–era–ended–in–foreign–policy/>

47 Nathaniel Copsey, *Public Opinion and the Making of Foreign Policy in the 'New Europe': A Comparative Study of Poland and Ukraine*, New York: Ashgate Publishing, 2013, p. 4

48 Valdas Adamkus, *Paskutinė kadencija. Prezidento dienoraščiai*, <The Last Term.Diaries of the President>. Vilnius: Tyto Alba, 2011, p. 8

49 Aleks Szczerbiak, *Poland within the European Union: New Awkward Partner or New Heart of Europe?* London: Routledge, 2012, p. 84

50 I–asis Jerzy Giedroyco dialogo ir bendradarbiavimo forumo suvažiavimas Druskininkuose <The first meeting of Jerzy Giedroyc Forum for Dialogue and Cooperation in Druskininkai> <http://www.wilno.msz.gov.pl/lt/ivykiai/i_asis_jerzy_giedroyco_dialogo_ir_bendradarbiavimo_forumo_suvaziavimas_druskininkuose>

oriented Eastern European states[51]. Hence, Lithuania maintained a role of the closest partner of Poland to strengthen regional security and seek mutual goals. Close political cooperation between Lithuania and Poland also led to a favourable public opinion – in spite of the previous conflicts, in 2007 more than 53 percent of Lithuanians regarded Poland as a friendly country, while only 7 percent as non-friendly[52]. While the Lithuanian Polish minority issues remained complicated, in Adamkus' words, "it did not harm our cooperation, as we were still able to use strong personal relationship and understanding"[53].

Furthermore, his relationship with the United States supported this role. "The United States recognised Lithuania's activity and was interested in his regional expertise: Adamkus was often asked to brief about the situation or to make recommendations. For example, during a meeting of Baltic leaders and the President of the United States of America George W. Bush (2001–2008), Adamkus was specifically asked about his meeting with the Belarus President, because no other participant had any direct contact with him"[54]. The leader of the U.S. was not actively seeking a policy of democracy promotion when he was elected, but that perception changed because of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. After that, democracy promotion became his central objective[55]. Bush even supported Ukrainian and Georgian aspirations to join NATO[56] and recognised Adamkus as a close partner in the region. Among Presidents of Lithuania after independence, Adamkus had the biggest number of direct contacts with the President of the United States[57]. Furthermore, he described George W. Bush as "the best friend of Lithuania"[58]. Lithuanian President consulted Bush before making important

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51 Gela Merabishvili, "Why Ukraine Matters to Georgia" <http://www.neweasterneurope.eu/interviews/1117–why–ukraine–matters–to–georgia>

52 Ainė Ramonaitė, Nerijus Maliukevičius, Mindaugas Degutis, "Tarp Rytų ir Vakarų: Lietuvos visuomenės geokultūrinės nuostatos" < file://hnas–cifs.activedir.vu.lt/CIFS_User/Redirected_studentai/s1316548/Downloads/geokulturines_nuostatos_isplestine_santrauka.pdf >

53 Adamkus, p. 162

54 A close aide to the President's Staff, interview with the author, Vilnius, 12 September, 2014

55 Federiga Bindi, *The Foreign Policy of the European Union: Assessing Europe's Role in the World*, New York: Brookings Institution Press, 2010, p. 305

56 "The Seduction of George W. Bush" <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/05/the_seduction_of_george_w_bush_by_vladimir_putin>

57 "Lietuvos ir JAV prezidentų bendravimas: nuo George'o W.Busho viešnagės Vilniuje iki nenoro vykti vakarienės su Baracku Obama į Prahą" <http://www.15min.lt/naujiena/aktualu/lietuva/lietuvos–ir–jav–prezidentu–bendravimas–nuo–george–o–w–busho–viesnages–vilniuje–iki–nenoro–vykti–vakarienes–su–baracku–obama–i–praha–56–364927>

58 A.Kwasniewskis: būdama didesnė, Lenkija galėtų būti ir supratingesnė <http://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithuania/akwasniewskis–budama–didesne–lenkija–galetu–buti–ir–supratingesne.d?id=55952065>

decisions, such as flying to Georgia during the conflict with Russia in 2008[59], there was regular telephone contact between the leaders[60] and high-level bilateral meetings to discuss the situation in the region[61]. In short, the United States ascribed to Lithuania the role of its "buffer or agent in Europe"[62], because it needed: a) partners in Europe who would defend the United States' interests during a difficult period of divisive war in Iraq, and b) allies, which could promote democratization to other regions[63]. Adamkus' personality and ambitions suited that role.

Yet the policies of the EU were rather different. Lithuania, which had recently joined the EU, lacked trust from the other Member States; furthermore, Lithuania did not have enough experience to construct an interest-mediation style according to Brussels' rules[64]. Furthermore, the EU itself seemed to be unsure about its policies towards the East[65]. It led to misunderstandings: for instance, Lithuania expressed its support to the Orange Revolution in Ukraine before the EU announced its official position[66]. Josep Borrell, then President of the European Parliament, criticized the role of Poland and Lithuania in Ukraine by noting that they acted under American influence and had a different stance from the majority of European countries[67]. Moreover, Lithuania and Poland did not succeed in their role as "agenda setters" or "wake-up callers" during the 2008 Russian invasion in Georgia[68]. From the EU's perspective, Lithuania was rapidly becoming a "one issue state", with its criticism of Russia and activities in the post-Soviet region[69]. The Lithuanian President remarked that European leaders lacked an understanding of

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59 "Lietuvos prezidentas išvyksta į Gruziją, vizitą parėmė JAV prezidentas" <http://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithuania/lietuvos–prezidentas–isvyksta–i–gruzija–vizita–pareme–jav–prezidentas.d?id=18059923>

60 A close aide to the Presidents Staff, interview with the author, Vilnius, 12 September, 2014

61 "President Bush Meets with President Adamkus of Lithuania" <http://georgewbush–whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/09/20080929–5.html>

62 Stankus, Paulauskas, p. 57

63 Č. Laurinavičius et al., p. 105

64 Gunta Pastore, "Small New Member States in the EU Foreign Policy: Toward "Small State Smart Strategy"?", *Baltic Journal of Political Science*, 2013 (2), p. 75

65 Vilpišauskas, p. 136

66 Dovilė Budrytė, "Back in the USSR, or New Initiatives in Lithuania's Foreign Policy after the Dual Enlargement". Presentation in international conference Europe's Small States in a Changing Environment 2–3 June 2006, Copenhagen, Denmark <http://www.norface.org/files/s1–budryte.pdf>

67 Zaki Laïdi, *EU Foreign Policy in a Globalized World: Normative Power and Social Preferences*, New York: Routledge, 2008, p. 113

68 Pastore, p. 81

69 Karpavičiūtė, p. 123

the region: for instance, during the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, he described the European Union's High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana as a "person, who has no understanding what so ever of what is happening in Ukraine"[70], while Solana saw Lithuania's policies as too "radical"[71].

In practice, the national role performance of Lithuania's "regional leadership" was based on three dimensions. First, Lithuania was actively involved during the crises in both Ukraine and Georgia. Second, Lithuania initiated engagement with an informal group of states, the E–11 Caucus and organized international events, such as the "Vilnius 10" Summit in 2002 and *Vilnius Summit 2006: Common Vision for a Common Neighbourhood*, which brought together leaders from the Baltic States, the Black Sea region and the Vice–President of United States Dick Cheney[72]. Third, Lithuania politically supported Euro-Atlantic integration in Ukraine and other countries[73].

To sum up, the "regional leadership" concept had its roots in Adamkus' personality, as his personal experience, perception and values were compatible with activism in the region, especially after Paksas' isolation. Lithuania filled a "strategic vacuum" with "value based" foreign policy, led by the principles of democracy promotion and self-determination[74]. This kind of policy was also possible due to role expectations that were given to Lithuania by Poland, which sought similar goals and saw Lithuania as a key partner, and the United States, which recognised Adamkus as a suitable leader to promote its interests.

Yet Lithuania's achievements in Eastern policy could be described only as mixed[75]. One of the reasons is that the EU had a cautious approach towards Lithuania's initiatives. Furthermore, Eastern countries had "reform fatigue"[76] and often failed to meet expectations. Due to these and additional factors, such as an "overstretch" of broad and ambitious foreign policy targets[77], Lithuania's publicly announced ambitions to become a "regional centre" were not realized. In practice Lithuania was a partner to a significantly bigger and more influential country, Poland, which sought similar policies in the region. Without Poland Lithuania is

70 Adamkus, p. 135

71 Vilpišauskas, p .137

72 Budrytė

73 Jonavičius, p. 29

74 Laurinavičius et al, p. 107

75 Vilpišauskas, p. 135

76 Pastore, p. 70

77 Statkus, Paulauskas, p. 73

less able to have any influence in the EU or NATO, while opportunities to draw the attention of the United States also deteriorate considerably[78].

Therefore, in 2004–2009 Lithuania fulfilled its role of what was described by Holsti as a Regional–subsystem collaborator, rather than a regional centre. A Regional–subsystem collaborator conception envisages not occasional interposition into areas or issues of conflict, but it rather indicates far-reaching commitments to cooperative efforts with other states to build wider communities[79]. Lithuania sought this by seeking niches for itself in the foreign policy doctrines of the United States and Poland. As this is less ambitious, it could be argued that the main foreign policy goals were achieved: Lithuania regained its place among Western countries after Paksas' isolation and played a part in the far-reaching goal of democracy promotion in the East.



Diagram 1. Adamkus' conception

78 Irina Batorshina, Vadim Volovoy, "Modern Lithuanian foreign policy: the adjustment of traditional policy", *Journal of Baltic Region*, 2011 (4), p. 28

79 Holsti, p. 265

3. Grybauskaitė 2009–2014: from pragmatism to the "New Cold Warrior"

Dalia Grybauskaitė was elected in the first round in 2009 as an independent candidate. She openly criticized Adamkus' foreign policy and based her argument on the failure of "regional leadership" – for example, she openly spoke about Lithuania being laughed at as a "one-issue state"[80] at European institutions. In her inaugural speech Grybauskaitė said that, "the priority of foreign policy was and will continue to be good relations with its neighbours. But we need to adjust the foreign policy pendulum: let strong and consistent defence of the interests of Lithuania remain instead of only imaginary leadership in the Euro-Atlantic space"[81]. She later elaborated on the issue it by saying that "Lithuania had a single vector foreign policy – it was either the United States, or no one. My aim is to change it into a multi-vector foreign policy <…> by paying more attention to Europe, especially Northern Europe<…>. I aim to balance"[82].

Therefore, her national role conception at the beginning of her presidency clearly differed from that of Adamkus. It consisted of two main aspects:

Pragmatism. She came to office as a strict technocrat, with vast experience in various state institutions and a five-year tenure as European Commissioner for Financial Programming and the Budget. Therefore, she sought to play according to European rules as she "learned a lesson on the need for compromise" and had experience in complicated negotiations with partners in European institutions[83]. It led to a more cautious approach towards policy initiatives in the East and closer cooperation with European institutions in decision-making processes.

Focus towards Western Europe and more "beneficial" regions. The aim was to redirect Lithuanian foreign policy from the Eastern region and pronounced pro-Americanism towards "Old Europe and to shake off the label of a "one–issue state". Hence, the new focus was on the Baltic Sea Region[84] and countries

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80 Vaščenkaitė, p. 37

81 Inaugural Address by President Dalia Grybauskaitė Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania <http://www.president.lt/en/activities/speeches/inaugural_address_by_president_dalia_grybauskaite_seimas_of_the_republic_of_lithuania.html>

82 D.Grybauskaitė siekia ne pakeisti, bet subalansuoti užsienio politiką <http://www.lrytas.lt/–13100180671307815245–d–grybauskait%C4%97–siekia–ne–pakeisti–bet–subalansuoti–u%C5%BEsienio–politik%C4%85.htm>

83 Pastore, p. 74

84 Prezidentės D. Grybauskaitės kalba atidarant Baltijos jūros valstybių vyriausybių vadovų susitikimą. 2010–06–028 http://www.president.lt/lt/prezidento_veikla/kalbos/prezidentes_d._grybauskaites_kalba_atidarant_baltijos_juros_valstybiu_vyriausybiu_vadovu_susitikima.html

with which Grybauskaitė had close contact during her years in the European Commission. For example, she chose Sweden as the destination for her first foreign visit[85]. As Grybauskaitė noted during the State of Nation Address in 2011, "We are an integral part of the Baltic Sea Region and we have reliable partners here with whom we share the same regional development goals. It is natural therefore that cooperation with Nordic countries in all spheres continues to be a top priority". It was apparent that Eastern countries were left somewhat aside – only Belarus was briefly mentioned in the address[86]. Nordic formats (NB6 and NB8) were often emphasized together with the task of ensuring an independent supply of energy and fulfilling other strategic projects. Another key factor was Grybauskaitė's relationship with German Chancellor Angela Merkel – during this term, as the incapability of bilateral interests diminished and relationship intensified[87]. For instance, Grybauskaitė noted that, "Germany is a strategic partner of Lithuania and a staunch advocate of our membership in the EU and NATO"[88].

Several structural role expectation factors stimulated this shift. First, it was understood that Lithuania does not have sufficient resources to become an interlocutor or bridge between Russia and the EU with its activities in Eastern Europe[89]. During the global economic crisis, the Lithuanian Gross Domestic Product (GDP) shrunk around 15 percent[90]. As, according to Miniotaitė, Lithuania's previous ambitions were based on recent achievements, especially in its fast-growing economy, rather than its "glorious past"[91], it was difficult to continue promoting the image of a "success story" in the East. Therefore, it is no surprise that the speeches and annual reports of the first years in office show Grybauskaitė's priorities in areas such as social conflicts within society, justice and legislation. In short, domestic issues dominated, while there was less attention to foreign policy[92].

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85 2009 metų išvažiuojamųjų vizitų apžvalga [Review of international visits in 2009] <http://www.prezidentas.lt/lt/prezidento_veikla/vizitai/2009_metu_apzvalga.html>

86 State of the Nation Address by H.E. Dalia Grybauskaitė, President of the Republic of Lithuania <http://www.president.lt/en/activities/speeches/state_of_the_nation_address_by_h.e._dalia_grybauskaite_president_of_the_republic_of_lithuania_8497.html>

87 Matthias Rantzsch, "The German Interests towards Lithuania: a Dilemma of the Zwischenraum", *Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review*, 2008 (20), p. 46

88 Lithuania's strategic partnership with Germany is for the benefit of Europe <http://www.eurodialogue.eu/Lithuania–strategic–partnership–with–Germany–is–for–the–benefit–of–Europe>

89 Statkus, Paulauskas, p. 75

90 Lithuania in second attempt to join euro <http://euobserver.com/lithuania/120293>

91 Miniotaitė, *In search of identity in contemporary Lithuanian foreign policy: between East and North dimensions*, p. 97

92 Batorshina, Volovoy, p. 27

Second, the foreign policy concepts of the principal strategic partners changed and "deprived Lithuania of an important foothold in tackling international issues"[93]. It is related with Lithuania's relationship with the United States and Poland, two countries that played an essential part in Adamkus' leadership attempts.

The newly-elected President of the United States Barrack Obama outlined the Asia – Pacific region as a foreign policy priority, while being less interested in Europe and post-Soviet countries[94]. Furthermore, as Obama launched a "reset" policy expecting to turn Russia into a cooperative partner by showing greater humility and by accommodating President Vladimir Putin's sensibilities on Iran, ballistic missile defence, nuclear arms treaties, Lithuania's, which remained critical towards Russia, role declined. In April 2010, Obama and Russian president Dmitry Medvedev signed a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) in Prague, decreasing tension after previous plans by the United States to deploy the missile defence system Eastern European. Grybauskaitė openly disagreed with Obama's reduction plan, claiming it could harm Lithuanian security. A symbolic gesture of this was refusal to take part in the dinner in Prague, where Obama invited the presidents of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Romania, as well as the prime ministers of Poland, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia. D. Grybauskaitė was the only president who did not accept the invitation[95]. She also noted that Lithuania would not become a "hostage" of the United States' foreign policy[96].

- In addition, the relationship with Poland came to a "deadlock"[97]. Various factors, some of which may not be regarded as structural, contributed to this shift:
- Increased activity of Polish minority leaders, which formed a faction in the Parliament of Lithuania for the first time in 2012, as they are often regarded "neither loyal nor trustworthy to Lithuania and even Poland";
- The unsolved and escalating problem of the spelling of family names in Lithuanian passports;

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93 Ibid.

94 Jarosław Ćwiek–Karpowicz, "Polish Foreign Policy Toward its Eastern Neighbors: Is a Close Cooperation with Germany Possible?", DGAPanalyse, 2011, p. 3 <https://dgap.org/en/article/getFullPDF/20366>

95 How the Russian 'Reset' Explains Obama's Foreign Policy <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/10/16/how_the_russian_reset_explains_obama_s_foreign_policy>

96 Has Grybauskaite helped Lithuania break free from hostage status? <http://www.lithuaniatribune.com/3425/has–grybauskaite–helped–lithuania–break–free–from–hostage–status–20103425>

97 The Economist, Bad blood <http://www.economist.com/node/21549987>

- Certain other tension-provoking issues (national education policy of minorities; land restitution in the Vilnius region, "Mažeikių nafta" / PKN Orlen issues);
- Personal convictions and specific personalities[98]. For example:
  a) Polish foreign minister Radoslaw Sikorski openly refused to visit Lithuania until minority issues were not being dealt with[99];
  b) Polish President Bronislaw Komorowski, who was elected in 2010, and Grybauskaitė continued a good bilateral relationship on a presidential level, but did not avoid certain stand-offs – for instance, Grybauskaitė declined to visit Warsaw to discuss regional security with other Baltic leaders in reaction to Polish pressure and suggestions that it might review its position on the NATO air-policing mission if Lithuania did not addresses minority issues;
  c) Komorowski, who was elected in 2010, sought a "more moderate" line on Russia than the Kaczynski brothers[100], causing concern for Grybauskaitė that the Baltic countries could become "scapegoats" of such a policy[101];
  d) In 2012, Grybauskaitė even called a "pause" on ceremonial meetings between state leaders[102].

Bilateral tensions were reflected in society – a remarkable shift in Lithuania's public opinion took place, as only 12 percent of respondents considered Poland to be a "friendly state" while 27 percent characterised it as "hostile" in 2014[103].

In practice, at the beginning of her term Grybauskaitė shaped her Eastern policy by continuously aligning it with the dominant EU approach and Eastern

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98 Živilė Dambrauskaitė et al., "Lithuanian–Polish Relations Reconsidered: a Constrained Bilateral Agenda or an Empty Strategic Partnership?", Eastern Europe study centre, Analytical Review, 2011, p. 34–36

99 Wayne C. Thompson, *Nordic, Central, and Southeastern Europe*, 2014. London: Rowman & Littlefield, p. 158

100 Stratfor, Russia's Role in Polish–Lithuanian Tensions <http://www.stratfor.com/video/russias–role–polish–lithuanian–tensions–dispatch#axzz3J4s46Lb0>

101 Relations with Poland continue to worsen <http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=1609128145&Country=Lithuania&topic=Politics&subtopic=Recent+developments&aid=1&oid=598071444>

102 Lithuanian President wants pause in "ceremonial meetings" with Poland <http://www.15min.lt/en/article/world/lithuanian–president–wants–pause–in–ceremonial–meetings–with–poland–529–262324>

103 Lithuanians' trust for Poles plummets <http://www.thenews. l/1/10/Artykul/172598,Lithuanians–trust–for–Poles–plummets>

Partnership (EaP) policy goals. By seeking this direction, Lithuania avoided controversial unilateral policies and coordinated its goals on an EU level – for example, bilateral meetings with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko in Vilnius and Minsk were considered as an "European signal" for rapprochement, rather than a Lithuanian-only initiative[104]. It played a significant role in shaping new Lithuanian orientation towards Eastern partnership countries through structural frameworks approved in the EU instead of bilateral or regional strategies of New Europe's countries towards their Eastern neighbours. Hence calls for closer cooperation in the framework of EaP in technical areas such as modernization, granting of visas or the prospects of EU Association agreements became dominant, while a value-based approach played a rather marginal role.

Furthermore, cooperation in Nordic formats such as the NB8 intensified: it was developing in the areas of security and defence, with joint military training such as Amber Hope and Baltic Spirit conducted in the region, cooperation in international missions intensified. Furthermore, all the countries worked to enhance cyber- and energy security as well as civil safety in the region[105].

It was not only Grybauskaitė's own national role conception, but also structural conditions which shaped unfavourable conditions for a continuation of an active Eastern policy. It was especially notable at the time of the economic crisis, as it also reflected the country's actual economic interdependencies in terms of investment, trade and strategic economic goals[106] rather than value-based ambitions. Therefore, Grybauskaitė sought to refocus on the Nordic dimension. According to Holsti's typology, Grybauskaitė embraced the role of Internal Development, which had little reference to any particular task or function within the international system. The emphasis, on the contrary, is that "most efforts of the government should be directed toward problems of internal development". While international political matters are of second importance, it does not preclude various forms of international cooperation, particularly in economic and technical matters". Grybauskaitė sought to deal with the economic crisis, strengthen ties with the Northern countries and fulfil Lithuania's role as a modern European state.

The changes are visible while reviewing the foreign visits made by Grybauskaitė. While visits may not fully reflect political priorities and even be misleading, Grybauskaitė was clearly less willing to go to Eastern Neighbourhood countries.

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104 Election Stakes High for Lukashenko <http://www. themoscowtimes.com/news/article/election–stakes–high–for–lukashenko/422824.html>

105 NB8 cooperation is unique <http://president.lt/en/press_center/press_releases/nb8_cooperation_is_unique.html>

106 Vilpišauskas, p. 135

For example, close cooperation and friendship with Eastern countries were not among of her foreign policy priorities[107].

Table 2. Foreign visits of President Dalia Grybauskaitė (2009–September 2014)[108]

Country	**Visits**
Belgium	34
Poland	10
Germany	9
United States	7
Latvia	6
Finland	4
Estonia	4
France	4
Norway	3
Eastern partnership countries	
Ukraine	**6**
Georgia	**2**
Moldova	**1**
Armenia	**1**
Azerbaijan	**1**
Belarus	**1**
	115

Yet Grybauskaitė's policies shifted again in the latter phase of her first term. Her activities became increasingly similar to the previous policies of Adamkus as even some features of leadership in the region became evident. While the first four years could be described as Internal Development, characterized by pragmatic policies, 2013 notes a significant shift to the new phase of Lithuania's activism in the region.

Several factors may have contributed to this shift:

– Stabilization of domestic politics due to arelatively successful handling of the economic crisis. Lithuania's economy is currently among the fastest growing in the EU[109];

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107 Ibid.

108 Visits of President of the Republic of Lithuania <http://www.president.lt/en/activities/visits_414.html>

109 European economy guide: Taking Europe's pulse <http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2014/11/european–economy–guide>

– Lithuanian Presidency of the Council of the European Union. Lithuania declared Eastern Partnership as one of the key priorities during its Presidency and hosted EaP in Vilnius in the second part of 2013. Because of this, international attention to the issues of the EU's policies towards Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia and other EaP countries grew considerably. Lithuania's Presidency created more favourable structural conditions for activism, as the EU itself engaged in debates about the future of Eastern Partnership and did not discourage greater Lithuanian activism in the region;

– Russia's aggression in Ukraine and the changing security environment in the region after the Vilnius Summit caused a shift of political priorities. Annexation of Crimea and escalation in Eastern Ukraine was considered as a direct security threat to Lithuania. It caused a shift of priorities both for politicians and society. For example, Grybauskaitė started her State of the Nation Address in 2014 by emphasizing that, "War and occupation <...> have become a real threat on the continent of Europe" and continued that "the direct threat to regional security also highlighted the importance of neighbourhood cooperation. Fully aware that the strength of the region is built on unity, together we – Lithuanians, Poles, Latvians, and Estonians – assessed the threats and joined our efforts to ensure security"[110]. Economic problems, which dominated the media during the financial crisis, gave way to security issues. In March 2014, just before the Lithuanian Presidential elections, 87 percent of Lithuanians believed that there is a "real threat" of Russia's military attack on Lithuania[111], while in 2012 more than 60 percent said that Lithuania does not face "any direct threats"[112]. The crisis also caused a shift of attention for the United States, which played a crucial role in the sanctions policy towards Russia; furthermore, both President B. Obama and vice-president Joe Biden visited the Baltic States and expressed support for NATO defence commitments[113].

– A new phase in the relationship with Poland. While the Polish minority issues remained tense, the new geopolitical circumstances and similarities of security

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110 State of the Nation Address by H.E. Dalia Grybauskaitė, President of the Republic of Lithuania <http://president.lt/en/activities/state_of_the_nation_address/2014.html>

111 87% Lithuanians are certain that Russia could attack <http://www.lrt.lt/naujienos/news_in_english/29/39562/87_lithuanians_are_certain_that_russia_could_attack>

112 Visuomenės nuomonės tyrimas šalies saugumo ir gynybos klausimais (Public opinion research on country's security and defence) <http://www.spinter.lt/site/lt/vidinis/menutop/9/home/publish/NjAyOzk7OzA=>

113 Obama Transcript: NATO Will Defend Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania <http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2014/09/03/obama–transcript–nato–will–defend–estonia–latvia–lithuania>

threats led to similar positions on the international stage. For instance, Poland and Lithuania, together with other Baltic countries, were named in the group of the most "hawkish" EU Member States while discussing events in Ukraine and sanctions against Russia[114]. It also led to strategically important practical decisions: formation of a joint Polish–Lithuanian–Ukrainian military unit[115] and Lithuanian support for Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk for the position of the new President of the European Council. In addition, strategic energy projects, such as the Polish–Lithuanian gas pipeline[116], were given a new impetus[117].

Hence during the first term Grybauskaitė demonstrated transformation from a pragmatic and cooperative approach to a proactive ("new Cold War warrior"[118]) positioning, even if a more cautious approach remained dominant in the EU. National role conception, as it was previously described, played only a marginal role, as it did not directly reflect the new priorities. It could be argued that her national role performance was flexible and not based on long-term foundations. Therefore, the shift was caused by structural factors: while being critical of Adamkus' policies at the beginning of her term, Grybauskaitė soon sided with her predecessor's policies mainly due to Russia's aggression in Ukraine and successful economic stabilisation, while ensuing factors, such new impetus for cooperation with Poland, played an essential role. Hence, the foreign policy role moved from Internal Development closer to an Adamkus–like Regional–subsystem collaborator.

The key factor remains Poland: the effectiveness of new role depends on her ability to continue close cooperation with Poland, which may still be harmed by domestic policies, less favourable personal relationship and other circumstances. If the relationship returns to the earlier more complicated stage, Lithuania's policy may seem as Regional leadership without a solid foundation for effective implementation.

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114 Divided we stand: Where do EU states stand on further sanctions on Russia? <http://www.openeurope.org.uk/Article/Page/en/LIVE?id=19876>

115 BBC, Poland, Ukraine and Lithuania form joint military unit <http://www.bbc.com/news/world–europe–29284548>

116 Lithuania Seeks Faster Baltic–EU Energy Links on Ukraine Concern <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014–03–04/lithuania–seeks–faster–baltic–eu–energy–links–on–ukraine–concern.html>

117 Lithuanian president reveals her vote in EU appointments <http://en.delfi.lt/eu/lithuanian–president–reveals–her–vote–in–eu–appointments.d?id=65710952>

118 Mark Leonard, Nicu Popescu, "A Power Audit of EU–Russia Relations", Policy Paper, ECFR, 2007, p. 2



Diagram 2. D. Grybauskaitė's Eastern policy dynamism

Conclusions

Adamkus' Eastern policy was described by the President himself as "regional leadership". It was influenced by several factors, such as the ideas of liberalism and democratisation, which shaped his perception in the United States; understanding of Lithuania's interest to form close regional cooperation with Poland, Ukraine; the

need to break Lithuania's isolation after the impeachment of R. Paksas. Structural factors and role prescriptions were mixed: while the United States encouraged Lithuania's activism in Eastern policy as it was compatible with its interests, the EU implemented a more cautious approach and criticised Vilnius for lack of coordination. But the main factor was an excellent relationship with Poland, which was due to personal contacts between Presidents, common foreign policy visions and strategic interests. Hence, while Adamkus expressed the idea of "regional leadership", according to Holsti, it was more in line with a Regional–subsystem collaborator, as Lithuania played the partner's role to Poland's initiatives and could not have pursued the same policies without its support.

After Adamkus activism, Grybauskaitė started-off as a leader who prioritised a pragmatic approach. Due to vast experience in various institutions and the European Commission, she emphasized European institutions and cooperation according to multilateral rules as the key element for success. Distancing herself from her predecessor's policy, Grybauskaite at the beginning embodied a certain withdrawal from Eastern policy as she sought to change Lithuania's image as a "one issue state". Structural factors, such as the economic crisis, influenced her decision to focus on domestic challenges instead of idealism towards Eastern neighbours. In accordance to economic interests, closer ties with Nordic countries were also highlighted. Furthermore, neither Poland, with which the relationship became increasingly complicated, nor the United States, which prioritised other regions, encouraged Lithuania's activities in Eastern policy.

Yet in a latter phase Grybauskaitė changed her foreign policy to move closer to Adamkus' regional sub-system collaborator. The shift was noted just before Lithuania took over Presidency of European Council in 2013 and was caused by structural factors, mainly Russia's aggression in Ukraine and refocus on international issues after stabilisation of the domestic economy. These two shifts during Grybauskaitė's term reveal that the national role conception hardly depended on the President's proposed trajectories; structural factors and role expectations played a more important role. The key factor is the relationship with Poland, which is an essential partner in order to implement the regional sub-system collaborator role, which was dominant in Adamkus' term and recently became a practice of Grybauskaitė. In order to be effective, Lithuania should ensure close cooperation with Poland; if this relationship declines, Lithuania risks moving into a role of solitary and possible ineffective regional leadership.

Discussion of which factors were the most important (e.g., the geopolitical situation *versus* the consensus of the political elite *versus* the relationship with Poland, the United States, etc.) could be beneficial for future research.

LITHUANIA AT THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL: STRATEGY OR ACCIDENT?

Raimonda Miglinaitė, Dovilė Jakniūnaitė*

Abstract

The aim of the article is to investigate more thoroughly in what ways Lithuania's becoming a member of the UN SC can be considered a tangible achievement. The main thesis is that UN SC membership itself has an important symbolic meaning and the successful bid for the UN SC seat is a demonstration of a consistent LFP strategy. However a notable lack of strategic ideas on how to capitalise on this success transforms the political achievement of a non-permanent UN SC seat into lofty declarations emphasizing mainly bureaucratic gains. First, the article analyses the theoretical significance of UN SC membership from the small state perspective. Second, it analyses Lithuania's bid to the UN SC by looking into the arguments to justify the decision and strategies used. Finally, in order to understand the vision of Lithuania's being in the SC, the article evaluates and puts into the theoretical context the first four months of its membership.

Introduction

In October 2013 the United Nations General Assembly elected Lithuania to become one of the ten non-permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UN SC)[1]. Although in Lithuania itself this result received much less attention than the on-going Lithuanian presidency of the EU Council, it was nevertheless hailed as an "historic achievement"[2] of Lithuanian diplomacy. It was

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1 This article was written as a part of the research project "Lithuanian Foreign Policy since 2004: Between Stability and Change" conducted by Vilnius University. The research was funded by a grant (No. MIP–012/2013) from the Research Council of Lithuania.

2 „Istorinis pasiekimas: Lietuva išrinkta į Jungtinių Tautų Saugumo Tarybą" [Historical Achievement: Lithuania is elected to the UN Security Council], Delfi.lt, 17 10 2013, http://www.delfi.

noticed that Lithuania was the first Baltic State to become a member of the UN SC[3], that it served as a testimony of Lithuania's international prestige[4] and an opportunity to become a part of an important decision-making process[5].

The symbolic value of a position at the UN SC notwithstanding, the actual impact of a position at the UN SC to a state's international standing, prestige, let alone more tangible gains in economic and political terms are far from obvious and have to be analysed more carefully. At the heart of the matter is the fact that the UN SC is a hierarchical institution. The permanent five members (P5) with their veto right have a clear institutional advantage over non-permanent members. The interests of the most powerful states in the world often fall at odds over matters of global peace and security. Hence the question is whether Lithuania, as a state with limited human, economic and military resources can participate in the "great power politics" of the UN SC and in what sense its newly acquired position can be considered as a successful, let alone, historic achievement.

The aim of this article is to investigate more thoroughly in what ways Lithuania's becoming the member of the UN SC can be considered a tangible achievement. The main thesis of the article is that UN SC membership itself has an important symbolic meaning while the successful bid for the UN SC seat is a demonstration of a consistent LFP strategy. However a notable lack of strategic ideas on how to capitalise on this success transforms the political achievement of the non-permanent UN SC seat into lofty declarations emphasizing mainly bureaucratic gains.

The argument of the article is developed in three steps. First, the article analyses the theoretical significance of UN SC membership from the small state perspective. Second, it analyses Lithuania's bid to the UN SC by looking into the arguments to justify the decision and strategies used. Finally, in order to understand the vision of Lithuania being in the SC, the article evaluates and puts into the theoretical context the first four months of its membership[6].

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lt/news/daily/lithuania/istorinis–pasiekimas–lietuva–isrinkta–i–jungtiniu–tautu–saugumo–taryba.d?id=63066126, 10 11 2014.

3 „Istorinė pergalė: Lietuva tapo JT Saugumo Tarybos nare" [Historical victory: Lithuania became a member of the UN Security Council], *Lrytas.lt*, 17 10 2013, http://www.lrytas.lt/lietuvos-diena/aktualijos/istorine-pergale-lietuva-tapo-jt-saugumo-tarybos-nare-atnaujinta.htm, 10 11 2014.

4 Ibid.

5 Press Office of the President of the Republic of Lithuania, „Lietuva išrinkta į Jungtinių Tautų Saugumo Tarybą" [Lithuania is elected to the UN Security Council], 17 10 2014, http://president.lt/lt/spaudos_centras_392/pranesimai_spaudai/lietuva_isrinkta_i_jungtiniu_tautu_saugumo_taryba.html, 04 05 2014.

6 The data for the article was gathered through 5 interviews with current and former Lithuanian diplomats who were involved in Lithuania's bid for the UN SC.

1. Why bother? Small states at the UN SC

The proliferation of international organizations is the defining feature of a contemporary international system. Both from the perspective of international relations discipline[7] and political practice, state cooperation in multilateral forums facilitates collective action, enables the exchange of information and strengthens political and economic ties between nation-states, thus minimizing a threat of military confrontation[8]. To put it simply – international organizations increase the effectiveness of states' foreign policies and enhance the legitimacy of their actions in the international arena[9].

The international relations theory also points out several points of contention that question either the capacity of international organizations to impact change in the international system, or their ability to facilitate anything else but the interests of their most powerful members. At the centre of this contention is the realist paradigm, which insists that despite claims of common interests and cooperation, the functioning of international organizations reflects the power differences between states. In other words, the interests of powerful states directly influence the actions of international institutions, which become less so platforms for multilateral cooperation than "clubs of the privileged", where small states succumb to the rules of the more powerful ones[10]. From this perspective a discussion of international institutions as anything else but vehicles advancing the great states' interests is largely meaningless. Arguably, the dynamic of the "club of the privileged" is especially evident at the UN SC, which by its institutional structure alone clearly privileges the most powerful states (the P5) over others. UN SC actually more resembles a great power club rather than a typical international intergovernmental organization.

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7 For example, Keohane R., "Lilliputians' dilemmas", *International Organization* 2 (23), 1969, p. 291–310.

8 Keohane R., Martin L., "The promise of institutionalist theory", *International Security* 1 (20), 1995, p. 42.

9 See for example Snidal D., "Political economy and international institutions", *International Review of Law and Economics* 1 (16), 1996, p. 121–137. Also Abbott K.W., Snidal D., "Why states act through formal international organizations", *Journal of conflict resolution* 1 (42), 1998, p. 3–32.

10 Keohane R., Nye J., "Introduction: Governance in the Globalizing World" in Donahue J. and Nye J., eds., *Governance in the Globalizing World,* Washington: Brookings Institutions Press, 2000, p. 17. Also Mearsheimer J., "The false promise of international institutions", *International security* 3 (19), 1994-1995, p. 5–49.

The power differences between the states are emphasized by the mandate of the Council to maintain international peace and security and the exclusive right to authorize military action in the international arena[11]. Despite its mandate and power the Council is criticized for its inaction in the face of international crises. Geopolitical interests of the P5 often become more important than issues of global peace and security, leading the Council to an impasse[12]. On top of that, small states wishing to push any of the P5 members to action face the risk of upsetting their relations with the more powerful states[13].

These facts lead to at least two questions: firstly, why do small states seek a place at the UN SC, and, secondly, how if at all can non-permanent small state members of the UN SC exert any tangible influence on the Council?

A liberal institutionalist approach to international organizations in general and to the UN SC in particular provides an answer to these questions. It notes that the very existence of international organizations means that states in general are interested in cooperation. In other words, the emergence of international organizations is a result of states' willingness to cooperate, even in the conditions of anarchy[14]. Hence disregard of the organization's rules limits a state's ability to effectively further its interests[15]. This works for the advantage of small states, as by limiting actions of the more powerful ones it creates additional room for its own manoeuvres. The UN SC is a good example: even though the power differences between its members are clearly pronounced, their cooperation is necessary, even if it is often limited to procedural questions. The right of every member of the Council to draw its attention to matters of global security prevents the P5 from taking over the Council's agenda and creates an important avenue for action for the small states even in this highly hierarchical institution[16].

An even more important aspect here is that rules and procedures of international organizations not only facilitate their day-to-day functioning but also help to ensure their legitimacy and validate their role in the international arena.

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11 See Chapter VII, article 42 - Charter of the United Nations, http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/, 12 05 2014.

12 For example, Glennon M, "Why the security council failed", *Foreign Affairs* 82, 2003, p. 16.

13 Keating C., "The United Nations Security Council: Options for Small States", *Conference address*, Reikjavik, Iceland, 16 06 2008, p. 2.

14 Keohane and Martin (note 8), p. 41.

15 Abbott and Snidal (note 9), p. 16.

16 Thorhallsson B., "Small States in the UN Security Council: Means of Influence?", *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy* 2 (7), 2012, p. 141. Thorhallson, referring to Hedley Bull, also notices that the procedures of international organizations are changing the bilateral and multilateral state relations. Thus these rule and compliance with them is as important as the substantive decisions.

International organizations, in other words, become more than just a sum of their members, but rather international actors in their own right[17].

Besides simply facilitating multilateral action, international organizations perform symbolic and normative functions, which in turn give them power to act within the international system. By associating themselves with certain international institutions, states can tap into the source of their power[18]. Hurd notes, that while the UN Charter gives the UN SC broad powers, it does not provide the tools with which to enact them. Therefore, the power of the Council is contingent upon voluntary cooperation of states, which in turn is mobilized by the symbolic significance of the UN SC[19]. To put it differently, the UN SC is attributed with power over global matters of peace and security not because of formal provisions of the UN Charter, and not only because of involvement of the great states, but rather because the majority of members of the international community *see and acknowledge* the Council as a powerful institution. As a consequence states that compose the Council appropriate a part of its symbolic power[20], which explains the attraction of a place at the UN SC especially for the small states.

Despite all of the constrains imposed by the power differences between the P5 and the rest, the UN SC still offers small states a say in global matters[21], even if it does not necessarily get translated into action[22]. Nevertheless small states at the UN SC appear at the centre of global discussions, receive the possibility to voice their concerns and gain first-hand insight into matters of global politics[23]. Furthermore, the title of a non-permanent member of the UN SC affects a state's international standing, giving it additional tools to favourably shape its image both to its domestic public and abroad[24], while the successful bid to the UN SC alone

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17 Barnett M., Finnemore M., "The politics, power, and pathologies of international organizations", *International organization,* 4 (53), 1999, p. 699–732.

18 Hurd, I., „Legitimacy, Power, and the Symbolic Life of the UN Security Council", *Global Governance* 1 (8), 2002, p. 44.

19 Ibid., 35.

20 Ibid., 44.

21 Colin Keating notes the role of New Zealand and its activism in matters related to Rwanda (note 13).

22 Vanu Gapala Menon, the ambassador of Singapore notes that the small states are usually excluded from the "real" discussions at the UN SC that are dominated by the P5. In Gopala Menon V., Speech at the Academic Council of the United Nations system "Challenges facing small states at the UN", *Informational Memorandum,* 79, 2009.

23 Hurd, 42 (note 18).

24 Australia is a case in point, which used its successful bid for a seat at the UN SC in 2013-2014 to strengthen its image of a middle power concerned about giving a voice to small and middle states in the world. Melissa C. Tyler, Eleanor Pahlow, "Australia on the UN Security Council 2013–14: A Voice for Small and Medium Countries?" *The Round Table* ahead-of-print (2014): p. 96, 102.

is taken as a sign of international recognition and trust in a state's political and diplomatic capacities[25]. UN SC membership can also bring tangible economic gains in the form of financial aid[26] and easier access to the funds of global financial institutions[27].

Nevertheless it is worth noting that getting elected to the UN SC is only the beginning. Keeping in mind the constrains of power differences between the members, the ability of a small state to influence decisions made at the UN SC cannot be taken for granted. A small state that becomes a UN SC member has to be ready to deal with an intensive agenda, which firstly implies having competent and professional diplomatic staff, an effective administrative apparatus and the ability to set work priorities[28]. Secondly, a small state that knows how to use its coalition-building and leadership skills can strengthen its position at the UN SC and navigate between the interests of the great states easier[29]. Finally, a small state needs to be willing to assume an active role within the Council despite the risk of upsetting any of the more powerful states, if it wants to have any kind of influence on the UN SC[30].

Thus to briefly summarize the reasons why small states would seek a place at the UN SC, it is worth noting the symbolic value of a seat at the Council, and quite possibly its symbolic power as well. UN SC membership also demonstrates a state's reputation in the international arena and provides first-hand insights into the global issues, processes and positions. Finally it endows small states with more legitimacy to talk and be heard. Even though some authors also stress financial gains, they seem to be only of secondary importance, not least because such gains cannot be guaranteed.

The theoretical literature provides a much murkier answer to the second question, namely the ways in which a small state can gain influence at the UN SC. Mainly it is the institutional framework of the UN SC that allows participating in the formation of a global peace and security agenda, and at least to some

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25 Malone D., "Eyes on the prize: the quest for non-permanent seats on the UN Security Council", *Global Governance*, 6, 2000, p. 6.

26 The UN SC non-permanent seat brings up to 17 million USD in additional financial aid: US bilateral aid is 16 million, an additional 1 million is provided by the UN itself. See - Kuziemko I., Werker E., "How much is a seat on the Security Council worth? Foreign aid and bribery at the United Nations", *Journal of Political Economy*, 5 (114), 2006, p. 905-930.

27 Dreher A., Sturm, J.-E., Vreeland J. R., "Global horse trading: IMF loans for votes in the United Nations Security Council", *European Economic Review*, 7 (53), 2009, p 742-757.

28 Thorhallsson, "Small States in the UN Security Council", p. 152-154.

29 Ibid., p. 157-158.

30 Tyler, Pahlow, p. 99 (note 24).

extent enables quicker access to the most influential global powers. While a state's preparation to work at the UN SC in terms of diplomatic staff, clear priorities, and willingness to be active can have a positive effect, a small state's role at the UN SC is also likely to be shaped by unfolding global events and dynamics between the P5 themselves and other powerful states.

2. Lithuania's road to the Security Council

By analysing the main reasoning behind Lithuania's UN SC bid, and the actions it took during the election campaign, this section demonstrates that the main goal of Lithuania was its symbolic recognition. Indeed, as Ian Hurd notes, the symbolic power of the UN SC fuels the desire to become a part of the Council, even if non-permanent members cannot expect to have real influence[31].

The beginning of membership in the EU and NATO in 2004 was a landmark event for Lithuania. As the goals of accession largely defined its policies since regaining independence in 1990, Lithuania had to develop new ones that would lead its foreign policy onwards. These quickly became defined as greater presence and visibility both in the EU and NATO and international politics more generally, especially in the Eastern European region[32]. Initially the goal of greater international visibility was closely linked with the aim to establish Lithuania as a "regional centre", promoting democratic reforms in its Eastern neighbourhood[33]. Though the idea of a "regional centre" gradually lost traction, the goal of greater international visibility and hence, active participation in international organizations remained. Lithuania's efforts to become a non-permanent member of the UN SC have to be seen in this context.

Actually, neither strategic documents, nor the diplomats interviewed for this article have indicated any more concrete goals that Lithuania aimed to achieve in the UN SC. Rather, membership at the Council was seen as a goal in itself, enabling Lithuania to participate at the highest level of international politics – an achievement that in the future could possibly facilitate creation of economic and

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31 Hurd, p. 41-42 (note 18).

32 Paulauskas, A, „Naujoji Lietuvos užsienio politika" [New Lithuanian Foreign Policy], Speech by Acting President Artūras Paulauskas at Vilnius University, 24 05 2004, http://paulauskas.president.lt/one.phtml?id=4994, 12 05 2014.

33 Ibid.

cultural ties with the other UN member-states[34]. Nevertheless such a goal is still too vague to be considered strategic.

As indicated in the previous section, the seat at the UN SC is considered to showcase a state's international reputation. However an international reputation has to be at least partially built prior to actual membership in the Council. In other words, the country has to firstly become visible as a candidate, to be later visible as a member of the UN SC. Thus, it was understood that Lithuania had to increase its presence in UN structures and secure the support of the regional Eastern European electoral group in order to place a successful bid[35].

Even though the UN Charter does not list any specific requirements for candidates to the Security Council, the general practice dictates that aspirants must have substantial experience in international leadership, be active in peacekeeping, peace-building and development efforts, and make timely contributions to the UN budget[36]. Meeting these requirements can be likened to acquiring "diplomatic capital", and demands a long-term consistent effort.

Lithuania's most prominent involvements in the UN structures after 2004 were its chairmanship of the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in 2007 and its bid for the UN GA presidency in 2012. Work at the forefront of the ECOSOC was an important exercise for Lithuania that strengthened its capacity to work with global development issues that do not receive much attention in Lithuania's foreign policy. According to the interviewed diplomats, this experience helped to create an image of an "honest broker" and develop consensus-building skills, which were important both for Lithuania's election campaign and work at the UN SC itself[37]. Nevertheless the value of ECOSOC chairmanship in terms of the UN SC bid is assigned retrospectively: it does not seem to have been a part of a consistent strategy to secure a non-permanent member's seat, but rather an outcome of the general LFP aim of "greater international visibility"[38].

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34 Istorinis pasiekimas (note 2).

35 Regional electoral groups ensure equitable geographical distribution on non-permanent UN SC members. Hence one seat is assigned for Eastern European countries that comprise the electoral group, which in turn selects a candidate for the UN SC to be approved by the General Assembly. See Chapter XV. Elections to Principal Organs in General Assembly of United Nations, *Rules of Procedure*, http://www.un.org/en/ga/about/ropga/elect.shtml, 10 10 2014.

36 The UN Elections Campaign, *Security Council*, http://www.unelections.org/?q=node/33, 12 05 2014.

37 Interview with a Lithuanian diplomat, 26 03 2014, Vilnius.

38 For example, a brief action report of MFA in 2007 notes that "successful chairmanship of the [ECOSOC] strengthens Lithuania's international authority", however does not indicate any potential benefits to the UN SC bid. *2007 m. veiklos ataskaita (užsienio politika)* [Report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007], http://www.urm.lt/default/lt/2007m-veiklos-ataskaita, 12 05 2014.

In that regard Lithuania's bid to preside over the 67th general debate of the General Assembly was probably a more significant factor establishing its status of a serious contender for a UN SC seat. Usually the president of the General Assembly is assigned on a rotational basis regarding the regional groups, – after they reach consensus regarding the candidate. In 2012, Russia, which belongs to the same regional group as Lithuania, unexpectedly threw its active support behind the Serbian candidate Vuk Jeremic, thus violating an implicit agreement[39] within the group to support the Lithuanian candidate Dalius Cekuolis.

Consequently the selection of the UN GA president that was meant to be a formality became a major challenge and competition for Lithuanian diplomacy. It was the first time in 20 years that the president of the Assembly was determined by a secret vote[40]. The Lithuanian candidate lost by a narrow margin (99 to 85)[41], and the vote in Lithuania was labelled as "failure of Lithuanian diplomacy" [42]. However, this fight became instrumental in securing the seat at the UN SC. According to the Lithuanian diplomat, Russia's actions that breached informal arrangements within the regional group prevented it to dispute Lithuania's candidacy for the UN SC, as a representative of Eastern European countries[43]. Although the election dynamics vary across the regional groups, the most frequent determinant of UN SC elections is "turn-taking"[44], arguably because in the conditions of high competition it helps to ensure equitable opportunities to bid for the UN SC to the majority of UN members. Hence the breach of "turn-taking" arrangements, although occurring[45], is frowned upon, just as is the meddling of great-states in the electoral process[46].

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39 As it was stated by Lithuanian diplomats participating in the process.

40 United Nations, "General Assembly Elects Serbia's Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremic President of Sixty-seventh Session; Also Names 20 Vice-Presidents", New York: UN Department of Public Information, 2012, http://www.un.org/press/en/2012/ga11253.doc.htm, 12 05 2014.

41 Ibid.

42 BNS, „Čekuolis pralaimėjo JT Generalinės Asamblėjos pirmininko rinkimus varžovui iš Serbijos" [Čekuolis lost the elections of the UN General Assembly President to the Serbian opponent], *Alfa.lt*, 08 06 2012, http://www.alfa.lt/straipsnis/14752698/Cekuolis.pralaimejo.JT.Generalines.Asamblejos.pirmininko.rinkimus.varzovui.is.Serbijos=2012–06–08_18–13/#.U3MTVMagwlI, 13 05 2014.

43 Interview with a former Lithuanian diplomat, 01 04 2014, Vilnius.

44 Vreeland J. R., Dreher A., *The political Economy of the United Nations Security Council,* New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014, p. 97.

45 Malone (note 24), p 19.

46 For example Australia saw its close relations with the US as a possibly damaging factor in its 2012 bid, as it was aware that other states could perceive that as protectionism. See International Peace Institute, Taking Stock, *Moving Forward. Report to the Foreign Ministry of Finland on the 2012*

Lithuania's attempts to secure the support of its regional group were further strengthened by the fact that its main competitor was Georgia. Although Georgia was especially active in promoting its candidacy[47], its chances were limited because of its complicated geopolitical situation[48]. Thus, Georgia withdrew its bid for the UN SC seat four months prior to the vote in the General Assembly, leaving Lithuania the sole contender. It seems also that this decision was also influenced by good Lithuanian-Georgian relations and the latter's principle agreement to Lithuania being in the UN SC[49].

It can also be contended that Lithuania's success was reinforced by its previous experience of chairing the OSCE and the Community of Democracies. Lithuanian diplomats believe that it shaped Lithuania's image as a competent international player and allowed to secure endorsements from other UN members in various bilateral and multilateral meetings[50]. This resulted in a successful albeit small budget[51] election campaign – Lithuania's candidacy for the UN SC received the support of 187 states.

Thus the quick analysis of the Lithuania's election process demonstrates that its strategy was to create a favourable international reputation and further increase international visibility. Besides meetings with diplomats in New York and other international forums, Lithuania did not seem to use many other election tactics (for example, actively promote a specific UN cause[52]). In that regard, Lithuania's election strategy could be likened to a process of acquiring diplomatic capital, which happens over time and requires using every opportunity for international engagements. However this also means that during the election process Lithuania's reasoning behind the UN SC bid was not explained beyond the goal of yet more international visibility.

Elections to the United Nations Security Council, 2013, http://formin.finland.fi/public/download.aspx?ID=112186&GUID=%7BD6FD5A08–5BD4–4F17–994E–F3262539F28F%7D, 13 10 2014, p. 5.

47 Interview with a Lithuanian diplomat, 26 03 2014, Vilnius.

48 The UN elections Campaign (note 36).

49 Interview with a former Lithuanian diplomat, 01 04 2014, Vilnius.

50 Interview with a Lithuanian diplomat, 02 04 2014, Vilnius.

51 Even though the exact sum is not disclosed, unofficial data suggests the campaign budget was 300 000 LTL, that were mainly used to pay for the trips of the diplomatic staff.

52 As noted by the International Peace Institute Report, a clearly defined election theme or a priority area helps to demonstrate competence and leadership within the international community. It is used as election tactic and can be useful to the work in the Council itself. International Peace Institute (note 46), p. 5, also Thorhallsson (note 16), p. 147.

3. Lithuania at the UN SC: opportunities and visibility

Small states that begin their term at the UN SC are simultaneously faced with an increased number of international issues on their agenda and the need to delicately navigate the interests and interactions of the permanent members of the Council. Even more important however is the internalisation of UN SC member status. As it was demonstrated in the first section of the article, there are few strategies and tools to influence the workings of the UN SC. The most tangible influence can be gained through agenda-setting, using the procedural rules of the Council.

As at the time of preparation of the article Lithuania has not even completed its first year at the UN SC, its performance and capacities to achieve its goals are assessed based on the first four months spent at the Council (including the presidency of the Council in February 2014) and through the perceptions of diplomats about the possibilities on what could and should be done. Therefore the main question of this section is not whether Lithuania is successful in influencing UN SC decisions, but whether it is prepared to do so.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania had institutionally prepared for membership quite effectively. As Lithuania's term in the UN SC was approaching, its diplomatic representation in New York received additional staff. The Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs also established a new Security Council Affairs Coordination division[53] that was set to coordinate the work at the UN SC. Clearly, institutional preparation was timely and calculated though the effectiveness and necessity of a new department has yet to be independently assessed.

During the first month alone, Lithuania had to engage in discussions regarding the situation in Mali, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Palestine, Sudan and South Sudan, the Ivory Coast and Burundi[54]. It also began its chairmanship of the Central African Republic Sanctions Committee, where it had to deal with questions of civilian protection, prevention of sexual violence and peace-building[55]. These are questions that usually fall out of the range of the competences of Lithuanian diplomacy and are very far from Lithuanian foreign policy interests, let alone

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53 Interview with a Lithuanian diplomat, 03 04 2014, Vilnius.

54 The UN SC Meetings Records, http://www.un.org/en/sc/meetings/records/2014.shtml, 12 05 2014.

55 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania, „JT Saugumo Tarybos Sankcijų komitetas Centrinei Afrikos Respublikai" [Security Council Committee concerning the Central African Republic], 17 02 2014, http://www.urm.lt/default/lt/jt–saugumo–tarybos–sankciju–komitetas–centrinei–afrikos–respublikai, 16 05 2014.

priorities. Because of that Lithuanian diplomats cannot rely solely on their national bureaucracy (a situation further complicated by a small number of Lithuanian diplomatic representations outside of Europe), but have to find additional sources of information[56]. This situation increases the extent of the workload and responsibility and encourages personal rather than institutional diplomacy. On the other hand, a small bureaucratic apparatus leaves a lot of room for individual action and initiative for the diplomats in New York, which also allows them to react to situations quickly and speeds up the decision-making process.

The diplomats noted, that their work at the UN SC was facilitated by "team playing" with the UN Secretariat, especially with regards to the exchange of information[57]. Close cooperation with other EU countries was also important: several states which have an extensive network of diplomatic representations around the world were willing to share information and expertise regarding events that are outside the usual scope (and, hence, expertise) of Lithuanian interests[58].

Nevertheless the Chairmanship of the EU Council in the second half of 2013 demonstrated that Lithuania lacks expertise in a variety of topics. The scope of demands for expertise is even more extensive at the UN SC. The events in Ukraine since the end of 2014 have forced Lithuanian diplomats to concentrate on an issue they are deeply competent and vocal about. But Lithuania's capacity to express independent and concise positions on other matters seems to be limited so far. Furthermore, dependence on outside sources of expertise and information is an obstacle to form an independent position that fully reflects Lithuania's national interests (assuming it has one regarding a particular issue) and policy.

The second challenge of being in the UN SC is working around a variety of cleavages that exist globally, especially between the countries of the "Global North" and the "Global South". In this context Lithuanian diplomats most frequently tend to talk about Lithuania as an "honest broker", the role which by itself can increase the country's influence in the institution. However the implication behind the role of an "honest broker" has to be scrutinised more carefully.

Generally, the idea is that the majority of questions discussed at the UN SC are not of immediate significance to Lithuania, which facilitates the creation of an "honest broker" image. A limited geography of national interests also means that Lithuania does not bring its own "problems" to the UN SC and is unlikely to transfer its foreign policy questions to the Council's agenda. In other words it is believed that Lithuania is generally considered as neutral regarding the questions

56 Interview with a Lithuanian diplomat, 26 03 2014, Vilnius.

57 Interview with a Lithuanian diplomat, 26 03 2014, Vilnius.

58 Interview with a Lithuanian diplomat, 03 04 2014, Vilnius.

that cause the biggest disagreements between the countries of the "Global South" and the "Global North". Consequently, despite it belonging to the "club of the privileged"[59], Lithuania is seen as a "reasonable country", which opens up more space for it to act within the UN SC. But the question remains, what kind of actions is this kind of space being opened for?

Furthermore an even more acute question is whether membership in the so-called "privileged club" (i.e. the EU) provides at least part of the neutrality Lithuanian diplomats tend to depict. One case stands out as serious contradiction to the neutrality claims: namely the question of Palestine in the UN. In 2011 Lithuania voted against Palestinian membership in UNESCO[60]. Though this decision was much debated domestically[61], in general this position essentially reflected the desire for official Lithuanian foreign policy to have strong and close relations with the US and its attempts to strengthen ties with Israel. However in the UN context this vote clearly put Lithuania in the group of states that support Israel in the Middle East conflict, which potentially also raises doubt regarding Lithuania's ability to be a "honest broker" in matters of contentious global issues. Besides, the further question is whether a state can remain an "honest broker" when the actions of UN SC directly affect its national interests, as the crisis in Ukraine demonstrates. The vocal and unambiguous position of Lithuania regarding Russia's role in the Ukrainian conflict[62] during the first several months in the UN SC clearly contradicts the initial ideas about Lithuania's planned role in the institution.

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59 Interview with a Lithuanian diplomat, 26 03 2014, Vilnius.

60 BNS, ELTA, „Palestina tapo UNESCO nare, Lietuva balsavo prieš" [Palestine became UNESCO member, Lithuania voted against], Delfi.lt, 31 10 2011, http://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/world/palestina–tapo–unesco–nare–lietuva–balsavo–pries.d?id=51270287, 17 05 2014.

61 E.g., Bogdanas, R., „Lietuva ir Palestina: greitai pamiršome, kaip mus palaikė" [Lithuania and Palestine: we forgot very quickly how we had been supported], Delfi.lt, 02 12 2011, http://www.delfi.lt/news/ringas/lit/rbogdanas-lietuva-ir-palestina-greitai-pamirsome-kaip-mus-palaike.d?id=52440529, 10 11 2014; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania, URM pareiškimas dėl Palestinos statuso UNESCO [MFA Statement regarding the status of Palestine in UNESCO], 02 11 2011, http://www.urm.lt/default/lt/naujienos/urm-pareiskimas-del-palestinos-statuso-unesco, 11 11 2014.

62 See - Elta, „JT Saugumo Tarybos posėdyje - Lietuvos parama Ukrainai" [UN SC – Support of Ukraine by Lithuania], Delfi.lt, 01 03 2014, http://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithuania/jt-saugumo-tarybos-posedyje-lietuvos-parama-ukrainai.d?id=64163380, 11 10 2014; BNS, „Lietuvos ambasadorė: Rusija JT naudoja propagandą, manipuliacijas ir spaudimą" [Lithuanian ambassador: Russia uses propaganda, manipulation and pressure in the UN], Delfi.lt, 17 10 2014, http://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithuania/lietuvos-ambasadore-rusija-jt-naudoja-propaganda-manipuliacijas-ir-spaudima.d?id=66139930, 11 11 2014; BNS, „Lietuvos prašymu šaukiamas JT Saugumo Tarybos posėdis dėl Ukrainos" [On request of Lithuania UN SC organizes the meeting on Ukraine], Delfi.lt, 28 08 2014, http://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithuania/lietuvos-prasymu-saukiamas-jt-saugumo-tarybos-posedis-del-ukrainos.d?id=65684934, 11 11 2014.

However such a role is consistent with Lithuania's resolve to be active at the UN SC, which in this case is not understood exclusively in a sense of frequent contributions to Council discussions (or other quantifiable criteria), but rather defines the general attitude to the work in the Council and willingness to take initiative. Lithuania's priorities for its work at the UN SC include strengthening the rule of law, prevention of armed conflict, civilian protection (in particular, of women and children), prevention of sexual violence, cyber and energy security[63]. These priorities should not be understood as stemming directly from Lithuanian national interests[64], but rather approached as a set of broad questions that help it to get involved in the global agenda of the UN SC. But more importantly, their relatively high number reflects Lithuania's aim to be an active member of the Council, – a sentiment which was repeated by the interviewed diplomats[65]. Notably this is also consistent with a general goal of Lithuanian foreign policy – that of having an active role within international organizations, as noted above. But it also indicates ambiguity regarding the specific achievements that Lithuania expects of its term at the UN SC.

Nevertheless, Ukrainian events provided the impetus to have a more defined policy line in the UN SC, and to achieve some tangible results in its foreign policy. Even the general goal of "more visibility" here has a concrete expression. The UN SC pretty quickly started to pay attention to the Ukrainian crisis and Lithuanian efforts to include it in the agenda were visible and effective. Lithuania had to cooperate closely with UK, France and the US, as without their support it would have hardly been successful[66]. This revealed the Lithuanian capability to use its resources (i.e. diplomacy and the image of an expert in Eastern European matters) and insert very specific questions into the Council's agenda, which are relevant for its national interests.

Even though it is very difficult to capture progress in the matters of global peace and security, the Lithuanian tendency to follow an ambitious agenda at international organizations complicates its abilities to achieve tangible progress in selected areas[67]. The effectiveness of its efforts would increase if it prioritized one of the areas relevant in the UN context. The benefits of such an approach are

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63 Permanent Mission of Lithuania to the United Nations in New York, *Lithuania Commenced its Term on the UN Security Council*, Vilnius, 02 01 2014, http://mission–un–ny.mfa.lt/index.php?2151146331, 16 05 2014.

64 Except for energy and cyber security.

65 Interview with a Lithuanian diplomat, 26 03 2014, Vilnius.

66 Interview with a Lithuanian diplomat, 02 04 2014, Vilnius.

67 Thorhallsson (note 16), p. 146.

confirmed by the examples of the Nordic States, which have consistently worked with conflict prevention and peace-building issues and, arguably because of that created an image of effective and competent members of the international society[68]. However this kind of visibility is built not on the idea to be seen and heard as often as possible, but rather on taking up specific activities and having a consistent policy and position.

On one hand, Lithuania seems to be prepared to achieve some kind of influence at the UN: it made the necessary institutional arrangements and its diplomats have acquired experience of working at prominent multilateral institutions. However that does not guarantee an expert understanding of most of the issues discussed at the UN SC. Lithuania's position is further complicated by ambiguity of its "honest broker" image – it is not clear whether Lithuania is as successful in maintaining it as the interviewed diplomats suggest, especially with regards to events in Ukraine. On the other hand, Lithuania's vocal position on this matter is consistent with its national interests and its area of expertise. The question remains though, whether Lithuania will be able to capitalise on this issue in the absence of a more coherent strategy of membership in the UN SC.

Conclusions

Lithuania's membership in the UN SC is clearly associated with a goal of increased international prominence and visibility. However the actual benefits of such a position to Lithuania's foreign policy remain unclear. Rather, with the UN SC membership Lithuania seems to be following the general tendency of its foreign policy to seek international visibility for its own sake. However with regards to the UN SC membership, such a position is not exclusive to Lithuania – as demonstrated in this article, it has a highly symbolic value that puts small states at the centre of global events and can even contribute to the increase of their symbolic power.

However, for that to happen a non-permanent member has to be able to capitalise on its membership at the UN SC, and Lithuania's position in that regard

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[68] Ibid., p. 147. On the other hand, as the interviewed diplomats note, the fact that Lithuania did not closely associate itself with one specific priority helped it to gather support in the election campaign. States that deviate from the best-practises in terms of rule of law or human rights did not have to be afraid of a Lithuanian "dictate", and thus supported its candidacy. This is also confirmed by the Finnish experience, whose failure to be elected to the Council in 2012 was partially caused by its insistence on good governance and human rights, that alienated a number of states. See International Peace Institute (note 46).

is ambiguous. On one hand, its election to the Council and previous experience at the helm of international forums (the OSCE, Community of Democracies and the EU Council) indicates that it can successfully raise its international profile and is capable of working at the top level of international politics, even if it lacks expertise on a number of questions discussed at the UN SC because of the limited priorities of its foreign policy. A notable exception in that regard is Lithuania's engagement with the question of Ukraine: the crisis that coincided with the beginning of Lithuania's term at the UN SC encourages Lithuania to assume an active role at the Council, as this is a question directly related to Lithuania's national interests.

On the other hand, the more important issue here is the absence of any coherent strategy of what Lithuania aims to achieve with its term at the UN SC. The priorities that it has set for itself are numerous, broad, and concern areas that are not within its expertise. Paradoxically this situation is somewhat mitigated by the coincidence of the Ukrainian crisis, however taking a broader look at the term in the UN SC it remains unclear how exactly, Lithuania intends to capitalise on its increased international visibility. Lithuania's membership in the UN SC thus more resembles a lucky accident that coincides with its insistence on "greater international visibility", rather than an outcome of the foreign policy strategy.

Of course, membership at the UN SC can indeed be considered an achievement in terms of opportunities for a small state's visibility and symbolic power. It is necessary to make sure though, that they both are not wasted.

ENERGY SECURITY THROUGH MEMBERSHIP IN NATO AND THE EU: INTERESTS AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF LITHUANIA

Arūnas Molis, Tomas Vaišnoras*

Abstract

Lithuania's energy security is inseparable from the country's membership in the EU and NATO. As a small state with little domestic resources and almost completely dependent on external suppliers, Lithuania is very interested in multilateral energy cooperation. Therefore the first part of this article is an overview of the development of the EU's common energy policy's external dimension and NATO energy initiatives. We present a chronological outline of the most important developments, distinguish the main goals, problems and possible solutions. The second part of the article explores Lithuania's interests and achievements in creating the EU Common Energy Policy and formulating a NATO energy strategy. The focus is on Lithuania's achievements and failures during the EU Presidency, also on the importance of the NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence and its possible impact on energy security[1].

Introduction

According to the data of the International Maritime Bureau, in the first half of 2011 there were 266 pirate attacks. This is 36 percent more than during the same period in 2010. The majority of incidents were reported off the coasts of Somalia and Yemen – waters of probably the most intensive oil tanker movement in the world[2]. On the other hand, neither this nor any other energy security challenges are new to EU Member States: ensuring supply or demand, reliability of

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2 Brigita Kupstaityte, "Setting databases – another way to prevent attacks against the energy infrastructure". *Energy security: operational highlights. NATO Energy security Centre of excellence,* 2013. P.1 4.

external suppliers, physical protection of infrastructure, and supranational energy policy dilemmas have been known for more than half a century[3]. Despite this, development of a common EU energy policy (hereinafter – CEP) began only in 2005–2006: up to then, issues of energy have been attributed to the competence of environmental protection, competitiveness, trade, common market and other "common" EU policies. The resolution to create the CEP was motivated by a number of factors: EU expansion and the interests of the new Member States, more common disruptions in the supply of energy resources, growing global competition for resources, the acknowledged need to more effectively encourage energy saving and development of renewable energy resources (hereinafter – RER) and finally – the search for a new EU integration "engine". All this just in a few years allowed the EU CEP to become one of the most dynamically developing directions in EU integration.

Now B. Nowak (2010) proposes to distinguish two main EU CEP dimensions: internal – related to the development of a common market and competitiveness, and external – related to ensuring the supply of energy resources from third countries[4]. So far the external dimension of the EU's common energy policy is in the stage of debates and negotiations, however, there are indications of some progress in this area: the EU collaborates with NATO and TATENA, Brazil, China, India, Iraq, Norway, South Africa, Russia, Ukraine, OPEC countries and the USA regarding energy issues, energy aspects are also discussed in the agreements concerning the action plan of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), in the agreements of association or collaboration; non-committal agreements (MoU) in the energy domain have been signed with Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Iraq, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. As concerns regarding energy resource supply are becoming an integral part of security policy, certain decisions have already been made at a supranational level by following other principles of creating and implementing a common foreign and security policy (CFSP)[5].

In 2006 issues of energy security finally made their way into the NATO agenda. As it often happens, the way for political consultations and discussions on the subject of energy in the Alliance was paved by dangerous tendencies in the strategic environment: namely, 2005 marked the beginning of rather noticeable

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3 Dimitrios Triantaphyllou, "Energy Security and Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Wider Black Sea Area Context", *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies,* No.7 Issue 2, 2007, p. 289.

4 Bartlomiej Nowak, "Forging the External Dimension of the Energy Policy of the European Union", *The Electricity Journal,* Vol. 23, Issue 1, 2010, p 57.

5 Op. Cit. Triantaphyllou D. p. 290

disputes between Russia and Ukraine over gas transit that are still relevant in terms of security of self-supply of energy resources among Alliance members. Before that energy issues have been solved on a technical level, i.e., they have been discussed in the context of logistics, fuel supply and have not been included in the NATO political agenda. However, NATO's Strategic Concept of 1999 already includes a sentence addressing energy security issues: it is stated in the document that energy supply disruptions pose a threat to NATO members. The document did not specify the details of possible NATO actions, though joint consultations and a collective response were indicated as possible measures. This gave birth to one more important EU and NATO partnership direction – ensuring energy security by developing Euro-Atlantic relations with non-EE and non-NATO countries.

The objective of this article is to give an overview of the development of the EU CEP external dimension and NATO energy security initiatives, and to identify Lithuanian interests in this context. This article makes the assumption that Lithuania is interested not only in expanding and reinforcing the EU CEP external dimension, but also NATO's involvement in the issues of energy security. Thus by evaluating the success or failure of fulfilling Lithuanian interests in this context, the focus is on to what extent objectives relating to external Lithuanian energy policy were incorporated in the EU and NATO documents, some of which became norms, laws, commitments or initiated other fundamental decisions. Results of this research serve as a basis for proposals regarding further Lithuanian efforts in fostering united EU and NATO actions in different areas of energy security.

1. Legal development of the EU CEP external dimension

The Single European Act, and the Treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice have not established any supranational mechanisms in the energy domain[6]. However, in the sixties and seventies there was some effort by the EC to deal with the issue of energy security on a supranational level: e.g., in 1968 the EC introduced the Community Energy Policy[7], in which dependence on external suppliers was identified as a "dangerous tendency", it was proposed to create a common EU energy market and diversify suppliers. Yet at that time energy prices were relatively

[6] Sami Andoura, Leigh Hancher, Marc Van Der Woude, *Towards a European Energy Community: A Policy Proposal*, Notre Europe, 2010, p. 7.

[7] Secretariat-General of the Commission of the European Comminities, *First Guidelines for a Community Energy Policy*, 1968, <http://aei.pitt.edu/5134/1/5134.pdf>, 23 06 2014

reasonable and supply was adequate and without disruptions, so those suggestions by the Commission were ignored. Therefore, EU energy security has developed mainly as a response to crises, such as the Suez Crisis in 1956, the Six-Day War in 1967, the oil embargo in 1973, and the Iranian Revolution in 1979.

It was not until 2007 that EU countries began to search for ways of how to compensate the growing dependency in the sector of fossil fuels and associated risks by effective diplomatic, political and economic means. It is worth noting that despite dominant contrary opinion about Germany, the most important binding documents regulating Member State integration in the energy sector were adopted in the term of its presidency (i.e., in the first half of 2007). This also applies to the first EC initiatives, for instance, the document regarding the Strategic Energy Review ("The EU Strategic Energy Review. Driving Investment in Clean and Secure Energy"). Namely on the basis of this document, on 8–9 March 2007, the European Council adopted the 2007–2009 action plan of the Council of Europe – "An Energy Policy for Europe"[8], by means of which Member States were encouraged to increase diversity of energy resources and supply routes, competitiveness in the internal energy market and to create more effective responses to crises mechanisms, grounded on partnership inside the EU.

Later, on 13 November 2008, the EC adopted "An EU Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan: Second Strategic Energy Review"[9]. This document covers the strategy of relations with external players and introduces a fundamental notion that "speaking with one voice" is essential in seeking pragmatic cooperation with energy suppliers and transit countries. On the other hand, even until 2009 the approach has prevailed that reliable resource supply should be founded not on negotiations of supranational EU institutions with suppliers, but on an effectively functioning common EU internal market. Because of this approach the EU Council retained the main competencies of shaping external energy policy[10] – the power of the EC was limited. The situation changed after a gas supply crisis in 2009, when the EC proposed to expand its powers and to hold to the principle of "solidarity"

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8 Communication from the Commission to the European Council and the European Parliament, *An Energy Policy for Europe*, 2007, <http://ec.europa.eu/energy/energy_policy/doc/01_energy_policy_for_europe_en.pdf>, 23 06 2014

9 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, An EU Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan, 2008, <http://www.aie.eu/files/Directives_EU/strategic_energy_review_communication_EN.pdf>, 23 06 2014

10 Tomas Maltby, "European Union energy policy integration: A case of European Commission policy entrepreneurship and increasing supranationalism", *Energy Policy*, 2013, p. 6.

in dealing with external suppliers. Member States agreed on this matter and this enabled the Commission to prepare a Regulation on the Security of Gas Supply in the Internal Market, which was adopted by the EP and Council in 2010. When the Third Energy Package (TEP)[11] prepared by the EC was adopted in 2009, this paved the way for new electricity and gas suppliers to enter the EU market.

In February of 2010 the EU Council prepared an overview of the EU energy policy dimension in which it was noted that because of the growing dependency on imported energy resources and other important reasons, the EU must use its advantages and strengthen the external dimension of the common energy policy. The EC was one of the most active institutions in shaping the EU CEP, however after being deprived of the authority to create the EU CEP external dimension directly, the EC chose an alternative path to achieve this goal. For example, after the adoption of Regulation No 994/2010 *concerning measures to safeguard security of gas supply* of 20 October 2010[12] and after establishing mandatory requirements for gas supply infrastructure, countries were obliged to ensure that in case of gas supply disruptions in the main infrastructure, the technical capabilities of the remaining infrastructure would be adequate to supply for a maximum daily gas demand. The Communication of 17 November 2010 – *Energy infrastructure priorities for 2020 and beyond – A Blueprint for an integrated European energy network*[13] – proposed a way to achieve this: focus is on the imperative to prepare a new EU energy infrastructure policy that should coordinate development of energy networks at a European level, establish the most appropriate model, etc.

In 2011 the EC was for the first time granted authority to negotiate with Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan regarding the building of the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline, while in 2012 it received the opportunity to negotiate with Russia and Belarus regarding disconnection of the Baltic States' electrical energy system and market. The EC Communication of 2011 and following conclusions of the EU Council: "The EU Energy Policy: Engaging with Partners beyond Our Borders" proposed ways on how to mitigate some possible outcomes by employing instruments of the EU CEP external dimension: shortly after, an EC mechanism dedicated to informing about the planned bilateral agreements with non EU

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11 *Third Package for Electricity and Gas Markets*, 2007, <http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/legislation/third_legislative_package_en.htm>, 29 06 2014

12 Regulation (EU) no 994/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council, *Concerning Measures to Safeguard Security of Gas Supply*, 2010, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32010R0994&from=EN>, 29 06 2014

13 The Communication from the Commission, *Energy infrastructure priorities for 2020 and beyond*, 2011, <http://ec.europa.eu/energy/infrastructure/strategy/2020_en.htm>, 03 07 2014

members regarding supply and transportation of energy resources was introduced. Member States were offered legal support in negotiating decisions, directly related to internal market legislation. Neighbouring countries were encouraged to adopt EU energy market regulations. Thus, although the EC's role in the area of the EU CEP external dimension still cannot be compared with its influence in other areas of common market regulation, the EC has become an important power center, supervising EU relations with key suppliers of energy resources.

2. Reinforcing the EU CEP external dimension: goals, challenges, solutions

One of the essential goals of the EU CEP external dimension is to enhance supply security by diversifying energy resources, their supply routes and suppliers themselves. Although Member States are not in dispute over the importance of the EU CEP external dimension, it must be admitted that its development is still very slow. This is mainly caused by two reasons: 1) problematic relationships with external suppliers (especially Russia), caused by their reluctance to follow EU energy *acquis communautaires*; 2) lack of solidarity inside the EU as bilateral agreements are prioritized over a collective position of the whole Union which leads to reluctance or inability to coordinate all EU external policy initiatives. Successful development of the EU CEP external dimension is hardly possible if these problems are not solved. Therefore, further follows a discussion of those challenges as well as possible solutions.

Energy *acquis communautaires* could be expanded by the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), Energy Community Treaty, EU Neighbourhood Policy, partnership and cooperation associations, free-trade and other agreements with EU partner countries. Some of the most important regions for the EU in this context are Middle East, North Africa and Caspian Sea regions that are rich in natural resources, as well as the Balkans, Eastern Europe, South Caucasus and Turkey, valuable in terms of the transportation of energy resources. As regards legally binding agreements with EU partners, the Energy Community Treaty plays a substantial role: its primary objective has been to create a regional energy market between the EU and the Balkans, later on this goal was expanded to Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia. This agreement obliged newly accessing countries to gradually adopt the EU legal base in the areas of energy, environmental protection, renewable energy and competition. It should be noted that expansion of the EU energy *acquis* beyond the Community

boundaries faces an essential problem of differing attitudes and interests, where Russia plays a substantial role. This doesn't come as a surprise: F. Umbrach claims that transposition of the EU's common energy market regulations beyond the EU would substantially undermine Russia's monopolistic position and contribute to lowering the price of natural gas[14].

Member State solidarity in relation to agreements with suppliers concerning quantities, prices, transportation means and conditions is a completely different case. One of the fundamental challenges in this context lies in the divergent member state attitudes towards the relationship with Russia – the largest natural gas exporter and the second largest oil exporter to the EU. The ECT's envisioned liberalization of the energy market, opening of supply networks and admitting foreign investors contradicts Russian strategic goals in the energy sector[15]. Therefore Russia is more inclined to base energy relations on bilateral agreements between countries rather than on the principle of multilateralism.[16] Moreover, the dialogue between the EU and Russia regarding energy is impeded by the position in the area of energy security in terms of values: there are divergent visions as to what the energy market should be like and what should be the structure of the natural gas sector. But the worst thing is that there is no agreement inside the EU regarding collective response to these tactics coming from Moscow. Though many CEE countries encourage a prompt reduction on dependence on Russian energy resources, to ground the relations with third country suppliers on the export of their *acquis communautaire* and use it as a basis for creating a common regulatory system (standards, regulations, etc.), even in the face of a military crisis in Ukraine, some Western countries still pursue to maintain an intensive bilateral energy relationship with this country.

In B. Nowak's opinion, another issue arising from the lack of solidarity lies in the reluctance of Member States (especially the great powers) to relegate to EU institutions negotiations with energy resource suppliers: long-term bilateral contracts are signed between external suppliers and separate EU countries, and not the EC[17] (e.g., the North Stream project was an agreement between Germany and

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14 Frank Umbach, "Global energy security and the implications for the EU", *Energy Policy*, Vol. 38, 2010, p. 1237.

15 Oil and natural gas are one of the key instruments of Russia for reinforcing its authority in the region and trying to recover its superpower status. Since the state controls almost all Russian energy resources, they are rather openly used as a means of political pressure.

16 Sadek Boursena, Catherine Loctelli, "Energy institutional and organizational changes in EU and Russia: Revisiting gas relations", *Energy Policy*, 2013, p. 2.

17 Op. cit. Nowak, B., p. 64.

Russia, South Stream – between Italy, Bulgaria and Russia, various liquefied gas deals have been made between France, Spain and Algeria). Although it is clear that the negotiating position of companies from the EU's small powers is substantially worse, the great powers' companies are not inclined to invest in unprofitable, usually politically biased projects or initiatives that would strengthen not their energy security, but that of the small powers. In other words, German, French and Italian energy companies that already have access to Russian energy resources, have no interest to pass on their negotiating competencies to EU institutions, for instance, the EC[18].

On the other hand, this does not mean that the EU's small powers have given up and do nothing to reinforce the role of supranational institutions. In the EC Communicate of 2011 – "EU Energy Policy: Engaging with Partners beyond Our Borders"[19] – it is mostly to their credit that the first specific instruments for increasing solidarity were successfully adopted: information exchange and legal support to the members negotiating energy resources. The EC achieved that those Member State agreements with third countries that might have a significant impact on the development of EU energy infrastructure and energy supply, must entirely comply with EU legislation. This mechanism implies that before signing a bilateral agreement with any third country, every Member State should inform the Commission about it (in order to assess its compliance with EU law). It is especially important that Member States are obliged to inform about any bilateral agreements even before they are signed, which enables the Commission to influence ongoing negotiations and not just express its opinion about an already signed agreement[20].

As regards the development of the EU CEP external dimension – in response to the need to reconcile EU CEP external dimension initiatives and other externally oriented common EU policies, the EC report "EU Energy Supply Security and Geopolitics"[21] has already attempted to consolidate the EU CFSP and CEP external dimension. For instance, this report states that the CFSP and external trade policy are fundamental instruments for ensuring the safety of the energy

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18 Arūnas Molis, "Rethinking EU-Russia energy relations: What do the Baltic States want?" SPES Policy Papers, 2011, p. 21.

19 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, *The EU Energy Policy: Engaging with Partners beyond Our Borders*, 2011, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52011DC0539&from=EN>, 03 07 2014

20 Adelina Marini. A Single European Energy Policy.

21 European Commission Report: *EU Energy Supply Security and Geopolitics,* 2008, <http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/studies/doc/gas/2008_05_lng_facilities_part_2_task_a.pdf>, 03 07 2014

resource supply. This seems the right time to remember lingering discussions about potential shale gas imports to the EU from the USA – the latter so far has been exporting its energy resources only to those countries with which it has free-trade agreements. Meanwhile, EU and USA negotiations regarding a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Agreement, also its extension into the EU-USA energy dialogue and the legal base for the export of USA shale gas to Europe seems to be stuck despite the deteriorating situation of supplier and carrier countries which have so far dominated EU markets.

There are different reasons for this draw back, such as American restrictions on foreign ownership in the shipping, energy, air and transport sectors, or different regulatory and tax systems in various states. Various EU Member States also impose a range of different, and very restrictive, policies and practices on foreign investors (e.g. films in France, stocks with differentiated voting rights in Germany and Sweden, the liquor monopoly in Sweden)[22]. However the main problem with the TTIP seems to be the lack of support from both state officials and the general public. One of the main TTIP opponents is the European environmental lobby. They have expressed misgivings that an agreement could open the door to an expansion of hydraulic fracturing (fracking) in Europe. In particular, there are concerns that EU states could soon find domestic laws subject to challenges in tribunals where national legislation has little weight[23]. A different business culture and opposing positions on some sensitive issues such as GMOs or the environment make TTIP negotiation very difficult.

Although the EC has identified problems, still little has changed in terms of improving relationships with suppliers, sustaining solidarity or coordinating EU external initiatives[24]. Despite active involvement of the Commission, supranational institutions still lack appreciable competencies for shaping the Union's energy policy; therefore the external dimension remains the least developed part of the EU CEP.

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22 Leif Johan Eliasson, „Problems, progress, and prognosis: the Transatlantic Free Trade and Investment Agreement", 2013, <http://euce.org/eusa/2013/papers/7c_eliasson.pdf>, 04 11 2014

23 Trevor Slack, „EU-US Free Trade Agreement Could Boost Gas Exports to Europe", *Natural Gas Europe*, 2013, <http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/eu-us-free-trade-agreement-gas-exports-to-europe>, 04 11 2014

24 Amelia Hadfield, "EU Foreign Energy Policy: In the Pipeline?" *CFSP Forum*, Vol.4, No.1, 2006, p. 2.

3. NATO's first steps towards energy

For a long time NATO members were convinced that the energy security issue would serve as a distracting factor in the agenda of Alliance committees and therefore might become an obstacle to perform NATO's functions of ensuring European security properly. Moreover, NATO members did not have a common vision of energy security, i.e., even countries that approved of NATO involvement had different energy security goals. Thirdly, some NATO members did not want the issue of energy security to be militarized, hoping that all challenges and disputes can and should be resolved without the involvement of the military block[25]. These fears were reflected in the assertions of the planned 2005 NATO forum on energy security issues that have never eventuated: back then it was claimed that NATO has no formal role or policy in the area of energy security and no intention to resort to military action in order to protect oil and gas infrastructure in the Caucasus or other regions.

However, the rise of attacks against energy infrastructure objects, usage of energy for the purposes of foreign policy, the growing demand of energy resources and limited supply, as well as NATO's expansion into Middle and Eastern European countries (1999 and 2004) and the favourable position of the USA has allowed consultations to begin about extending NATO's responsibilities. Even skeptics had to admit that the potential of NATO was huge: the Alliance includes North American as well as European countries (even those that are not part of the EU), it can employ political as well as military instruments of impact, and it has developed an effective mechanism of decision making, etc. After the 2006 energy crisis in Europe even those that had doubts were forced to admit that NATO must use its competencies and accumulated institutional experience for solving energy issues.

It was in 2006 when the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR) pointed out a connection between the Russian-Ukrainian dispute over gas supply and securing energy safety in the West. The same year NATO representatives declared that the Alliance was about to consider ways how it could contribute to securing the supply of energy resources[26]. Eventually, at the NATO summit (that

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[25] Arūnas Molis, "NATO vaidmuo energetikoje: nuo vamzdynų iki strategijos", *Lietuva ir NATO: 10 metų kartu.*, LR Krašto apsaugos ministerija, 2014. p. 191-195 [Arūnas Molis, "NATO's role in the energy sector, from pipelines to strategy", *Lithuania and NATO:10 years together.*, Lithuanian Ministry of Defence, 2014. p. 191-195]

[26] Op. Cit. Arūnas Molis, "NATO vaidmuo energetikoje: nuo vamzdynų iki strategijos", *Lietuva ir NATO: 10 metų kartu.*, LR Krašto apsaugos ministerija, 2014. p. 191–195 [Arūnas Molis, "NATO's

took place in Riga in October 2006) disruptions of the flow of energy resources were named as a threat to the security of NATO members. In 2007 more specific discussions relating to NATO involvement were started: NATO's potential role in the protection of critical energy infrastructure, integration of energy security policy into NATO policy, etc. In the summer of 2007, the North Atlantic Council adopted a resolution regarding minimum military requirements necessary to ensure protection of energy infrastructure objects.

After setting limits to NATO's involvement, protection of critical infrastructure work was started (by monitoring sea routes and carrying out anti-piracy operations). For instance, during the "Ocean Shield" operation from 2007 onwards, NATO ships patrol the Somali coast, the Niger Delta and by the Cape of Good Hope – places of former actual threat to energy infrastructure. In order to promote dialogue between NATO and its partners, there is actual cooperation with Ukraine, Azerbaijan and other countries, energy issues have been included in partnership formats: "Partnership for Peace" program, Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, and there has been an agreement to include issues of energy security into Azerbaijan's individual NATO membership action plan, etc.

A particularly important step in explaining, protecting and defining NATO's role in energy security was made at the NATO Bucharest Summit in April 2008[27]. There, NATO members finally came to an agreement on specific roles the Alliance could take to ensure energy security. These included sharing of information and intelligence, maintenance of stability, international and regional cooperation, and support for the security of strategic energy objects. In two years at the Summit meeting in Lisbon, NATO adopted a new Strategic Concept that reflected not only the principal agreement to expand the Alliance's energy role, but also named yet another direction of NATO involvement – promotion of effective consumption of energy resources in NATO structures, missions and operations. The above-mentioned document also emphasized the necessity of uninterrupted energy resource supply and growing NATO military structures' dependence on energy resources.

It is especially important that the Chicago Summit identified and clearly defined (basically narrowed) the limits of NATO's involvement in energy issues – it was agreed to concentrate on the so-called operational energy security. This

role in the energy sector, from pipelines to strategy", *Lithuania and NATO:10 years together.*, Lithuanian Ministry of Defence, 2014. p. 191-195]

27 E. Ruhle, "NATO and Energy Security: from Philosophy to Implementation", *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, 2012, 10:4.

means that the Alliance will primary focus on effective, safe and relatively cheap fuel supply in operations, missions, exercises and other activities, that would not have a negative impact on military units' ability to perform their direct tasks[28]. Thus, energy efficiency has become one of the strategic goals of NATO, in addition to the need to strengthen critical energy infrastructure protection and to develop relations with partners. Alliance members clearly stated their willingness to reduce dependence on traditional kinds of fuel, to improve logistics of energy resources and to consider environmental factors.

Basically, one can distinguish two main dimensions in NATO's energy security initiatives – first concerning national energy security (protection of critical infrastructure, anti-piracy operations etc.), second – operational energy security (effective, safe and relatively cheap fuel supply in operations)[29]. In terms of evaluating achievements, it should be noted that after energy issues were included in NATO's agenda, this had an impact on its internal structural changes as well. For instance, the Emerging Security Challenges Division with an Energy Security Section within it was established in NATO's international headquarters in Brussels in 2010. After concentrating on decision-making and implementation mechanisms in these structural units, new visions of NATO's response to future security challenges and related documents are being prepared. Moreover, it is precisely the above-mentioned division that formulates NATO's essential needs in the domain of energy security training. The aim is to ensure that practically no NATO-level military exercise would go ahead without including energy factors into the exercise scenario. But for this to happen, certain documents should be prepared: policy strategies, concepts, doctrines, standards, operating procedures, etc. The Alliance still has much to do in this context. While waiting for a favourable political climate to start discussions regarding these documents, the powers of the Alliance, compared to the competencies of other international global or regional organizations, national governments or private companies, remain limited.

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[28] Arūnas Molis, "Energy in the military after the NATO summit meeting in Chicago" *Energy security highlights. NATO Energy security Centre of excellence,* 2012. P. 4.

[29] Op. Cit. Arūnas Molis, "Energy in the military after the NATO summit meeting in Chicago", *Energy security highlights. NATO Energy security Centre of excellence,* 2012. P. 5.

4. Goals and action strategy of Lithuania

4.1. Activity of Lithuania in the context of the EU CEP external dimension

Lithuanian interests, proposals and actions in the domain of the EU CEP external dimension are motivated by three fundamental groups of factors: 1) the country's energy isolation and associated objective to diversify suppliers of fossil fuels both for Lithuania and the whole EU; 2) the attitude of EU Member States to fundamental EU "values" in the economy domain, such as the common internal market, sustaining competitiveness, strengthening environmental requirements, solidarity, etc.; 3) an opportunity for Lithuania to actually contribute to the creation of the EU CEP external dimension by proposing specific initiatives and in this way enhancing Lithuania's role in EU institutions. Taking into account these circumstances, it follows the analysis and evaluation of the perspectives for realizing Lithuania's interests in the energy domain: what Lithuania should do and how it should act to fully or partially achieve the above-mentioned goals.

So, Lithuania has an interest in sustaining the supranationality principle in the domain of the EU CEP external dimension in order to ensure a reliable supply of electricity and fossil fuels from several alternative sources. First of all, this means expanding the EU's regulatory environment beyond the Community borders, creating a mechanism to respond to supply crises and developing infrastructure that would become a part of the common EU electricity and natural gas markets (this means necessary investments into new objects of energy import, production and transportation in the whole EU, unification of Lithuanian energy network and energy infrastructure networks of other EU countries, development of the legal environment inside the EU and in the neighborhood)[30]. It is good that key infrastructure development projects in this context are already identified in the principal EU documents: BEMIP (prepared by the EC) includes provisions to invest in the power link between Lithuania and Sweden ("NordBalt"), the electricity link between Lithuania and Poland ("LitPol Link"), a new nuclear plant, a liquefied natural gas terminal, and a gas link between Lithuania and Poland. Regarding projects that are not directly related to Lithuanian participation (such

[30] *Study on the development of energy security dimension within EU common security and defence policy* accomplished by consulting firm ESTEP according to the contract with Lithuanian ministry of defence, ESTEP, 2012.

as the Southern Gas Corridor), they are also being included in the lists of the EU's political and energy priorities and their implementation is beginning, thanks to Lithuania and its partners. However, such issues as the inclusion of energy relationships with Russia in the CEP agenda, restricting Russian ambitions in the region and Europe, etc. remain unresolved.

During the term of its presidency, Lithuania faced an important tactical dilemma in this context – whether to go into already accomplished agreements, technical detail, coordinate relatively careful discussions, initiatives and proposals together with the EC, Member States and General Secretariat of the EU Council (in order to get the attention and to continue discussions after the presidency term) or to talk boldly and propose innovations reflecting the *zeitgeist* and present situation. Lithuania attempted to focus on collective action with its partners. First there have been attempts to engage and "attract" Germany, France, Great Britain or at least one of these countries to this process. France seemed an ideal partner as it used to emphasize the importance of solidarity between EU members in dealing with issues related to energy security. France and Lithuania shared common interests in the discussions about the legitimization of nuclear safety requirements and possible extension to the countries willing to export nuclear plant energy to the EU. Lithuania was also in favour of France's objective to expand the Energy Community Treaty to Eastern Europe and to set clear regulations in the domain of energy cooperation, which at least to some extent would reflect the provisions of the European Energy Charter.

Lithuania found its other strategic partners in EU institutions – the EC and General Secretariat of the EU Council. Cooperating with them during the term of its presidency, Vilnius prepared a non-paper for the discussion about the development of the EU CEP external dimension at an informal meeting of EU energy ministers (discussions on this issue lasted for 2 hours in Vilnius), also a non-paper on the subject of Russia for the meeting of the EC supervised Strategy work group dedicated to international cooperation in the energy domain. After these discussions, the EU Council's conclusions of 2011 regarding the EU CEP external dimension have been revised. Basically all EU Member States have approved of geographic and functional expansion and extension of the old Energy Community Treaty (ECT), about to expire in 2016 (it was extended for ten years in October 2013). And thanks to Lithuania, Member States have agreed to expand the regulatory domains of the Treaty not limited only to environmental protection, i.e., to incorporate instruments for regulating market and price policy, but also encompassing fair competition regulations. An opportunity was also created to

join more strategically important countries from the South Caucasus, Central Asia and MENA regions to the ECT. This might be considered an important achievement, as namely the ECT can become a model leading to EU and third country energy cooperation to become a legal obligation to create a Pan-European regulatory environment.

By emphasizing that energy collaboration between the EU and Russia is a complex process, embracing areas from energy resource diversification to nuclear energy safety standards, Lithuania demands to base this collaboration upon clear and stable regulations and agreements. During its presidency term it was identified in the non-papers, suggested for different EU Council formats (and later also adopted in official reports), that these regulations should be non-discriminating and uniform to all participants (the so-called "level playing field" principle was established). Attention has also been drawn to the fact, that the EU's continued liberalization of internal energy market is seen by Russia as huge threat to Russian interests in the European natural gas market. Therefore, in order to prevent Russian manipulations, Lithuania has defended its goal not to separate energy collaboration with Russia from collaboration on other political domains, such as foreign and security policy, environmental protection, economic and competitiveness policy.

Tactics chosen by Vilnius have revived the already half-forgotten discussion (from two years ago), but no unexpected issues or initiatives were actually raised. It is worth noting that this was a conscious decision of a key institution in this context – the Ministry of Energy. For instance, the Lithuanian Ministry of National Defence organized broad discussions about energy factors in the context of CSDP development, expressed willingness to actively participate in the European Defence Agency projects "Military Green" and "Go Green" (i.e., to begin associating the EU CEP external dimension with the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in practice), but received practically no support from the institution coordinating Lithuania's actions in the context of EU CEP external dimension development. Although Lithuania does not have much power in shaping the CSDP, inclusion of energy security issues into this domain of EU policy would have been in the interests of the country: it would be easier to transfer the solidarity principle active in the CSDP domain to the EU CEP (by which Member States have committed to provide assistance and support to a country facing aggression in its territory).

In terms of what regards the future oriented action strategy in the EU CEP external dimension domain, it cannot be overlooked that in the face of geopolitical confrontation between East and West, now is a good opportunity to raise half-

forgotten ambitious ideas, first of all – those related to reinforcing supranationality and solidarity, and the creation of supply crisis response mechanisms[31]. Lithuania should also support the ambitious projects of other countries or policies (e.g., related to the creation of the Energy Community), it should aim that as a consequence of the EC mandate growing stronger and expanding, in the future it would represent the whole EU and would take over Member States' right to negotiate with third countries. Especially because during the term of presidency in the EU Council, the first humble steps were already made in this direction: the EC supervised Strategic Group for International Energy Collaboration has discussed EU energy relationships with Russia. It would be useful for Lithuania to further support the activities of this group in order to fully realize its potential as forum where Member States and the EC exchange opinions.

4.2. Lithuanian contribution towards NATO's energy policy development

The Vilnius-based NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence (ENSEC COE) was officially established on July 10, 2012 and accredited in the autumn of the same year[32]. Establishment documents were signed by the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Transformation and Lithuanian, Italian, Latvian and Turkish military plenipotentiaries at NATO's Allied Command Transformation headquarters in Norfolk (USA). France and Estonia signed establishment documents a few months later, and Georgia and the United Kingdom joined the Centre in the end of 2014. The essential aim of the above-mentioned international military organization is to provide the Alliance with qualified and appropriate expert advice on subject matter as required by NATO, by supplementing, but not duplicating the activities of NATO's international staffs and headquarters. Basically, what the NATO ENSEC COE tries to do is: provide the Alliance with global solutions in the domains of resource consumption, technology implementation, infrastructure protection strengthening, science and industry collaboration[33].

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31 *Study on the development of energy security dimension within EU common security and defence policy* accomplished by the consulting firm ESTEP according to the contract with the Lithuanian Ministry of Defence, ESTEP, 2012.

32 For more information on the NATO ENSEC COE look here: www.enseccoe.org

33 Arūnas Molis, „ESC after accreditation – activity in exercises and trainings" *Energy security highlights. NATO Energy security Centre of excellence,* 2012. P. 15

After creating the Centre of Excellence with support from other countries and NATO headquarters, Lithuania has probably the greatest responsibility in ensuring the smooth activity of this new institution. Although the international personnel at this institution is comprised of representatives from all countries taking part in the activities of the NATO ENSEC COE , the Lithuanian contribution is the greatest: a Lithuanian representative leads the centre (according to the agreement, the ENSEC COE director will always be a Lithuanian military officer and his deputy will be French), and Lithuania also appoints or hires administrative personnel. Moreover, the army has delegated five and the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs – one specialist to work at the centre. Of the other countries involved in the activities of the centre, each appoints one representative to the position of deputy director, department managers or specialists, pays their wages and an agreed financial contribution to the operating (dedicated to activities) budget of the organization.

It is worth noting that until now Lithuania hasn't been "home" to any international institution. Therefore, when creating the NATO ENSEC COE, Lithuania must have applied its own legal base and gained experience that can be adopted in Lithuania in establishing other international institutions and organizations, delegating Lithuanian representatives to them, etc. Even more important is the fact that such organizational expertise needed by NATO serves as a Lithuanian "window" to the Alliance's decision-making backstage. In other words, although the ENSEC COE is an international (i.e., not Lithuanian) institution, Lithuania's initiative and responsibility taken on also enhances the country's political authority in those areas that are not directly related to energy. For instance, in the negotiations regarding the Alliance's activity in the framework of its traditional responsibility, also in NATO's transformation, collaboration with partners, training system reorganization and other areas. Not to mention new opportunities for industrial enterprises and scientific potential – similar to those of Brussels and Paris because of the influential international institutions based there. Therefore, despite previous acknowledgment that NATO's involvement in addressing energy issues is still underdeveloped, it is worth noting that Lithuania together with other participating states has a unique possibility to actually impact on NATO's activities in the domain of energy security[34].

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[34] Arūnas Molis, "NATO vaidmuo energetikoje: nuo vamzdynų iki strategijos", *Lietuva ir NATO: 10 metų kartu.*, LR Krašto apsaugos ministerija, 2014, p. 191-195 [Arūnas Molis, "NATO's role in the energy sector, from pipelines to strategy", *Lithuania and NATO:10 years together.*, LR Ministry of Defence, 2014. p. 191-195]

The NATO ENSEC COE and its research capabilities are important to all Member States and HQs. Military forces use large quantities of fossil fuels during operations and a substantial proportion of this consumption is dedicated to electrical power generation for deployed force infrastructure. Consequently, allies' militaries expect advice on how to contribute to the more efficient use of energy resources by introducing smart technologies, investing into the application of vehicles that rely to a lesser extent on traditional fuel, renovating buildings, adapting military machinery and relying on renewable energy sources. On the other hand, the technological improvements solely do not guarantee the desired results: more efficient control of consumption (i.e., improvement of the energy consumption management system) coupled with the facilitation of changes in cultural or behavioural domains of energy consumption is also required[35].

Talking about the achievements of the NATO ENSEC COE, they are the most visible in the areas of awareness raising (conferences, seminars, exhibitions), analysis, research, individual and collective training areas. These activities were started even before the Centre was created, i.e., by its predecessor, the Energy Security Centre under the Lithuanian MFA. For instance, under the supervision of the LT MFA and in cooperation with the Lithuanian Armed Forces (AF) and local experts, a study called "Energy Efficiency of the National Defence System" has been prepared. It marked an important step in changing the approach to the management methods of traditional energy resources. The study proposed a model of efficient energy use management suitable for the national defence system, based on the international standard ISO 50001:2011. Extensive detailed analysis of energy consumption efficiency in the National Defence System has been accomplished under the umbrella of this study and this paved the way to the creation of the efficient energy resources management model. If it will prove to be efficient, this model could serve as a pattern to other NATO member states.

At the moment the NATO ENSEC COE might seem like the only significant Lithuanian achievement regarding energy security in the framework of NATO. However as mentioned before, NATO's involvement in energy security is fairly recent, the strategy and the administration framework is still developing. Therefore Lithuania, being one of the most active members in this field, has an opportunity to influence or even to play one of the leading roles in shaping NATO's energy strategy.

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35 E. Ruhle, "NATO and Energy Security: from Philosophy to Implementation", *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, 2012, 10:4.

Conclusions

When Lithuania took over presidency of the EU Council in 2013, it made a resolution to use this period in order to reduce the country's energy isolation. It looked like a good opportunity, as Member States had already recognized the challenges after gas supply disruptions, Poland had already done important preparatory work and the EC had identified energy isolation as one of the main obstacles in increasing the EU's economic competitiveness[36]. A formal position and the power of being the country holding the presidency has endowed not only additional information and procedural resources, but a certain normative authority as well. One more important aspect should be taken into account: as the financial perspective of 2007–2013 was coming to an end, there was anticipation of discussions and consensus regarding more than 80 Commission proposals: in theory that could mean the likelihood to earn less acceptance from countries showing interest in the development of the EU CEP external dimension in exchange for "concessions" or initiative in other domains. All of this should not have only made it easier for Lithuania to include energy issues in the EU agenda, but also to ensure actual support from the great powers and EU institutions to infrastructure development projects as well as implementation of the entire EU CEP dimension.[37]

There have been some achievements in this context. First, common EU electricity and natural gas markets are being successfully created which not only reduce the energy isolation of countries such as Lithuania, but also create preconditions for the development of an external EU CEP: without a common EU market, arguments to conduct collective negotiations on resource supply would be pointless. Second, energy infrastructure development projects that are important to Lithuania (though not concerning it directly) have been included in the lists of political and energy EU priorities, some of them are already being launched. Third, the EC Communication of 2011 (accepted and determined by Lithuania) provided for a possibility for the EU to submit ex-ante assessment of EU law compliance of any future intergovernmental agreement[38]. This is an important step in seeking

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[36] Lietuvos įtakos ir konkurencingumo didinimo Europos Sąjungoje kryptys. Tyrimo ataskaita. 2010. p. - 36 [The development of Lithuania's influence and competitiveness in the European Union. Research report. 2010. p. - 36]

[37] Lietuvos įtakos ir konkurencingumo didinimo Europos Sąjungoje kryptys. Tyrimo ataskaita. 2010. p. - 38 [The development of Lithuania's influence and competitiveness in the European Union. Research report. 2010. p. - 38]

[38] *Study on the development of energy security dimension within EU common security and defence policy* accomplished by the consulting firm ESTEP according to the contract with Lithuanian Ministry of Defence, ESTEP, 2012.

to further strengthen the supranationality principle in the domain of the EU CEP external dimension. Fourth, receiving the approval of all the EU Member States for geographic and functional expansion and extension of the old Energy Community Treaty for ten years (i.e., until 2013) was deemed successful.

On the other hand, usually divergent EU Member State attitudes towards the development of supranationality as well as towards strategic issues of the relations with third countries or the strengthening of energy independence forced Lithuania to waive some goals, to act in a more restrained way and even acknowledge that some of these goals have not been achieved. First of all, no strategy of the relationship with at least some of the key resource suppliers has been formulated and stated, such as would reflect the collective EU approach towards the Community's energy relations with Russia, Central Asia, North Africa or some other region. The lack of this kind of common EU strategy prevents the creation and implementation of a consistent action plan in regard to this region at the operating level or to involve EU partners in more manifest and binding agreements in the energy domain. Secondly, creation of a fully functional association between the EU CEP external dimension and other instruments of the EU's external activity was not successful: the ENP, CFSP, CSDP, trade policy as well as other policies focusing on relations with third countries. Thirdly, Lithuania never attempted to raise some of its foreseen goals: e.g., proposals to strengthen the EC's role or to create a European Energy Community have been practically voluntarily abandoned.

Although the EU presidency term now is over, the Vilnius-based NATO ENSE COE is suitable to formulate further actions of an international nature, which would strengthen the security of energy supplies and focus on monitoring, analysis and research, also preparation of tailor-made education, training courses and exercises, enabling development of common standards, common language and common procedures among the allies. For instance, Lithuania offered to other NATO countries to develop three key principles in the area of energy security, which are modularity, interoperability and sustainability. Although the implementation of these requires considerable investments into sophisticated technologies, it will facilitate the diversification of the consumed sources or the use of traditional energy sources in a more efficient way.

ENHANCING TEAMWORK WITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNION DIPLOMACY AND INCLUDING KEY EXTERNAL PARTNERS IN THE EU COORDINATION PROCESS IN GENEVA

Xavier Pierre, Rytis Paulauskas*

Abstract

This paper reflects on the state of affairs of the Geneva-based EU diplomacy, while examining adaptive challenges faced by its Member States. It also presents the concrete experience of Lithuania's EU Presidency in participating in the EU coordination process. The objective of this research is to identify where improvements can be made to strengthen the EU Diplomacy in Geneva. This article underlines the value of reinforcing the EU coordination process, in particular by increasing the inclusion of the small and medium sized Member States and of the key partners. The article generates new materials on the basis of interviews conducted with Ambassadors and Deputy Permanent Representatives (DPRs) of the EU Delegation, 15 EU and non-EU countries, in the context of Geneva. It offers valuable findings as well as interesting questions and possible venues for further research.

Introduction

Heifetz, Grashow and Linsky[1] underline that human progress and the ability for large numbers of people to live together are linked to "the growth and

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We would like to thank the Ambassadors and Deputy Permanent Representatives of multilateral missions and the EU Delegation in Geneva who participated in the interviews, lending us their precious time and providing the authors with very valuable material for this paper.
We would like to thank Professor Jan Wouters (Professor of International Law and International

variation in scope, structure, governance, strategy and coordination of political and commercial enterprise". The European Union (EU) illustrates the development of a complex governance system for a diverse population to live and prosper on a very large scale. It is one of the most advanced forms of multilateral cooperation among States[2]. The EU is a relatively new governance model, comprising 28 Member States with a history of difficult relationships, marked by intense competition for hegemony and periods of armed conflict. In this sense, it is significant that countries embroiled in conflict in the past now form a union that was awarded the 2012 Nobel Peace Prize for "having contributed to the achievement of peace and reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe".

At the same time, the EU project is one that is still in construction. A major landmark in the evolution of the EU took place through the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon signed in 2007, entering into force on December 2009. The Treaty led to the creation of a High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the main coordinator and representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) within the EU, and head of the EU External Action Service (EEAS), represented through EU Delegations around the world. Through the work of the EEAS, diplomatic coordination in the EU is being boosted in order to enhance the force of the voice of the EU on the international scene. In this paper, the EEAS and rotating Presidency are referred to as "the local EU diplomatic representation". See Figure 1.

Savall and Zardet (1995[3], 2008[4]) underline that the strategic force of an organization is based on its internal cohesion. Internal cohesion results from an efficient coordination of stakeholders. If we apply in this context adaptive leadership

Organizations at the University of Leuven, KU Leuven), and his colleagues Anna Luise Chané and Katrien Meuwissen, of the Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies, as well Professor Ramūnas Vilpišauskas (Director of the Institute of International Relations and Political Science of Vilnius University) and Dr. Tomas Janeliūnas (Institute of International Relations and Political Science of Vilnius University) for their very useful comments and review of our article. Their remarks have been a source of improvement for this paper.

1 Heifetz R., Alexander Grashow A., Marty Linsky M., *The Practice of Adaptive Leadership: Tools and Tactics for Changing Your Organization and the World*, Harvard Business Review Press, 2009.

2 Wouters J., Chané A.-L., Odermatt J., Ramopoulos T., 'Improving the EU's Status in the UN and the UN System: An Objective Without a Strategy?' in Christine Kaddous (ed) *The European Union in International Organisations and Global Governance* (Hart Publishing, forthcoming), 2014.

3 Savall H., Zardet V., *Ingénierie stratégique du roseau*, Edition Economica, 2ème édition, Préface de Serge Pasquier, 1995.

4 Savall H., Zardet V., *Mastering Hidden Costs – Socio-Economic performance*, IAP, Charlotte, USA, Preface of A. Buono, 2008.

theory, as well as group dynamics theory, the goal of the local EU diplomatic representation should be: (1) "to mobilize people [country representatives] to tackle tough challenges and thrive" (Heifetz, Grashow & Linsky, 2009[5]); (2) "to allow the group [EU] and its individuals [Member States] to establish a unique and meaningful identity where each is an integral part of the other" (3) to allow the EU and its Member States to operate efficiently at their highest potential.



Figure 1. Representation of the EU Diplomacy in Geneva

Source: prepared by the authors

As outlined by Heifetz & others (2009), "The adaptive success in an organizational sense requires leadership that can orchestrate multiple stakeholder priorities to define thriving and then realize it. The same authors identify the adaptive challenge as "the gap between the values people stand for (that constitutes

[5] Heifetz R. & al., 2009, (note 1).

thriving) and the reality that they face (their current lack of capacity to realize those values in their environment)".

What are the criteria for efficiency and effectiveness of the EU diplomacy? Based on what was expressed by the representatives we met in Geneva, in order to both satisfy Member States needs and collective goals (such as increasing the influence of the EU) more information-sharing is needed within the group, as well as internal burden-sharing, in order to increase the capacity to negotiate collectively.

This paper reflects on the state of affairs of the Geneva-based EU diplomacy, while examining adaptive challenges faced by its Member States. It also presents the concrete experience of Lithuania's EU Presidency in participating in the EU coordination process. The objective is to identify where improvements can be made to strengthen the EU diplomacy in Geneva. This article underlines the value of reinforcing the EU coordination process, in particular by increasing the inclusion of the small and medium sized Member States and of the key partners. The article generates new materials on the basis of interviews conducted with relevant stakeholders. The authors believe that it offers some findings as well as interesting questions and possible venues for further research.

1. Background and research methodology

This article is the result of collaboration between a researcher in the field of management and a practitioner in diplomacy. Xavier Pierre is researcher at ISEOR, a research institute in management science, and teaches at the University of Lyon III (France). His work focuses on the management of trans-organisational cooperation. Ambassador Rytis Paulauskas is the Permanent Representative of Lithuania in Geneva and led the Lithuanian 2013 EU Presidency in Geneva, as well as Task Force for the Lithuanian OSCE's Chairmanship in 2011. He focuses on the application of the "adaptive leadership" and "smart power" concepts in the multilateral diplomacy.

The Lithuanian Foreign Ministry undertook thorough preparations for the EU Presidency. As for each country holding the presidency, a logo was developed. It is a visual form of identity and a message that each country wants to spread about itself and its presidency philosophy. The circle in the logo represents the colours of the Lithuanian flag and of a united European Union, to symbolize the willingness of the Member States to work together, foster European values and overcome challenges that arise. A strategic line was developed for Lithuania's EU policy to the EU Presidency: "More Europe in Lithuania and Lithuania in

Europe!" Although some external and internal actors perceived Lithuania as a post-Soviet newcomer, a goal during the Presidency was to demonstrate its ability to be an effective interlocutor within the EU community. Lithuania acknowledged the importance of a strong partnership with the EU delegation and members to attain common goals, such as responding to increasing tensions in the Middle East, humanitarian crises and any natural disasters arising during the period of the Presidency. At the same time, the adaptive challenge for the EU in Geneva was to improve its level of external and internal efficiency.

This paper is the fruit of a shared interest by the two authors in increasing cooperation within the EU diplomacy and the evolution of the role of the local EU diplomatic representation. This project is aligned with the objective of the EU local diplomatic representation in Geneva to see the Member States "work as a team". As we demonstrate in this paper, there is a need to further enhance the existing feeling of belonging to the EU group as well as to develop leadership by the local EU diplomatic representation, in order to increase cooperation among Member States.

The authors conducted 17 interviews in total with Ambassadors and Deputy Permanent Representatives (DPRs) of the EU Delegation, 15 EU and non-EU countries, including Lithuania, which held the Presidency of the EU at that time (second semester of 2013). See Table 1.

Table 1. **Interviewed countries and institutions**

LOCAL EU DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION	EU MEMBER STATES	KEY EXTERNAL PARTNERS
EU DELEGATION EU PRESIDENCY	DENMARK FRANCE GERMANY UNITED KINGDOM GREECE IRELAND ITALY LATVIA LITHUANIA NETHERLANDS PORTUGAL	CANADA GEORGIA SWITZERLAND USA

Source: prepared by the authors

The experience of Geneva-based processes and the preparation of each interviewee varied, as well as his/her previous experiences of European diplomacy in other bilateral and multilateral contexts. Some interviewees even went as far as preparing for the interview by organizing consultations with their team in Geneva and with other relevant diplomatic missions. The choice of the countries selected to participate in the interviews represents a sample of the large EU countries, the medium, and small Member States, as well as key external partners of EU. In our analysis, and as it is observed in practice, we divide the Member States in two categories. The first group called the "key EU stakeholders" is composed of the more influential countries wielding power due to multiple elements according to Joseph Nye[6]:

PERCEIVED POWER =(POPULATION + TERRITORY + ECONOMY + MILITARY) X (STRATEGY + WILL)

The second group includes the rest of the EU Member States categorized as "small and medium countries". The EU Delegation itself was also interviewed in this process. The EU Presidency was represented by Lithuania, which assumed the role at that time, but also through interviews with countries that recently held the role or preparing to assume it in the near future. The average length of the interviews was one hour. The interviews were conducted using a semi-directive methodology based on an open questionnaire (see Table 2). The questionnaire is the result of preliminary exchanges between the two authors, based on the research experience in inter-organizational cooperation environment of the management researcher, and on the diplomatic practitioner's perception of EU diplomacy processes in Geneva. The questionnaire was further developed as well during the interview process. We would like to thank all of the Ambassadors and DPRs who participated in this exercise for offering their precious time to this project.

After the interviews, 385 sentences were extracted and selected and classified on 83 key ideas structured in 5 themes and 14 subthemes, with the purpose of analysing converging and specific ideas between interviewees[7]. Key sentences are used throughout the text to depict the observations made in the paper. The results are presented in this article, theme by theme. Using the reflections expressed in the

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6 Nye J., *The Future of Power*, New York : Public Affairs, 2011.

7 Savall H., Zardet V., *The Qualimetrics Approach - Observing the Complexe Object*, IAP, Charlotte, USA, 2011.

interview process, this article analyses the cooperation and the coordination of the EU diplomacy in the multilateral context in Geneva.

Table 2. Questionnaire

PARTICIPANTS	THEMES - QUESTIONS
1/EU DELEGATION AND EU PRESIDENCY	– Effective functioning of EU coordination; Perceived obstacles; – Member States' behaviours; Perceived role of the EU Delegation, Presidency, Member States; Coordination between Brussels and the EU Delegation in Geneva; Future of the EU presidency; Prospects for improvement in the EU coordination.
2/EU MEMBER STATES	– Perception of each Member States' own role played in EU coordination; Perceived difficulties in EU coordination; Behaviours by actors involved in coordination process; – Consultation by the EU Delegation with Member States during the coordination process; Autonomy versus influence of Member States; Impact of work organization in each EU mission as a result of the EU coordination; Benefits of EU coordination for each Member State; Current and future strategies adopted by each Member State in response to EU coordination process; Perceived role of the EU Delegation, Presidency, Member States; Prospects for improvement in EU coordination.
3/EXTERNAL PARTNERS	– Understanding of EU coordination processes; Identifying benefits and difficulties during negotiation processes with the EU coordination and EU member States; Current and future strategies adopted in response to EU coordination processes; Prospects for improvement in EU coordination.

Source: prepared by the authors

2. Application of the Lisbon Treaty in Geneva

The Lisbon Treaty foresees a limited list of EU competences as well as a clear delineation between the competences of the EU and Member States. The Lisbon Treaty provides important guarantees regarding the protection of the distribution

of powers (see Appendix 1); including Article 13 (2) TEU which defines that "each institution shall act within the limits of the powers conferred on it in the Treaties, and in conformity with the procedures, conditions and objectives set out in them." The intense discussions which have taken place in 2011 regarding (1) the distribution of competencies between the EU and MS, and (2) between the EU and other regional groups regarding the EU status and the sequence of its statements in IOs resulted in the adoption of the General Arrangements by the COREPER on 21st October 2011. The General Arrangements seem to be functioning reasonably well. Yet the question on "what constitutes the CFSP" raised on a regular basis indicates that the issue might be simmering for quite some time to come, at least in Geneva. The EU Presidency is expected to assume the role of an honest and impartial broker in these discussions.

The status of the Rotating Presidency in Geneva retains some of the features of the "pre-Lisbon Treaty" Presidency. The EU Delegation now largely takes care of internal coordination as well as external representation, for example by presenting many of the EU's positions at formal UN meetings and negotiations. However, the Rotating Presidency still undertakes certain EU representational duties, in particular in those cases where the EU is legally confined to an observer status within the international organization, attributed to other regional international organisations or other players too. Four models of representation might be distinguished:

1) The EU Delegation has undertaken the majority of the external representation functions in the UN Human Rights Council (except during the process of the HRC decision making), the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) and the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) which can be characterised as a classical *Post-Lisbon Treaty Presidency.*
2) *The hybrid model of the Presidency***,** which has some features[8] of pre- and post- Lisbon Treaty (an exception is WIPO)[9], has been developed in the specialised UN agencies[10]. The EU Delegation, which has undertaken the function of internal coordination in the Conference of Disarmament also has to share the function of representation with the Rotating Presidency.

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8 The Lithuanian representative, elected in 25/5/2012 to the Executive Board of the World Health Organisation (WHO) delivers statements on behalf of the EU and its MS in it.

9 The EU has an observer status only in the Standing Committee on the Law of Patents and the Committee on Development and Intellectual property of the WIPO. All the preparation work for the sessions and statements are delivered by the rotating presidency on the behalf of the EU. The workload is even greater for the rotating presidency during WIPO General Assembly.

10 The International Labour Organisation, World Health Organisation, International Telecommunications Union.

The representatives of the EU Delegation are registered as part of the delegation of a Rotating Presidency and speak up from its seat. The situation is similar (not identical) in other disarmament fora, where the EU holds the status of a regional international organisation only and is seated among the observers. Ireland has already requested Lithuania to represent the EU Presidency in the Governing Body of the International Labour Organisation. The extension of the request to the Irish or the Greek Delegation to be represented in the Executive Committee of the UN HCR shall be considered altogether.

3) The nature of *the pre-Lisbon Presidency* essentially remains at WIPO pending the accumulation of the competencies by the EU Delegation and undertakes the functions foreseen by the Lisbon treaty.
4) The Lisbon Treaty did not affect the Common Foreign Trade Policy, which belongs to the exclusive competence of the EU, therefore the Presidency's role for EU activities in the WTO remained unchanged. The Presidency prepares EU coordination meetings, their agendas, makes conclusions concerning the questions discussed during the meetings, if necessary - prepares compromise positions or proposals.

3. Value of enhancing teamwork between EU Member States and with the EU local diplomatic representation in Geneva

Heifetz, Grashow and Linsky[11] consider that, "new environments and new dreams demand new strategies and abilities, as well as the leadership to mobilize them". With the evolving hierarchy of global power among States, EU Member States are striving to maintain influence in a new environment in diplomacy. The dream in this context is an EU with a capacity to defend and promote values such as democracy, and protecting its sovereignty and developing its economy. One of the objectives of the EEAS is "to promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance"[12]. The Union not only wants to participate in the multilateral system, it actually has a role in shaping it. In order to achieve this goal, the EU should have a strong and effective voice within the UN and the UN system[13]. Most representatives interviewed believe that

[11] Heifetz R. & al., 2009, (note 1).

[12] Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union.

[13] Wouters J. & al., 2014, (note 2).

the voice of the EU would be stronger if Member States speak with the same voice or coordinate their actions and demonstrate their solidarity to external partners. This new environment and the EU's ability to realize its "dreams" demand a strategy and leadership that can orchestrate multiple stakeholders working together as a team.

There is a willingness to develop the capacity to negotiate collectively in a more efficient manner to influence external partners and the work taking place in international organizations.

Interviewees affirmed that to be able to act more collectively and to be more proactive there is a need to enhance cooperation between EU Member States on an on-going basis. An adaptive challenge for the EU is to further engage the countries in this dynamic and to develop a feeling of belonging to the group.

Member States and the local EU diplomatic representation expect from the joint diplomacy that players will engage in internal burden-sharing, as well as information-sharing and effective outreach with important external EU partners. After important meetings, it is assumed that EU participants will redistribute strategic information to other Member States. Member States, in particular small and medium countries, expect the EU Delegation to also redistribute information and to consult the EU group after and before meetings.

One of the most obvious added values of the joint EU diplomacy is the possibility to combine human and financial resources. Local EU diplomatic representation (Delegation and Presidency), Member States as well as key external partners perceive this as an advantage of the EU working as a team. In Geneva, there are approximately 7,000 meetings a year that take place in the context of multilateral diplomacy. The common EU diplomacy permits greater coverage and the practice of burden-sharing between Member States, significantly increasing efficiency at this level. Combining the resources of the Member States offers the EU *"the equivalent of a US administration"*. The objective is to be able to share knowledge, contacts and resources of the 28 Member States and the local EU diplomatic representation and to negotiate, in order to achieve the EU's strategic goals.

4. State of cooperation within the EU

Many EU representatives noted the necessity to further increase the confidence level between EU countries and expressed a desire for increased discussions to enhance and intensify the level of cooperation between Member States (see Extract 1). While EU coordination meetings are the opportunity to exchange views and to share information, there is a feeling by some member States that the EU joint diplomacy can go farther.

There is a shared feeling that good will to cooperate is not translated enough into action in particular by the larger States. Some representatives observed that the proclaimed principles of solidarity and transparency are not always respected. Small and medium States have the impression that key EU stakeholders act according to their own strategy without sufficiently taking into account the interests of the other stakeholders. There is a general feeling that each EU country could contribute more and that increased burden-sharing could take place. As a result, there is a predominance of national interests that play out and there is a sense that the EU could be more present at negotiations. The adaptive challenge is to integrate each Member State's national interests in the coordination process in order to enhance the burden-sharing.

Another challenge is to increase cohesion and trust within the group and to ensure that information is not being shared with outside partners without the consent of the group. Some representatives observed that leaks of information have taken place after EU coordination meetings. Additionally, there is a need for increased trust among Member States in order for burden-sharing to take place effectively and ensure information sharing among Member States after important meetings.

Extract 1. Need for enhanced teamwork within the EU

LOCAL EU DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION – "To come to a consolidated position in the EU is a complicated process."

KEY EU STAKEHOLDER – "My personal perception is that the EU is underperforming compared to what we could be doing together."

KEY EU STAKEHOLDER – "We did the right thing establishing the European Diplomacy. Now, how to do it more effectively in Geneva? Our ambition should be to be a proactive player."

KEY EU STAKEHOLDER – "If you don't have the resources nationally to cover everything, you need to rely on someone else and the EU is useful for that."

KEY EU STAKEHOLDER – "We are effective at a level of minimum cooperation: exchanging information. We should improve our capacity as a negotiating partner."

SMALL OR MEDIUM MEMBER STATE – "Presently the tendency is more about the interests of the Member States. The big players tend to play their games resulting in decreased cooperation."

SMALL OR MEDIUM MEMBER STATE – "My country is very pro-European Union integration. We want to push it as far as we can."

Source: prepared by the authors

If on one hand, a relative homogeneity of views and values between EU Member States exists, there is also an apparent divergence in the way they approach the issues, and how they conceive EU coordination and external representation rules making it difficult to obtain a common position in the EU. Key external partners interviewed have noticed some tensions within the EU group and it is no secret when a common position on an issue or on a UN resolution is not reached.

5. Impact of the EU coordination on relationships with external partners

A risk defined by external partners in the EU's coordination process post-Lisbon Treaty is the perception of the EU operating as a block, and encouraging "block diplomacy" resulting in polarization, hampering multilateral negotiations (see Extract 2). It is important to keep in mind that this criticism of the EU is not necessarily neutral in that it is particularly expressed in describing circumstances where the EU position was not aligned with the partner's own position. However, it is also crucial to acknowledge this widely shared perception in order to enhance cooperation with partners.

The external partners interviewed did not hide the fact that they value their cooperation with the local EU diplomatic representation (Delegation or Presidency) in particular when they are aligned with their own position and can offer support for them. They find the EU coordination valuable when it helps them to implement their own strategy.

Representatives of the external partners are learning how to play the EU coordination game depending on the alignment with their own positions. When the EU position is close to theirs, they deal directly with the EU Delegation. However, when the position differs, external partners both from the North and South hemispheres will approach EU Member States with which, for regional, historic or linguistic-cultural reasons, they have stronger ties, and try to influence the opinion shapers or split the EU group. In other words, it has been observed that partners can apply the well-known "divide and conquer" tactics in certain circumstances.

Key external partners tend to have particularly strong links with certain EU Member States, which are historical or based on the same interest-value-logic on certain issues. Although key partners were concerned previous to the joint

EU diplomacy that their historical partnerships would weaken because of the coordination process, they also value having close partners in the EU that can influence the rest of the group.

Extract 2. The EU's relationships with external partners

LOCAL EU DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION – "From the external partners point of view, there is a risk they will look at the EU as a block, less flexible, more polarised. It is not fair, but it is an easy accusation. Block politics affects the international community in a negative way. If the EU becomes a more collective player, we will have more and more of this antagonism."

LOCAL EU DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION – "First, the EU Delegation chairs meetings between Member States to obtain a common position. After that, it has to defend this position at the UN with all of the other States to convince them. Very often, the EU Delegation has to then go back to the 28 member States to re-negotiate and re-coordinate before going back to the UN. It is a difficult exercise. But we are a strong player at the UN in Geneva on human rights. Some partners think that we are too slow, but the EU is a club of Democracies co-building positions."

KEY EXTERNAL PARTNER – "Our strategy is to adapt. We will engage who the opinion shaper is. On some themes it is the EU Delegation. Sometimes it is a Member State. Sometimes it is both."

KEY EXTERNAL PARTNER – "We are constantly with the EU. We suffer the coordination process, we influence it, we go to capital to break it or play it."

KEY EXTERNAL PARTNER – "The EU is a large and important partner for us. We are linked on many issues."

KEY EXTERNAL PARTNER – "The EU is the most successful experiment [in governance] in the last century."

KEY EXTERNAL PARTNER – "We see the advantage of having one voice. When the 28 say something it is something. It is attractive. I wish we could have that."

KEY EXTERNAL PARTNER – "The EU can be the most frustrating organisation to work with."

KEY EXTERNAL PARTNER – "In two years it has improved. I realize that the EU in Geneva has made a lot of progress integrating other countries in their processes."

KEY EXTERNAL PARTNER – "EU coordination meetings make us wait. This is a problem."

KEY EXTERNAL PARTNER – "When you have a negotiation, the point will be possibly A or B. But if the EU comes with C, the position may be far away from a common position on a resolution. The EU should be much more flexible, not with a single position. The strength of EU is that you have the numbers. It should also give you the possibility to be much more flexible."

KEY EXTERNAL PARTNER – "The EU takes for granted non EU friends."

KEY EXTERNAL PARTNER – "The EU puts a lot of energy in internal coordination. That is why it has an inward looking rather than outward looking perspective. After negotiations [between them] they have the feeling a lot has been done, but it is just the first step. Afterwards, everything still has to be done."

Source: prepared by the authors

In general terms, interviewed external partners share positions that are similar to that of the EU and cooperate on many issues.

Unanimously, external partners value the EU project. They value the impact of EU on peace in Europe and see the interest of EU Member States working as a team. It is attractive to them to work with a group of 28 countries that has the ability to speak with one voice. Key partners expressed a strong desire to be consulted during the EU coordination process. Some expressed respect for the strength in numbers held by the EU.

6. Including key external partners in the EU coordination process

While the advantage of EU coordination for Member States is understood by External Partners, they feel frustration in working with this system, even if they observe that the involvement of external Partners in the EU coordination process has improved in recent years.

In general, however, representatives of external partners emitted criticism concerning the EU coordination process and the capacity of the EU to be a positive partner in multilateral negotiations. In some cases this criticism might also be driven by the willingness to weaken the EU's position. However they regret the fact that it is very difficult to negotiate with the EU group when the local EU diplomatic representation and Member States have completed the coordination process. It often requires great effort to define an "average position or consensus",

that the EU group is not willing to go back to the negotiating table between them, regardless of the positions of their partners. When there is consensus in the EU group, partners find themselves in front of a block representing 28 votes. They feel that the EU group is self-centered and applies most of its efforts internally rather than investing the time and energy necessary to maintain strong relationships with key partners and other non-like-minded countries.

One element of frustration is also that partners must wait for the EU to coordinate before being able to consult with them or coordinate positions. The EU group imposes its own pace on external partners. Representatives perceive a lack of reactivity and the need to anticipate positions to be able to really negotiate and coordinate with the EU. The coordination process also impacts the EU's ability to be vocal during meetings while positions are being formed. Positions can also be formed too late in the negotiating process to be influential.

The fact that the EU position is often an average position between EU Member States could be problematic for succeeding in multilateral negotiations. Work to come to an agreement on difficult matters with non-like-minded countries demands flexibility in order to make the steps required for overcoming stagnant status quo situations. As the EU wants to speak with one voice and gets stuck in the position agreed between them, this results sometimes in hampering the EU members' ability to be positive players in difficult negotiations. There is a need to be able to negotiate and adapt to the stage of the negotiation. For some countries, the only way to deal with the EU coordination process is to act early on and lobby the group before the coordination takes place in order to influence its positions.

In the view of some external partners, the major danger in the EU coordination process is that the process itself tends to absorb all of the attention and the resources of the members and the local EU diplomatic representation while coordination is taking place, while forgetting key external partnerships and negotiations with non-like-minded countries. This could lead to disengagement by allies if partners continue to feel that they cannot negotiate and influence the EU group, or that it requires too much effort for too small a result. Another negative result for partners is that the local EU diplomatic representation and Member States tend to stop at achieving an internal negotiation, while forgetting that the coordinated position must then be negotiated externally and that this second step is the more important one.

7. External representation of the EU group

With regards to the external representation roles, some tensions appear in the relationships within the EU group. Wouters & al. (2014) underline that one of the greatest obstacles in having a unified and effective presence in the UN system is "the division of powers between the EU and its Member States, most notably with the right to speak or the right to negotiate international agreements" [14]. First of all there is no clear consensus between the EU Delegation and the EU Presidency. While before Lisbon, the group was represented by the Presidency, now the EU Delegation has the main co-ordinating position. The remaining issues are about the participation of the EU Presidency at meetings between the EU Delegation and external partners and at negotiations. Invitations to the EU Presidency to participate in these types of strategic meetings tend to be rather limited. A similar exclusion is experienced by smaller and medium Member States, leading to tensions with the EU Delegation. Most countries are satisfied with the EU Delegation holding a coordinating role, however some Member States questioned its role in representing Member States. Finally, some Member States, in particular the key EU stakeholders, at times only speak for themselves without coordinating with the rest of the group (see Extract 3).

Extract 3. External representation of the EU group

LOCAL EU DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION – "The problem is representation. Some Member States want support for their own position. They want the help of the EU. It is a case of selective EU-ism we live with."

KEY EU STAKEHOLDER – "It is important to have members of the EU playing different roles not just presenting one position close to the average position. We could lose influence that way."

KEY EXTERNAL PARTNER – "There is an internal competition for competence, especially in Geneva. Who talks? The Presidency? The Delegation? The Member States?"

KEY EXTERNAL PARTNER – "Only one EU member speaks. So it puts a lot of pressure on external partners to speak in informal meetings. There are fewer voices speaking. We need a multiplicity of voices."

Source: prepared by the authors

[14] Wouters J. & al., 2014, (note 2).

In some negotiating or representational situations, numerous EU States are present, and only one speaks, which can be awkward for the others participating. When Member States remain quiet, external partners have the feeling that they have less support during meetings, and as a result have to speak more to compensate. There is a sense for some EU countries that it would be more efficient if Member States spoke in their national capacity rather than having just one voice in order to complement arguments presented in a negotiation process and offer a larger range of positions. An adaptive challenge for the EU group is to identify the best way to deal with external representation and as a union made up of 28 Member States, the EU Presidency and the EU Delegation to act with its highest potential.

8. Coordination by the EU Delegation

The Treaty of Lisbon created the EEAS with the objective of establishing a constant coordinator and more consistency in its external actions.[15] Most representatives expressed their satisfaction about the continuity offered by the EU Delegation. The EU Delegation can also be perceived as more neutral. It considers that its role is principally to chair coordination meetings between EU Member States, but that it also holds other responsibilities. The EU Delegation has the objective of building and implementing a strategy for the EU Diplomacy to be more efficient and have a more long-term perspective, however, developing a strategic coordination is a work in process.

The EU Delegation is very active and efficient in Geneva in organizing and chairing hundreds of meetings among EU experts, at the ambassadorial level, and with key external partners. Its role is rising, which represents a colossal workload for the EU Delegation, and also demonstrates its growing clout. A large number of representatives agree that the EU Delegation is consolidating more and more power with the perspective of agreeing on a common position. From the EU Delegation's perspective, it is very challenging to bring 28 countries to agree on a single position. On the other hand, there is the impression that the EU sometimes overtakes the influence of smaller or medium Member States in the process of bringing Member States to agreement. This, from the perspective of some representatives, could result in increased disengagement and tension. There is a latent fear of competence

[15] Hadeshian N., European Union's External Relations: More Consistency?, *Yearbook of Polish European Studies*, Vol. 13, 2010, pp. 107-127.

creep in this context.[16] Some States seem to be against this evolution, while some enjoy it, and others still are simply in the acceptance of facts. One point of view is that the role of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is to make diplomats of different countries work together in the same structure. As mentioned above, many representatives inside and outside the EU noted that the EU Delegation has significantly improved its functioning and efficiency in recent years. Some internal and external partners recognize the EU Delegation as being effective on the coordination aspect. Some observe that they are taking on more and more substantive work.

There is still a perception, by some representatives, that the EU Delegation is not yet taking enough initiative, they feel that it needs to be pushed by Member States to be more proactive and vocal in meetings. However, it has also been observed that sometimes there is a vested interest by some delegations to promote national initiatives through the EU Delegation without the consensus of the membership of the EU as a whole. There is an understanding by some interviewees that the EU Delegation lacks the resources to be present everywhere and to cover every key issue. They have to make up for this by hiring interns to compensate. Perhaps increased burden-sharing by the EU Presidency and Member States could offer a solution. At the same time, some consider the resources of the EU Delegation are underused. There is a perception that the EU Delegation representatives are not mobilized enough to negotiate on behalf of the Member States and the group.

Extract 4. Coordination of the EU group

LOCAL EU DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION – "The aim of the EU Delegation is to be strategic. There is consensus that the EU Delegation should chair meetings. It tries to be more than a secretary."

LOCAL EU DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION – "We deal with 40 resolutions at each session of the Human Rights Council, of which there are 3 sessions a year. On top of that, for each session, there are 30 to 40 declarations by the EU outside of the resolutions. And that is just the Council, not including the Universal Periodic Review. The team chairs 130 coordination meetings a year."

LOCAL EU DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION – "The role of the EEAS is to coordinate the EU with an overarching goal: to have a common vision for each resolution. That is our challenge. In the EU we share the same values when it comes to thematic issues. On the other hand, if we talk about country-specific issues, there are 28 positions. That is why we meet 130 times a year.

[16] Wouters J. & al., 2014, (note 2).

We had a common position on 99% of the resolutions these last two years. The Member States negotiate the common position, but they need someone to chair meetings on their behalf."

LOCAL EU DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION – "The EU Delegation is good for continuity."

KEY EU STAKEHOLDER – "The role of the EU Delegation is getting stronger and stronger."

KEY EU STAKEHOLDER – "I see a huge EU Delegation in Geneva. These resources seem underused. We can use the EU Delegation to negotiate on our behalf."

SMALL OR MEDIUM MEMBER STATE – "The coordination process should be in the hands of the EU Delegation because they know how to do it efficiently."

SMALL OR MEDIUM MEMBER STATE – "The EEAS is really about coordination and not policy making. We should prevent them to work on policy making."

SMALL OR MEDIUM MEMBER STATE – "Some countries are integrators. Some other States want Member States to have more competences."

Source: prepared by the authors

While certain countries are advocates of further integration, some EU Member States would like to limit the role of the EU Delegation to a more technical, coordinating role. They do not want a strong EEAS that develops policy. Some representatives expressed concern about maintaining competences in the longer-term perspective and the respect of national views by the EU Delegation.

The adaptive challenge here is to identify how to enhance the role of the EU Delegation and at the same time to protect national competences and interests by developing active and constructive participation in the EU coordination process through increased burden-sharing by Member States, focusing in particular on small and medium States.

9. Enhancing inclusiveness in the EU coordination process

Representatives, mainly from small and medium States, expressed concern about the involvement of EU members in the decision-making and coordination processes. The manner in which the current process plays out could be interpreted

in some situations, especially by smaller Member States, as an imposition of decisions by the EU Delegation. That said, others are under the impression that small and medium countries allow themselves to fall to the background and let the EU Delegation make decisions with the key EU stakeholders. An adaptive challenge for the local EU diplomatic representation is to further integrate Member States' concerns when preparing the agenda for coordination meetings.

Extract 5. Inclusiveness of the EU coordination process

SMALL OR MEDIUM MEMBER STATE – "There are tensions between us, member states. The EEAS should be careful not to overrule a Member State's point of view."

SMALL OR MEDIUM MEMBER STATE – "A general difficulty right now is linked to the way the EU Delegation manages agendas. What is raised by the Member States is often at the bottom of the agenda. The EU team pushes what is important for them. The EU team requires a bit of reflection on how not to leave Member States concerns to the end of the agenda. They are too focused on the issues they are following."

SMALL OR MEDIUM MEMBER STATE – "It seems that the EU foreign policy is decided by a few countries and that the others end up left out of the decision-making process. If you want to speak the voice of 28, you have to spread the decision-making powers."

SMALL OR MEDIUM MEMBER STATE – "When building the strategic plan, the EU Delegation in Geneva sends a draft to Brussels without consulting with Member States. It would be more transparent to show us. When it is in written form, it is harder to change it, even if it is a draft. Brussels and the EEAS are always in contact but the Member States are not informed. Brussels never gives feedback on demarches. It is a structural problem. Nobody is taking responsibility to do it. It is an internal management issue in Brussels."

Source: prepared by the authors

A large number of representatives also have the feeling that the most powerful Member States dominate the coordination process. This may be a result of the fact that key members composing the EU Delegation team come predominantly from larger Member States. Another contributing factor to this perception is that the key EU stakeholders have access to intelligence information and that they are present in the Security Council. The small and medium States could at times feel excluded. Representatives from these countries expressed that they have the impression they

are asked to just follow the mainstream while larger countries just talk for themselves, do not provide information and feedback, and do not want to burden share with the others. This lack of inclusiveness of small and medium countries considerably weakens the EU group and the legitimacy of the coordination process. Countries have to be afforded the capacity to influence situations or enough competence to make a meaningful contribution. The mid-term challenge for the smaller and medium countries is to retain and enhance their competencies.

Another problem in the inclusiveness of the EU coordination process concerns the relationship with Brussels. The EU Delegation periodically proposes strategic plans to the EEAS in Brussels, however, Member States are left out of this process. Similarly, a great number of EU Member States in Geneva feel that they do not get sufficient feedback from the EU Delegation on consultations that take place on a constant basis with Brussels. Therefore, they feel a "cognitive distance"[17] with Brussels in the sense they are not involved, are not informed and are not aware of how Brussels influences the EU diplomacy in Geneva. When Brussels takes a decision, it is difficult to go back to change it. The adaptive challenge will be to improve the communication between Brussels and the local EU Delegation mission in order to make this relationship more transparent for Member States and to better integrate their concerns.

10. Potential for improving teamwork

Some interviewees consider that in Geneva the EU Delegation and the Diplomatic Missions enjoy relative autonomy to experiment with ways to improve the teamwork (see extract 6). The Treaty of Lisbon allows manoeuvring room for experimenting with the way members are organized. European Commission President Barroso and Vice-President Ashton issued on 20 December 2012 a 'Strategy for the progressive improvement of the EU status in international organisations and other fora in line with the objectives of the Treaty of Lisbon'. Wouters & al. demonstrate that "the Barroso-Ashton Strategy to achieve this goal lacks therequired level of vision and precision, and is thus inadequate for guiding

[17] Zardet V., Pierre X., *Distance spatiale et cognitive entre acteurs impliqués dans le management d'un territoire*, Atelier de l'AIMS : Stratégies, Espaces et Territoires, « Loin, proche : la dimension spatiale dans le management des organisations », Orléans, France, 2007. [Spatial and Cognitive Distance between Actors Involved in the Management of a Region]

the EU's efforts towards assuming its desired leadership role at the UN level"[18]. There is a general appetite by delegations to identify actions for improving the efficiency of EU diplomacy in Geneva.

However, almost all of the representatives interviewed believe that there should be parameters that should be respected for discussions on the improvement of the EU Diplomacy in Geneva. First, some representatives noted that it would be dangerous to alter the structure of the local EU diplomatic representation, as coming to an agreement on what has been established was a difficult process. Now the goal is to experiment and to work on the management of the EU coordination process itself. Some representatives consider that what is needed is not a legalistic approach, but an analysis of ways to improve the teamwork. At the same time, endless debates around the distribution of competences between the EU Delegation, EU Presidency and the Member States have already taken place and resulting in a matrix that is simply collecting dust. These experiences have led to the idea that the improvement of the teamwork should be developed through action, through concrete cases, in order to discuss: how to make efficient use of resources offered by the Member States and local EU diplomatic representation how to develop the burden-sharing, with the goal of gaining benefits for both for EU and Member States. The general idea is how to improve EU coordination to render the process more inclusive for all the Member States and key partners.

The discussion on the improvement of the EU coordination process should integrate greater inclusiveness of the Member States. Small and medium countries clearly want to be consulted more. At the same time, there is a prevailing position among the key stakeholders that the inclusion in the consultative process should be merit-based and not a "free-ride". This approach however, could create a vicious cycle: representatives are not included due to lack of expertise, and thus they are prevented from developing it. The adaptive challenge here is how to include Member States in the consultative processes, the outreach activities and negotiations with external partners, in particular smaller Member States, and not only the key EU stakeholders, in order to develop their capacity to be positive contributors to EU diplomacy. There are questions about how to open meetings. Is it necessary to create more formats for consultations? Perhaps there should be consideration given to developing informal coordination processes or sharing more in writing.

[18] Wouters J. & al., 2014, (note 2).

Extracts 6. Enhancing teamwork within the EU diplomacy in Geneva

LOCAL EU DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION – "The inclusivity aspect is an issue. Member States want to be more involved the consultation."

LOCAL EU DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION – "External representation should be defined more in detail."

KEY EU STAKEHOLDER – "In 2011, there were some endless debate on discussing a matrix of competences of Presidency, Delegation and Member States. This matrix has disappeared. The task and function are defined by the daily agenda. It makes no sense to establish principles to implement the Lisbon treaty. We are creating this experience. We should allow it to grow."

KEY EU STAKEHOLDER – "Countries are not able to cover all the subjects. We need to do more burden-sharing. We are talking on behalf of the EU, but we do have all the countries present."

KEY EU STAKEHOLDER – "The problem is not only coordination. It is about policy. We don't have policy. Here in Geneva, we are very far away from Brussels. What they do in Brussels doesn't interfere with what we do in Geneva. We can have a policy actions plan here in Geneva."

KEY EU STAKEHOLDER – "The EU Delegation could have a bigger role, proposing coordination on some subject."

KEY EU STAKEHOLDER – "We need a clear mandate for the EU Delegation. Collectively as nations, we are not willing to move on. We prefer our national ways of doing things. We have to task the EU to take the lead, to agree on a negotiation position, to negotiate and to come back to us. The EU delegation needs a pressure from member states to initiate an action."

KEY EU STAKEHOLDER – "The problem is not the goodwill. We have to create a way of communication."

SMALL AND MEDIUM MEMBER STATE – "The EU Delegation don't want to hear about changing the structure, because it was hard to come to this actual situation."

SMALL AND MEDIUM MEMBER STATE – "It is better to have a consensus than to apply the rules only when they suit us."

KEY EXTERNAL PARTNER – "I think that the EU will be more influential if you align your troop on a larger front."

KEY EXTERNAL PARTNER – "In New York there is a monthly meeting between the EU and partners. That will be an opportunity for us to copy paste, and it will be of benefit for all of us. Having talks between us before events, other than the major events, could be profitable."

Source: prepared by the authors

It appears important as well to discuss how to improve external representation. Is it important to keep the one voice system or would it be more interesting to "align the troops on a larger front" as one representative suggested, to develop the influence of the EU? Another important point is the inclusiveness of key partners in the EU coordination process. There is a need to include their perspectives either very early in the process, to end up with one position, or at least later in the process after having already defined a EU position. Of course, early engagement of the external key partners would benefit fostering strengthened links with them and the general influence. But earlier engagement within the EU group would help to define the EU's interests and to be more influential with key partners.

Some representatives expect a strategic work plan to develop the coherence of the group in order to be more influential and more proactive. The idea is to have an evolving document outlining the strategic views of the EU group. There is a need to define Geneva-tailored political lines to implement in Geneva. A general question to debate is how to further increase the trust and the coordination between Member States and the EU Delegation in a manner to be more reactive collectively and to be more proactive. There is a general need to be active early on ahead of major events, such as sessions of the Human Rights Council.

Another issue that should be discussed is how to develop and better organize the burden-sharing. Most Member States do not have the resources to be able to cover all the subjects discussed in Geneva on their own. This capacity issue also applies to the EU Delegation. The solution suggested by many interviewees is to increase and enhance burden-sharing. There is an appetite to see how the coordination of the EU diplomacy could be improved and it appears that the EU Delegation has a great role to play. There is a desire from some countries to see the EU Delegation take more initiative and to take the lead more. There is finally a need to improve the communication between Member States and the sharing of information. To take good decisions, countries realize that they need to share more information and point of views inside and outside the EU.

11. Organizational development process

There is a need to implement an organisational development process in order to collectively address within the EU group in Geneva the issues highlighted in this paper. Some options could be proposed through the socio-economic approach

of management (SEAM) developed by ISEOR (Savall, 1981[19]; Savall, Zardet, 1995[20], 2008[21]; Buono, Savall, 2007[22]). This methodology has been successful in various contexts to conduct change and increase effectiveness and efficiency in organizations by involving the stakeholders and developing managerial capacities.

As a first step, further interviews could be conducted with other ambassadors and DPRs as well as experts of the EU Delegation and diplomatic missions in order to identify where there is some prospects for improvement of the internal and external EU coordination process. It will be relevant to present these elements to the EU group in a collective session to create a "mirror effect", offering the possibility to the actors to discuss their observations and to develop a shared vision of the adaptive challenge. On that basis, a few sessions could be organized to collectively define solutions for improvement. These elements could be formalized in a strategic action plan driven by the EU Delegation in cooperation with all the Member States involved in this process.

The socio-economic approach to management offers a structured methodology and tools to increase the capacity of management of complex projects with a large number of stakeholders with various objectives and behaviours. In the specific context of the EU diplomacy in Geneva, developing the ability of the local EU diplomatic representation, especially of the EU Delegation, to further involve and manage the Member States in the internal-external EU coordination process appears as a opportunity to address the adaptive challenge highlighted in this paper.

Conclusion

On the basis of the expression of the 17 representatives interviewed, this article offers an analysis of the state of affairs in the EU diplomacy in Geneva and areas in need of improvement to enhance the work of the EU as a team. We have identified existing tensions and potential areas for increased cooperation.

The adaptive challenge for the smaller and medium stakeholders is to identify how to engage at their full potential by continually investing in the enhancement of their diplomatic capabilities in order to stay relevant in the multilateral

19 Savall H., *Work & people. An Economic Evaluation of Job-Enrichment*, Oxford University Press, 1981.

20 Savall H., Zardet V., 1995, (note 3).

21 Savall H., Zardet V., 2008, (note 4).

22 Buono A., Savall H., *Socio-Economic Intervention in Organizations - The intervener-researcher and the SEAM approach to organizational analysis*, IAP, Charlotte, USA, 2007.

diplomacy and to foster meaningful relationships with the key internal and external partners. In order to encourage this progression, the adaptive challenge for the EU Delegation and key EU stakeholders is to determine how to create an inclusive internal climate conducive to a more transparent information exchange and decision-making processes. The adaptive challenge for the local EU representation as a whole is to look outward and work on inclusiveness of key EU external partners in consultations in order to consolidate strong relationships with allies, which is essential for effective diplomacy to take place.

It is relevant as well to reflect on the role of the rotational Presidency that is indisputably decreasing – and may very well disappear – but currently still exists according to the Lisbon Treaty and the EU practices at the Human Rights Council in Geneva. At the current stage of the evolution of the EU diplomacy, EU Member States continue to hold this role, because it is an obligation to do so, and this entails a considerable investment of resources. However, in practice, the Presidency is not necessarily welcome to assume its role, particularly if it might be perceived as retaining the pre-Lisbon components of the Presidency, by other EU stakeholders, which generates some frustration and tension. A question that could be discussed collectively by EU stakeholders in Geneva to address this issue is "how to leverage the Presidency in order to strengthen the voice of the EU in Geneva, while keeping in mind the interests of the country holding the role, other Member States and the EU Delegation".

If the strategic force of an organization is based on its internal cohesion and if internal cohesion results from the involvement and the efficient coordination of stakeholders (Savall, Zardet, 1995[23], 2008[24]), this paper demonstrates, in a diplomatic context, the need for more involvement and inclusiveness by actors in an organization that indeed exists in every sector. We have demonstrated how lack of cohesion in a group influences the efficiency of a diplomatic structure due to dysfunctions stemming from conflicting actors' behaviours and objectives. Dysfunctions are translated in this paper through the positive approach of adaptive challenges that the actors are facing.

The EU coordination in Geneva has demonstrated real successes in the coordination process, such as obtaining 99% of the EU's joint position on resolutions at the HRC, due in large part to efforts of the EU Delegation. However, the representatives of Member States interviewed expressed a gap between the results obtained by the actual process of coordination and the indicators of efficiency,

[23] Savall H., Zardet V., 1995, (note 3).

[24] Savall H., Zardet V., 2008, (note 4).

such as the quality of information sharing, the effectiveness of internal burden-sharing, and the capacity to negotiate collectively. Perhaps the goal should not be so much having 100% agreement on common positions but rather enhancing the influence of the EU group by leveraging the diversity of views and using a strategic distribution of roles. The ultimate goal should not necessarily to be always weigh in as a block (even if it is often very effective), but also be able to adapt to the specificities of certain situations, and to engage aligned as well as non-aligned partners in a process that reflects the value of the EU.

The main prospects for improvement appear to be on increasing inclusiveness in the EU coordination process of the internal and external stakeholders through more consultations, work on the organization of the group through the use of management tools and increasing trust between EU members by working on communication. To develop and maintain sustainable cooperation between Member States, there is a need for someone in charge of managing the group. In that sense, the EU Delegation appears to be best placed to take on this role. At the same time, in order to enhance its efficiency, there is a need for more inclusiveness and involvement of all of the parties in the decision-making process. This can be achieved through the application of solid management science tools and participative methodologies. We hope in the near future to be in a position to implement the socio-economic approach of management to the structure examined in this paper in order to analyse its effects on the development of EU diplomacy in Geneva and on enhancing of the teamwork among Member States and the local EU diplomatic representation.

LITHUANIAN-POLISH RELATIONS AFTER 2004: GOOD OLD COOPERATION IN REGRETFULLY BAD NEW WRAPPING

Galina Vaščenkaitė*

Abstract

This article aims to analyse the change of Lithuanian-Polish relations after accession of both countries to the EU and NATO and to evaluate the influence of the main identified problems of bilateral relations upon the effectiveness of Lithuanian-Polish cooperation. The priority areas of bilateral cooperation (i.e., military and economic cooperation as well as cooperation in the energy field) and the main catalysts of tensions in Lithuanian-Polish relations (namely, unresolved issues of the Polish national minority in Lithuania and the influence of both countries political leaders' personal characteristics upon changes in political rhetoric) are examined. The analysis results in concluding that although the issues of national minorities and harsh political rhetoric worsen the general emotional setting of bilateral relations, they do not create obstacles for the effective and substantial cooperation between Lithuania and Poland.

Introduction

Not only during the centuries, but also over the last 25 years Lithuania and Poland keep changing their "political feelings" towards each other radically from time to time. Very warm relations between Lithuania and Poland during the *Solidarność* and *Sąjūdis* era started to deteriorate gradually by the end of 1991, soon after both countries escaped the "Iron Curtain". It took just a fraction of time to worsen bilateral relations to the point that they were described by some experts as almost openly confrontational in 1992–1993[1]. However, it did not take long

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1 Laurinavičius Č., Motieka E., Statkus N., *Baltijos valstybių geopolitikos bruožai. XX amžius* ['Features

to witness a new "thaw". It started in 1994 and reached its peak in 1997, when Lithuanian-Polish strategic partnership was officially declared and successfully developed until both countries became members of the EU and NATO as well as several years after.

It is hard to tell unequivocally which event(s) triggered the new fracture in Lithuanian-Polish relations. However, since 2010–2011 experts again unanimously agree that relations between the two countries are very bad, even conflicting, full of constant strains[2], or that at least "their deterioration […] is beyond doubt"[3]. Exceptionally unfriendly political rhetoric, resurfaced disagreements on national minorities' issues and exceptionally negative reflections in the media on these issues in both countries are usually referred to as main indicators of the worsening of Lithuanian-Polish relations [4].

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of the Baltic States' Geopolitics. 20th Century'], Vilnius: Lietuvos istorijos instituto leidykla, 2005, p. 306

2 Dambrauskaitė Ž., et al., "Lithuanian-Polish Relations Reconsidered: A Constrained Bilateral Agenda or an Empty Strategic Partnership", *EESC analytical review* No. 3, 2011, p. 3-4, 14; Ivanauskas V., "Netapti Smolensko tragedijos įkaitais: Lietuvos ir Lenkijos gerų santykių dinamikos veiksniai" ['Avoiding Becoming Hostages of Smolensk Tragedy: Factors of Good Lithuanian - Polish Relations'], *The Eastern Pulse,* No. 1(40), 2012, p. 1; Kasčiūnas L., Keršanskas V., Kojala L., "Lietuvos ir Lenkijos santykiai: recepto paieškos" ['Lithuanian-Polish Relations: The Search of Recipe'], *The Eastern Pulse,* No. 2(47), 2013, p. 1; Bujnicki T., "Some Comments on Polish-Lithuanian Tensions", *Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review*, No. 26, 2011, p. 149; Dudzińska K., „Polityka wobec Litwy – pat czy szansa na przełom?" ['Policy towards Lithuania – The Stalemate or the Turning-Point?'], *Rocznik Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej 2011*, Warszawa: Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, 2011, p. 136; Fuksiewicz A., Kucharczyk J., Łada A., *Šalia. Lenkai ir lietuviai vieni kitų akimis*: Tyrimo ataskaita ['Alongside. Poles and Lithuanians through the Eyes of Each Other: Research Report'], Varšuva: Viešųjų reikalų institutas, 2013, p. 111; BNS, „Politologas: Lietuvos ir Lenkijos nesutarimai gali atsiliepti viso Baltijos regiono energetikos saugumui" ['Political Scientist: Lithuanian-Polish Disagreements Can Affect the Energy Security of the Whole Region'], *Delfi.lt,* 2010 10 26, <http://www.delfi.lt/verslas/energetika/politologas-lietuvos-ir-lenkijos-nesutarimai-gali-atsiliepti-viso-baltijos-regiono-energetikos-saugumui.d?id=37895687#ixzz2lIqu4HKz>; PAP, „Relacje Polski z Litwą najgorsze w UE" ['Polish Relations with Lithuania Are the Worst within the EU'], *Wirtualna Polska (Wp.pl)*, 14 01 2011, <http://wiadomosci.wp.pl/kat,1023303,title,Relacje-Polski-z-Litwa-najgorsze-w-UE,wid,13035175,wiadomosc.html?ticaid=113528>.

3 Bumblauskas A., "Lietuvos etninės įtampos kaip didžiųjų istorijos naratyvų priešpriešų išdava" ['Ethnic Tensions in Lithuania as a Result of Face-Off of the Great Historic Narratives'], an article written as a part of research project "The Tradition, Image and Modern Identities of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania", Vilnius: 2011, <http://www.mdl.projektas.vu.lt/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/2011-lietuvos-etnines-itampos-kaip-didziuju-istorijos-naratyvu-priespriesu-isdava.pdf>, accessed 04 04 2014.

4 Kasčiūnas, Keršanskas, Kojala, (note 2) p. 1; Borodzicz-Smolinski W., Jurkonis V., "Lithuania and Poland: Lost in Translation", *The Eastern Pulse* 2(41), 2012.

Leaving prejudices on the quality of relations behind, this article aims at analysing the change of Lithuanian-Polish relations after accession of both countries to the EU and NATO and evaluating the influence of the main identified problems (i.e., disagreements on the situation of the Polish minority in Lithuania and harsh political rhetoric) upon the effectiveness of Lithuanian-Polish bilateral cooperation. The hypothesis is raised that although the issues of national minorities and harsh political rhetoric worsen the general emotional background of relations, they do not create obstacles for effective and substantial cooperation between Lithuania and Poland.

The hypothesis is confirmed in two stages. Firstly, the priority areas of bilateral cooperation – military and economic cooperation as well as cooperation in the energy field – are examined. These areas reflect the real potential of strategic partnership and the possibilities to mobilise this potential for the implementation of common goals. Political relations between Lithuania and Poland are not analysed separately, assuming that due to their horizontal nature, they penetrate all areas of bilateral cooperation. Secondly, the main catalysts of tensions in Lithuanian-Polish relations are examined, namely – the unresolved issues of the Polish national minority in Lithuania and the influence of both countries' political leaders' personal characteristics upon changes in political rhetoric. The analysis reveals that during certain periods, these factors influence the creation of a negative context of bilateral relations; however, they do not prevent constructive bilateral cooperation in other areas.

1. Explanations for the deterioration of Lithuanian-Polish relations and their limitations

While searching for the reasons of the new "Ice Age" of Lithuanian-Polish relations, several factors are usually named. Popular discourse is dominated by the explanation that the deterioration of bilateral relations is stipulated by the long-standing and unresolved issues of the Polish national minority in Lithuania (this factor also considered as the most important by some Polish experts[5]) and the harsh rhetoric of Lithuanian and Polish political leaders alike. In both cases, reasons

[5] Dudzińska, (note 2) p. 136; Expert interviews (I) and (III) with researchers at Polish foreign policy think-tanks, Vilnius, 20 01 2014 and 10 04 2014; Fuksiewicz, Kucharczyk, Łada (note 2) p. 16, 118-119.

are confused with (eventual) symptoms. The issue of the Polish national minority in Lithuania is without doubt the biggest problem in bilateral Lithuanian-Polish relations. However, this issue was always on the Lithuanian-Polish relations agenda[6], nevertheless it has not impeded with intense cooperation during the period of exceptional closeness, i.e., 1994–2004. Thus, while active escalation of national minority issues clouds the atmosphere of Lithuanian-Polish relations, the problems of national minorities "do not reflect the real reasons behind the worsening of relations"[7]. These problems are rather the result or reflection of tensions than the reason themselves. Similarly, political rhetoric may deepen or inflame tensions in bilateral relations. Yet political rhetoric by itself is hardly the reason behind changes in relations but rather the reflection of such changes. The poignancy of Lithuanian and Polish political leaders' rhetoric, which raises a huge resonance in the respective countries' societies, especially during electoral campaigns, is caused more by the personal qualities of the leaders, the models of political behaviour they adopt and partly – by their ideological beliefs[8] and approach to history[9] rather than the changing content of bilateral relations.

Scholars, analysing the changes in Lithuanian-Polish relation more deeply, usually outline four geopolitical factors. First, the increase of Poland's political

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6 Dambrauskaitė, et al., (note 2) p. 23; Sirutavičius V., "Lithuanian-Polish Strategic Partnership: Genesis and Prospects", *Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review*, No. 7, 2001, p. 21; Miniotaitė G., Jakniūnaitė D., "Lietuvos saugumo politika ir identitetas šiuolaikinių saugumo studijų požiūriu" ['Lithuanian Security Policy and Identity from the Viewpoint of Contemporary Security Studies'], *Politologija*, No. 1(23), 2001, p. 18;

7 Samoškaitė E., „V.Adamkus: toks jausmas, kad Lietuvos ir Lenkijos santykiai sugriuvo per naktį" ['V. Adamkus: Feels Like Lithuanian-Polish Relations Collapsed Overnight'], *Delfi.lt*, 19 02 2011, <http://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithuania/vadamkus-toks-jausmas-kad-lietuvos-ir-lenkijos-santykiai-sugriuvo-per-nakti.d?id=42165857#ixzz3B41AVQEq>; Expert interview (I) with the researcher at Polish foreign policy think-tank, Vilnius, 20 01 2014.

8 Kasčiūnas, Keršanskas, Kojala, (note 2) p. 4.

9 For more information on projections of historic memory in contemporary Lithuanian-Polish relations, see Bumblauskas, (note 3); Sirutavičius V., Lopata R., *„Lenkiškasis" istorijos veiksnys Lietuvos politikoje*, ['The "Polish" History Factor in Lithuanian Politics'], Vilnius: Vilniaus universitetas, 2011; Łaszkiewicz H., „Pamięć i zapomnienie. Węzły pamięci w stosunkach polsko-litewskich" ['Memory and Oblivion. The Memory Knots in Polish-Lithuanian Relations'], article written as a part of research project "History and the Present. The Heritage of Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Current Polish-Lithuanian Relations", Lublin, Instytut Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, 2012, <http://www.iesw.lublin.pl/projekty/pliki/IESW-121-02-09.pdf>, accessed 22 08 2014; Kazlauskaitė R., "Common Past, Divided Memories: The "Question of Vilnius" in the Collective Memory of the Polish Minority Members in Lithuania", in Dębicki M., Makaro J., eds., *Sąsiedztwa III RP – Lenkija, Litwa, Polska, Lietuva. Zagadnienia społeczne*, Wrocław: GAJT Wydawnictwo, 2012, p. 223–236; etc.

"weight" within the EU and corresponding changes in Polish geopolitical orientation. It is argued that full-fledged EU membership raised Poland's awareness of its potential (stemming from its size and economy) of becoming one of the most influential nations in the EU. Poland started to exploit this potential after the proponent of pragmatic policy Donald Tusk came into power as the Polish Prime Minister and even more so when Bronislaw Komorowski took up the President's office after his predecessor Lech Kaczyński died in the Smolensk catastrophe in 2010. While searching for political allies Poland started to gradually turn away from smaller partners in Eastern Europe towards the "core" EU countries (first and foremost – Germany and France) and align its foreign policy with the *modus operandi* of the latter[10]. Meanwhile, analysts claim, Lithuania did not succeed in finding enough common denominators with the changing interests of Poland. Most importantly, Lithuania failed to react adequately upon the fact that as Poland becomes more powerful, Lithuanian-Polish relations become even more asymmetrical than they were before. Thus, Lithuania should now be more interested in investing in a close relationship with Poland than Poland is in trying to find a common ground with Lithuania[11]. The effect of the change in Polish geopolitical orientation upon relations with Lithuania is beyond doubt. Therefore, this argument is compelling. However, its explanatory power is limited. It could only explain the diminished intensity of Lithuanian-Polish relations, but not the reasons behind their rising hostility (in case this rise actually takes place).

Second, according to experts, the estrangement of Lithuanian-Polish relations was also stimulated by the "reset" of Polish-Russian relations[12]. Former Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski was indeed one of the most enthusiastic supporters of the US-Russia "reset"[13] and thus steered Polish foreign policy *vis-à-vis* Russia in a similar direction[14]. In fact, for some time, especially in the aftermath

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[10] Dambrauskaitė, et al., (note 2) p. 10, 11-14; Hyndle J., Kutysz M., "Stosunki Polski z Litwą w latach 2004–2006" ['Polish Relations with Lithuania in 2004–2006'], *Rocznik Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej 2007*, Warszawa: Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, 2007, p. 148; Sirutavičius (note 6) p. 18; Dudzińska, (note 2), p. 137; Bukowiecka H., „Polityka Polski wobec Litwy" ['Polish Policy towards Lithuania'], *Rocznik Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej 2008*, Warszawa: Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, 2008, p. 214; Samoškaitė, (note 7).

[11] Dambrauskaitė, et al., (note 2) p. 10, 13; Kasčiūnas, Keršanskas, Kojala, (note 2) p. 5.

[12] Dambrauskaitė, et al., (note 2) p. 10, 15–16.

[13] Krickus D.,"Barack Obama and the Security in the Eastern Baltic Sea Region", *Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 2010-2011,* Vilnius: Military Academy of Lithuania, 2011, p. 18.

[14] Miniotaitė G., "Europeanisation Tendencies of the Foreign and Security Policy of the Baltic States", *Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 2010-2011,* Vilnius: Military Academy of Lithuania, 2011, p. 116. For more information, see Bieleń S., „The Possibility of Reconciliation in Polish - Russian Relations", *Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review,* No. 27, 2012, p. 11–34.

of the Smolensk tragedy in 2010, it seemed that Polish-Russian relations improved significantly[15]. However, even if Russia's factor might have influenced Lithuanian-Polish relations negatively since 2009, delusion in the "reset" towards Russia has begun to vanish during recent years, and totally collapsed since the outbreak of the crisis in Ukraine in 2013. Thus for some time already, the Russian factor serves not as a hindrance, but as a catalyst of Lithuanian-Polish relations.

Third, the increased attention of Lithuanian foreign policy towards cooperation with the Nordic countries[16] is sometimes considered as an additional factor worsening Lithuanian relations with Poland. The emersion of the Nordic dimension in Lithuanian foreign policy was partly stimulated by the reaction towards changing Poland's foreign policy vectors and also by the success story of Estonia. However, bilateral cooperation with individual EU Member States or close partners of the EU is not a zero-sum game. Thus, the emphasis on the trade-off between cooperation with Poland and with the Nordic countries appears artificial. The argument that "strengthening ties with the Nordic Countries does not contradict but, instead, complements cooperation with Poland"[17] is more convincing.

Fourth, the worsening of Lithuanian-Polish relations is mostly beneficial to the external actor – Russia. It is interested in preventing the development of a Polish-Lithuanian alliance capable (especially, if supported by the USA) of consolidating other actors of similar foreign and security strategies and thereby (potentially) counterbalancing Russia's influence in Central and Eastern Europe and the EU Eastern neighbourhood[18]. Russia's interests are without doubt one of the major factors influencing both the domestic and foreign policies of Central and Eastern European countries. However, while the Russian factor may indicate one of the most important sources of Lithuanian-Polish rift incitements, it is not sufficient

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15 Krickus, (note 13) p. 18.

16 Dudzińska, (note 2) p. 137; Dambrauskaitė, et al., (note 2) p. 10.

17 Bajarūnas E., "Cooperation of Nordic-Baltic Countries on Security and Defence", *Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 2012-2013*, No. 11, 2013, p. 118.

18 Borodzicz-Smolinski, Jurkonis, (note 4) p. 2–3; Kasčiūnas, Keršanskas, Kojala, (note 2) p. 5; Šapokas E., LRT televizijos naujienų tarnyba, "A. Michnikas: kam naudingas Lietuvos ir Lenkijos santykių griovimas" ['A.Michnik: Who Is to Profit from the Demolition of Lithuanian-Polish Relations'], *Delfi.lt*, 21 08 2014, <http://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithuania/a-michnikas-kam-naudingas-lietuvos-ir-lenkijos-santykiu-griovimas.d?id=65622006>; Expert interview (II) with high-ranking Lithuanian diplomat, Vilnius, 20 03 2014; the same idea expressed during the discussion „Lithuanian Foreign Policy: *quo vadis*?" organized by the Eastern Europe Studies Centre, Vilnius, 07 03 2014.

to explain why Lithuania and Poland surrender to the "divide and rule" policy of Russia, which is harmful to both of them.

To sum up, none of the above-mentioned arguments provides either undeniable evidence or sufficient explanation of the worsening of Lithuanian-Polish relations in recent years.

2. Priority areas of Lithuanian-Polish cooperation

2.1. Lithuanian-Polish military cooperation as the most consistent expression of the countries' strategic partnership

Military cooperation between Lithuania and Poland started in 1994 by signing the Inter-Governmental Agreement on Defence Cooperation. The countries cooperated in training of professional soldiers, consulted on the development of air defence systems and exchanged classified military information. Bilateral military cooperation reached a qualitatively new stage in 1999 when Poland became a member of NATO. Polish assistance was key for transformation of the Lithuanian Armed Forces and Lithuanian engagement into international peacekeeping operations[19]. Poland's support for Lithuanian Euro-Atlantic integration stemmed not only from friendliness towards a smaller neighbour, but also from a very rational consciousness that without a secure Lithuania there cannot be a secure Poland; likewise without a secure Poland there cannot be a secure Lithuania[20].

Seeking to enhance security in the region and, most importantly, to help the Lithuanian Armed Forces adjust to NATO military standards, the Lithuanian-Polish peacekeeping battalion LITPOLBAT with its headquarters in Poland[21] was established in 1999[22] making Lithuania the only NATO candidate country

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19 Žigaras F., *Baltijos šalys: saugumas ir gynyba 1990-2002,* ['The Baltic States: Security and Defence 1990–2002'], Vilnius: Leidybos centras prie KAM, 2002, p. 191–192.

20 Sirutavičius, (note 6) p. 16.

21 Krivas A., "Lithuanian-Polish military cooperation", *Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review*, No. 1(7), 2001, p. 35; "Polish-Lithuanian Cooperation", at the website of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Vilnius, <http://www.wilno.msz.gov.pl/en/bilateral_cooperation/polish_lithuanian_co_operation/>, accessed 19 01 2014.

22 Lithuanian-Polish agreement on creation of a joint peacekeeping battalion signed two years before, in the summer of 1997.

at that time to have a joint military unit with a NATO member state[23]. Poland's membership in NATO created the opportunity for LITPOLBAT soldiers to participate in international military exercises (e.g., "Amber Hope 2001") and training as well as NATO, UN and OSCE missions, namely in Kosovo, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq[24]. Furthermore, Poland supported the Lithuanian Armed Forces by donating used and new military equipment and training Lithuanian soldiers in Polish military training institutions[25]. Both countries also cooperated on civil protection.

Lithuanian-Polish military cooperation was not limited to bilateral projects but also actively developed in regional formats. Poland participated in joint defence projects of the three Baltic States. Due to technical and geographical reasons, some of those projects could not have even been implemented without Poland's involvement[26]. Poland also acted as a "bridge" for Lithuanian military cooperation with other NATO members. E.g. Lithuania, together with Latvia and Estonia, was invited to participate in trilateral meetings of the Defence Ministers of Denmark, Poland, and Germany[27].

Before and several years after accession to NATO, the Lithuanian military mainly participated in international peacekeeping missions (e.g., in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq) with Polish compounds[28]. Although during the first years of

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23 Lithuanian Ministry of Economy, "Lithuania. Country Profile: April 2001", Vilnius: Lithuanian Ministry of Economy, 2001, p. 11.

24 „Zamknięto LITPOLBAT" ['LITPOLBAT Closed'], *Tygodnik Wileńszczyzny*, No. 356, 5-11 07 2007, <http://www.tygodnik.lt/200727/aktualia.html>.

25 Krivas, (note 23) p. 36; Valionis A., Ignatavičius E., Bričkovskienė I., "From Solidarity to Partnership: Lithuanian-Polish Relations 1988–1998", *Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review*, No. 2, 1998, p. 17; Hyndle, Kutysz, (note 10) p. 163.

26 BALTBAT (Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion, established in 1994; dissolved after fulfilment of its functions in the autumn of 2003); BALTNET (Baltic Air Surveillance Network integrated into NATO Air Surveillance and Control System in 2004. Technically and geographically, BALTNET could only operate through Poland and therefore its involvement was a prerequisite); BALTRON (The Baltic Naval Squadron, established in August 1998 as a constant readiness unit of the Baltic States' military ships, still operative); BALTDEFCOL (The Baltic Defence College is an international military education institution for operational and strategic-level military and civilian leaders of the Baltic states and allied countries, established in February 1999 in Tartu, Estonia) – Krivas, (note 23) p. 36; Žigaras, (note 20) p. 191; „Baltijos šalių bendradarbiavimas" ['Cooperation among the Baltic States'], on the website of the Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania (Lithuanian version), <http://www.kam.lt/lt/tarptautinis_bendradarbiavimas/baltijos_saliu_bendradarbiavimas.html>, accessed 01 04 2014.

27 Žigaras, (note 20) p. 200.

28 In 1999, Special Operations Element of Lithuanian Armed Forces participated in the NATO

Lithuania's membership in NATO Poland continued to support the transformation of Lithuanian Armed Forces, the demand for this support decreased as Lithuania itself became adapted within the Alliance. Being a member of the EU and NATO, Lithuania developed into a self-sustaining contributor to international missions. Today both countries participate in NATO, EU, and UN peacekeeping missions and operations on an equal basis, though, naturally, with different capabilities. Thus, Lithuania is no longer dependent on Polish integration and networking assistance as it was before the accession to NATO.

Nevertheless, due to geographical proximity and common security threats, Lithuania and Poland continue to play an exclusive role in each other's security architecture. Within NATO, Lithuania and Poland, as neighbouring nations, inevitably cooperate with each other much closer than with other, especially more distant, member states. Regional exercises are continued under the NATO "umbrella" with the participation of the Polish, Lithuanian, and frequently – the military forces of the other Baltic States (e.g., "Steadfast Jazz" in November 2013). Poland leads the Baltic Air Policing Mission, established in 2004 in Zokniai, Lithuania, more frequently than any other NATO member state. Already the fifth rotation of Polish pilots and fighters was deployed in Zokniai in the summer of 2014[29] and the sixth rotation is scheduled for January 2015[30].

Moreover, Lithuania and Poland transfer their experience of bilateral military cooperation into new projects aimed at responding to security challenges in their immediate neighbourhood. For example, after LITPOLBAT accomplished its

operation in Kosovo (KFOR) as a part of the Polish military battalion. After accession to NATO, Lithuania actively continued participation in KFOR until 2009, not only as a part of the Polish battalion, but later also as a part of Danish, Czech and Slovak battalions. In terms of the Lithuanian contingent deployed, KFOR (1999–2009) was the second largest international operation for the Lithuanian military surpassed only by NATO-led operations in Afghanistan. During operations in Iraq (2003–2011), the most numerous Lithuanian military forces were deployed as part of Polish and UK units (during 2003–2008). During 2003–2006, five LITDET (Lithuanian Detachment) rotations were deployed in the areas of Polish responsibility (as a part of the Polish Division in the cities of Al Hillah and Al Kut). LITDET were withdrawn from Iraq after Poland decided to reduce its contingent in the mission – Žigaras, (note 20) p. 197; Krivas, (note 23) p. 35; "Multinational operations", on the website of Lithuanian Armed Forces (Lithuanian version), <http://kariuomene.kam.lt/lt/tarptautines_operacijos_786.html>, accessed 01 04 2014.

[29] German pilots and fighters also completed five rotations, but the sixth one has not yet been announced.

[30] „Baltijos šalių dangų saugantys lenkai: „Rusai kasmet aktyvesni" [Poles Guarding the Baltic Sky: "Russians Are Getting More Active Each Year"] (BNS and lrytas.lt inf.), *lrytas.lt,* 27 07 2014, <http://www.lrytas.lt/lietuvos-diena/aktualijos/baltijos-saliu-dangu-saugantys-lenkai-rusai-kasmet-aktyvesni.htm>.

mission and *de facto* ceased to exist in 2007[31], it was used as a model for creating the Lithuanian-Polish-Ukrainian Brigade (LITPOLUKRBRIG). A Memorandum of Understanding on creation of LITPOLUKRBRIG signed back in 2009. However, the project was delayed mostly due to the alternating position of the Ukrainian government. The foreseen start of the project was postponed several times and the draft Agreement on establishing LITPOLUKRBRIG remained unsigned[32]. As Lithuanian-Polish relations appeared to grow colder, it seemed that the idea of creating the Lithuanian-Polish-Ukrainian Brigade would never materialize. However, in light of the political crisis in Ukraine and Russia's increased aggression, the Polish Ministry of Defence announced the renewal of LITPOLUKRBRIG after consultations with NATO Headquarters in March 2014[33]. The idea of creating the Joint Brigade as soon as possible was supported by the Lithuanian and Ukrainian Defence Ministers. Thus, the evident and rapid growth of security threat boosted the signature of the Agreement on establishing the joint Lithuanian-Polish-Ukrainian Brigade, which finally took place in September 2014[34].

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31 Lithuanian-Polish Treaty on LITPOLBAT officially denounced in May 2008. – LR įstatymas Nr. X-1547 dėl Lietuvos Respublikos Vyriausybės ir Lenkijos Respublikos Vyriausybės sutarties dėl bendro karinio dalinio sudarymo tarptautiniam saugumui ir taikai palaikyti bei atkurti denonsavimo [Act of the Republic of Lithuania No X-1547 on the Denunciation of the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the Government of the Republic of Poland on the Establishment of Joint Military Peacekeeping Unit], (20 05 2008), Vilnius: Valstybės žinios, No. 63, 03 06 2008; „LITPOLBAT savo vaidmenį atliko" ['LITPOLBAT Accomplished its Role'], *Delfi*, 07 11 2007, <http://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithuania/litpolbat-savo-vaidmeni-atliko.d?id=14915545>.

32 Marcin Wojciechowski, „Wspólna brygada Polski, Litwy i Ukrainy" ['Joint Polish, Lithuanian and Ukrainian Brigade'], *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 16 11 2009, <http://wyborcza.pl/1,76842,7257108,Wspolna_brygada_Polski__Litwy_i_Ukrainy.html>; Interfax-Ukraine, „Combined Ukrainian-Polish-Lithuanian brigade could appear in autumn", *KyivPost*, 13 05 2011, <http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/combined-ukrainian-polish-lithuanian-brigade-could-104303.html>; „Угода про створення ЛитПолУкрбриг може бути підписана в червні – Міноборони Польщі" ['Agreement on the Establishment of LITPOLUKRBRIG Can Be Signed in June'], *Укрінформ*, 17 04 2013, <http://www.ukrinform.ua/ukr/news/ugoda_pro_stvorennya_litpolukrbrig_moge_buti_pidpisana_v_chervni___minoboroni_polshchi_1818939>.

33 Matthew Day, "Poland Plans to Reform Military Brigade with Ukraine and Lithuania", *The Telegraph*, 17 03 2014, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/10703016/Poland-plans-to-reform-military-brigade-with-Ukraine-and-Lithuania.html>.

34 "Agreement on the Establishment of trilateral Lithuanian-Polish-Ukrainian Brigade was endorsed", Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania, 20 09 2014, <http://www.kam.lt/en/news_1098/current_issues/agreement_on_the_establishment_of_trilateral_lithuanian-polish-ukrainian_brigade_will_be_endorsed.html?pbck=10>.

The wish to help its "little brothers" in the Baltics may not be the main reason behind Poland's increased concern about regional security. It may be grounded by very pragmatic considerations. First, eventual Russian aggression next to Polish borders would take a heavy toll on Poland itself. Second, Poland, as the largest and economically strongest country on the Eastern frontier of NATO, would have to deploy the largest military contingent to protect the Baltic States in case of Russia's aggression[35]. Notwithstanding this pragmatic rationale, however, one could hardly reckon on the mobilisation and consolidation of Polish and Lithuanian defence capabilities of such a velocity and scale in case the relations between the two countries were indeed antagonistic. Thus, the effective military cooperation between Lithuania and Poland casts serious doubts on the claims that the relations between the countries are hostile. On the contrary, the intensification of bilateral defence cooperation in light of a genuine security threat demonstrates the capability of Lithuania and Poland to mobilise the potential of their strategic partnership and cooperate constructively as such need arises.

2.2. Lithuanian-Polish economic relations: invisible hand of the market with a glimpse of political interests

Well-developed economic relations are often presented by experts either as proof of the constructiveness of Lithuanian-Polish bilateral cooperation or at least as a clear contrast to the harsh political rhetoric and problems of national minorities[36].

During the last decade, Lithuanian-Polish economic cooperation intensified significantly. From 2004 to 2013[37] Lithuanian exports to Poland increased more than fivefold and Polish exports to Lithuania more than tripled (see Figure 1). Poland is one of the most important trade partners of Lithuania. In 2013, Lithuanian exports to Poland totalled 6.26 bn LTL (7.4% of overall exports). Lithuania exported more only to Russia (16.8 bn LTL), Latvia (8.5 bn LTL), and Estonia (6.4 bn LTL). Lithuanian imports from Poland amounting to 8.6 bn LTL (9% of all imports) were only surpassed by Lithuanian imports from Russia

35 Krickus, (note 13) p. 21.

36 Fuksiewicz, Kuchzrczyk, Łada, (note 2) p. 113.

37 Statistics Lithuania and Central Bank of Lithuania have yet only published the data for the IQ of 2014, thus data for 2013 is used as the most up to date in this article.

(26.8 bn LTL) and Germany (9.5 bn LTL)[38]. The bilateral trade balance however remains negative for Lithuania for the last decade. Lithuania imports more from Poland than it exports to Poland (see Figure 1).



Figure 1. Lithuania's exports to Poland, and imports from Poland, trade balance, 2004–2013 (end of year, bn LTL)

Source: Statistics Lithuania

Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows between the two countries increased even more significantly during the last decade. Annual net cumulated FDI from Poland increased 16 times (from 0.29 bn LTL in 2004 to 4.73 bn LTL in 2013) (see Figure 2). In 2013, in terms of cumulated FDI, Poland was the second largest investor in Lithuania (after Sweden, the cumulated FDI of which totalled 10.3 bn LTL by the end of 2013)[39].

[38] Statistics Lithuania, <http://osp.stat.gov.lt/documents/10180/606987/Imp_exp_2013_01_12.pdf/1b4a5ba6-0c55-460c-9cf0-a1c895665f63>, accessed 28 03 2014.

[39] Central Bank of Lithuania, <http://www.lb.lt/stat_pub/statbrowser.aspx?group=8006&lang=lt>, accessed 28 03 2014.



Figure 2. Aggregated FDI in Lithuania and Poland's aggregated FDI in Lithuania, 2004–2013 (end of year, bn LTL).

Source: Central Bank of Lithuania

Taking into account the size of the economies, Poland is a significantly more important investor for Lithuania than Lithuania is for Poland. This tendency is not likely to change in the future. FDI flows from Lithuania to Poland are comparatively very low (amounting to millions rather than billions LTL) and have almost no effect on the Polish economy. Still, Lithuanian FDI in Poland has grown since 2006[40] (from 0.35 bn LTL in 2006 to 0.49 bn LTL in 2012), and almost doubled during 2013 (from 0.49 bn LTL in 2012 to 0.8 bn LTL in 2013) (see Figure 3). In 2013, in terms of Lithuanian FDI, Poland stood at fifth place. Lithuania invested more in the Netherlands (1.74 bn LTL), Estonia (1.04 bn LTL), Latvia (1 bn LTL), and Cyprus (0.9 bn LTL)[41].

[40] If we compare the amounts of Lithuanian net cumulative FDI at the end of the year in Poland from 2004 to 2013, the increase by 100 times of this indicator might appear misleading. This is the case because Lithuanian FDI were insignificant before just several years after its accession to the EU. To illustrate this trend, Figure 2 shows Lithuanian FDI starting from 1997, not 2004. The graph demonstrates that to reflect not the overall changes of the flows of Lithuanian FDI, but rather the trends of Lithuanian investments to Poland, it makes more sense to analyse the period of 2006–2013 not 2004–2013.

[41] Central Bank of Lithuania, <http://www.lb.lt/stat_pub/statbrowser.aspx?group=8006&lang=lt>, accessed 28 03 2014.



Figure 3. Aggregated Lithuania's FDI and aggregated Lithuania's FDI in Poland, 2004–2013 (end of year, bn LTL)

Source: Central Bank of Lithuania

Strengthening bilateral economic cooperation should not necessarily be considered a consequence of political partnership. Market economy determines that business interests, legal regulation of the Internal Market, economic development of the countries, the structure of national economies, business culture, and other aspects, not necessarily directly related to "high" politics, shape economic relations between two EU Member States more than politics does. At the same time, however, the possibilities of politicising economies should not be underestimated. Political interests can influence economic cooperation just as business interests influence politics, both by encouraging and by hampering it.

The most vivid example of politicising of economic relations between Lithuania and Poland was the sale of the oil refinery *Mažeikių nafta* to the Polish *PKN Orlen* in 2006[42]. This deal was based primarily on energy security concerns rather than on economic calculations. The probability was high that after bankruptcy of the Russian *Yukos* owning a 53.7% share of *Mažeikių nafta,* the controlling block would go for a mere trifle to the Kremlin-controlled *Gazprom*[43]. Thus, it was of vital importance for Lithuania that the company of its strategic partner Poland would hinder such a scenario. Officially, Warsaw also supported Lithuania's aim to prevent this energy security threat and emphasized the political side of the deal. More importantly,

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42 Dambrauskaitė, et al., (note 2) p. 30.

43 Staselis R., „"Kommersant": „Jukos" akcininkams iš Rusijos priteista 50 mlrd. USD" ['"Kommersant": 500 Billion USD Adjudged to Yukos Shareholders'], *Vz.lt*, 28 07 2014, <http://vz.lt/article/2014/7/28/kommersant-jukos-akcininkams-is-rusijos-priteista-50-mlrd-usd>.

Poland considered it a possibility to enhance not only Lithuanian, but also Polish and regional energy security. Therefore, both countries regarded the acquisition of *Mažeikių nafta* by *PKN Orlen* as clear proof of a Lithuanian-Polish strategic partnership[44].

Thus, energy security interests and the strategic partnership between Lithuania and Poland stimulated the largest-ever Polish investment in Lithuania. It is worth mentioning that the Lithuanian government continues to closely cooperate with the Polish government and *PKN Orlen* at both a national and EU level seeking to improve business conditions for *PKN Orlen*[45] and helping obtain maximum dividends from this political investment both for *PKN Orlen* (in economic terms) and for Lithuania (primarily in terms of energy security).

The example of the acquisition of *Mažeikių nafta* by *PKN Orlen* demonstrates that when the need arises, economic cooperation can serve as a means of the realization of strategic interests of Lithuania and Poland. At the same time, when there is no strategic demand to interfere into economic relations determined by the free market and fuelled by business interests, macroeconomic data (exports and FDI flows) illustrates that political relations between Lithuania and Poland at least do not hinder the development of economic cooperation.

2.3. Implementation of strategic energy projects: the paradoxes of the most asymmetrical area of cooperation

The notion that cooperation with Poland is necessary in order to ensure and strengthen energy security of Lithuania, primarily by reducing dependence on energy supplies from Russia, has been present in Lithuanian strategic documents since 1994[46]. Talks on certain projects began even earlier. At the time being, there are two major Lithuanian energy infrastructure projects, the implementation of which requires cooperation with Poland – the Lithuanian-Polish electricity link *LitPol Link* and Gas Interconnection Poland-Lithuania (GIPL).

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44 Hyndle, Kutysz, (note 10) p. 156, 159.

45 „Strateginiai projektai naftos sektoriuje“ [‘Strategic Projects in the Oil Sector’], on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania (Lithuanian version), <http://www.urm.lt/default/lt/uzsienio-politika/uzsienio-politikos-prioritetai/energetinis-saugumas/strateginiai-projektai-naftos-sektoriuje>, accessed 23 08 2014.

46 Budrys K., “The Impact of Cooperation with Poland on Lithuania’s Energy Security”, *Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 2007*, Vilnius: Military academy of Lithuania, 2008, p. 224.

The Lithuania-Poland electricity link, *LitPol Link,* is one of the means of integrating Lithuania into a common EU electricity system, thus eliminating existing energy isolation and diversifying Lithuanian electricity import and export markets. This aim encompasses two parallel processes: 1) connection of the Baltic States' electricity market with the market of continental Europe by connecting Lithuania's and Poland's electricity systems (building *LitPol Link*), and 2) synchronisation with the European Continental Network (ECN), that would enable disconnection from the CIS countries' energy system. To synchronise the Lithuanian power system with ECN, *LitPol Link* is not enough. Two more interconnections are needed – another one with Poland (*LitPol Link 2*) and the link with Sweden (*NordBalt*). Although the talks on the Lithuanian-Polish power link began in 1992, the real work started only in 2008, after signing the Lithuanian-Polish agreement on building the electricity link and establishing the joint venture *LitPol Link*, owned in equal shares by the electricity supply system operators of Lithuania (*Litgrid*) and Poland (*PSE*). *LitPol Link* officially began being built on 5 May 2014. The start of operation of the 500 MW Lithuanian-Polish power link is scheduled at the end of 2015. After completion of the second phase in 2020, its operational power should double[47].

Gas Interconnection Poland-Lithuania (GIPL) is aimed at integrating isolated gas markets of the Baltic countries through Poland into a single European gas market and herewith diversifying gas supply sources and routes. This would reduce Lithuanian dependence of gas import from Russia creating possibilities for an alternative gas supply. Under preliminary calculations, the estimated length of GIPL is to be 562 km, most of it in Polish territory. Accordingly, the major share of the estimated cost (471 mill EUR in total) will be invested in Poland. In 2013, the GIPL feasibility study was completed and in 2014 the project developers Polish GAZ-SYSTEM S.A. and Lithuanian AB Amber Grid submitted requests

[47] Kasčiūnas, Keršanskas, Kojala, (note 2) p. 2.; Janeliūnas T., Tumkevič A., "Securitization of the Energy Sectors in Estonia, Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine: Motives and Extraordinary Measures", *Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review*, No. 30, 2013, p. 78; BNS, "Pradedamas dar vienos Lietuvos energetinės vilties tiesimas" ['The Laying of Yet Another Lithuanian Energy Hope Begins'], *Delfi.lt*, 05 05 2014, <http://www.delfi.lt/verslas/energetika/pradedamas-dar-vienos-lietuvos-energetines-vilties-tiesimas.d?id=64698841>; "Synchronous operation Connection", on the website of the Ministry of Energy of the Republic of Lithuania, <http://www.enmin.lt/en/activity/veiklos_kryptys/strateginiai_projektai/Synchronous%20operation.php?clear_cache=Y>, accessed 14 09 2014; "LitPol Link (Lithuania-Poland electricity link)", on the website of the Ministry of Energy of the Republic of Lithuania, <http://www.enmin.lt/en/activity/veiklos_kryptys/strateginiai_projektai/litpolink_project.php?clear_cache=Y>, accessed 10 10 2014.

for EU co-financing under the Connecting Europe Facility. GIPL is expected to be completed by 2019[48].

The third one – the Visaginas Nuclear Power Plant (VAE) project is currently "frozen" in Lithuania, and it is unclear whether it will be renewed or not. The plans of building Visaginas Nuclear Power Plant (VAE) have been in development since 2006. The main rationale behind this project is the compensation of the impact of the shutdown of Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant on the Lithuanian energy system. The VAE project was planned as a joint project of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. At the beginning, Polish participation was not foreseen. However, later in 2006, Poland declared its intentions to join the VAE project. The project was planned to be completed by 2020. The new VAE would have supplied electricity to the Baltic States and Poland and energy surplus could have been exported to the East, West, and North alike. In 2011, the Japanese company *Hitachi GE Nuclear Energy* was selected as the strategic investor of the project. However, already by the end of 2011, the differences of project partners' interests became evident. Poland left the project because it was not satisfied with the allocated future production quotas and considered building new NPPs on its own territory. In addition, the Fukushima NPP catastrophe raised fears regarding nuclear safety. The project was finally wrecked in 2012 by the negative turnouts of the consultative referendum on the development of nuclear energy in Lithuania (organised together with the parliamentary elections) and by the lack of political will of the newly elected left-wing Government to continue the development of the VAE project. Finally, this resulted in withdrawal of the strategic investor *Hitachi* from the project making further prospects of the project vague[49].

However, VAE deserves attention as a symptomatic example of Lithuanian-Polish cooperation in the field of energy.

Infrastructure development, especially in the area of energy, is a time-consuming process. Nevertheless, the fact that after more than two decades of

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[48] "Gas interconnection Poland-Lithuania", on the website of the Ministry of Energy of the Republic of Lithuania, <http://www.enmin.lt/en/activity/veiklos_kryptys/strateginiai_projektai/pipeline_Lt_PL.php?clear_cache=Y>, accessed 14 09 2014; "The Gas Interconnection Poland-Lithuania (GIPL)", on the website of "Amber Grid", <http://www.ambergrid.lt/en/transmission-system/dvelopment-of-the-transmission-system/the-gas-interconnection-Poland-Lithuania>, accessed 14 09 2014.

[49] Budrys, (note 49) p. 255-256; Molis A., Gliebutė J., "Prospects for the Development of Nuclear Energy in the Baltic Region", *Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 2011-2012*, Vilnius: Military Academy of Lithuania, 2012, p. 130-131, 136-137, 140-142, 149-151; "About the Project", on the website of Visaginas Nuclear Power Plant project, <http://www.vae.lt/en/pages/about-the-project>, accessed 14 09 2014.

considerations and planning, none of the Lithuanian-Polish energy projects are completed[50] forces us to admit that the bilateral cooperation in this area is not effective enough, and that the reasons behind this should be looked at.

The simplest argument to name is poor political relations between Lithuania and Poland. Such an explanation might seem rational, since energy infrastructure projects are usually based not only on economic benefit, but also (and even more so) on political will and strategic interests. The economic benefit of such projects manifests itself only in the long-term and is usually hard to forecast due to the evolving geo-economic and political situation. Therefore, the possibility to find an agreement on such politically motivated projects is low (or non-existent at all) in case the relations between the partners are poor. However, despite its explanatory power, this argument proves to be inapplicable to the analysis of Lithuanian-Polish cooperation in the field of energy, because the periods of effectiveness and stagnation of this cooperation do not coincide with the periods of "freezing" and "warming" political relations. From 1994 to 2006, despite warm political relations, Lithuania could hardly convince Poland to become involved in joint energy projects[51]. The acquisition of *Mažeikių nafta* by *PKN Orlen* and the declared Polish interest to join the VAE project in 2006 raised hopes that cooperation in the energy field could become more substantial. These expectations were further reinforced as the Lithuanian-Polish power interconnection feasibility study was completed in 2007[52] and the agreement on establishing the joint company *LitPol Link* was signed in 2008. Political will to strengthen bilateral cooperation in the energy field was fuelled by the direct effect of the Russian gas cuts policy and repetitive "breakdowns" of the "Druzhba" pipeline on both countries' energy security[53]. Yet despite the fact that this period of seemingly intensified Lithuanian-Polish energy cooperation coincided with the time of a favourable political climate, it did not materialize into tangible results (the only exception being the *Mažeikių nafta* acquisition)[54]. Paradoxically, the GIPL feasibility study was completed in 2013,

[50] *LitPol Link* started to be built only in 2014; the developers of GIPL are still waiting for the final decision concerning their request for EU co-financing submitted at the end of October, 2013; and the prospects of the VAE remain vague.

[51] Budrys, (note 49) p. 224; Hyndle, Kutysz, (note 10) p. 157.

[52] Budrys, (note 49) p. 223–224.

[53] Budrys, (note 49) p. 260–262; Adamkus V., *Paskutinė kadencija. Prezidento dienoraščiai*. ['Last Term. The President's Diaries'], Vilnius: Tyto Alba, 2011, p. 336–337, 429.

[54] Kasčiūnas, Keršanskas, Kojala, (note 2) p. 2.; Bukowiecka, (note 10) p. 215; Dambrauskaitė, et al., (note 2) p. 25; Česnakas G., "Energy Security in the Baltic-Black Sea Region: Energy Insecurity Sources and their Impact upon Strategies", *Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 2011-2012*, Vilnius: Lietuvos karo akademija, 2012, p. 168, 196.

and the construction of *LitPol Link* started in spring 2014, at the time when Polish-Lithuanian political relations were considered as deteriorating for quite some time. Thus, there is no direct causality between the political climate in Lithuanian-Polish relations and (in)effectiveness of cooperation in the field of energy[55].

Searching for more plausible arguments, attention needs to be paid to the different scale of demand of Lithuania and Poland on bilateral cooperation in the energy field. Due to different geo-strategic positions, Poland is a more important energy transit country in the region than is Lithuania. Also, Poland has more alternatives for energy supplies and thus, is less vulnerable to energy security threats than Lithuania. Geographically, Poland is a necessary link for Lithuania to connect with Eastern, Central and Southern Europe[56]. Whereas for Poland Lithuania can only serve as a link with other Baltic States and, partly, the Nordic countries. Due to the different geo-strategic functions of Lithuania and Poland, the biggest sceptics even held that Lithuanian-Polish cooperation on energy security is altogether impossible, and thus Lithuania should implement its energy projects independently or search for other partners[57]. Such assessments proved wrong as the implementation of *LitPol Link* started and the GIPL project moved forward. The asymmetry of the necessity of bilateral energy relations is partly neutralised by the fact that Poland considers strengthening its own and whole regions' (including Lithuania's) energy independence an instrument of reducing Russian influence in Central and Eastern Europe. Thus, Poland is also interested in cooperation with Lithuania on energy security[58]. Nevertheless, Poland's interest is only derivative, whereas Lithuania's interest – direct and vital. Therefore, bilateral energy projects being of strategic importance for Lithuania do not top Polish energy policy agenda.

Considering the asymmetry in demand of cooperation in the energy field, three factors, which influence the effectiveness of implementation of joint Lithuanian-Polish energy projects more than a bilateral political climate does, can be suggested. First, since joint energy projects with Lithuania are not among Poland's priority strategic projects, Polish involvement is strongly determined by economic calculations. If the project is not economically viable (or its viability unclear), political will is hardly enough for its development. For example, one of the main holdbacks of *LitPol Link* in 2007 was the inconsistency of the project

55 Kasčiūnas, Keršanskas, Kojala, (note 2) p. 2.

56 Ibid., p. 1–2.

57 Budrys, (note 49) p. 223, 269–272.

58 Dambrauskaitė, et al., (note 2) p. 16.

with the interests of major Polish financial and energy companies[59]. In the case of the VAE, despite numerous feasibility studies and evaluations, the real costs of the project and the prospective cost price of electricity produced by the VAE remained unclear[60]. This was the main reason of Polish withdrawal from the project.

The second factor influencing risk and cost evaluation as well as effective implementation of strategic energy projects is political stability and broad political consensus on these projects in the countries involved. Poland and Lithuania (at least until 2008) definitely lacked political consistency in the energy field. There was and still is a broad political consensus in both countries regarding energy independence as their strategic objective. However, major political parties in both Poland and Lithuania take different stances regarding which particular projects are their priorities. From 1990 to 2008, 15 governments changed in Lithuania making the lack of political continuity one of the major problems undermining the successful implementation of not only energy projects but also many other political initiatives. In Poland governments were more stable, but as joint energy projects with Lithuania were not the top priorities, governments' position regarding them was also easy to change. The development of the VAE is the most vivid example of the aftermaths of such political inconsistency. After 2008, however, there is more political stability in Lithuania. The fact that the 15th right-wing government endured the entire term and the present left-wing government, which won elections in 2012, has every chance to repeat this precedent, raises expectations that the Lithuanian government's position regarding priority energy projects will become more consistent or at least that it will not change more often than every four years. The increase of political consistency in Lithuania can partly explain the recent rise of efficiency of energy cooperation with Poland and suggests that we could expect a continuity of implementation of these (or any new) projects, at least from the Lithuanian side, in the future.

The third factor, affecting the economic efficiency of the project, is the institutional capacity of participating states to create favourable conditions for project implementation and to ensure external financing of the project. Due to the above-mentioned asymmetry of Polish and Lithuanian demand in cooperation in the energy field, this factor mainly applies to Lithuania as the initiator of joint energy projects. Before its EU accession and during the first years of membership, the institutional capacities of Lithuania were rather poor or at least not sufficiently mobilised for implementation of strategic projects. One of the illustrative examples

[59] Adamkus, (note 57) p. 379–380.

[60] Molis, Gliebutė, (note 53) p. 144–146.

– the Ministry of Economy lingered for two years and finally, after repeated public tender procedures, busted the agreement between the Lithuanian *AB Lietuvos energija* and the Polish *Power Grid Company* on the building of the Lithuanian-Polish Power Bridge back in 1999[61]. After its EU accession, Lithuania's institutional and support-mobilising capacities gradually improved. EU membership increased Lithuania's reliability in the eyes of potential investors. More importantly, Lithuania developed capacities to transfer its national interests onto the EU agenda and thereby to mobilise the advantages of EU membership for their realisation. Lithuania, together with Poland and some other Member States sharing similar interests, managed to lift energy security issues on the priority agenda of the EU. This allowed Lithuanian-Polish electricity and gas interconnections to obtain the status of EU common interest projects aimed at completing the European single energy market, and apply for EU co-financing under the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF). The eligibility for EU co-financing served as the major impetus for implementation of *LitPol Link* and GIPL[62].

To sum up, only the last years witnessed a transition from words to deeds in implementing the most important Lithuanian energy projects with Poland – the power interconnection *LitPol Link* and the gas interconnection GIPL. Before, despite the good political climate, Lithuanian-Polish energy cooperation was ineffective. The economic efficiency of energy projects was vague, and Lithuania as their initiator lacked the institutional capacities and political consistency vital for their implementation. The major stimulus for implementation of joint energy projects was their listing among priority EU infrastructure projects, which also enabled EU co-financing. Similarly as in the case of military cooperation, be the bilateral relations poor, neither an external threat (energy dependence on Russia) nor a possibility (EU co-financing) would be enough to start joint projects, especially in a field as politicised as energy. The last 20 years' experience of Lithuanian-Polish cooperation in the energy field demonstrates that even though political will alone is not enough and external stimuli are needed, the political

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61 In the end of 1997, the Ministry of Economy denied the permission to *AB Lietuvos energija* to sign the agreement, despite the fact that negotiations were successfully completed and the draft agreement prepared. Later, the public procurement procedure was dragged on for more than a year. Due to too short deadlines for applications the procedure was repeated twice; when no single company was able to comply with all the procurement requirements, direct negotiations started with *Power Grid Company*. However, the negotiations failed in 1999, and the agreement was not signed – Kazlauskas J., "About the Lithuanian-Polish Power Bridge", *Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review*, No. 7, 2001, p. 55–59.

62 Kasčiūnas, Keršanskas, Kojala, (note 2) p. 2.

will to cooperate remains, and it had started to materialise, despite the widespread belief that political relations are bad. Thus, again, similarly to the cases of bilateral military and economic relations, the analysis of Lithuanian-Polish cooperation in the energy field does not provide any evidence that a worsened political climate in Lithuanian-Polish relations could have had a negative impact on the implementation of joint energy projects. On the contrary, it rather challenges the prevailing opinion that Lithuanian-Polish relations are at a deadlock and that the Lithuanian-Polish strategic partnership has ceased to exist.

3. The main problems in Lithuanian-Polish relations

3.1. Problems of the Polish national minority in Lithuania: some things never change

The most obvious problem in Lithuanian-Polish relations is the still disputed situation of the Polish national minority in Lithuania. Some of the issues (e.g., the recognition of education certificates obtained abroad) were resolved as both countries harmonised their laws with the EU's *acquis communautaire*[63]. Other issues remain unresolved, most important among them being the spelling of personal names in their original form (using Polish diacritical marks) in a person's identity documents (IDs) issued by the Republic of Lithuania; the display of bilingual Lithuanian-Polish place (mainly, street) names plates in the areas densely populated by Poles (mainly in the Vilnius region – Šalčininkai, Trakai, Švenčionys and Vilnius district[64] municipalities); and the issues of education of the Polish minority in Lithuania.

Disagreements regarding the situation of national minorities are on the agenda of Lithuanian-Polish relations since the reestablishment of independence. Different periods were marked with different levels of escalation of these disagreements. From the end of 1991 until the beginning of 1994, the situation of national minorities (alongside different interpretations of history) was the major source of disagreements between Lithuania and Poland. In 1994–2004, during the period of

[63] Hyndle, Kutysz, (note 10) p. 146, 151; Jakimowicz R., „Polityczne aspekty stosunków polsko-litewskich w latach 1991-2003", ['Political Aspects of Polish-Lithuanian relations from 1991 to 2003'] *Zeszyty naukowe Akademii Ekonomicznej w Krakowie,* No. 706, 2006, p. 58.

[64] Not to be confused with the Vilnius City municipality.

tangible improvement of bilateral relations, the disputes on the issues of national minorities remained unresolved, but re-emerged only episodically. Both countries were rather focused on strategic partnership and the achievement of common goals than inclined to look for threats in each other's domestic policies. Also, Lithuania kept demonstrating the political will to solve the problems raised by the Polish national minority as soon as possible[65]. In the decade after both countries' accession to the EU, Poland has raised the issues of the Polish minority in Lithuania at almost every bilateral meeting with Lithuanian officials arguing that it is wearied of waiting while Lithuania fulfils the promises it has made[66]. Meanwhile, Lithuanian politicians keep making promises to improve the situation but do not deliver, constantly lacking either political will and flexibility, or political consensus, or, sometimes, all of the above.

The accusations against the Lithuanian government regarding the unresolved issues of the Polish national minority in Lithuania are usually based on three main arguments. First, the reference is made that Lithuania is not fulfilling its obligations (namely, postulated in the Treaty on Friendly Relations and Good Neighbourly Cooperation of the Republic of Lithuania and the Republic of Poland, signed in 1994) to improve the situation of the Polish national minority. The Polish side usually refers to Article 14 of the Treaty, which envisages that Lithuanian citizens of Polish descent and Polish citizens of Lithuanian descent have the right "to use their names and surnames according to the sound of the national minority language"[67]. However, this wording does not imply that the names and surnames of Lithuanian Poles in their IDs must be written using Polish diacritical marks, but not transcribed into Lithuanian following their pronunciation, as is the case currently. Thus, the argument about non-adherence to the bilateral agreements partly depends on their interpretation.

The second argument states that the Polish minority in Lithuania should be granted the same rights as the Lithuanian minority enjoys in Poland. This argument is solid, but applicable only concerning the issue of the spelling of personal names in the ID's and, to some extent, concerning the use of bilingual street name plates. In Lithuania, neither of the two rights are granted by law. In Poland, The Law on National and Ethnic Minorities and Regional Languages provides the right to spell

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65 Miniotaitė, Jakniūnaitė, (note 6) p. 18; Dambrauskaitė, et al., (note 2) p. 23; Sirutavičius, (note 6), p. 21; Bukowiecka, (note 10) p. 215; Hyndle, Kutysz, (note 10) p. 164.

66 Dambrauskaitė, et al., (note 2) p. 4; Hyndle, Kutysz, (note 10) p. 164.

67 Treaty on Friendly Relations and Good Neighbourly Cooperation of the Republic of Lithuania and Republic of Poland, Vilnius, 26 04 1994. (Translation into English – <http://www.lfpr.lt/uploads/File/1998-2/Treaty%20on%20Friendly%20Relations.pdf>, accessed 10 10 2014.)

personal names in IDs in their original form if the citizen of non-Polish descent requires so and if the original alphabet is based on the Latin script (otherwise, the name is transcribed)[68]. The same Law allows use of bilingual place names plates in the counties that are on the list of Polish counties inhabited by national or ethnic minorities, or if a certain national minority constitutes at least 20 percent of a county's population and its request for use of bilateral plates is granted by the municipality[69]. Thus in practice, the Lithuanian minority in Punsk County (which is on the above-mentioned list) could enjoy this right, but chooses not to, due to practical reasons – they all understand Polish and the place names in the county are of no historical or cultural significance to Lithuanians. Meanwhile, for example, Lithuanians constituting around 90 percent of the inhabitants of Burbiškės village in Sejny County are not granted the right to use bilingual place name plates by the municipality, as in the whole Sejny county Lithuanians do not make up the required 20 percent of inhabitants. On the other hand, the argument of unequal rights of Lithuanian and Polish national minorities in Poland and Lithuania respectively, is absolutely inapplicable, or rather, can be used by the Lithuanian side to accuse Poland, if the possibilities for national minorities to gain an education in their mother tongue are considered. Since 1990, the number of Polish schools in Lithuania increased by 50% (from the total of circa 170 Polish schools abroad, 81 are in Lithuania alone). Lithuania is the only country in the world where citizens of Polish descent can obtain an education in Polish from kindergarten to their university degree. Moreover, they can learn and study from Polish textbooks. Meanwhile, in Poland, the number of Lithuanian schools has been in constant decline. From 1999 to 2013, 8 Lithuanian schools closed in Poland and only 4 remain open (in Sejny, Punsk and Widugiery). Lithuanian schools in Poland are closed not only because of the shrinking number of pupils, but also due to insufficient allocations from Poland's budget. Children attending Lithuanian schools in Poland can learn from Lithuanian textbooks only until the fourth grade. From the fifth grade up, no textbooks are translated into Lithuanian.

The third argument is that the Polish minority feels discriminated in Lithuania. This argument is quite ambiguous though. According to social research conducted in 2012 by the Polish Institute of Public Affairs under the request of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Vilnius, 44 percent of surveyed Lithuanian Poles

[68] Ustawa z dnia 6 stycznia 2005 r. o mniejszościach narodowych i etnicznych oraz o języku regionalnym [The Law on National and Ethnic Minorities and Regional Languages of 6 Januray, 2005], Art. 7, p. 3, <http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU20050170141>, accessed 02 10 2014.

[69] Ibid., Art. 12, p. 5–6.

claimed that their rights are respected in Lithuania. Somewhat fewer (40 percent) disagreed with this statement. As many as 73 percent of surveyed Lithuanian Poles stated that they personally have never experienced any sort of discrimination based on nationality[70]. When asked to identify the problems in Lithuanian-Polish relations, only 7 percent of respondents named the lack (or closure) of Polish schools in Lithuania, 22 percent pointed at disagreements on bilingual place name plates or the original spelling of personal names in the IDs issued by the Republic of Lithuania. Only 3 percent of surveyed Lithuanian Poles named the lack of tolerance[71].

Definitely, the controversy around all three above-mentioned arguments does not imply that the problems are non-existent or that they should not be addressed and resolved. However, there is also enough room for (at least partly artificial) securitisation of these problems. Thus, the questions arise, who and why benefits from the securitisation of Polish minority problems, and how it affects the content of Lithuanian-Polish bilateral cooperation.

First, the problems raised by the Polish minority in Lithuania are widely escalated by the media in both countries[72], mainly to raise the readability of articles with resonant headlines. It should be noted that the problems of the Polish minority in Lithuania are exaggerated more in Lithuanian nationalist tabloids (such as *Respublika*, *Lietuvos Aidas*, *Voruta*, and some others), rather than in respectable Lithuanian- or Polish-language media. The afore-mentioned nationalistic media outlets are oriented towards readers with marginal viewpoints and do not affect the public opinion to the extent that could have an influence upon either policy-makers or the content of Lithuanian-Polish relations.

Second, the escalation and securitisation of Polish minority problems in Lithuania are fuelled by the activities and statements of The Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania (EAPL) and its leader Valdemar Tomaševski. After its creation in 1994 as a party focused only on the situation of the Polish minority in Lithuania, the EAPL seems to be keen on maintaining the status of a "single-issue" party. Although EAPL representatives make up a majority in Vilnius region municipalities, they focus on the issues of the spelling of personal names in IDs, the display of bilingual Lithuanian-Polish place names plates and the issues of education of the Polish minority in Lithuania ignoring other acute problems, such as high unemployment, poor infrastructure development, low flows of foreign

70 Fuksiewicz, Kucharczyk, Łada, (note 2) p. 15.

71 Ibid., p. 75.

72 Borodzicz-Smolinski, Jurkonis, (note 4), p. 2.

investments and other issues relevant to the Šalčininkai, Trakai, Švenčionys and Vilnius district municipalities[73].

The assumption that the EAPL is outgrowing its current "single-issue" and "one-leader" status was fuelled by EAPL's success in the Lithuanian Parliamentary elections in 2012 and the following entry of EAPL into a governing coalition. The EAPL took part in these elections in coalition with the Russian Alliance, and for the first time gained Parliamentary seats not only in several single-member constituencies, but also nation-wide, overstepping the 7 percent electoral quota due for coalitions. The activities of the EAPL in the governing coalition, formed in 2012, seemed to be constructive until the spring-summer of 2014. EAPL-nominated Minister of Energy Jaroslav Neverovič was one of few ministers of the 16th Government, commended by the President[74], the partners within the ruling coalition, policy experts[75], media, and even the opposition alike. The EAPL did not attempt to raise the issues of the Polish minority in Lithuania above the efficient work of the whole Government. However, the scandalous resignation of the EAPL from the governing coalition in the summer of 2014, interpreted as a part of EAPL's electoral campaign for upcoming municipal elections, raised doubts on EAPL's intentions of evolving to adopt a full platform. While being part of the governmental coalition, the EAPL possessed tangible political assets for solving national minority issues. However the EAPL chose not to fully exploit them but on the contrary, to resign from the coalition, thus confirming experts' estimations that the main objective and *raison d'etre* of the EAPL is the escalation – not the resolution of Polish minority problems in Lithuania[76]. In case these problems were solved, the EAPL would lose its main means of electorate mobilisation. Thus, the EAPL neither tries to solve Polish minority issues on the level of Lithuanian national

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73 Ibid., p. 4-6; Dambrauskaitė, et al., (note 2) p. 31–32.

74 „D. Grybauskaitė įvertino J. Neverovičių" ['D.Grybauskaitė Commended J. Neverovič'], *Delfi.lt*, 21 05 2014, <http://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithuania/d-grybauskaite-ivertino-j-neveroviciu. d?id=64840875>.

75 „Kas laukia ministrų po Prezidento rinkimų?" ['What Awaits Ministers after the Presidential Elections?'], *Delfi.lt*, 04 05 2014, <http://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithuania/kas-laukia-ministru-po-prezidento-rinkimu.d?id=64697767>.

76 Jackevičius M., „T. Janeliūnas: LLRA naudinga įtampa tarp Lietuvos ir Lenkijos" ['T. Janeliūnas: EAPL Gains from Growing Tension between Lithuania and Poland'], *Delfi.lt*, 11 02 2013, <http://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithuania/tjaneliunas-llra-naudinga-itampa-tarp-lietuvos-ir-lenkijos.d?id=60640099>; Andrulevičiūtė V., „R. Lopata: lietuvių ir lenkų santykiai – Lietuvos politikų impotencijos išraiška" ['R.Lopata: Lithuanian-Polish Relations – the expression of impotence of Lithuanian politicians'], *Delfi.lt*, 06 02 2014, http://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithuania/r-lopata-lietuviu-ir-lenku-santykiai-lietuvos-politiku-impotencijos-israiska.d?id=63947100.

politics nor is it interested in making Polish-Lithuanian bilateral cooperation a "hostage" of these problems.

The escalation of Polish minority issues in Lithuania is to some extent stipulated by Poland's politicians, especially during electoral campaigns. *Polonia*[77] issues serve as a popular electoral "card up the sleeve" of Polish politicians and parties, left-wing and right-wing alike, helping them gain popularity, especially among the elderly conservative electorate[78]. However, during the periods between the campaigns, the escalation of *Polonia* issues decreases and the situation returns back to the usual *status quo* of a "frozen problem". Thus, when estimating the real impact of Polish minority issues in Lithuania on Lithuanian-Polish bilateral relations, one needs to distinguish the electoral rhetoric, both in Lithuania and in Poland, from the real scope of the problem as it is perceived in both countries. Furthermore, Polish anxiety about *Polonia* and the securitisation of its situation is applicable not only to Lithuania. The rhetoric of the Polish political elite on Polish diaspora issues is equally strong regarding other countries, not Lithuania alone. For example, in May 2011, Poland cancelled negotiations with the German delegation and refused to sign a bilateral declaration on the implementation of the intergovernmental Polish-German agreement, arguing that the Polish minority is being discriminated in Germany[79]. Thus, the escalation of Polish minority issues should not be interpreted as unique and employed only towards Lithuania. The same problem is present in Polish bilateral relations with many other countries – including Germany, the Czech Republic, Belarus, Ukraine, and others[80]. Although, this does not mean that Poland's bilateral relations with the above-mentioned countries, especially Germany or the Czech Republic, qualify as bad.

To conclude, there are no substantial arguments to claim that any significant political player in Lithuania or Poland has an interest to go further than just escalating the problems of the Polish minority in Lithuania and to make the other areas of cooperation into hostages of minority problems. There was no proof of such behaviour while previously analysing Lithuanian-Polish relations in military and economic cooperation and joint projects in the energy field. Thus, while the

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77 A term used for Polish diaspora.

78 Dambrauskaitė, et al., (note 2) p. 25-26; Borodzicz-Smolinski, Jurkonis, (note 4) p. 3–4.

79 „Varšuva atšaukė derybas su Vokietijos atstovais dėl politikos lenkų mažumos atžvilgiu" ['Warsaw Cancelled the Negotiations with German Delegation because of their Policy towards Polish Minority'] (BNS and lrytas.lt inf.), *lrytas.lt*, 06 05 2011, <http://www.lrytas.lt/-13046754891303960520-var%C5%A1uva-at%C5%A1auk%C4%97-derybas-su-vokietijos-atstovais-d%C4%97l-politikos-lenk%C5%B3-ma%C5%BEumos-at%C5%BEvilgiu.htm>.

80 Bujnicki, (note 2) p. 151.

problems of the Polish minority in Lithuania have remained on the bilateral agenda already for two decades, they are becoming more of an undesirable but usual *modus vivendi* in bilateral relations rather than leverage or an "instrument of blackmail" in solving other issues of cooperation.

3.2. The impact of political leaders' personalities on Lithuanian-Polish political rhetoric

Considering the assessments of Lithuanian and Polish politicians and experts, as well as the provided analysis of bilateral cooperation, the assertion can be put forward that the harsh rhetoric of Lithuanian and Polish high-level politicians does not influence, at least substantially, practical bilateral cooperation. Nevertheless, such rhetoric creates an unfavourable background of bilateral relations and fosters escalation of the conflict, be it real or artificial. The argument of emotional weariness regarding old and unresolved national minorities problems is hardly enough to explain why the rhetoric of both Vilnius' and Warsaw's politicians turned exceptionally negative over the last few years. More convincing answers can be found in a detailed analysis of the personal characteristics and ideological beliefs of Lithuanian and Polish top foreign policy makers.

1995–2008 can be considered as the period of the warmest Lithuanian and Polish political rhetoric towards each other. It was caused primarily by the close personal ties of the then Lithuanian and Polish Presidents and their similar views towards Poland's and Lithuania's role in the region and in Europe. Aleksander Kwaśniewski, the Polish President during 1995–2005, enjoyed a personal friendship with Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus. Kwaśniewski also had personal sentiments towards Lithuania as his mother and grandmother were born in Vilnius. He tried to avoid or at least immediately neutralise any disagreements with Lithuania. Even if the issues of national minorities or other potentially high-tension questions were unavoidable during bilateral meetings, Kwaśniewski raised them very delicately, almost apologising that they had to be discussed at all[81]. Both Kwaśniewski and Adamkus were adherents of diplomatic and compromise-oriented rather than confrontational rhetoric.

The period of Rolandas Paksas' Presidency from 2003 to 2004 was too short to make an impact on Lithuanian-Polish bilateral relations at the highest political level. His impeachment destabilised the political situation in Lithuania for a

[81] Adamkus, (note 57) p. 219.

while though. To demonstrate neutrality regarding domestic political processes in Lithuania, Polish high-ranked officials cancelled their planned visits to Lithuania during the impeachment process. However the return of Adamkus to presidency quickly restored the tradition of warm informal relations between the Heads of both states[82].

Lech Kaczyński, who replaced Aleksander Kwaśniewski as the Polish President in 2005, unlike his predecessor, had no personal relation with Lithuania. However, his views on the common history of Lithuania and Poland stipulated Kaczyński's positive approach towards the neighbouring country. He was inclined to believe that the cultural and political achievements of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth were more important than interwar bilateral conflicts. Accordingly, in contemporary bilateral relations he paid much more attention to long-term strategic interests rather than short-term problems[83]. The potential for Lithuanian-Polish disagreements on the highest political level was also diminished by the fact that both Kwaśniewski and Kaczyński shared the so-called "Jagiellonian" and Jerzy Władysław Giedroyc's visions of contemporary Poland. The first conceiving Polish leadership in Central and Eastern Europe and "containment" of Russian impetus of the country's foreign policy, the second emphasizing the importance of good cohabitation with neighbouring countries, and both being favourable towards Lithuania[84]. To a lesser extent, but also important was the fact that Adamkus had spent the period of major disagreements between Lithuania and Poland (1991–1994) in the USA. Thus, he was not associated with any of the conflicting interpretations of Lithuanian-Polish interwar conflicts neither in Lithuania nor in Poland. Some experts argue that good personal relations between Adamkus and Kaczyński had a major impact on the favourable development of Lithuanian-Polish relations at the time[85].

The tradition of warm personal relations and atmosphere of friendliness at the highest political level, developed by Adamkus, Kwaśniewski and Kaczyński, started to deteriorate in 2009–2010. First, having gained experience as Polish Foreign Minister, Sikorski, characterised by harsh and sometimes openly arrogant rhetoric[86], started to play a more pronounced and distinct role in Polish foreign policy. Sikorski publicly emphasised the broad and unquestioned political consensus

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82 Hyndle, Kutysz, (note 10) p. 147–149.

83 Adamkus, (note 57) p. 517.

84 Kasčiūnas, Keršanskas, Kojala, (note 2) p. 3.

85 Dambrauskaitė, et al., (note 2, version in Lithuanian) p. 24.

86 Expert interviews (I) and (III) with researchers at Polish foreign policy think-tanks, Vilnius, 20 01 2014 and 10 04 2014; Expert interview (IV) with high-ranking Lithuanian diplomat, Vilnius, 16 04 2014.

in Poland on the domination of Giedroyc's vision in its foreign policy. However, according to some experts, Sikorski himself (at least partly) sympathised with the political vision of the Piast dynasty (advocating Poland's participation in the "Concert" of the great European powers), which was unfavourable for Lithuania[87]. In July 2009, President Adamkus was succeeded by President Grybauskaitė, whose strict and non-concessional rhetoric as well as an inclination to separate working relations from close personal ties contrasted with her predecessor's Adamkus' posture. Officially, Grybauskaitė has never revealed her political attitudes and has not aligned herself with any political party. However, the influence of conservative thought upon her views generated an inevitable conflict with the projections of the Piast dynasty ideas in Sikorski's foreign policy visions. Later, in 2012, Sikorski's advocated "reset" of relations with Russia provoked Grybauskaitė to "declare" a "pause" in Lithuanian-Polish relations[88]. The situation further worsened as the relatively liberal and autonomous Foreign Minister Vygaudas Ušackas was replaced with the conservative Audronius Ažubalis. The conservative line (at least partly balanced by Ušackas before) prevailed in Lithuanian foreign policy. And the power centre of Lithuanian foreign policy-making was transferred from the MFA to the President's Office, as it was aspired. President Kaczyński balanced the harsh rhetoric of Sikorski, at least to some extent. However, as Kaczyński perished in the Smolensk catastrophe in April 2010, and his successor Bronisław Komorowski distanced himself from foreign affairs, Sikorski emerged as the main player in Polish foreign policy[89]. The emotional background of Lithuanian-Polish relations at the highest political level was left to be shaped by Sikorski in Poland and Grybauskaitė in Lithuania – both strict and straightforward public speakers not avoiding to officially raise bilateral issues on which they disagreed. Thus, it is not surprising that their plainspoken messages got the attention of media in both countries and were further exaggerated for the sake of sound-bite headlines.

In 2013, there was an attempt to turn a new page in Lithuanian-Polish political leaders' rhetoric. The appointed Lithuanian Foreign Minister Linas Linkevičius during his visit to Warsaw presented a public apology to the Polish nation for the regrettable fact that on the eve of the Smolensk tragedy, during the last visit

87 Dambrauskaitė, et al., (note 2) p. 22–23; Kasčiūnas, Keršanskas, Kojala, (note 2) p. 2–3.

88 BNS, "D.Grybauskaitė apie Lietuvą ir Lenkiją: kai kuriuose santykiuose geriau daryti pauzę nei bandyti taisyti, kas nepataisoma" ['D. Grybauskaitė on Lithuania and Poland: In some Relations it Is Better to Make a Pause Rather than Try to Repair what Is Irreparable'], *Delfi.lt*, 04 06 2012, <http://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithuania/dgrybauskaite-apie-lietuva-ir-lenkija-kai-kuriuose-santykiuose-geriau-daryti-pauze-nei-bandyti-taisyti-kas-nepataisoma.d?id=58849941#ixzz3B3ezrxaF>.

89 Dambrauskaitė, et al., (note 2) p. 21.

of Polish President Kaczyński to Vilnius, Lithuanian politicians lacked the will to adopt the law, granting the right to spell non-Lithuanian personal names in the IDs in their original form using non-Lithuanian diacritical marks. After the meeting with Polish Foreign Minister Sikorski, Linkevičius stated that his apology was an effort to put Lithuanian-Polish dialogue "back on the normal track". "The time of miscommunication, and frankly, non-communication of Lithuania and Poland has taken too long", Linkevičius said[90]. However, this step by the Lithuanian Foreign Minister towards rhetorical reconciliation with Poland was not supported in Lithuania, rather, on the contrary, it was publicly criticised by President Dalia Grybauskaitė and the Prime Minister Algirdas Butkevičius[91]. Polish-Lithuanian public "miscommunication" and "non-communication" at the highest political level continued.

From July to December 2013, Lithuanian and Polish political rhetoric normalised, since Warsaw kept its promise not to escalate the issues of national minorities during the Lithuanian EU Presidency. Harsh mutual rhetoric almost renewed after the end of the Lithuanian EU Presidency, but a deepening crisis in Ukraine and an increased Russian threat to regional and European security "silenced" rhetorical disputes between Lithuanian and Polish politicians, demonstrating their absurdity[92] and incompatibility with the real content and quality of bilateral cooperation. Lithuanian-Polish cooperation strengthened in the light of the Russia's threat revealing and mobilising the real potential of strategic partnership. In her State of the Nation Address delivered in March 2014, Grybauskaitė emphasised that "The direct threat to regional security [...] highlighted the importance of neighbourhood cooperation. Fully aware that the strength of the region is built on unity, together we – Lithuanians, Poles, Latvians, and Estonians – assessed the threats and joined our efforts to ensure security"[93].

The "warming" of Lithuanian and Polish political leaders' rhetoric, inspired by Russian expansionism, might be further impelled by changes in Polish leadership after Tusk leaves Polish internal policy to be appointed the President of the European Council. Sikorski's rise to the post of Speaker of the Parliament

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90 BNS, „L. Linkevičius atsiprašė lenkų" ['L. Linkevičius Apologized to the Poles'], *Delfi.lt*, 07 02 2013, <http://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithuania/llinkevicius-atsiprase-lenku.d?id=60617107#ixzz3BM3ilgpi>.

91 BNS and lrytas.lt, „Prezidentė kritikuoja L. Linkevičiaus atsiprašymą Lenkijoje" ['President Criticises Linkevičius' Apology in Poland'], *lrytas.lt*, 13 02 2013, <http://www.lrytas.lt/lietuvos-diena/aktualijos/prezidente-kritikuoja-l-linkeviciaus-atsiprasyma-lenkijoje.htm>.

92 Šapokas (note 18).

93 State of the Nation Address by H.E. Dalia Grybauskaitė, President of the Republic of Lithuania, Vilnius, 27 03 2014, <http://president.lt/en/activities/state_of_the_nation_address/2014.html>.

demonstrates his choice to re-orientate himself from foreign towards domestic policy and focus on leadership within Civic Platform, which lost its charismatic Tusk. The appointment of the new Polish Prime Minister Ewa Kopacz and her choice of Grzegorz Schetyna as the new Foreign Minister, both relative novices to foreign relations (despite that since November 2011, Schetyna was Chairman of the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Commission, experts claim that he played no significant role in Polish foreign policy)[94], marks a new stage in Polish foreign policy and, respectively, creates the preconditions for change in political rhetoric.

To conclude, the harsh rhetoric of Lithuanian and Polish political leaders is a temporary problem in bilateral relations, which so far has not created fundamental obstacles for bilateral cooperation, and can increase, decrease, or totally disappear either due to external factors (mainly, the Russian threat) or as a consequence of changes within the political elite's configurations in both countries.

Conclusions

The analysis of Lithuanian-Polish military and economic relations as well as cooperation in the field of energy provides no compelling evidence for the prevailing public (and often – expert) opinion that over the last few years Lithuanian-Polish relations are hostile and constantly worsening. To the contrary, in the area of defence, although NATO membership widened the circle of partners, Lithuania and Poland often enjoy more solid cooperation with each other than with geographically more distant member states. Defence capabilities and the potential of Lithuanian-Polish strategic partnership are effectively mobilised to respond to external threats, primarily, the growing aggression of Russia challenging regional and European security. Bilateral economic cooperation has been intensifying constantly during the last decade, and can be, when needed, employed to achieve other common goals like enhancing energy security or counterbalancing Russia. In recent years tangible results have been achieved in implementing joint Lithuanian and Polish projects of energy infrastructure development.

The major problems in Lithuanian-Polish relations – disagreement regarding the conditions of the Polish minority in Lithuania and the "harsh" rhetoric of

[94] New Eastern Europe, "Meet Poland's New Minister of Foreign Affairs", *Neweasterneurope.eu*, 19 09 2014, <http://www.neweasterneurope.eu/articles-and-commentary/1331-meet-poland-s-new-minister-of-foreign-affairs>; Magierowski M., "Schetyna as foreign minister: a disaster in the making", *Dorzeczy.pl.*, 19 09 2014, <http://dorzeczy.pl/id,4270/Schetyna-as-foreign-minister-a-disaster-in-the-making.html>.

political leaders – although worsening the climate of bilateral relations, nevertheless, do not create obstacles for constructive cooperation in the above-mentioned areas. The disagreements on Polish minority issues in Lithuania have not disappeared from the bilateral agenda for more than two decades, and thus gained the status of a "frozen problem". The intensification of escalation of this problem is usually related to the electoral cycles in both countries. However it creates more of an undesirable but habitual *modus vivendi* of Lithuanian-Polish relations rather than leverage or an "instrument of blackmail" in proceeding with other issues of cooperation. The "harsh" rhetoric of Lithuanian and Polish political leaders is influenced more by their personal characteristics and ideological beliefs rather than by changes in the content or perspectives of Lithuanian-Polish bilateral relations. The problem of hostile relations is a temporary one and can increase, decrease, or totally disappear subject to changes of the political elite's configurations in both countries.

To sum up, the negative popular and expert evaluations of recent Lithuanian-Polish relations are hardly based on facts and tend to be superficial and misleading. The narrative of bad Lithuanian-Polish relations can be a result of focusing on dramatic changes of political rhetoric rather than on the unbiased analysis of practical bilateral cooperation. To some extent also, the narrative of spoiled Lithuanian-Polish relations might have been fuelled by unjustified expectations that the extraordinarily intense bilateral cooperation during 1994–2004 would further intensify and bring even more rapid and visible results. Meanwhile, after 2004, some of the bilateral cooperation issues were naturally relocated into multilateral, mainly EU and NATO, formats. At the same time, the bilateral agenda lost a segment of mutual support for European and Euro-Atlantic integration, which carried a strong emotional charge. The results of Lithuanian-Polish cooperation after 2004 though still tangible and important, are not nearly as striking and overwhelming as the achievement of a joint strategic objective, integration into the EU and NATO, was. Nevertheless, despite the unsatisfied expectations of further revolutionary achievements, Lithuanian-Polish day-to-day cooperation can be regarded as a tangible strategic partnership and productive neighbourly relations with, like in relations between all and especially neighbourly countries, some problems to be addressed.